Results for 'Theories of Personal Identity'

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  1. Subjective Theories of Personal Identity and Practical Concerns.Radim Bělohrad - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3):282-301.
    This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. I call these theories subjective theories of personal identity. I argue that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the (...)
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  2. A Theory of Personal Identity.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2016 - Amazon Digital Services LLC.
    According to David Hume, there is nothing to the mind other than the various fleeting events that it hosts. According to commonsense, this is false. But the commonsense view has never been meaningfully elaborated. This short work states an analysis of personal identity that combines Hume's position with the position, so far as there is one, of commonsense, thereby giving much needed substance to the latter.
     
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  3. No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity.John Schwenkler - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):57-65.
    A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain (...)
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  4.  19
    Locke's Theory of Personal Identity: A Re-examination.Henry E. Allison - 1966 - Journal of the History of Ideas 27 (1):41.
  5.  86
    Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Paul Helm - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (208):173 - 185.
    It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory (...)
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  6.  26
    Clinical cases and metaphysical theories of personal identity.Gabriel Andrade - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (2):317-326.
    In this article, we consider three metaphysical theories of personal identity: the soul theory, the body theory, and the psychological theory. Clinical cases are discussed as they present conceptual problems for each of these theories. For the soul theory, the case of Phineas Gage, and cases of pedophilic behavior due to a brain tumor are discussed. For the body theory, hypothetical cases of cephalosomatic anastomosis and actual cases of dicephalic parapagus and craniopagus parasiticus are discussed. For (...)
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  7.  75
    Defending Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity and Discarding the Appendix.Lasse Nielsen - 2016 - Ostium 12 (2).
    Since his contribution to the field of personal identity in 1738 Hume’s theory has been debated thoroughly. Throughout the years there have been multiple critiques of Hume’s theory, but despite the fact that all of these generally appear unsatisfactory, Hume’s theory of personal identity is far from being a popular one in the field. I believe the blame partly falls on Hume himself. Hume’s appendix to Treaties is most often read as expressing a deep concern regarding (...)
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  8. Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Margaret Atherton - 1983 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1):273-293.
  9.  64
    Lewis's theory of personal identity.Melinda Robert - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1):58-67.
    David lewis has argued that--Despite the 'fission' cases--One may consistently hold both that what matters in survival is "mental continuity and connectedness" and that what matters in survival is identity. To prove his point, He produces a certain theory of persons. Derek parfit and penelope maddy have objected that the theory lewis produces does not actually have the advantages he claims for it. In this paper, The author questions their objections, And then argues that, Even though lewis's theory has (...)
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  10.  66
    An impersonal theory of personal identity.Baruch Brody - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):313 - 329.
    In this paper, I defend the view that the identity of indiscernibles could serve as an adequate basis for a general theory of identity. I then show how a theory of essentialism forces one to modify that general theory. In light of both the original and modified theory, I offer a new resolution of some of the classical and contemporary problems of personal identity.
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  11.  14
    How Sense-phenomenal Theory of Personal Identity Might Legitimize Racism.Maduka Enyimba - 2021 - Dialogue and Universalism 31 (1):177-190.
    The major concern of the problem of personal identity gravitates around the question of whether a person’s identity is located in the mind or in the body. Scholars have developed different theories such as survivalist and physicalist criteria among others in response to this question. In this paper, I engage with the theory of sense-phenomenalism as an aspect of the physicalist criterion of personal identity to show how it might legitimize racism and colour-branding. Sense-phenomenalism (...)
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  12. The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Shelley Weinberg - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (3):387-415.
    Locke’s theory of personal identity was philosophically groundbreaking for its attempt to establish a non-substantial identity condition. Locke states, “For the same consciousness being preserv’d, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal Identity is preserv’d” (II.xxvii.13). Many have interpreted Locke to think that consciousness identifies a self both synchronically and diachronically by attributing thoughts and actions to a self. Thus, many have attributed to Locke either a memory theory or an appropriation theory of (...)
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  13. Leibniz's Theory of Personal Identity in the New Essays.Ezio Vailati - 1985 - Studia Leibnitiana 17 (1):36-43.
    Il est une opinion fort répandue que la théorie leibnizienne de l'identité personnele dans les Nouveaux Essais est contradictoire car elle renferme deux thèses incompatibles, à savoir, que 1) comme persone, je suis mon esprit, et que 2) je pourrais continuer, sans mon esprit. Dans cette étude, par une interprétation nouvelle de la pensée leibnizienne sur l'identité personnelle dans les Nouveaux Essais, je soutiens que pour Leibniz est vrai mais est faux, et que par conséquence sa théorie est consistante.
     
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  14. Is Leibniz’s Theory of Personal Identity Coherent?Marc Bobro - 1999 - The Leibniz Review 9:117-129.
    "In this paper, I shall consider the several ways in which interpreters, since 1976, have attempted to challenge the premises of Wilson's argument, and so have tried to rescue Leibniz's theory from Wilson's charge of incoherence. I shall argue that only one of these ways stands any chance of being successful." (S. 117/118)\nDiskussion zu Margaret Wilson: Leibniz : self-consciousness and immortality in the Paris notes and after. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 58 (1976), S. 335 - 352 (vgl. M 2, (...)
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  15. 20th Century Theories of Personal Identity.Jens Johansson - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. Routledge.
     
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  16. 20th-Century Theories of Personal Identity.Jens Johansson - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries. Routledge.
     
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  17. The simple Theory of personal Identity and the First-Person Perspective.Matthias Stefan - 2011 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 118 (1):3-20.
     
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  18. Locke's organismic theory of personal identity.Christopher Hughes Conn - 2002 - Locke Studies 2:105-135.
  19.  76
    Strawson on Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Masaki Ichinose - 2014 - Philosophical Studies (University of Tokyo) 32:1-9.
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  20. Locke perspectival theory of personal identity.B. Kienzle - 1985 - Studia Leibnitiana 17 (1):52-65.
     
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  21. On the prospects for a theory of personal identity.Alan Sidelle - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):351-72.
    Much specific support for theories of personal identity comes from data which is really about 'what matters' in identity. I argue that if we accept Parfit's arguments that identity is not sufficient for what matters, then we should think our subject matter is actually underdetermined and indefinite, and there can be no correct answer to the question 'Under what conditions is P2 identical to P!?'.
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  22.  16
    The biblical roots of Locke's theory of personal identity.Diego Lucci - 2021 - Zygon 56 (1):168-187.
    Locke’s consciousness-based theory of personal identity resulted not only from his agnosticism on substance, but also from his biblical theology. This theory was intended to complement and sustain Locke’s moral and theological commitments to a system of otherworldly rewards and sanctions as revealed in Scripture. Moreover, he inferred mortalist ideas from the Bible, rejecting the resurrection of the same body and maintaining that the soul dies at physical death and will be resurrected by divine miracle. Accordingly, personal (...)
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  23. A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity.Jacob Berger - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (1):41-55.
    The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P1 at time T1 is numerically identical with a person P2 at a later time T2, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in (...)
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  24. Thomas Reid’s objection to Locke’s Theory of personal identity.Vinícius França Freitas - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (1):147-164.
    The paper aims to present two distinct ways of defending John Locke’s theory of personal identity from Thomas Reid’s objection. First, it will be argued that this objection is not effective since it starts from a misunderstanding of Locke’s theory. The identity of a person is not preserved by the psychological continuity of consciousness, as Reid understood it, but by its ontological continuity: the existence of the same consciousness preserves the personal identity. Secondly, it will (...)
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  25. The Dynamic Process of Being (a Person): Two Process-Ontological Theories of Personal Identity.Daniel Robert Siakel - 2014 - Process Studies 43 (2):4-28.
    The purpose of this article is to introduce, interpret, and develop two incompatible process -ontological theories of personal identity that have received little attention in analytic metaphysics. The first theory derives from the notion of personal identity proposed in Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy, but I interpret this notion differently from previous commentators. The Whiteheadian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but (...)
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  26.  23
    Withering Minds: towards a unified embodied mind theory of personal identity for understanding dementia.David M. Lyreskog - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (10):699-706.
    A prominent view on personal identity over time, Jeff McMahan’s ‘Embodied Mind Account’ (2002) holds that we cease to exist only once our brains can no longer sustain the basic capacity to uphold consciousness. One of the many implications of this view on identity persistence is that we continue to exist throughout even the most severe cases of dementia, until our consciousness irreversibly shuts down. In this paper, I argue that, while the most convincing of prominent accounts (...)
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  27.  83
    Thomas Reid’s objection to Hume’s theory of personal identity.Vinícius França Freitas - 2019 - Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica E Modernidade 24 (2):53-69.
    The paper discusses Thomas Reid's objection to David Hume's theory of personal identity. The hypothesis states that this criticism is not effective because it is based on a misunderstanding of Hume’s theory, namely, that Hume would have admitted a negative ontological thesis - the inexistence of a mind beyond perceptions - and a positive ontological thesis - a mind reduced to a bundle of perceptions. After explaining in what measures Reid’s objection is based upon this misunderstanding, the paper (...)
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  28.  66
    The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.Frederick C. Doepke - 1996 - Open Court Publishing Company.
    The main contribution of this work is to develop the account of material constitution presented in Spatially Coinciding Objects (Ratio 24, 1982) and a series of related articles. This account was merely ‘analytical’ in that it applied generously to ‘putative’ examples of distinct entities (individuals, pluralities and masses of stuff) in the same place at the same time. The account herein is ‘critical’ in that it seeks justification for recognizing the existence of entities constituted in addition to the entities that (...)
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  29. Can We Do Without a Metaphysical Theory of Personal Identity in Practice?Radim Bělohrad - 2014 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 13 (2):315-334.
    In this paper, I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, (...)
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  30.  19
    Putting your money where your self is: Connecting dimensions of closeness and theories of personal identity.Jan K. Woike, Philip Collard & Bruce Hood - 2020 - PLoS ONE 15 (2):1-44.
    Studying personal identity, the continuity and sameness of persons across lifetimes, is notoriously difficult and competing conceptualizations exist within philosophy and psychology. Personal reidentification, linking persons between points in time is a fundamental step in allocating merit and blame and assigning rights and privileges. Based on Nozick’s closest continuer theory we develop a theoretical framework that explicitly invites a meaningful empirical approach and offers a constructive, integrative solution to current disputes about appropriate experiments. Following Nozick, reidentification involves (...)
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  31.  99
    An ambiguity in Parfit's theory of personal identity.Howard Curzer - 1991 - Ratio 4 (1):16-24.
    In Reasons and Persons Parfit vacillates between two views of personal identity. Both views have unpalatable consequences. According to one view, the question, "Is person A the same as person C?" is always empty. According to the other view, this question is empty only some of the time. The first view is elegant, but it has consequences which are counterintuitive and incompatible with Parfit's later claims. The second view is commonsensical, but its only coherent version is vulnerable to (...)
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  32. Reid's Criticism of Hume's Theory of Personal Identity.Harry Lesser - 1978 - Hume Studies 4 (2):41-63.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REID' S CRITICISM OF HUME'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY One of the most interesting philosophical controversies is that between Reid and Hume, considered as representatives of two different sorts of empiricism. Hume, for these purposes, represents 'radical' empiricism, and the attempt to base knowledge solely on experience and what can be validly inferred from it, regardless of how far this leads one from everyday notions and beliefs. (...)
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  33. A sense of identity: Prolegomena to a social theory of personal identity.John D. GreenwooD - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (1):25–46.
    A philosophical account of personal identity - in terms of the maintenance of fundamental beliefs, principles and commitments by spatiotemporally continuous particulars - is sketched, an account which is able to incorporate a social and relational conception of personal identity, and thus serve as the basis for a social psychological theory of personal identity - in terms of the pursuit of identity projects’within social collectives. Some implications of this theory are developed, concerning the (...)
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  34.  44
    The Negotiative Theory of Gender Identity and the Limits of First-Person Authority.Burkay Ozturk - 2022 - In Raja Halwani, Jacob M. Held, Natasha McKeever & Alan Soble (eds.), The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 8th edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 261-281.
    This paper assesses the first-person authority account (FPA) of gender, according to which X's self-identification of what X's gender is, is the final say on what X's gender is, such that if others disagree, they are mistaken. One main reason in support of FPA is respecting X's autonomy—that is, overriding X's self-identification amounts to denying X's autonomy. Ozturk criticizes this view using analogies of religious and patriotic self-identifications, such that there are cases in which someone can permissibly claim that another (...)
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  35.  15
    The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.Marc Slors - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):465.
    The main target of The Kinds of Things is the Lockean-Humean view of personal identity that had its most controversial expression in Parfit and that so thoroughly shaped the debate on the issue. Doepke develops an alternative Kantian-Aristotelian account of personal identity, partly by analyzng the demerits of the Lockean-Humean view. While locating itself in the landscape of the traditional debate, though, the book is very atypical of it.
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  36.  14
    The Anglican Response to Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.R. C. Tennant - 1982 - Journal of the History of Ideas 43 (1):73-90.
    The article sets out aspects of locke's theory of personal identity which were seen by contemporaries to be not only fallacious but also to conflict with christian doctrine regarding the soul. A modified theory is then educed, From berkeley, Butler, William law and other divines, Which avoids these fallacies, Is epistemologically more rigorous and arguably expressed christian doctrine more accurately. This is seen as a forerunner of some central concerns of romantic theology.
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  37. The Negotiative Theory of Gender Identity and the Limits of First-Person Authority.Burkay Ozturk - 2017 - In Raja El El Halwani, Alan Soble, Sarah Hoffman & Jacob Held (eds.), The Philosophy of Sex. New York, USA: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 139-159.
    The first-person authority view (FPA) is the current dominant view about what someone’s gender is. According to FPA the person has authority over her own gender identity; her sincere self-identification trumps the opinions of others. There are two versions of FPA: epistemic and ethical. Both versions try to explain why a person has authority over her own gender identity. But both have problems. Epistemic FPA attributes to the self-identifier an unrealistic degree of doxastic reliability. Ethical FPA implies the (...)
     
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  38.  14
    Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality.Logi Gunnarsson - 2009 - New York: Routledge.
    As witnessed by recent films such as _Fight Club_ and _Identity_, our culture is obsessed with multiple personality—a phenomenon raising intriguing questions about personal identity. This study offers both a full-fledged philosophical theory of personal identity and a systematic account of multiple personality. Gunnarsson combines the methods of analytic philosophy with close hermeneutic and phenomenological readings of cases from different fields, focusing on psychiatric and psychological treatises, self-help books, biographies, and fiction. He develops an original account (...)
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  39. Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality.Logi Gunnarsson - 2009 - New York: Routledge.
    As witnessed by recent films such as _Fight Club_ and _Identity_, our culture is obsessed with multiple personality—a phenomenon raising intriguing questions about personal identity. This study offers both a full-fledged philosophical theory of personal identity and a systematic account of multiple personality. Gunnarsson combines the methods of analytic philosophy with close hermeneutic and phenomenological readings of cases from different fields, focusing on psychiatric and psychological treatises, self-help books, biographies, and fiction. He develops an original account (...)
     
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  40.  10
    The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument.Raymond Martin - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):240-243.
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  41. Hume's Recantation of His Theory of Personal Identity.David Pears - 2004 - Hume Studies 30 (2):257-264.
    I am going to defend a diagnosis of Hume’s recantation that I have already defended—rather unsuccessfully—in more than one publication. My excuse for trying again is that I shall now offer a more carefully qualified defense. My diagnosis was, and still is, that in the Appendix to the Treatise Hume came to see that he could not account for the necessary ownership of perceptions —i.e., for the fact that this very perception could not have occurred in a different set.
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  42.  62
    The idea of a momentary self and Hume's theory of personal identity.Michael J. Green - 1999 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1):103 – 122.
  43.  19
    The application of modal language ML in defense of Locke's theory of personal identity.Nataša Rakić - 1991 - Theoria 34 (3-4):73-80.
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    No Self?: Some Reflections on Buddhist Theories of Personal Identity.Anthony Rudd - 2015 - Philosophy East and West 65 (3):869-891.
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  45. Frederick C. Doepke, The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument Reviewed by.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 1998 - Philosophy in Review 18 (4):248-250.
     
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  46. Beyond the Brave Officer: Reid on the Unity of the Mind, the Moral Sense, and Locke's Theory of Personal Identity.Gideon Yaffe - 2009 - In Sabine Roeser (ed.), Reid on Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  47. The informational nature of personal identity.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (4):549-566.
    In this paper, I present an informational approach to the nature of personal identity. In “Plato and the problem of the chariot”, I use Plato’s famous metaphor of the chariot to introduce a specific problem regarding the nature of the self as an informational multiagent system: what keeps the self together as a whole and coherent unity? In “Egology and its two branches” and “Egology as synchronic individualisation”, I outline two branches of the theory of the self: one (...)
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  48.  66
    Towards a Phenomenological Account of Personal Identity.Hanne Jacobs - 2010 - In Ierna Carlo, Jacobs Hanne & Mattens Filip (eds.), Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences. Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl. Springer. pp. 333--361.
    In this article, I develop how the phenomenological understanding of the intentionality of consciousness allows us to formulate a theory of personal identity that can at least account for the continuity of consciousness through time, provide an account of a certain aspect of what it means to be a person, namely to be able to appropriate one’s past as one’s own, and give an original answer to the question of personal identity and state in what the (...)
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  49. The metaphysics of personal identity and our special concern for the future.Amy Kind - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.
    Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. (...)
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  50. The concept of personal identity.Steven Rieber - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.
    Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarily consists in, but frequently leave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paper is concerned with conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personal identity in terms of a definite description. The analysis coheres with out judgments about clear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate. The apparent indeterminacy results from attempting to apply (...)
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