Results for 'Thick concepts'

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  1. Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):439-469.
    So-called "thick" moral concepts are distinctive in that they somehow "hold together" evaluation and description. But how? This paper argues against the standard view that the evaluations which thick concepts may be used to convey belong to sense or semantic content. That view cannot explain linguistic data concerning how thick concepts behave in a distinctive type of disagreements and denials which arise when one speaker regards another's thick concept as "objectionable" in a certain (...)
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  2. Thick Concepts and Variability.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-17.
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative (...)
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  3.  57
    Thick Concepts.Simon T. Kirchin - unknown
    What is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones are termed thick concepts. In this volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. (...)
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  4. Thick Concepts: Where’s Evaluation? 1.Pekka Väyrynen - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:235-70.
    This chapter presents an alternative to the standard view that at least some of the evaluations that the so-called “thick” terms and concepts in ethics may be used to convey belong to their sense or semantic meaning. After introducing the topic and making some methodological remarks, the chapter presents a wide variety of linguistic data that are well explained by the alternative view that at least a very wide range of thick terms and concepts are such (...)
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  5. Thick Concepts and Underdetermination.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press. pp. 136-160.
    Thick terms and concepts in ethics somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. The non-evaluative aspects of thick terms and concepts underdetermine their extensions. Many writers argue that this underdetermination point is best explained by supposing that thick terms and concepts are semantically evaluative in some way such that evaluation plays a role in determining their extensions. This paper argues that the extensions of thick terms and concepts are underdetermined by their meanings in (...)
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  6. Thick Concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):677-688.
    In ethics, aesthetics and increasingly in epistemology, a distinction is drawn between thick and thin evaluative concepts. A common characterisation of the distinction is that thin concepts have only evaluative content, whereas thick concepts combine evaluative and descriptive content. Because of this combination, it is again commonly thought that thick concepts have various distinctive powers including the power to undermine the distinction between fact and value. This paper discusses the accuracy of this view (...)
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  7. Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2016 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A term expresses a thick concept if it expresses a specific evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive. It is a matter of debate how this rough account should be unpacked, but examples can help to convey the basic idea. Thick concepts are often illustrated with virtue concepts like courageous and generous, action concepts like murder and betray, epistemic concepts like dogmatic and wise, and aesthetic concepts like gaudy and brilliant. These concepts (...)
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  8. Thick Concepts, Non-Cognitivism, and Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):286-309.
    Non-cognitivists claim that thick concepts can be disentangled into distinct descriptive and evaluative components and that since thick concepts have descriptive shape they can be mastered independently of evaluation. In Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, John McDowell uses Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to show that such a non-cognitivist view is untenable. In this paper I do several things. I describe the non-cognitivist position in its various forms and explain its driving motivations. I then explain McDowell’s argument against non-cognitivism and (...)
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  9.  23
    Thick Concepts and Thick Descriptions.Simon Kirchin - 2013 - In Thick Concepts. Oxford University Press. pp. 60.
    In this article I compare Ryle's notion of a thick description with Williams' notion of a thick concept so as to illuminate our understanding of both. In doing so I suggest lines of thought that show us that the notion of 'evaluation' in play in many people's writings should be broadened. Doing so will help to lessen the credibility of separationist notions of thick concepts.
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  10. Thick Concepts.Debbie Roberts - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 211-225.
  11.  72
    The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics.Pekka Väyrynen - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In (...)
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  12. The Expansion View of Thick Concepts.Brent G. Kyle - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):914-944.
    This paper proposes a new Separabilist account of thick concepts, called the Expansion View (or EV). According to EV, thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms. An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers. Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it is distinct from the only kind of Separabilism discussed in the literature, and it has many features that Inseparabilists want from an account of thick concepts. (...)
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  13. What Are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
    Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, treachery, promise, brutality, courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick concepts are value concepts with (...)
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  14.  16
    Thick Concepts and Sociological Research.Gabriel Abend - 2019 - Sociological Theory 37 (3):209-233.
    I consider how to do sociological things with thick concepts, what’s the relation between thick concepts and social facts, what’s unique about thick concepts, and what’s unique about creatures in whose lives there are thick concepts.
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  15. Thick Concepts and Emotion.Peter Goldie - 2008 - In Daniel Callcut (ed.), Reading Bernard Williams. Routledge.
  16. Thick Concepts and Their Role in Moral Psychology.Chloë Fitzgerald & Peter Goldie - 2012 - In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press.
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  17.  85
    Slurs & Thick Concepts-is the New Expressivism Tenable?Nenad Miščević - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):159-182.
    Mark Richard in his book offers a new and challenging expressivist theory of the use and semantics of slurs (pejoratives). The paper argues that in contrast, the central and standard uses of slurs are cognitive. It does so from the role of stereotypes in slurring, from fi gurative slurs and from the need for cognitive effort (or simple of knowledge of relevant presumed properties of the target). Since cognition has to do with truth and falsity, and since the cognitive task (...)
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  18. 'Thick' Concepts Revised.Stephan L. Burton - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):28 - 32.
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  19.  46
    Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 219.
  20. In Defense of Thick Concepts.Jonathan Dancy - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):263-279.
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  21. Morality and Thick Concepts.Allan Gibbard & Simon Blackburn - 1992 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 66 (1):267 - 299.
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  22. Morality and Thick Concepts.Allan Gibbard & Simon Blackburn - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 66:267-299.
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  23.  6
    Thick Concepts Revisited: A Reply to Burton.Eve Garrard & Alonso Church - 1993 - Analysis 53 (1):57.
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  24. Thick Ethical Concepts.Pekka Väyrynen - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Evaluative terms and concepts are often divided into “thin” and “thick”. We don’t evaluate actions and persons merely as good or bad, or right or wrong, but also as kind, courageous, tactful, selfish, boorish, and cruel. The latter evaluative concepts are "descriptively thick": their application somehow involves both evaluation and a substantial amount of non-evaluative description. This article surveys various attempts to answer four fundamental questions about thick terms and concepts. (1) A “combination question”: (...)
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  25.  37
    A New Account of Thick Concepts.Andrew Payne - 2005 - Journal of Value Inquiry 39 (1):89-103.
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  26.  67
    Thick Concepts and Holism About Reasons.Andrew Sneddon - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (4):461-468.
    Thick moral concepts are a topic of particular disagreement in discussions of reasons holism. These concepts, such as justice, are called “thick” because they have both evaluative and descriptive aspects. Thin moral concepts, such as good, are purely evaluative. The disagreement concerns whether the fact that an action is, for example, just always a reason in favor of performing that action. The present argument follows Jonathan Dancy’s strategy of connecting moral reasons and concepts to (...)
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  27.  31
    Thick Concepts and Practice.Niklas Möller - 2011 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):77-98.
    Thick concepts provide a focal point for several important issues in ethical theory. Separatists argue that the descriptive and evaluative elements of a thick concept can be separated out. Non-separatists deny this and claim that there are no descriptive boundaries delimiting a thick concept. A common strategy for both camps in the debate has been an appeal to armchair intuitions of various everyday thick concepts. My alternative strategy consists in a closer study of the (...)
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  28.  18
    Health and Disease as 'Thick' Concepts in Ecosystemic Contexts.James Lindemann Nelson - 1995 - Environmental Values 4 (4):311 - 322.
    In this paper, I consider what kind of normative work might be done by speaking of ecosystems utilising a 'medical' vocabulary – drawing, that is, on such notions as 'health', 'disease', and 'illness'. Some writers attracted to this mode of expression have been rather modest about what they think it might purchase. I wish to be bolder. Drawing on the idea of 'thick' evaluative concepts as discussed by McDowell, Williams and Taylor, and resorting to a phenomenological argument for (...)
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  29.  36
    Thick Concepts and Context Dependence.Anna Bergqvist - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):221-232.
    In this paper I develop my account of moral particularism, focussing on the nature of thick moral concepts. My aim is to show how the particularist can consistently uphold an non-reductive cognitivist ‘dual role’ view of thick moral concepts, even though she holds that the qualities ascribed by such concepts can vary in their moral relevance – so that to judge that something is generous or an act of integrity need not entail that the object (...)
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  30.  17
    Thick Concepts and Moral Revisionism in Plato’s Gorgias: Arguing About Something There Can Be No Argument About.Philipp Brüllmann - 2019 - Phronesis 65 (2):153-178.
    David Furley has suggested that we think of Callicles’ immoralism as attacking a thick concept. I take up this suggestion and apply it to the argument of Plato’s Gorgias more generally. I show that the discussion between Socrates, Gorgias and Polus, which prepares the ground for Callicles, is precisely addressing the thickness of the concept of justice: it reveals that this concept is both descriptive and evaluative and that formulating a revisionist position about justice is therefore extremely difficult. Callicles’ (...)
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  31.  21
    Thick Concepts Revisited: A Reply to Burton.Eve Garrard & David McNaughton - 1993 - Analysis 53 (1):57 - 58.
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  32.  15
    Thick Concepts Simon Kirchin Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; 236 Pp.; £45.00. [REVIEW]David Rocheleau-Houle - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (3).
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  33.  12
    Thick Concepts.E. Skidelsky - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):131-134.
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    The Complex First Paradox Why Do Semantically Thick Concepts so Early Lexicalize as Nouns?Markus Werning - 2008 - Interaction Studies 9 (1):67-83.
  35.  14
    Latour's Thick Concepts and His Analysis of Scientific Practice.Chris Kaposy - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (5):34-41.
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    Latour's Thick Concepts.Chris Kaposy - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (9999):34-41.
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    Latour's Thick Concepts: And His Analysis of Scientific Practice.Chris Kaposy - 2002 - Philosophy Today 46 (Supplement):34-41.
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  38. Review of 'The Lewd, the Rude, and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics' by Pekka Väyrynen. [REVIEW]Brent G. Kyle - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):576-582.
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  39.  11
    The “Complex First” Paradox: Why Do Semantically Thick Concepts so Early Lexicalize as Nouns?Markus Werning - 2008 - Interaction Studies: Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 9 (1):67-83.
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    Thinning the Thicket: Thick Concepts, Context, and Evaluative Frameworks.Kenneth Shockley - 2012 - Environmental Ethics 34 (3):227-246.
    When Aldo Leopold claimed that “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community,” he made a conceptual connection between descriptive features of the biotic community and a normative judgment. In conjoining descriptive and normative elements within a single concept Leopold seemed to have been invoking what are now referred to as thick evaluative concepts. Two interpretations of thick concepts that have received increasing attention in environmental ethics (...)
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    Objectivity, Intrinsicality and Sustainability: Comment on Nelson's 'Health and Disease as "Thick" Concepts in Ecosystemic Contexts'.Bryan Norton - 1995 - Environmental Values 4 (4):323 - 332.
    Ecosystem health, as James Nelson argues, must be understood as having both descriptive and normative content; it is in this sense a 'morally thick' concept. The health analogy refers (a) at the similarities between conservation ecology and medicine or plant pathology as normative sciences, and (b) to the ability of ecosystems to 'heal' themselves in the face of disturbances. Nelson, however, goes beyond these two aspects and argues that judgements of illness in ecosystems only support moral obligations to protect (...)
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  42.  28
    Some Limits of Decision-Theory in Bioethics: Rights, Ends, and Thick Concepts.Stephen R. Latham - 2006 - American Journal of Bioethics 6 (3):56 – 58.
  43.  16
    Väyrynen, Pekka. The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 288. $49.95. [REVIEW]Debbie Roberts - 2015 - Ethics 125 (3):910-915.
  44.  24
    Personality Disorders and Thick Concepts.Konrad Banicki - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):209-221.
    'Cruel' simply ignores the supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself to be used sometimes for a normative purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term.Personality disorders have always attracted considerable attention within the philosophy of psychiatry. It was not until two papers written by Louis Charland, however, that they simulated a wider and lively debate. The importance and, at least partly, the strength of Charland's analyses lie in the fact that they are relatively particular and focused in their...
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  45. Through Thick and Thin: Good and its Determinates.Christine Tappolet - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (2):207-221.
    What is the relation between the concept good and more specific or ‘thickconcepts such as admirable or courageous? I argue that good or more precisely good pro tanto is a general concept, but that the relation between good pro tanto and the more specific concepts is not that of a genus to its species. The relation of an important class of specific evaluative concepts, which I call ‘affective concepts’, to good pro tanto is better (...)
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  46. ‘BOGHOSSIAN's BLIND REASONING’, CONDITIONALIZATION AND THICK CONCEPTS A FUNCTIONAL MODEL.Olga Ramirez - 2012 - Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.
    Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical (...) present a specific case, whose analysis requires a somewhat different reconstruction from that which Boghossian offers. A proper account of thick ethical concepts should be able to explain how ‘evaluated’ and ‘evaluation’ are connected. (shrink)
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  47. Introduction: Thick and Thin Concepts.Simon T. Kirchin - unknown
     
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  48.  51
    Thick Ethical Concepts in the Philosophy and Literature of Iris Murdoch.Jessy E. G. Jordan - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):402-417.
    Although thick ethical concepts have been neglected in Murdochian scholarship, this article argues that they were central to the thought of Iris Murdoch. In the first section, the article provides a sustained account of thick ethical concepts in Murdoch's philosophy, demonstrating how these concepts align with and illuminate familiar aspects of her philosophical essays. The first section also explores the ways in which Murdoch's alternative account of moral concepts was at the heart of her (...)
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  49.  7
    Williams on Thick Ethical Concepts and Reasons for Action.Eric Wiland - 2013 - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-216.
    Bernard Williams argued that philosophers should pay more attention to the role thick ethical concepts play in our moral thinking, and, separately, that all reasons for action depend in the first place upon the agent's pre-exisitng motives. Here I argue that these two views are in tension. Much like the standard examples of thick ethical concepts, the concept REASONABLE is likewise thick, and the features of the world that guide its correct use have much less (...)
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  50. Thick Aesthetic Concepts.Roman Bonzon - 2009 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 67 (2):191-199.
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