When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood (...) is developmentally prior to and logically more basic than joint action, but also because it might constitute a way of being together with others, which we need to study if we wish to better understand the nature of the we. In the present contribution, my primary aim will be to offer an answer to the following question: does the we-experience, the experience of being part of a we, presuppose, precede, preserve, or abolish the difference between self- and other-experience? In pursuing this task, I will take a closer look at emotional sharing and draw on resources that are too frequently ignored in current social ontology, namely insights found in classical phenomenology and in contemporary research on social cognition. (shrink)

This volume commemorates the centenary of Logical Investigations by subjecting the work to a comprehensive critical analysis. It contains new contributions by leading scholars addressing some of the most central analyses to be found in the book.

In this paper we suggest adding to predicate modal and temporal logic a locality predicate W which gives names to worlds (or time points). We also study an equal time predicate D(x, y)which states that two time points are at the same distance from the root. We provide the systems studied with complete axiomatizations and illustrate the expressive power gained for modal logic by simulating other logics. The completeness proofs rely on the fairly intuitive notion of a configuration in order (...) to use a proof technique similar to a Henkin completion mixed with a tableau construction. The main elements of the completeness proofs are given for each case, while purely technical results are grouped in the appendix. (shrink)

"It's a jungle out there. And in here, too. Through this jungle prowl all the demons of dirt and disorder. Though they must win eventually, the way to delay their victory is to keep everything in its proper place, and that means noticing any detail that doesn't fit." "Welcome to the world of former San Francisco police detective Adrian Monk, intellectual athlete and behavioral cripple, master of crime-solving and slave to his own terrors. Mr. Monk and Philosophy examines that world (...) through the lens of philosophy, bags all the evidence, and identifies DNA samples of Aristotle, Aquinas, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein." --Book Jacket. (shrink)

D W Hamlyn; Need Philosophy of Education be so Dreary?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 159–165, https://doi.org/10.1.

Tools and technologies expand our capacities, including our cognitive capacities. Microscopes extend our perceptual capacities. Notebooks extend the natural limits of memory. These facts are important, for all that they are obvious. The extended cognition hypothesis wants more. Some external devices and processes are literal parts of cognitive processes themselves. When there is fast and reliable access to external data or processes, then the cognitive processes that occur uncontroversially inside the brain literally and controversially extend out into the world to (...) incorporate external structures or processes. Retrieval of an address from memory and retrieval of the same information from a notebook can both be fully cognitive processes involving fully cognitive representations. So say the proponents of extended cognition.It is an attractive metaphor. But is there any good reason to take it as literal truth? Adams and Aizawa argue that the debate on extended cognition implicates an …. (shrink)

On one view about the word 'might', to say, sincerely and literally, that it might be that S is to say something about one's epistemic state (and perhaps also about the epistemic states of those around one). For convenience, I will call this the natural view about 'might' On one version of the natural view, to say that it might be that S is to say that what one is certain of is consistent with the proposition that S. Seth Yalcin (...) (2007) has argued that all versions of the natural view are wrong. My aim in this article is to show how at least one version of the natural view escapes Yalcin's argument. (shrink)

The work of Michèle Le Dœuff creatively disrupts established notions of what philosophy might be. Far from being a discipline about the leader and the disciple, a hierarchy of knowledge and paternalism, Le Dœuff proposes a philosophy of dialogue and friendship. The conversations in this book explore how this philosophy can be enacted and explored, and show how openness and generosity can be the starting point of truly rigorous thinking. Introduced and curated by the late philosopher, Pamela Sue Anderson, In (...) Dialogue with Michèle Le Dœuff explores themes like contemporary feminism, joy in philosophy, memory, the significance of friendship to thinking and a key Le Dœuffian concept, the imaginary. Le Dœuff's interlocutors, including Penelope Deutscher, Elizabeth Fallaize and Meenda Dhanda, are some of the most significant thinkers in the fields of feminism and continental thought and provide insights and ways into considering philosophy as a profoundly dialogical exercise. (shrink)

Physicalists motivate their position by posing a problem for the opposition: given the causal completeness of physics and the impact of the mental (or, more broadly, the seemingly nonphysical) on the physical, antiphysicalism implies that causal overdetermination is rampant. This argument is, however, equivocal in its use of 'physical'. As Scott Sturgeon has recently argued, if 'physical' means that which is the object of physical theory, completeness is plausible, but the further claim that the mental has a causal impact on (...) the physical is no longer so evident. In this paper I assess the damage due to the ambiguity of 'physical' and provide a repair to the overdetermination strategy. (shrink)

In this rehabilitation of the relational transaction of compromising, we follow Paul Ricoeur in arguing that at the intersection of diverse orders of value, compromising rises to the level of a moral duty. Thus, an ethics of compromise, rooted in recognition theory, provides a virtuous means of moral engagement with otherness in the context of pluralism. Virtue theory needs to move in an interactive direction by enlisting moral epistemology, for a shift in focus from the individual agent to the interaction (...) of agents ; attending to the political theorists and sociologists who ground meaningful compromise in mutual recognition; and tailoring such recognition to bounded human capacities for rationality and empathy, via "psychological realism"—all in service of attenuating the discomfort and even moral pain that agents may feel when called upon to compromise. (shrink)

In part ix of "dialogues concerning natural religion", Demea advances an "a priori" argument for the existence of god: an argument of which cleanthes and philo then make a number of trenchant criticisms. These criticisms are acknowledged by all commentators to be hume's own, And they are regarded by almost all commentators as being fatal to demea's argument. I show that, On the contrary, Hume's main criticisms are all worthless, And that they even include an inconsistency of the most glaring (...) kind. (shrink)

"Some patients find it difficult to be in the present because they are stuck in the past; others, by contrast, struggle to remain connected with the past and are suspended in a so-called present that is effectively atemporal, that is out of time”.1 For psychoanalysts, the most profound and ultimately ethical way that we can help individuals, is by helping them know themselves. This involves discovering how they were shaped by their past and how their ongoing self-experience cannot be understood (...) in isolation from its constitutive contexts. Psychoanalysts help patients explore foundational questions such as: ‘Who am I?’ ‘How did I get here?’ ‘How am I implicated in my own suffering?’ ‘How can I grow and flourish and truly engage with my life?’. The answers to these questions emerge from a detailed exploration of the persons lived relational history, their current social and relational context and the political systems within which they are embedded. It is via this expansion of self-awareness that individuals can access agency and true freedom of choice. The clinical approach presented by Notini et al 2 is grounded in a completely different, radically decontextualised understanding of human experience. Their conceptualisation of Phoenix’s gender identity is ahistorical and atemporal: it is indeed ‘out of time’. For these authors, gender identity is assumed to be an immutable core essence, much like Ehrensaft’s3 ‘true gender self….there from birth’. It simply ‘is’. This is a …. (shrink)

Une étude sur la virtualité toujours présente du mal politique. Pour comprendre le présent de ce mal, il faut rouvrir le passé, remonter notamment au mal radical selon Kant, ou aux liens entre le tragique et la capacité d'institution politique chez Aristote. Se dégage alors une longue tradition : celle d'une humanité dénuée de toute prétention à l'innocence, rendue au mal de sa liberté.

Susan Schneider argues that the entities to be identified as part of the 'physical base' for physicalism must be in part abstract and that this fact either falsifies physicalism or renders it so problematic as to be 'no physicalism worth having'. I accept the abstractness of the entities but argue both that physicalism is consistent with such and that none of the alleged problems for Platonistic physicalism are serious.

Arabic literature; history and criticism.

Stove defends his book, Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism, and claims his critics have "irished", or changed the question.