Keith DeRose gives an invalid argument for contextualism in “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” In section 2.4, entitled “The Argument for Contextualism,” DeRose makes the following remarks. “The knowledge account of assertion provides a powerful argument for contextualism: If the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P are the same as those that comprise a truth-condition for ‘I know P,’ then if the former vary with context, so do the latter. In short: The knowledge account (...) of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge”. (shrink)

I argue for an alternative interpretation of some of the examples Fred Feldman uses to establish his theory of happiness. According to Feldman, the examples show that certain utterances of the form S is pleased/glad that P and S is displeased/sad that P should be interpreted as expressions of extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and hence must be excluded from the aggregative sum of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure that constitutes happiness. I develop a new interpretation of Feldman’s examples. My interpretation (...) is plausible in its own right. Moreover, it is significant within the context of the debate. It allows the attitudinal hedonist to preserve the initial understanding of happiness that Feldman believes is open to counterexample: that happiness is the sum of attitudinal pleasure minus attitudinal displeasure and that all attitudinal pleasure and displeasure counts equally in the aggregation that constitutes happiness. (shrink)

Keith DeRose gives an invalid argument for contextualism in “Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.” In section 2.4, entitled “The Argument for Contextualism,” DeRose makes the following remarks. “The knowledge account of assertion provides a powerful argument for contextualism: If the standards for when one is in a position to warrantedly assert that P are the same as those that comprise a truth-condition for ‘I know P,’ then if the former vary with context, so do the latter. In short: The knowledge account (...) of assertion together with the context-sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge”. (shrink)

Few recent events in the world of Platonic scholarship have caused more excitement than the publication of the initial volumes of R. E. Allen’s The Dialogues of Plato. Allen is on track to become the first scholar since Benjamin Jowett in the nineteenth century to produce a translation, with commentary, of all of Plato’s works. This feat is all the more impressive because Allen’s translations and comments thus far have been superb.

In the Phaedo, to explain why the philosopher lives in the unusually ascetic way he does, Socrates explains what someone realizes when philosophy takes possession of his soul and how he changes his behavior on the basis of this information. This paper considers the conception of belief the character uses in this explanation and whether it is the same as the conception Michael Frede thinks the historical Socrates is likely to have held and that the Stoics much later incorporated into (...) their doctrine of practice. (shrink)

Ancient Greek Philosophy: From the Presocratics to the Hellenistic Philosophers presents a comprehensive introduction to the philosophers and philosophical traditions that developed in ancient Greece from 585 BC to 529 AD. Provides coverage of the Presocratics through the Hellenistic philosophers Moves beyond traditional textbooks that conclude with Aristotle A uniquely balanced organization of exposition, choice excerpts and commentary, informed by classroom feedback Contextual commentary traces the development of lines of thought through the period, ideal for students new to the discipline (...) Can be used in conjunction with the online resources found at http://tomblackson.com/Ancient/toc.html. (shrink)

This work is a Festschrift to celebrate the philosophical and scholarly achievements of John Dillon on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday on 15 September 1999. Such celebrations too often have little or no academic interest, but the editor is aware of this problem and has taken steps to prevent it from plaguing Traditions of Platonism. In order to avoid academic provincialism and to create a truly cosmopolitan collection of papers, contributed by some of the leading international experts within the (...) field of Platonic and Neoplatonic studies, Professor Cleary says that he has carefully selected the contributors for their expertise on the ancient traditions of Platonism and for their diversity of perspectives, languages and traditions of scholarship. (shrink)

IN POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 2.19 AND METAPHYSICS 1.1, Aristotle describes the natural process by which man acquires reason and the knowledge that belongs to reason. He says that from perception comes memory, from memory comes experience, and from experience comes reason and the knowledge that belongs to reason. This is the sequence in induction, and it is common to the description in both passages. In the Metaphysics, however, unlike in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle goes on to explain how the expertise gained (...) in experience is different from but easily mistaken for the knowledge that belongs to reason. He says that men of experience know that the thing is so, but not the why and the cause, and this can be perplexing because it can seem to conflict with his epistemology and ontology of reason. As I understand Aristotle, he thought that wisdom, not the knowledge that belongs to reason, varies among men, and that every adult who is not defective acquires the knowledge why in the course of his natural development. It thus follows that the experience that men of experience possess cannot be the experience in induction, for otherwise reason and its knowledge would come to man late in life, if at all, and would come to only those who had acquired the expertise that belongs to men of experience. (shrink)

This book is a collection of twenty-three of Professor Cooper’s essays on ancient moral philosophy and ethical theory. Two essays are published here for the first time. Three essays are “somewhat revised” versions of essays first prepared for other collections that were in press during the time in which Cooper wrote the preface. Three essays are “reworkings” of previously published review essays, and the remaining fifteen essays are reprints with editorial alterations of essays Cooper first published between 1973 and 1996. (...) Cooper offers these twenty-three essays to “a wider readership” in the “hope [that] they present a unified way of reading and reflecting on some of the most significant texts and issues in ancient moral philosophy from Socrates to Epicurus and the Stoic philosophers Chrysippus and Posidonius, and beyond”. (shrink)

This book may well become the definitive work on Philo of Larissa. It is comprehensive, and the knowledge of the texts and their historical contexts is impressive. My only concern is with the philosophical exposition. Philo is an important figure in the history of epistemology, and it seems to me that his contribution should have been specified more clearly. This of course is a tall order. Ancient epistemology is a difficult subject, and my desire for a clearer exposition is more (...) of a wish than a criticism. Philo of Larissa is a very good book. (shrink)

In Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Professor Bobzien accomplishes what she describes as her “primary goal”; namely, “to establish-as far as that is possible—what the Stoic positions were, and to make them comprehensible to modern readers”. To this end, she demonstrates a scholarly command of the ancient texts and the contemporary secondary literature that places her as one of the most knowledgeable philosophers working in the history of ancient philosophy today. Moreover, as Myles Burnyeat says in his remarks on (...) the jacket, not only is the book “a model of scholarly method,” it is “an outstanding example of lucid philosophical thinking in an area where clear thought is extremely difficult.” Bobzien herself says that the “book is written with those in mind who have an interest in philosophy” and that “[t]his means that historical and philological questions are treated strictly as subordinate to the question of what the respective philosophical position was, whether it was consistent, etc.” This strict subordination is not always so clear, and the philosophical problems are certainly interesting enough that a deeper and more extensive discussion would have been welcome, but Bobzien does provide a philosophically lucid treatment of the Stoic position on determinism, freedom, and related subjects. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy is likely to be a dominate work in the field for quite some time. (shrink)

This volume contains the papers and commentaries that were originally given during the 1996/97 academic year at the meetings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. The speakers give their papers at colloquia that occur at Boston College, Boston University, Brown University, Clark University, College of the Holy Cross, Harvard University, and Wellesley College. There is a commentator for each paper.

This volume contains eight articles on various topics in Stoic philosophy, an introduction devoted primarily to the history of the scholarly study of Stoic philosophy, and a select bibliography devoted to recent work on Stoic philosophy not found in either Spindel Conference 1984: Recovering the Stoics, R. H. Epp or The Hellenistic Philosophers, A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley. The first six articles appeared previously in translation in the Greek philosophical journal Deukalion. Professor Ierodiakonou commissioned these articles as “an (...) attempt to present to the Greek public current work on Stoic philosophy, an area that has been unduly neglected in contemporary Greek scholarship,” but subsequently she came to think that these articles “should also, with the addition of two further articles, be made available in their original version” because they “were highly original and important” and because “modern Greek—unfortunately—is not a lingua franca”. (shrink)

Professor Kahn says that Plato and the Socratic Dialogue “presents a new paradigm for the interpretation of Plato’s early and middle dialogues as a unified literary project, displaying an artistic plan for the expression of a unified world view”. To this end, Kahn argues that “[w]hat we can trace in these dialogues is not the development of Plato’s thought,” as Aristotle and others seem to have thought, “but the gradual unfolding of a literary plan for presenting his philosophical views to (...) the general public”. This “unfolding” begins shortly after the Gorgias. Kahn argues that Plato then “created an essentially new form, the aporetic dialogue with a pseudo-historical setting” in order to bridge the psychological distance between the ordinary conception of the world and the radically new world view he would present in the middle dialogues. Kahn calls his interpretation “the hypothesis of ingressive exposition” and says that this hypothesis is “the claim that the seven threshold dialogues [Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis, and Euthydemus] are designed to prepare the reader for the views expounded in the Symposium, Phaedo, and Republic, and that they can be adequately understood only from the perspective of these middle dialogues”. (shrink)

Professor Beversluis says that this book is a re-reading of Platos early dialogues from the point of view of the characters with whom Socrates engages in debate. He says that unlike existing studies, which are thoroughly dismissive of the interlocutors and reduce them to the status of mere mouthpieces, this book takes them seriously and treats them as genuine intellectual opponents whose views are often more defensible than commentators have standardly thought. Beversluis says his purpose is not to summarize their (...) positions or the arguments of the dialogues in which they appear, much less to produce a series of biographical sketches, but to investigate the phenomenology of philosophical disputation as it manifests itself in the early dialogues. He thinks that this investigation demonstrates the truth of his thesis that Socrates frequent use of faulty arguments and unscrupulous dialectical tactics calls in question his announced seriousness and concern for the souls of his fellows. (shrink)