Jean-Paul Sartre, in describing the realization of his freedom, was often inclined to say mysterious things like ‘I am what I am not’, ‘I am not what I am’ He was therefore plainly contradicting himself, but was this merely a playful literary figure , or was he really being incoherent? By the latter judgment I do not mean to reject his statements entirely ; for I believe there is an intimate link between contradiction and freedom, as I shall explain in (...) this paper. But a minor thing we must first have out of the way is the suggestion that Sartre's language was just a rhetorical trope, designed merely to express some banal platitude in a bemusing way: ‘I am not yet what I will be’, ‘I am no longer what I was’ are sane and sensible, for instance, but cannot be the meant content of Sartre's sayings, since, while they would indeed describe the reform of some character, they would be appropriate only before or after some metamorphosis, not, as Sartre clearly intended, in the midst of some process of riddance and conversion, whether radical or otherwise. Yet, in the turmoil of such a change, ‘I am not what I am’ still, surely, cannot be true, and if that is the case, Sartre must be being inocherent, and therefore, obfuscating and deliberately obscure, and hence, it seems, must properly be rejected by all right and clear thinking men. (shrink)
Such a misconception of grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near to the left of x such that, if he were to utter the sentence “I am hot” at t, what he would (...) thereby say is true’ (Evans 1985: 358). But not only does this disturb the proper relation between direct and indirect speech, it continues a Fregean tradition which these very cases show to be quite mistaken about the logic of intensions. (shrink)
Simultaneous discovery in science has been a subject of close historical investigations, not only for assessing claims of priority, which occasionally generate controversy rather than consensus, but also for understanding the cultural and intellectual context of the time. Thomas S. Kuhn is a pioneer in the contextual study of simultaneous discovery, and his paper on the formulation of the first law of thermodynamics has already become a classic.
Galton and subsequent investigators find wide divergences in people's subjective reports of mental imagery. Such individual differences might be taken to explain the peculiarly irreconcilable disputes over the nature and cognitive significance of imagery which have periodically broken out among psychologists and philosophers. However, to so explain these disputes is itself to take a substantive and questionable position on the cognitive role of imagery. This article distinguishes three separable issues over which people can be "for" or "against" mental images. Conflation (...) of these issues can lead to theoretical differences being mistaken for experiential differences, even by theorists themselves. This is applied to the case of John B. Watson, who inaugurated a half-century of neglect of image psychology. Watson originally claimed to have vivid imagery; by 1913 he was denying the existence of images. This strange reversal, which made his behaviorism possible, is explicable as a "creative misconstrual" of Dunlap's "motor" theory of imagination. (shrink)
An excellent comparison of the thought of the major figure in the "classic period of Roman Catholic theology" with that of "the central figure of seventeenth century [Protestant] theology." Aquinas's views on creation are succinctly summarized and provide a useful background for the exposition of Gerhard's theology. The author finds the different quality of these two theological outlooks to lie in Aquinas's awareness of man's "richness" and Gerhard's emphasis of man's "inner contradictoriness." That is to say, whereas Aquinas sees the (...) world as "reflecting the abundance of God's resourcefulness and ordering love," Gerhard sees more of creation's inner contradictions: "man trying to save himself though unable to do so...." One hopes that more such comparative studies in Catholic-Protestant thought will be forthcoming.—B. P. H. (shrink)
This volume contains thirty-one papers grouped under the following headings: "The Nature of Philosophy," "Man and Knowledge," "God and Religious Knowledge," "Ethics," "Law," and "Texts." A few of the papers discuss the Augustinian tradition. Munoz-Alonso, Blondel, and Sciacca are mentioned as men who have renewed for our time the thought of Augustine. The papers on St. Bonaventure include an analysis by John O. Riedl of some of Bonaventure’s texts on Dionysius the Areopagite, a comparison and contrast by Bernardino Bonansea of (...) the position of Bonaventure and Thomas on the question of creation from eternity, a study by Ewert Cousins of Bonaventure’s dynamic self-diffusive God, and a discussion of his symbolic theology by Leonard Bowman. Scholars will be interested in the report of Ignatius Brady on the Quaracchi edition of Bonaventure’s writings, as well as in the report of James P. Reilly, Jr. on the Leonine Commission’s work on the texts of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)
Thomas clarifies his basic criticism of Yeager's book, Ethics as Social Science, emphasizing his concern about lack of clarity of argument rather than style. Thomas discusses the role of ethical standards in contextual moral reasoning and defends Rand's rejection of ethical altruism against criticisms that it represents a "corner solution" or an unrealistic slippery-slope argument.
The book opens with an article on the chronology and life of St. Thomas, which was written originally in 1920 by the well-known Thomistic scholar, Pierre Mandonnet, for the Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques. In a critical study, written in 1932 and reproduced here in its German version, Palémon Glorieux challenges Mandonnet's conclusions with regard to Thomas's Quaestiones disputatae, while in another essay, also appearing in this volume, he advances hypotheses and clarifies certain points about Aquinas's treatise, (...) De regimine Judaeorum. Many penetrating insights into Thomas's life and personality are furnished by Martin Grabmann in his essay on Aquinas's relationship to the civil and religious authorities of his time, while Heribert Scheeben discusses Thomas's sojourn in Cologne and his personal rapport with his master, Albert the Great. Aquinas's helpers and secretaries are also the subject of a special study by Antoine Dondaine. (shrink)
The first book length study of property-owning democracy, Republic of Equals argues that a society in which capital is universally accessible to all citizens is uniquely placed to meet the demands of justice. Arguing from a basis in liberal-republican principles, this expanded conception of the economic structure of society contextualizes the market to make its transactions fair. The author shows that a property-owning democracy structures economic incentives such that the domination of one agent by another in the market is structurally (...) impossible. The result is a renovated form of capitalism in which the free market is no longer a threat to social democratic values, but is potentially convergent with them. It is argued that a property-owning democracy has advantages that give it priority over rival forms of social organization such as welfare state capitalism and market socialist institutions. The book also addresses the currently high levels of inequality in the societies of the developed West to suggest a range of policies that target the "New Inequality" of our times. For this reason, the work engages not only with political philosophers such as John Rawls, Philip Pettit and John Tomasi, but also with the work of economists and historians such as Anthony B. Atkinson, François Bourguignon, Jacob S. Hacker, Lane Kenworthy, and Thomas Piketty. (shrink)
The first book-length study of property-owning democracy, Republic of Equals, argues that a society in which capital is universally accessible to all citizens is uniquely placed to meet the demands of justice. Arguing from a basis in liberal-republican principles, this expanded conception of the economic structure of society contextualizes the market to make its transactions fair. It shows that a property-owning democracy structures economic incentives such that the domination of one agent by another in the market is structurally impossible. The (...) result is a renovated form of capitalism in which the free market is no longer a threat to social democratic values but is potentially convergent with them. It is argued that a property-owning democracy has advantages that give it priority over rival forms of social organization such as welfare-state capitalism and market socialist institutions. The book also addresses the currently high levels of inequality in the societies of the developed West to suggest a range of policies that target the “New Inequality” of the twenty-first century. For this reason, the work engages not only with political philosophers such as John Rawls, Philip Pettit, and John Tomasi but also with the work of economists and historians such as Anthony B. Atkinson, François Bourguignon, Jacob S. Hacker, Lane Kenworthy, and Thomas Piketty. (shrink)
This essay is part of a symposium on affirmative action that took place at the University of Cincinnati with the distinguished legal scholar Ronald Dworkin. I argue against affirmative action. And I discuss at length the votes of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the dissent of Justice Clarence Thomas. I develop the idea of idiosyncratic excellence; and I argue that diversity is a weakness insofar as it (a) an excuse for social myopia and (b)an impediment to individuals seeing beyond (...) their differences and affirming the excellences that they witness. The expected publication date, Univ of Cinn Law Review, is March 2004. (shrink)