A great deal of modern Protestant theology looks very much like an attempt to conduct a salvage operation which is designed to make clear how it is possible to retain belief in Jesus Christ, and at the same time remain intellectually honest. For the same sceptical challenge which faces the secular historian also faces the theologian. If Christians are correct in arguing that the locus of God's revelation to man is in Jesus of Nazareth, then in order to know about (...) this supposed revelation, it is necessary to know about a period of time in the past; it is necessary to know the history of the man's life and actions. Theologians are therefore faced with the question: how, if at all, is it possible to bridge the logical gap between statements describing what Jesus of Nazareth said and did, and statements describing the evidence for what Jesus of Nazareth said and did. The solution found to this question by theologians tends to be determined by their conscious and unconscious philosophical presuppositions; just as it did in the examples discussed above of secular critical philosophies of history. (shrink)
An inclusive and non-technical introduction to "the universal teacher of Christendom," in which biography, history, and philosophical argument are intertwined. The author emphasizes parallels between Thomas' time and ours, and points to the special relevance of his spirit to the challenges of our age. A major theme of the book is that Thomistic "terminology" is not coincident with Thomas' "living language," and that the latter is decidedly more worthy of attention.--C. D.
Constantly aware of the mutual limits of philosophy and religion, Montagnes examines the development of St. Thomas' thought concerning the analogy of being and the conformity of his thought to that doctrine of Cajetan largely accepted by Thomists. He argues convincingly that Cajetan's thought differs importantly from that of Aquinas with regard to the source of the analogy.--C. E. B.
The growing block view of time holds that the past and present are real whilst the future is unreal; as future events become present and real, they are added on to the growing block of reality. Surprisingly, given the recent interest in this view, there is very little literature on its origins. This paper explores those origins, and advances two theses. First, I show that although C. D. Broad’s Scientific Thought provides the first defence of the growing block theory, the (...) theory receives its first articulation in Samuel Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity. Further, Alexander’s account of deity inclines towards the growing block view. Second, I argue that Broad shifted towards the growing block theory as a result of his newfound conviction that time has a direction. By way of tying these theses together, I argue that Broad’s views on the direction of time – and possibly even his growing block theory – are sourced in Alexander. (shrink)
After devoting a long section to a systematic exposition of Mann's philosophy, the author analyses, in chronological sequence, his main writings. Though a bit long-winded, the book does contain a good deal of insight into the content of Mann's work.--C. L.
A careful explication de texte which too rarely rises to a macroscopic view of Browne's works. Mrs. Bennett treats Browne less as a master of Baroque style than as a far-ranging, experimental thinker, a Janus who looked back on the medieval world and ahead to the modern one. He took witchcraft seriously but was skeptical of contemporary proofs of it; believed in a Ptolemaic universe but was open to the possible truth of Copernican conceptions; and speculated freely within a framework (...) of Christian belief. Browne emerges as more than a literary curiosity, although his thought seems less than striking when it is shorn of its stylistic glories.--C. B. (shrink)
This book examines the intersection between religious belief, dynastic ambitions, and late Renaissance court culture within the main branches of Germany's most storied ruling house, the Wittelsbach dynasty. Their influence touched many shores from the "coast" of Bohemia to Boston.
This translation of Thomas' paraphrase and analysis of Aristotle's philosophy of science is, unfortunately, mimeographed and bound in a paper cover. It lacks the introductory material which is needed to orient the reader philosophically and to specify the issues at stake; it also lacks notes giving the meanings of technical terms and comparing the exposition to Aristotle's own text. There is, however, a rather extensive index. The publication of this volume intensifies the historical problem whether commentaries such as this (...) accurately represent medieval conceptions of science. Recent volumes, such as A. C. Crombie's on Grosseteste, indicate that some thinkers at least were arriving at a mathematical conception of physical reality, which could not have been derived from exclusive attention to the Aristotelian corpus.--C. L. (shrink)
What I’m suggesting is that the model for Descartes’s defence of Renaissance science would be Aquinas’s own defence of thirteenth-century Aristotelian science, except that the coherence of the will took on the role of the consistency of concepts, as the controlling factor in the analyses of all types of science. As a result, the new science would incorporate the awareness of Platonic ideas and the divisibility of Euclidean space as equally valid input into a dialectical knowledge of sensory experience. You (...) can read the early arguments to doubt the reality of sensory experience and reason as a way of dividing out the experience of the will in affirming or denying an object’s nature, as the subject for subsequent inquiry. Je suggère dans cet article que le modèle de la défense par Descartes de la science de la Renaissance pourrait être celui par Thomas d’Aquin de la science « aristotélicienne » du treizième siècle, n’était le fait que c’est la cohérence de la volonté qui prit en charge chez Descartes le rôle de la consistance des concepts comme facteur contrôlant dans les analyses de tous les types de science. En conséquence, la science nouvelle pouvait intégrer la conscience des idées platoniciennes et la divisibilité de l’espace euclidien comme un apport tout aussi valide dans la connaissance dialectique de l’expérience sensorielle. On peut interpréter les premiers arguments invitant à douter de la réalité de l’expérience sensorielle et de la raison comme une façon de scinder l’expérience de la volonté dans l’affirmation et la négation de la nature d’un objet, ce qui sera le sujet d’une enquête ultérieure. (shrink)
This paper critically engages with Tom Shakespeare’s book Disability rights and wrongs. It concentrates on his attempt to demolish the social model of disability, as well as his sketch of an “alternative” approach to understanding “disability”. Shakespeare’s critique, it is argued, does British disability studies a “wrong” by presenting it as a meagre discipline that has not been able to engage with disability and impairment effects in an analytically sophisticated fashion. What was required was a measured presentation and evaluation of (...) the rich mix of theoretical and empirically based ideas to be found in the discipline, as the groundwork for forward thinking located within a social oppression paradigm. Shakespeare’s undermining of the discipline’s credibility in the eyes of outsiders and newcomers represents a diversionary missed opportunity by an influential writer and activist.Shakespeare’s book1 has certainly stirred up debate, and invited a flurry of angry reviews, in disability studies in the UK—the social science discipline that has been developing radical ideas about disability and disablism since the 1980s. Peopled by both disabled academics and like-minded non-disabled researchers and writers, the DS community recognises that Shakespeare’s book seeks to deliver a fatal wound to what he sees as its sacred cow: the British social model of disability.Shakespeare explains that what he calls the “strong” version of the social model of disability was formulated by Michael Oliver, a leading DS writer and disability activist, on the basis of the social and political ideas advanced in the 1970s by a group of disabled individuals fighting to free themselves from what they experienced as an oppressive care system that relegated and segregated people with serious impairments to residential institutions and to the category of the unemployable.2 3 In short, the social model asserts that “disability” is not caused …. (shrink)
Anecdotal reports obtained from three individuals with prosopagnosia, all of whom have participated in an investigation, capture the essence of their impairment. This article focuses on the contrast between two prominent forms of prosopagnosia, one of which results from an acquired brain insult in an otherwise premorbidly normal individual and a second which appears to be lifelong and occurs in the absence of any obvious brain damage, at least as evident on conventional brain imaging. It reviews two central issues: the (...) first concerns the similarities and differences in the psychological representations of faces in acquired prosopagnosia and congenital prosopagnosia, and the second concerns the nature of the underlying neural representations of faces in these two populations. Some well-established overlapping behavioral characteristics are identified. (shrink)