We introduce an Absolute (Relative) Time-consistent Axiom of Revealed Preference which characterizes the consistency of a choice function with the property of absolute (relative) time-consistency and impatience. The axiom requires that the absolute (relative) time-consistent and impatient closure of the revealed preference relation does not conflict with the strict revealed preference relation.

We consider a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous goods and we allow for asymmetric marginal costs. We derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck et al.. In contrast to the set of Nash equilibria, the unique Myopic Stable Set can be easily characterized in closed form and it provides an intuitive set-valued prediction.

We provide statistical inference for measures of predictive success. These measures are frequently used to evaluate and compare the performance of different models of individual and group decision making in experimental and revealed preference studies. We provide a brief illustration of our findings by comparing the predictive success of different revealed preference tests for models of intertemporal decision making. This demonstrates that it is possible to compare the predictive success of different models in a statistically meaningful way.