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Thomas Grundmann
University of Cologne
  1.  29
    Die Unhintergehbarkeit der Intuition.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
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  2.  25
    Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critcal Thinking Mislead Cognition.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - In Sven Bernecker, Amy Floweree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically relevant. In this paper, I will (...)
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  3. How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.
    In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement–the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)–are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I (...)
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  4.  19
    Theorie oder Therapie. Perspektiven der pyrrhonischen Skepsis bei Sextus Empiricus.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
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  5. Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.
    In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if (...)
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  6. Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism Cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Episteme:1-18.
    Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism is well-motivated, does not undercut (...)
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  7.  16
    Preface Special Issue GAP.10.Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):527-528.
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  8. Epistemic Authority: Preemption Through Source Sensitive Defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one (...)
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  9.  70
    Preemptive Authority: The Challenge From Outrageous Expert Judgment.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert assertions that strike the layperson as obviously false or outrageous, seem to give one a perfect reason to dispute that this judgment manifests expertise. In this paper, I will defend four claims. First, I will deliver an argument in support of the preemption view on expert judgments according to which we should not rationally use our own domain-specific reasons in the face of expert testimony. Secondly, I will argue (...)
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  10.  60
    Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations.Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533.
    Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one (...)
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  11. Erratum To: Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations.Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):535-536.
    Erratum to: Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3Dear Reader, due to production systems the following changes could not be made to this article:In the paragraph immediately preceding the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford, and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).should be replaced withHere (...)
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  12. Doubts About Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge From Disagreement.Thomas Grundmann - 2013 - In Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge. pp. 72-98.
    In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the first part of this paper I will focus on (...)
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  13.  92
    Knowledge From Forgetting.Sven Bernecker & Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-540.
    This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.
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  14. Saving Safety From Counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper I will offer a comprehensive defense of the safety account of knowledge against counterexamples that have been recently put forward. In section 1, I will discuss different versions of safety, arguing that a specific variant of method-relativized safety is the most plausible. I will then use this specific version of safety to respond to counterexamples in the recent literature. In section 2, I will address alleged examples of safe beliefs that still constitute Gettier cases. In section 3, (...)
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  15. Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.
    It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, e.g. that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out different reliabilist strategies to deal with the problem. Among them I will discuss conservative strategies (sect. 2), eliminativist stragies (sect. 3) and revisionist strategies (sect. 4). In the final section I will present an improved revisionist (...)
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  16. The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection.Thomas Grundmann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):69-87.
    In the first part of this paper I will characterize the specific nature of rational intuition. It will be claimed that rational intuition is an evidential state with modal content that has an a priori source. This claim will be defended against several objections. The second part of the paper deals with the so-called explanationist objection against rational intuition as a justifying source. According to the best reading of this objection, intuition cannot justify any judgment since there is no metaphysical (...)
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  17.  70
    Experimental Philosophy and its Critics.Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann (eds.) - 2012 - Routledge.
    Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers’ intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. In this volume, the metaphilosophical reflection on experimental philosophy is brought yet (...)
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  18. Defeasibility Theory.Thomas Grundmann - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 156-166.
    This is a survey article about epistemic defeaters: what is defeated, how defeaters work, different kinds of defeaters, indefeasibility and how defeaters fit into epistemic internalism and externalism.
     
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  19. Progress and Historical Reflection in Philosophy.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - In Philosophy and the Historical Perspective. Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy. pp. 51-68.
    What is the epistemic significance of reflecting on a discipline’s past for making progress in that discipline? I assume that the answer to this question negatively correlates with that discipline’s degree of progress over time. If and only if a science is progressive, then what people think or argue in that discipline ceases to be up-to-date. In this paper, I will distinguish different dimensions of disciplinary progress and consequently argue that veritic progress, i.e. collective convergence to truth, is the most (...)
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  20. New Lessons From Old Demons: The Case For Reliabilism.Thomas Grundmann - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-110.
  21. Platonism and the Apriori in Thought Experiments.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London, New York: Routledge.
  22.  1
    Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - Walter de Gruyter.
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  23. Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - De Gruyter.
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  24. Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams.Thomas Grundmann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):345-352.
    In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a successful diagnosis (...)
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  25.  98
    Conceptual Construction in Epistemology.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
    Standard Analytic Epistemology typically relies on conceptual analysis of folk epistemic terms such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘justification’. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective on this method leads to the worry that there might not be universally shared epistemic concepts, and that different languages might use folk notions that have different extensions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that our epistemic common-sense terms pick out what is epistemically most significant or valuable. In my paper, I take these issues as a starting (...)
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  26. Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2.Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):283-292.
    In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.
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  27.  24
    Transcendental Arguments and Realism.Thomas Grundmann & Catrin Misselhorn - 2003 - In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--218.
  28.  92
    How Reliabilism Saves the Apriori/Aposteriori Distinction.Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2747-2768.
    Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and reliabilism. (...)
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  29.  98
    Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):89-105.
    According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In (...)
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  30.  38
    Justification and the Truth-Connection, by Clayton Littlejohn: Cambridge: Routledge, 2012, Pp. Vii + 269, $42.95. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):622-624.
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  31.  97
    Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion.Thomas Grundmann, Joachim Horvath & Jens Kipper (eds.) - 2014 - Suhrkamp.
    Philosophen berufen sich in Gedankenexperimenten oft auf Intuitionen. Doch werden diese Intuitionen auch von anderen Philosophen oder von philosophischen Laien geteilt? Und durch welche Faktoren werden sie eigentlich bestimmt? Experimentelle Philosophen gehen solchen Fragen seit einigen Jahren mit empirischen Methoden auf den Grund. Ihre Ergebnisse sind mitunter verblüffend und haben für Aufsehen gesorgt. Der vorliegende Band lässt führende Vertreter und Gegner dieser wachsenden Bewegung zu Wort kommen und will die bislang überwiegend englischsprachige Debatte verstärkt in die deutsche Philosophie hineintragen.
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  32.  55
    Conceptual Construction: Why the Content of Our Folk Terms Has Only Limited Significance.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - In Masaharu Mizumoto & Stephen Stich (eds.), Ethno-Epistemology.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology typically relies on conceptual analysis of folk epistemic terms such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘justification’. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective on this method leads to the worry that there might not be universally shared epistemic concepts, and that different languages might use folk notions that have different extensions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that our epistemic common-sense terms pick out what is epistemically most significant or valuable. In my paper, I take these issues as a starting (...)
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  33.  19
    Egoismus, Altruismus Und Die Furcht Vor Dem Eigenen Tod. Ein Beitrag Zur Analytischen Existenzphilosophie.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (4):465-491.
    In this paper I will argue that Bernard William’s theory of frustrated desires is superior to Tom Nagel's theory of deprivation in explaining when and why death is harmful to oneself. The model of frustrated desires will then be applied contrastively to the altruist and the egoist. Contrary to what one might expect, death is not a misfortune only to the egoist. The truth is more nuanced. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between what death means to the altruist and (...)
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  34.  4
    7. Quellen des Wissens.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 337-404.
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  35. Erkenntnistheorie. Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart.Thomas Grundmann (ed.) - 2001 - mentis.
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  36.  28
    Warum wir Wissen als einen wichtigen Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie betrachten sollten: Eine Antwort auf Ansgar Beckermann.Thomas Grundmann - 2002 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1):118 - 124.
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  37. Bonjour‘s Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism.Thomas Grundmann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  38.  52
    Die Struktur Des Skeptischen Traumarguments.Thomas Grundmann - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):57-81.
    Skeptical dream-arguments are intended as general challenges to our epistemic claims concerning the world. They argue that we can never rule out the possibility of merely dreaming what we believe to perceive. In my paper I will scrutinize whether any kind of such argument is sound. On my view, many versions of this argument are defective. They are either too weak to challenge all kinds of our epistemic claims or they rely on implausibly strong epistemic principles. More plausible versions of (...)
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  39.  13
    Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited.Thomas Grundmann - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 2--65.
  40.  22
    Das erkenntnistheoretische Regreßargument.Thomas Grundmann - 2001 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (2):221 - 245.
    Wenn von dem epistemischen Regreßargument die Rede ist, dann denkt man gewöhnlich an ein Argument für den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus: Um einen drohenden Begründungsregreß zu vermeiden, muß man annehmen, daß es sogenannte basale Meinungen gibt, die nicht durch andere Meinungen (oder propositionale Zustände inferentiell gerechtfertigt werden, sondern unmittelbar gerechtfertigt sind. Das fundamentalistische Regreßargument ist jedoch nur eine mögliche Reaktion auf das zugrundeliegende epistemische Regreßproblem. Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich genauer mit den Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des skeptischen Regreßarguments und vertritt die These, daß (...)
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  41.  24
    Gibt es ein subjektives Fundament unseres Wissens?Thomas Grundmann - 1996 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (3):458 - 472.
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  42.  7
    1. Einführung.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 1-24.
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  43.  7
    Die Grenzen des Erkenntnistheoretischen Kontextualismus.Thomas Grundmann - 2003 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 51 (6):993.
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  44.  6
    9. Anhang : Seminarpläne.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 423-436.
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  45.  17
    Review: Neuere Tendenzen in der Analytischen Erkenntnistheorie. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 1997 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (4):627 - 648.
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  46.  9
    Die Bedingungen des Verstehens als Bedingungen der Gegenstände des Verstehens.Thomas Grundmann - 1997 - In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science. De Gruyter. pp. 232-245.
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  47.  6
    4. Erkenntnistheoretische Rechtfertigung.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. Walter de Gruyter.
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  48.  6
    6. Skeptizismus.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 253-336.
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  49.  5
    Glossar.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 449-460.
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  50.  14
    XVI. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie. "Neue Realitäten: Herausforderung der Philosophie" 20.-24. September 1993 an der TU Berlin. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 1994 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (2):292 - 299.
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