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Profile: Thomas Grundmann (University of Cologne)
  1.  32
    Conceptual Construction in Epistemology.Thomas Grundmann - manuscript
    Standard Analytic Epistemology typically relies on conceptual analysis of folk epistemic terms such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘justification’. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective on this method leads to the worry that there might not be universally shared epistemic concepts, and that different languages might use folk notions that have different extensions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that our epistemic common-sense terms pick out what is epistemically most significant or valuable. In my paper, I take these issues as a starting (...)
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  2. Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.
    In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if (...)
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  3.  25
    Platonism and the Apriori in Thought Experiments.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London, New York: Routledge.
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  4.  32
    Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations.Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):525-533.
    Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one (...)
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  5. Erratum To: Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations.Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):535-536.
    Erratum to: Philos Stud DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0226-3Dear Reader, due to production systems the following changes could not be made to this article:In the paragraph immediately preceding the case description (ford-iii), the sentenceHere we explicitly state that Smith’s inference is based only on his belief that Jones owns a Ford, and that this logical inference provides Smith’s only justification for believing that someone in his office owns a Ford (to make things fully precise, we also add a time index).should be replaced withHere (...)
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  6. The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection.Thomas Grundmann - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):69-87.
    In the first part of this paper I will characterize the specific nature of rational intuition. It will be claimed that rational intuition is an evidential state with modal content that has an a priori source. This claim will be defended against several objections. The second part of the paper deals with the so-called explanationist objection against rational intuition as a justifying source. According to the best reading of this objection, intuition cannot justify any judgment since there is no metaphysical (...)
     
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  7.  5
    Knowledge From Forgetting.Sven Bernecker & Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.
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  8. Doubts About Philosophy? The Alleged Challenge From Disagreement.Thomas Grundmann - 2013 - In Tim Henning & David Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action. Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work. Routledge. pp. 72-98.
    In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. This would prima facie suggest a robust suspension of judgment in philosophy. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In the first part of this paper I will focus on (...)
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  9.  83
    Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):89-105.
    According to the received view, externalist grounds or reasons need not be introspectively accessible. Roughly speaking, from an externalist point of view, a belief will be epistemically justified, iff it is based upon facts that make its truth objectively highly likely. This condition can be satisfied, even if the epistemic agent does not have actual or potential awareness of the justifying facts. No inner perspective on the belief-forming mechanism and its truth-ratio is needed for a belief to be justified. In (...)
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  10.  79
    Inferential Contextualism, Epistemological Realism and Scepticism: Comments on Williams.Thomas Grundmann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):345-352.
    In this paper I will discuss Michael Williamss inferential contextualism – a position that must be carefully distinguished from the currently more fashionable attributer contextualism. I will argue that Williamss contextualism is not stable, though it avoids some of the shortcomings of simple inferential contextualism. In particular, his criticism of epistemological realism cannot be supported on the basis of his own account. I will also argue that we need not give up epistemological realism in order to provide a successful diagnosis (...)
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  11. Reliabilism and the Problem of Defeaters.Thomas Grundmann - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):65-76.
    It is widely assumed that justification is defeasible, e.g. that under certain conditions counterevidence removes prior justification of beliefs. In this paper I will first (sect. 1) explain why this feature of justification poses a prima facie problem for reliabilism. I then will try out different reliabilist strategies to deal with the problem. Among them I will discuss conservative strategies (sect. 2), eliminativist stragies (sect. 3) and revisionist strategies (sect. 4). In the final section I will present an improved revisionist (...)
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  12.  7
    Progress and Historical Reflection in Philosophy.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - In Philosophy and the Historical Perspective. Proceedings of the British Academy.
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  13. Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2.Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):283-292.
    In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.
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  14.  47
    Experimental Philosophy and its Critics.Joachim Horvath & Thomas Grundmann (eds.) - 2012 - Routledge.
    Experimental philosophy is one of the most recent and controversial developments in philosophy. Its basic idea is rather simple: to test philosophical thought experiments and philosophers’ intuitions about them with scientific methods, mostly taken from psychology and the social sciences. The ensuing experimental results, such as the cultural relativity of certain philosophical intuitions, has engaged – and at times infuriated – many more traditionally minded "armchair" philosophers since then. In this volume, the metaphilosophical reflection on experimental philosophy is brought yet (...)
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  15. 7. Quellen des Wissens.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. Walter de Gruyter.
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  16.  63
    How Reliabilism Saves the Apriori/Aposteriori Distinction.Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2747-2768.
    Contemporary epistemologists typically define a priori justification as justification that is independent of sense experience. However, sense experience plays at least some role in the production of many paradigm cases of a priori justified belief. This raises the question of when experience is epistemically relevant to the justificatory status of the belief that is based on it. In this paper, I will outline the answers that can be given by the two currently dominant accounts of justification, i.e. evidentialism and reliabilism. (...)
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  17. Erkenntnistheorie. Positionen zwischen Tradition und Gegenwart.Thomas Grundmann (ed.) - 2001 - mentis.
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  18. BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism.Thomas Grundmann - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
    One of the most influential arguments for the coherence theory of empirical justification is BonJours a priori argument from the internalist regress. According to this argument, foundationalism cannot solve the problem of the internalist regress since internalism is incompatible with basic beliefs. Hence, coherentism seems to be the only option. In my article I contend that this argument is doomed to failure. It is either too strong or too weak. Too strong, since even coherentism cannot stop the internalist regress in (...)
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  19.  2
    New Lessons From Old Demons: The Case For Reliabilism.Thomas Grundmann - 2016 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-110.
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  20.  13
    Transcendental Arguments and Realism.Thomas Grundmann & Catrin Misselhorn - 2003 - In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. Oxford University Press. pp. 205--218.
  21.  18
    Das erkenntnistheoretische Regreßargument.Thomas Grundmann - 2001 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 55 (2):221 - 245.
    Wenn von dem epistemischen Regreßargument die Rede ist, dann denkt man gewöhnlich an ein Argument für den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus: Um einen drohenden Begründungsregreß zu vermeiden, muß man annehmen, daß es sogenannte basale Meinungen gibt, die nicht durch andere Meinungen (oder propositionale Zustände inferentiell gerechtfertigt werden, sondern unmittelbar gerechtfertigt sind. Das fundamentalistische Regreßargument ist jedoch nur eine mögliche Reaktion auf das zugrundeliegende epistemische Regreßproblem. Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich genauer mit den Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des skeptischen Regreßarguments und vertritt die These, daß (...)
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  22.  17
    Justification and the Truth-Connection, by Clayton Littlejohn.Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):622-624.
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  23.  21
    Warum wir Wissen als einen wichtigen Begriff der Erkenntnistheorie betrachten sollten: Eine Antwort auf Ansgar Beckermann.Thomas Grundmann - 2002 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1):118 - 124.
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  24.  9
    Counterexamples to Epistemic Externalism Revisited.Thomas Grundmann - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. pp. 2--65.
  25.  16
    Gibt es ein subjektives Fundament unseres Wissens?Thomas Grundmann - 1996 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 50 (3):458 - 472.
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  26.  13
    Review: Neuere Tendenzen in der Analytischen Erkenntnistheorie. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 1997 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 51 (4):627 - 648.
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  27.  13
    XVI. Deutscher Kongreß für Philosophie. "Neue Realitäten: Herausforderung der Philosophie" 20.-24. September 1993 an der TU Berlin. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 1994 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 48 (2):292 - 299.
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  28. Defeasibility Theory.Thomas Grundmann - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routleddge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 156-166.
    This is a survey article about epistemic defeaters: what is defeated, how defeaters work, different kinds of defeaters, indefeasibility and how defeaters fit into epistemic internalism and externalism.
     
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  29.  2
    Die Bedingungen des Verstehens als Bedingungen der Gegenstände des Verstehens.Thomas Grundmann - 1997 - In Julian Nida-Rümelin & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science. De Gruyter. pp. 232-245.
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  30. 9. Anhang : Seminarpläne.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 423-436.
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  31. Begründungsstrategien. Ein Weg durch die analytische Erkenntnistheorie. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 1999 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (2).
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  32.  39
    Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion.Thomas Grundmann, Joachim Horvath & Jens Kipper (eds.) - 2014 - Suhrkamp.
    Philosophen berufen sich in Gedankenexperimenten oft auf Intuitionen. Doch werden diese Intuitionen auch von anderen Philosophen oder von philosophischen Laien geteilt? Und durch welche Faktoren werden sie eigentlich bestimmt? Experimentelle Philosophen gehen solchen Fragen seit einigen Jahren mit empirischen Methoden auf den Grund. Ihre Ergebnisse sind mitunter verblüffend und haben für Aufsehen gesorgt. Der vorliegende Band lässt führende Vertreter und Gegner dieser wachsenden Bewegung zu Wort kommen und will die bislang überwiegend englischsprachige Debatte verstärkt in die deutsche Philosophie hineintragen.
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  33. 5. Die Struktur der Rechtfertigung.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. Walter de Gruyter.
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  34. 5. Die Struktur der Rechtfertigung.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 207-252.
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  35. 4. Erkenntnistheoretische Rechtfertigung.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 167-206.
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  36. Glossar.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 449-460.
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  37. Geert-lueke Lueken: Inkommensurabilität AlS problem rationalen argumentierens. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 1993 - Philosophische Rundschau 40 (4):325.
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  38. Literaturverzeichnis.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 437-448.
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  39. Namenregister.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 467-470.
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  40. Philosophie der Skepsis.Thomas Grundmann & Karsten Stüber - 1996
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  41. 7. Quellen des Wissens.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 337-404.
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  42. 6. Skeptizismus.Thomas Grundmann - 2008 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. Walter de Gruyter.
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  43. 6. Skeptizismus.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 253-336.
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  44. Sachregister.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 461-466.
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  45. Transcendental Arguments. Problems and Prospects; Transcendental Arguments and Scepticism. Answering the Question of Justification. [REVIEW]Thomas Grundmann - 2002 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (2).
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  46. Vorwort.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter.
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  47. Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter.
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  48. 2. Wahrheit.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 25-54.
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  49. 3. Wissen.Thomas Grundmann - 2017 - In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie. De Gruyter. pp. 55-166.
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  50. Wenn der Determinismus wahr ware... Uber die Möglichkeit von Willensfreiheit in der natiirlichen Welt1.Thomas Grundmann - 2003 - In Andreas Bächli & Klaus Petrus (eds.), Monism. Ontos. pp. 9--293.
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