This book consists of a selection of papers which throw new light on old problems in one of Plato s most difficult dialogues. The first set of papers deals with definitions of sophistry from different perspectives. In the central section E. Hulsz, D. O'Brien, B. Bossi, P. Mesquita and N. Cordero consider the problem of being and relative non-being with regard to Heraclitus and the legacy of Parmenides. The final section with papers by F. Fronterotta, J. de Garay, D. Ambuel (...) and L. Palumbo is devoted to ontology, predication and truth.". (shrink)

Environmental ethicists have frequently criticized ancient Greek philosophy as anti-environmental for a view of philosophy that is counterproductive to environmental ethics and a view of the world that puts nature at the disposal of people. This provocative collection of original essays reexamines the views of nature and ecology found in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Plotinus. Recognizing that these thinkers were not confronted with the environmental degradation that threatens contemporary philosophers, the contributors to this book find that (...) the Greeks nevertheless provide an excellent foundation for a sound theory of environmentalism. (shrink)

The paper has as its goal the investigation of the meaning of logos in DK frs. 1, 2, 31b, 39, 45, 50, 87, 108, and 115, with particular emphasis on frs. 1, 2 and 50. It is argued that the focal meaning of the term is ‘account’ or ‘statement’, and that the statement in question, of particular importance in frs 1, 2 and 50, it the account/statement forever being uttered by ‘that which is wise’,, Heraclitus’ divine principle. Plato picks up (...) the idea, with his notion of a World Soul which is similarly forever in a state of utterance which is a piece of self-description, and it is suggested that a modern version of the notion of the universe being in an everlasting state of such self-description is our ability to learn what it has to say by investigating the ‘language’ of radio waves and the like, which are forever being emitted by all moving systems composing the real, and thereby forever offering us a piece of the real’s self-description of itself. (shrink)

The paper deals with the "deuteros plous", literally ‘the second voyage’, proverbially ‘the next best way’, discussed in Plato’s "Phaedo", the key passage being Phd. 99e4–100a3. The second voyage refers to what Plato’s Socrates calls his “flight into the logoi”. Elaborating on the subject, the author first (I) provides a non-standard interpretation of the passage in question, and then (II) outlines the philosophical problem that it seems to imply, and, finally, (III) tries to apply this philosophical problem to the "ultimate (...) final proof" of immortality and to draw an analogy with the ontological argument for the existence of God, as proposed by Descartes in his 5th "Meditation". The main points are as follows: (a) the “flight into the logoi” can have two different interpretations, a common one and an astonishing one, and (b) there is a structural analogy between Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God in his 5th "Meditation" and the "ultimate final proof" for the immortality of the soul in the "Phaedo". (shrink)

Aunque el Libro I de República parece un diálogo socrático estándar sobre un término moral como justicia, que culmina con un estado de aparente aporía, se termina afirmando que la justicia es como un estado del alma caracterizado por el conocimiento. El libro I termina siendo el preámbulo para mostrar que ser justo es mejor que ser injusto, y que la justicia es en y por sí misma beneficiosa sin relación con cualquier ‘recompensa o consecuencia’ que devenga para el individuo (...) justo (358b). Ello mueve a Adimanto y Glaucon a retar a Sócrates a que muestre cómo independientemente de cualquier otra consideración, el hombre verdaderamente justo está mejor que el verdaderamente injusto, aun cuando el hombre verdaderamente justo se halle en el máximo de dolor y su reputación de bueno haya sido destruida, y el hombre malo no esté sufriendo ningún dolor y disfrute de una reputación de absolutamente virtuoso. En el presente artículo se examina este argumento y la relación entre justicia y eudaimonía, como solución platónica al reto de los sofistas. La clave interpretativa consiste en examinar los sentidos en los que se entiende la noción de eudaimonía en el contexto del reto. Palabras clave: Platón; República; Sócrates; Justicia; EudaimoníaAlthough Republic’s Book I seems a standard Socratic dialogue on a moral term as justice, which culminates with a state of apparent aporia, it ends up asserting that justice is like a state of the soul characterized by knowledge. Book I ends up being the preamble to show that being just is better than being unjust, and that justice is in itself and by itself beneficial, regardless of any ‘reward or consequence’ to the just individual (358b). This leads Adeimantus and Glaucon to challenge Socrates to show how, regardless of any other consideration, the truly just man is better than the truly unjust one, even when the truly just man found himself in the highest pain and his reputation as a good man had been destroyed, while the mean man did not suffer any pain and enjoyed a reputation as an absolutely virtuous man. In this paper we examine this argument and the relation between justice and eudemonia, as a Platonic solution to the sophists’ challenge. The interpretative key consists in examining the senses in w ich the notion of eudemonia is understood in the context of the challenge. Keywords: Plato; Republic; Socrates; Justice; Eudaimonia. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of Platonic scholarship that for Plato a significant, if not the most significant feature of Heracliteanism was the so-called “doctrine of flux”. In this paper I wish to discuss another feature of what seems to me basic Heraclitean doctrine that is taken over by Plato, albeit without explicit recognition of the fact, as a central tenet of his cosmopsychology: the notion of the language of the real.

What Heraclitus said about soul can be quickly set out: 1. One would never discover the limits of soul, should one traverse every road—so deep a measure does it possess. 2. For souls it is death to become water, and for water death to become earth. Water comes into existence out of earth, and soul out of water. 3. Whenever a man is drunk, he is led along, stumbling, by a beardless boy; he does not perceive where he is going, (...) because his soul is wet. 4. Poor witnesses for people are eyes and ears if they possess uncomprehending souls. 5. A flash of light a dry soul, wisest and best. 6. For souls it is joy or death to become wet. 7. It is difficult to fight passion, for whatever it wishes it buys at the price of soul. (shrink)

Two sixteenth-century manuscripts, Vat. 217 and 1338, each contain, as an appendix to the works of Sextus Empiricus, a small Sophistic treatise now usually referred to as the Δισσοὶ Λόγοι. The two appendices were first collated, it would seem, by Conrad Trieber, who planned to publish an edition of the treatise. He died, however, before the project was completed, and his notes passed into the possession of Wilamowitz, who allowed H. Mutschmann to consult them for purposes of writing his own (...) article on Sextus. (shrink)