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Thomas Metzinger [83]Thomas K. Metzinger [1]
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Thomas Metzinger
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
  1. Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
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  2. Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive Processing.Wanja Wiese & Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predictive Processing.
    The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. -/- The features described here (...)
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  3.  52
    The Ego Tunnel: The Science of Mind and the Myth of the Self.Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - Basic Books.
    Philosopher and scientist Thomas Metzinger argues that neuroscience's picture of the "self" as an emergent phenomenon of our biology and the attendant fact that the "self" can be manipulated--and even controlled--raises novel and serious ...
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  4. Full-Body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood.Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-13.
  5. The Problem of Mental Action.Thomas Metzinger - 2017 - Philosophy and Predicitive Processing.
    In mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and developing a first (...)
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  6. Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness.Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger & Olaf Blanke - 2007 - Science 317 (5841):1096-1099.
    Genes adjacent to species-specific loci are 6.2% older than genes adjacent to other dynamic loci (P < 10−2 by randomization; gray bars in Fig. 3); thus, species-specific genes are not randomly distributed but are found preferentially in the older regions, indicating that the incipient Escherichia and Salmonella lineages continued to participate in recombination at loci unlinked to lineage-specific genes.
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  7. Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions.Thomas Metzinger - 2000 - MIT Press.
  8. The Myth of Cognitive Agency: Subpersonal Thinking as a Cyclically Recurring Loss of Mental Autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.
    This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as (...)
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  9. Why Are Dreams Interesting for Philosophers? The Example of Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood, Plus an Agenda for Future Research.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:746.
    This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to (...)
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  10. Conscious Experience.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 1995 - Ferdinand Schoningh.
    The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 thematic sections, compiled by David Chalmers and Thomas (...)
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  11.  18
    Minimal Phenomenal Experience.Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-44.
    This is the first in a series of instalments aiming at a minimal model explanation for conscious experience, taking the phenomenal character of “pure consciousness” or “pure awareness” in meditation as its entry point. It develops the concept of “minimal phenomenal experience” as a candidate for the simplest form of consciousness, substantiating it by extracting six semantic constraints from the existing literature and using sixteen phenomenological case-studies to incrementally flesh out the new working concept. One empirical hypothesis is that the (...)
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  12. Empirical Perspectives From the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples.Thomas Metzinger - 2008 - In Rahul Banerjee & B. K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of Brain and Mind: Physical, Computational, and Psychological Approaches. Elsevier.
  13. Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct. Recommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-Technology.Michael Madary & Thomas Metzinger - 2016 - Frontiers in Robotics and AI 3:1-23.
    The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting that (...)
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  14. M-Autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):270-302.
    What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an unintentional form of inner behaviour. Empirical research shows that we are not mentally autonomous subjects for about two thirds of our conscious lifetime, because (...)
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  15. Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference.Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):353-393.
    A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of phenomenal opacity and phenomenal (...)
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  16. Faster Than Thought.Thomas Metzinger - 1995 - In Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    In this speculative paper I would like to show how important the integration of mental content is for a theory of phenomenal consciousness. I will draw the reader's attention to two manifestations of this problem which already play a role in the empirical sciences concerned with consciousness: The binding problem and the superposition problem. In doing so I hope to be able to leave the welltrodden paths of the debate over consciousness. My main concern is to gain a fresh access (...)
     
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  17. The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.Thomas Metzinger - 2004 - Networks:285--306.
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into (...)
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  18. The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory.Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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  19. The Philosophy of Dreaming and Self-Consciousness: What Happens to the Experiential Subject During the Dream State?Jennifer Michelle Windt & Thomas Metzinger - 2007 - In Deirdre Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming Vol 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 193-247.
  20. Motor Ontology: The Representational Reality of Goals, Actions and Selves.Vittorio Gallese & Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):365 – 388.
    The representational dynamics of the brain is a subsymbolic process, and it has to be conceived as an "agent-free" type of dynamical self-organization. However, in generating a coherent internal world-model, the brain decomposes target space in a certain way. In doing so, it defines an "ontology": to have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting the world, possesses an ontology too. It decomposes target space (...)
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  21. Out-of-Body Experiences as the Origin of the Concept of a 'Soul '.Thomas Metzinger - 2005 - Mind and Matter 3 (1):57-84.
    Contemporary philosophical and scienti .c discussions of mind developed from a 'proto-concept of mind ',a mythical,tradition- alistic,animistic and quasi-sensory theory about what it means to have a mind. It can be found in many di .erent cultures and has a semantic core corresponding to the folk-phenomenological notion of a 'soul '.It will be argued that this notion originates in accurate and truthful .rst-person reports about the experiential content of a special neurophenomenological state-class called 'out-of-body experiences '.They can be undergone by (...)
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  22. Introduction: Consciousness Research at the End of the Twentieth Century.Thomas Metzinger - 2000 - In T. Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press.
    conscious content like ``the self in the act of In 1989 the philosopher Colin McGinn asked the knowing'' (see, e.g., chapters 7 and 20 in this following question: ``How can technicolor phe- volume) or high-level phenomenal properties like nomenology arise from soggy gray matter?'' ``coherence'' or ``holism'' (e.g., chapters 8 and 9 (1989: 349). Since then many authors in the ®eld in this volume). But what, precisely, does it mean of consciousness research have quoted this ques- that conscious experience has (...)
     
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  23.  16
    The Family-Resemblances Framework for Mind-Wandering Remains Well Clad.Paul Seli, Michael J. Kane, Thomas Metzinger, Jonathan Smallwood, Daniel L. Schacter, David Maillet, Jonathan W. Schooler & Daniel Smilek - 2018 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (11):959-961.
  24. Precis: Being No-One.Thomas Metzinger - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11:1-30.
    This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book _Being No One_ (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained _in _the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundations for the overall (...)
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  25.  22
    Unconscious Integration of Multisensory Bodily Inputs in the Peripersonal Space Shapes Bodily Self-Consciousness.Roy Salomon, Jean-Paul Noel, Marta Łukowska, Nathan Faivre, Thomas Metzinger, Andrea Serino & Olaf Blanke - 2017 - Cognition 166:174-183.
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  26.  87
    The No-Self Alternative.Thomas Metzinger - 2010 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press.
    This article explores the ‘no-self alternative’ in the debate on the metaphysical and phenomenological concept of the self. It suggests that the no-self alternative may not be an alternative at all and it could simply be the default assumption for all rational approaches to self-consciousness and subjectivity. It outlines several different anti-realist arguments about the self and explains why the idea that there are no selves is counter-intuitive. It shows why the intuitions of phenomenology are traceable to the contingent fact (...)
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  27.  9
    Radical Disruptions of Self-Consciousness.Raphael Milliere & Thomas Metzinger - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I):1-13.
    This special issue is about something most of us might find very hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether missing.
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  28. Reply to Gallagher: Different Conceptions of Embodiment.Thomas Metzinger - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Gallagher is right in pointing out that scientific realism is an implicit background assumption of BNO, and that I did not give an independent argument for it. He is also right in saying that science does not _demonstrate_ the existence of certain entities, but that it assumes those entities in a process of explanation and theory formation. However, it is not true that science, as Gallagher writes (p.2), “simply” assumes the reality of certain things: such assumptions are embedded in the (...)
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  29. Conscious Volition and Mental Representation: Toward a More Fine-Grained Analysis.Thomas Metzinger - 2006 - In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
    A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England.
     
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  30. Self Models.Thomas Metzinger - 2007 - Scholarpedia.
  31.  55
    Subjekt Und Selbstmodell. Die Perspektivität Phänomenalen Bewußtseins Vor Dem Hintergrund Einer Naturalistischen Theorie Mentaler Repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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  32. What Does It Mean to Have an Open MIND?Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Windt - 2015 - Open MIND.
    We decided to use our editors’ introduction to briefly address a difficult, somewhat deeper, and in some ways more classical problem: that of what genuine open mindedness really is and how it can contribute to the Mind Sciences. The material in the collection speaks for itself. Here, and in contrast to the vast collection that is Open MIND, we want to be concise. We want to point to the broader context of a particular way of thinking about the mind. And (...)
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  33.  92
    Cognitive Enhancement.Thomas Metzinger & Elisabeth Hildt - 2011 - In Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press.
    Cognitive enhancement aims at optimizing a specific class of information-processing functions: cognitive functions, physically realized by the human brain. This article deals with ethical issues in cognitive enhancement. It discusses some standard conceptual issues related to the notion of “cognitive enhancement” and then continues from a purely descriptive point of view by briefly reviewing some empirical aspects and sketching the current situation. Several enhancement strategies are being tested and used. Then the chapter offers some reflections on the treatment or enhancement (...)
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  34. Open MIND.Thomas Metzinger & Jennifer Windt (eds.) - 2015 - MIND group.
    This is an edited collection of 39 original papers and as many commentaries and replies. The target papers and replies were written by senior members of the MIND Group, while all commentaries were written by junior group members. All papers and commentaries have undergone a rigorous process of anonymous peer review, during which the junior members of the MIND Group acted as reviewers. The final versions of all the target articles, commentaries and replies have undergone additional editorial review. -/- Besides (...)
     
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  35. Why Are Identity Disorders Interesting for Philosophers?Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - In T. Schramme & J. Thome (eds.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. De Gruyter.
    “Identity disorders” constitute a large class of psychiatric disturbances that, due to deviant forms of self-modeling, result in dramatic changes in the patients’ phenomenal experience of their own personal identity. The phenomenal experience of selfhood and transtemporal identity can vary along an extremely large number of dimensions: There are simple losses of content. There are also various typologies of phenomenal disintegration as in schizophrenia, in depersonalization disorders and in_ Dissociative Identity Disorder_, sometimes accompanied by multiplications of the phenomenal self within (...)
     
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  36. Spirituality and Intellectual Honesty.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Self-Published.
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  37. The Problem of Consciousness.Thomas Metzinger - 1985 - In Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 3--40.
  38. The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.Thomas Metzinger - 2000 - In Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 285--306.
    This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures.
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  39. Immediate Transfer of Synesthesia to a Novel Inducer.Aleksandra Mroczko, Thomas Metzinger, Wolf Singer & Danko Nikolić - 2009 - Journal of Vision 9 (12):1-8.
  40. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity: A Brief Summary with Examples.Thomas Metzinger - 2010 - Humana Mente 4 (14):1-28.
  41. Zehn Jahre Neuroethik des Pharmazeutischen Kognitiven Enhancements – Aktuelle Probleme Und Handlungsrichtlinien Für Die Praxis.Thomas Metzinger - 2012 - Fortschritte der Neurologie Und Psychiatrie 80 (1):36-43.
    An evaluating survey of the development of the neuroethics of pharmaceutical cognitive enhancement (PCE) during the last decade, focussing on the situation in Germany, has been undertaken. This article presents the most important conceptual problems, current substances and central ethical and legal issues. Very first guidelines and recommendations for policy-makers are formulated at the end of the text.
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  42.  36
    Grounding the Self in Action.Günther Knoblich, Birgit Elsner, Gisa Aschersleben & Thomas Metzinger - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):487-494.
  43.  47
    Empirische Perspektiven aus Sicht der Selbstmodell-Theorie der Subjektivität: Eine Kurzdarstellung mit Beispielen.Thomas Metzinger - 2015 - Selbstverlag.
    Das Ziel dieses Beitrags besteht darin, eine kurze Darstellung der "Selbstmodell-Theorie der Subjektivität" (SMT) anzubieten, die sich an naturwissenschaftlich orientierte Leser richtet, die selbst keine Philosophen sind, aber dennoch an philosophischen Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins interessiert sind.
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  44.  57
    The Pre-Scientific Concept of a "Soul": A Neurophenomenological Hypothesis About its Origin.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
  45. Self-Deception and the Dolphin Model of Cognition.Iuliia Pliushch & Thomas Metzinger - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press.
     
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  46. Appearance is Not Knowledge: The Incoherent Straw Man, Content-Content Confusions and Mindless Conscious Subjects.Thomas Metzinger - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):67-71.
  47.  93
    Commentary on Jakab's Ineffability of Qualia.Thomas Metzinger - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):352-362.
    Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to (...)
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  48.  7
    Reply to Hobson: Can There Be a First-Person Science of Consciousness?Thomas Metzinger - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Allan Hobson praises and accuses me. He praises me for being empirically informed. And he accuses me of being a “third-person half-some-one” . Specifically, he encourages me to come out of the closet, share some of my own first-person phenomenological experiences, and stop hiding behind neurophenomenological case studies taken from the existing scientific literature. Which I will do, below. But let us first begin with a matter of conceptual controversy.
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  49.  23
    Desiderata for a Mereotopological Theory of Consciousness.Wanja Wiese & Thomas Metzinger - 2012 - In Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 88--185.
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  50.  56
    Kriterien Für Eine Theorie Zur Lösung Des Leib-Seele-Problems.Thomas Metzinger - 1990 - Erkenntnis 32 (1):127 - 145.
    The article presents a critical survey of the philosophical discussion of the mind-body-problem since the collapse of Rylean behaviourism. The major theories (identity theories, supervenience, emergentist materialism, dualist interactionism and functionalism) are sketched and briefly evaluated with regard to their advantages and disadvantages. The conclusion is that no satisfactory theory about the relation between mental and neurophysiological states exists today, but considerable progress has been made regarding the contours of this cluster of problems. A catalogue of criteria which every future (...)
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