20 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Thomas Mulligan [17]Thomas M. Mulligan [2]Thomas Michael Mulligan [2]
See also
Thomas Mulligan
Georgetown University
  1. Plural Voting for the Twenty-First Century.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):286-306.
    Recent political developments cast doubt on the wisdom of democratic decision-making. Brexit, the Colombian people's (initial) rejection of peace with the FARC, and the election of Donald Trump suggest that the time is right to explore alternatives to democracy. In this essay, I describe and defend the epistocratic system of government which is, given current theoretical and empirical knowledge, most likely to produce optimal political outcomes—or at least better outcomes than democracy produces. To wit, we should expand the suffrage as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  2. Justice and the Meritocratic State.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - New York: Routledge.
    Like American politics, the academic debate over justice is polarized, with almost all theories of justice falling within one of two traditions: egalitarianism and libertarianism. This book provides an alternative to the partisan standoff by focusing not on equality or liberty, but on the idea that we should give people the things that they deserve. Mulligan argues that a just society is a meritocracy, in which equal opportunity prevails and social goods are distributed strictly on the basis of merit. That (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (3):458-476.
    In "epistocratic" forms of government, political power is wielded by those who possess the knowledge relevant to good policymaking. Some democrats--notably, David Estlund--concede that epistocracy might produce better political outcomes than democracy but argue that epistocracy cannot be justified under public reason. These objections to epistocracy are unsound because they violate a viability constraint: they are also fatal to democracy and all other plausible political arrangements. Moreover, there is a problem with the public reason framework itself--a problem that can only (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4. Why Not Be a Desertist?: Three Arguments for Desert and Against Luck Egalitarianism.Huub Brouwer & Thomas Mulligan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2271-2288.
    Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitariansm distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: it fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. Second, luck egalitarianism (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. A Critique of Milton Friedman's Essay 'the Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits'.Thomas Mulligan - 1986 - Journal of Business Ethics 5 (4):265 - 269.
    The main arguments of Milton Friedman's famous and influential essay are unsuccessful: He fails to prove that the exercise of social responsibility in business is by nature an unfair and socialist practice.Much of Friedman's case is based on a questionable paradigm; a key premise is false; and logical cogency is sometimes missing.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  6. Disagreement, Peerhood, and Three Paradoxes of Conciliationism.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):67-78.
    Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer. One question about which people might disagree is who should qualify as an epistemic peer and who should not. But when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemic peerhood itself, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Do People Deserve Their Economic Rents?Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):163-190.
    Rather than answering the broad question, ‘What is a just income?’, in this essay I consider one component of income—economic rent—under one understanding of justice—as giving people what they deserve. As it turns out, the answer to this more focused question is ‘no’. People do not deserve their economic rents, and there is no bar of justice to their confiscation. After briefly covering the concept of desert and explaining what economic rents are, I analyze six types of rent and show (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Uncertainty in Hiring Does Not Justify Affirmative Action.Thomas Mulligan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1299-1311.
    Luc Bovens has recently advanced a novel argument for affirmative action, grounded in the plausible idea that it is hard for an employer to evaluate the qualifications of candidates from underrepresented groups. Bovens claims that this provides a profit-maximizing employer with reason to shortlist prima facie less-qualified candidates from underrepresented groups. In this paper, I illuminate three flaws in Bovens’s argument. First, it suffers from model error: A rational employer does not incur costs to scrutinize candidates when it knows their (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. A Note on the Epistemology of Disagreement and Politics.Thomas Mulligan - 2016 - Political Theory 44 (5):657-663.
    Martin Ebeling argues that a popular theory in the epistemology of disagreement--conciliationism--supports an egalitarian approach to politics. This view is mistaken for two reasons. First, even if political parties have the epistemic value that Ebeling claims, voters should not regard each other as epistemic peers--which conciliationism requires that they do. The American electorate is strikingly heterogeneous in both its knowledgeability and its rationality, and so the necessary epistemic parity relation does not hold. Second, for technical reasons, the beliefs that a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  70
    Justifying Moral Initiative by Business, with Rejoinders to Bill Shaw and Richard Nunan.Thomas M. Mulligan - 1990 - Journal of Business Ethics 9 (2):93 - 103.
    In this paper I respond to separate criticisms by Bill Shaw (JBE, July 1988) and Richard Nunan (JBE, December 1988) of my paper A Critique of Milton Friedman's Essay The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits (JBE, August 1986). Professors Shaw and Nunan identify several points where my argument could benefit from clarification and improvement. They also make valuable contributions to the discussion of the broad issue area of whether and to what extent business should exercise moral (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11.  86
    On the Very Idea of a Just Wage (Editorial).Huub Brouwer & Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (2):iv-vi.
    An introduction to the special issue of the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics: "On the Very Idea of a Just Wage".
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  28
    Book Review. [REVIEW]Thomas M. Mulligan - 1992 - Journal of Business Ethics 11 (7):514-514.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Equal Pay for All: An Idea Whose Time Has Not, and Will Not, Come.Thomas Mulligan - 2021 - In Debating Equal Pay for All: Economy, Practicability and Ethics. Cham, Switzerland: pp. 21-35.
    The proposal on offer is a radical form of egalitarianism. Under it, each citizen receives the same income, regardless of profession or indeed whether he or she works or not. This proposal is bad for two reasons. First, it is inefficient. It would eliminate nearly all incentive to work, thereby shrinking national income and leaving all citizens poorly off (albeit equally poorly off). I illustrate this inefficiency via an indifference curve analysis. Second, the proposal would be regarded as unjust by (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. On Harry Frankfurt’s “Equality as a Moral Ideal”.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1171-1173,.
    A retrospective essay, written for the 125th anniversary of Ethics.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  7
    Plato's New Dialogue.Thomas Michael Mulligan - 2007 - Arion 15 (2):57-72.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Should Current Generations Make Reparation for Slavery? [REVIEW]Thomas Mulligan - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):847-847.
    A brief review of Janna Thompson's *Should Current Generations Make Reparation for Slavery?* (2018, Polity Press).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  65
    Social Choice or Collective Decision-Making: What Is Politics All About?Thomas Mulligan - 2020 - In Volker Kaul & Ingrid Salvatore (eds.), What Is Pluralism? Abingdon, UK: pp. 48-61.
    Sometimes citizens disagree about political matters, but a decision must be made. We have two theoretical frameworks for resolving political disagreement. The first is the framework of social choice. In it, our goal is to treat parties to the dispute fairly, and there is no sense in which some are right and the others wrong. The second framework is that of collective decision-making. Here, we do believe that preferences are truth apt, and our moral consideration is owed not to those (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Disagreement is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and philosophers have dutifully attended to it. One important question related to disagreement is epistemological: How does a rational person change her beliefs (if at all) in light of disagreement from others? The typical methodology for answering this question is to endorse a steadfast or conciliatory disagreement norm (and not both) on a priori grounds and selected intuitive cases. In this paper, I argue that this methodology is misguided. Instead, a thoroughgoingly Bayesian (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. The Limits of Liberal Tolerance.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Public Affairs Quarterly 29 (3):277-295.
    Political philosophy has seen vibrant debate over the connection, if any, between liberalism and pluralism. Some philosophers, following Isaiah Berlin, reckon a close connection between the two concepts. Others--most notably John Gray--believe that liberalism and pluralism are incompatible. In this essay, I argue that the puzzle can be solved by distinguishing the responsibilities of liberal states to their peoples from the responsibilities of liberal states to other states. There is an entailment from pluralism to liberalism, and it in turn implies (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. What's Wrong with Libertarianism: A Meritocratic Diagnosis.Thomas Mulligan - 2017 - In Jason Brennan, David Schmidtz & Bas van der Vossen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Libertarianism. New York: Routledge. pp. 77-91.
    Some people may think that libertarianism and meritocracy have much in common; that the libertarian's ideal world looks like the meritocrat's ideal world; and that the public policies guiding us to each are one and the same. This is wrong in all respects. In this essay I explain why. -/- After providing an overview of meritocratic justice, I argue that meritocracy is a more compelling theory of distributive justice than libertarianism. Meritocracy better protects the core value of personal responsibility; incorporates (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark