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  1.  81
    Perhaps the Most Difficult Problem Faced by Behaviorism.Thomas Natsoulas - 1983 - Behaviorism 11 (April):1-26.
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  2.  22
    What is Wrong with the Appendage Theory of Consciousness?Thomas Natsoulas - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.
    The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct awareness : mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark (...)
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  3.  18
    Your Use of the JSTOR Archive Indicates Your Acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, Available At.Thomas Natsoulas - 1977 - Behaviorism 5 (1):75-97.
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  4.  14
    Haugeland's First Hurdle.Thomas Natsoulas - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):243-243.
  5.  9
    On Perceptual Aboutness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1977 - Behaviorism 5 (1):75-97.
  6. Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1978 - American Psychologist 33:906-14.
     
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  7.  23
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Interpersonal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (September):63-89.
  8.  39
    Why Do Things Look as They Do? Some Gibsonian Answers to Koffka's Question.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):183-202.
  9.  14
    George Herbert Mead' S Conception of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1985 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 15 (1):60–75.
  10.  25
    Consciousness: Consideration of an Inferential Hypothesis.Thomas Natsoulas - 1977 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 7 (April):29-39.
  11.  30
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Personal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (September):339-67.
  12.  52
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Awareness Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 22 (2):199-225.
  13. The Unity of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1979 - Behaviorism 7 (2):45-63.
     
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  14.  16
    The Concept of Consciousness1: The Interpersonal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (1):63-89.
  15. Conscious Perception and the Paradox of "Blind-Sight".Thomas Natsoulas - 1982 - In G. Underwood (ed.), Aspects of Consciousness, Volume 3: Awareness and Self-Awareness. Academic Press.
     
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  16.  16
    An Examination of Four Objections to Self-Intimating States of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1989 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (1):63-116.
  17.  13
    On the Radical Behaviorist Conception of Cosciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1986 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 7 (1).
  18.  20
    Towards the Improvement of Gibsonian Perception Theory.Thomas Natsoulas - 1984 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (2):231–258.
  19.  10
    The Case for Intrinsic Theory: II. An Examination of a Conception of Consciousness 'Subscript 4' as Intrinsic, Necessary, and Concomitant.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.
    The present article is the second one in a series and begins to spell out the case for the intrinsic kind of theory of consciousness4. According to such theory, a mental-occurrence instance is conscious4 on its own, that is, as a part of its own internal structure. Considered here are a prominent phenomenologist’s argument in favor of an intrinsic theory of consciousness4, and his conception of how such inner awareness occurs in the case of objectivating mental acts, which are all (...)
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  20.  75
    Reflective Seeing: An Exploration in the Company of Edmund Husserl and James J. Gibson.Thomas Natsoulas - 1990 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 21 (1):1-31.
    Discusses reflective seeing in the context of the works of J. J. Gibson (published 1963–79) and E. Husserl (published 1960–83). Topics discussed include (1) naive-realistic seeing, (2) the nature of visual experiences, (3) the relation of reflective seeing to naive-realistic seeing, and (4) levels of consciousness with reference to reflective seeing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  21. The Case for Intrinsic Theory: I. An Introduction.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.
    This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness4." "Consciousness4" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account (...)
     
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  22.  4
    The Pluralistic Approach to the Nature of Feelings.Thomas Natsoulas - 1990 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (2):173-218.
    This article contains an initial statement of the pluralistic approach together with some justification for its adoption by psychologists. Two alternative coneptions of the nature of feelings, William James's and Edmund Husserl's, are discussed with the pluralistic approach in mind. Psychologists who would practice the pluralistic approach with respect to the nature of feelings must develop a plural conception of the nature of feelings. A plural conception differs from a singular conception by simultaneously including more than a single account of (...)
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  23.  62
    Blindsight and Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1997 - American Journal of Psychology 110:1-33.
  24.  50
    Roger W. Sperry's Monist Interactionism.Thomas Natsoulas - 1987 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 8:1-21.
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  25.  36
    The Concept of Consciousness4 the Reflective Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373–400.
    In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is (...)
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  26.  8
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Awareness Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 2 (2):199-25.
  27.  15
    How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
    In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
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  28.  80
    Sympathy, Empathy, and the Stream of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1988 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 18 (June):169-195.
  29.  23
    The Subjective, Experiential Element in Perception.Thomas Natsoulas - 1974 - Psychological Bulletin 81:611-31.
  30. Ontological Subjectivity.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 175 (2):175-200.
    Addressed here are certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity which Searle has lately been calling our attention, while arguing that certain brain-occurrences possess irreducibly subjective features - in the sense that no amount of strictly objective, third-person information about the animal and his or her brain and behavior could result in a description of any such features, except by inference based on the first-person perspective. In his relevant discussions, Searle has focused on the aspectual shapes of conscious mental brain-occurrences, (...)
     
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  31.  33
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Personal Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (September) 339 (September):339-367.
  32. Concerning Introspective "Knowledge".Thomas Natsoulas - 1970 - Psychological Bulletin 73 (2):89-111.
    Discusses the nature of introspective awareness, those events by whose occurrence acquire knowledge of our own mental episodes. Present orienting attitudes towards mental episodes and awareness of them are made explicit, as are some of the basic concepts to be used. Introspective awarenesses are discussed from the perspective of S; afterimages, pains, sense impressions, visual contents, and thoughts are examined as contents of introspective awarenesses. The intrinsic or factual character of such awarenesses is considered from the perspectives of 3 materialist (...)
     
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  33.  8
    The Distinction Between Visual Perceiving and Visual Perceptual Experience.Thomas Natsoulas - 1989 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (1):37-61.
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  34. Basic Problems of Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1981 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 41:132-78.
  35.  25
    A Rediscovery of Presence.Thomas Natsoulas - 1999 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (1):17-41.
    When we see Wilfrid Sellars's favorite object, an ice cube pink through and through, we see the very pinkness of it. Inner awareness of our visual experience finds the ice cube to be experientially present, not merely representationally present to our consciousness. Its pinkness and other properties are present not merely metaphorically, not merely in the sense that the experience represents or is an occurrent belief in the ice cube's being there before us. Despite his behavioristic inclinations, Sellars acknowledges experiential (...)
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  36. The Sciousness Hypothesis: Part I.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (1):45-66.
    The Sciousness Hypothesis holds that how we know our mental-occurrence instances does not include our having immediate awareness of them. Rather, we take notice of our behaviors or bodily reactions and infer mental-occurrence instances that would explain them. In The Principles, James left it an open question whether the Sciousness Hypothesis is true, and proceeded in accordance with the conviction that one’s stream of consciousness consists only of basic durational components of which one has immediate awareness. Nevertheless, James seems to (...)
     
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  37.  37
    A Rediscovery of Sigmund Freud.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 4 (3):300-322.
    As part of his rediscovery of consciousness, Searle has recently provided an interpretation of Freud's account of consciousness, including the relation of consciousness to nonconscious mental occurrences [i.e., preconscious mental occurrences and unconscious (repressed) mental occurrences]. Regrettably, Searle's interpretation is based on a single paragraph from The Unconscious and serves to eliminate Freud's general view on these matters as being "incoherent." In the present article, I rediscover Freud's account and show that Searle has deeply misunderstood him, thus converting Freud into (...)
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  38.  26
    Is Consciousness What Psychologists Actually Examine?Thomas Natsoulas - 1990 - American Journal of Psychology 105:363-84.
  39.  11
    The Primary Source of Intentionality.Thomas Natsoulas - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):440-441.
  40. Gustav Bergmann's Psychophysiological Parallelism.Thomas Natsoulas - 1984 - Behaviorism 12 (1):41-70.
     
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  41.  8
    The Sciousness Hypothesis — Part II.Thomas Natsoulas - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (2):185-206.
    The Sciousness Hypothesis holds that how we know our mental-occurrence instances does not include our having immediate awareness of them. Rather, we take notice of our behaviors or bodily reactions and infer mental-occurrence instances that would explain them. In The Principles, James left it an open question whether the Sciousness Hypothesis is true, although he proceeded on the conviction that one’s mental life consists exclusively of mental-occurrence instances of which one has immediate awareness. Nevertheless, James was tempted by the Sciousness (...)
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  42. The Six Basic Concepts of Consciousness and William James' Stream of Thought.Thomas Natsoulas - 1987 - Imagination, Cognition, and Personality 6:289-319.
  43.  4
    Consciousness: Consideration of a Self-International Hypothesis.Thomas Natsoulas - 1986 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 16 (2):197–207.
  44.  26
    Intentionality, Consciousness, and Subjectivity.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):281-308.
    Searle restricted intrinsic intentionality to occurrent neurophysiological states that are conscious in the sense that their owner has awareness of them when they occur; all occurrent nonconscious states of the brain have, at most, a derivative intentionality by reliably producing, unless obstructed, conscious intentional states. The grounds for thus restricting intrinsic intentionality are explored, and traced to Searle's conviction that aspectual shapes must be "manifest" whenever actually exemplified by an instance of any mental brain-occurrence. By "manifest," Searle seems to mean (...)
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  45.  18
    Is Any State of Consciousness Self-Intimating?Thomas Natsoulas - 1988 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 9 (2):167-203.
  46.  14
    Appendage Theory -- Pro and Con.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (4):371-96.
    Appendage theory seeks to identify the property of consciousness that makes conscious mental-occurrence instances conscious. For some years, Rosenthal has been proposing such a theory according to which "state consciousness" is due to a thought that accompanies, without apparent inference, each conscious mental state and affirms its occurrence. Every higher-order thought has reference to oneself as such, as well as to the target mental state. This is necessary, according to Rosenthal; otherwise, the higher-order thought would not find its target, would (...)
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  47. Concerning the Unity of Consciousness: . William James on Personal Conscious Unity.Thomas Natsoulas - 1986 - Imagination, Cognition and Personality 5:21-30.
  48.  11
    Consciousness and Commissurotomy: IV. Three Hypothesized Dimensions of Deconnected Left-Hemispheric Consciousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1992 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (1):37-68.
    If a conception like the commissural-integrative conception of the normal stream of consciousness is correct, then we should expect to find that the consciousness of the deconnected left hemisphere is not a normal consciousness, because the right hemisphere cannot contribute to the left hemisphere's stream except by means of inadequate subcortical connections. Therefore, the present article considers, from the literature, three hypothesized dimensions of deconnected left-hemispheric consciousness: Is the deconnected left hemisphere alienated as agent from behavior produced by the respective (...)
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  49.  11
    Consciousness and Gibson's Concept of Awareness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 3 (3):305-28.
    Currently in psychology, after a long hiatus, there exists an accelerating interest in the nature and character of consciousness. As might be expected at this early point in our return to consciousness, much of the relevant discussion among psychologists proceeds at the commonsense level of understanding. However, some psychologies are already moving beyond ordinary thought, and providing one or more technical concepts of consciousness. Such psychologies may be useful in improving psychologists' conceptual grasp of the referents of our ordinary concepts (...)
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  50.  10
    The Concept of Consciousness: The Reflective Meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373-400.
    In this article, which is fourth in a series of six articles, I address the fourth concept of consciousness that the Oxford English Dictionary defines in its six main entries under the word consciousness. I first introduce this fourth concept, the concept of consciousness4. by identifying the previous three OED concepts of consciousness, which I have already discussed in this series of articles, and by indicating how that to which we make reference, respectively, by means of those three concepts is (...)
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