The Lancet–O’Neill Institute/Georgetown University Commission on Global Health and Law published its report on the Legal Determinants of Health in 2019. The term ‘legal determinants of health’ draws attention to the power of law to influence upstream social and economic influences on population health. In this article, we introduce the Commission, including its background and rationale, set out its methodology, summarize its key findings and recommendations and reflect on its impact since publication. We also look to the future, making suggestions (...) as to how the global health community can make the best use of the Commission’s momentum in relation to using law and legal tools to advance population health. (shrink)

These two volumes are the first extensive study of the influence of Marsilio Ficino on major English poets. Ficino lived in Florence, Italy from 1433 to 1499. He introduced Plato to the Renaissance by his translations of the philosopher's complete works with detailed commentary. He wrote important works on astrology, a multi-volume work on Platonic Theology, and hundreds of brilliant public letters on a variety of subjects.

Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Social Personalism proposes that social Personalism can best provide for self-knowledge. Thomas O. Buford offers a social personalist understanding of self-knowledge which focuses on the relation of persons to each other and to the Personal, and avoids the impersonalisms that erode the dignity of persons and their moral life which characterize modern life.

_"Clarissa" on the Continent _defines and explores two strategies of literary translation—creative vs. preservative and strong vs. weak—as they transform one of the most influential English novels. Thomas Beebee compares the two opposing strategies as they influence the French translation of _Clarissa_ by the novelist Antione François de Prévost and the German translation by the Göttingen Orientalist Johann David Michaelis, and in doing so he demonstrates that each translator found authority for his procedure within the text itself. Each translation (...) is also examined in light of Richardson's other writings and placed in its literary and cultural context. This study uses translations in order to interpret _Clarissa_, to show how the basis for the novel's reception on the Continent was laid, and to explore the differences and interactions among three literary and cultural systems of the eighteenth century. The close examination of these two important translations enable the formulation of not only a theory of creative vs. preservative translation but also the interconnections between literary theory and translation theory. Beebee also looks at later translations of _Clarissa_ as products of literary and historical change and at Prévostian strategies of the novel. (shrink)

_"Clarissa" on the Continent _defines and explores two strategies of literary translation—creative vs. preservative and strong vs. weak—as they transform one of the most influential English novels. Thomas Beebee compares the two opposing strategies as they influence the French translation of _Clarissa_ by the novelist Antione François de Prévost and the German translation by the Göttingen Orientalist Johann David Michaelis, and in doing so he demonstrates that each translator found authority for his procedure within the text itself. Each translation (...) is also examined in light of Richardson's other writings and placed in its literary and cultural context. This study uses translations in order to interpret _Clarissa_, to show how the basis for the novel's reception on the Continent was laid, and to explore the differences and interactions among three literary and cultural systems of the eighteenth century. The close examination of these two important translations enable the formulation of not only a theory of creative vs. preservative translation but also the interconnections between literary theory and translation theory. Beebee also looks at later translations of _Clarissa_ as products of literary and historical change and at Prévostian strategies of the novel. (shrink)

This book is focused on what stabilizes and unifies our second nature, or that which we participants in a culture share in common. The claim is that in the triadic structure of the experience of all persons, trust is the key to the solidarity and stability of our second nature.

This essay is an informal examination of the efforts made by mathematical logicians from Russell on, to evade the paradoxes revealed by uncritical methods of definition and predication. Where systems are described it is with a minimum of formal apparatus, so that the climate is one of rather vague statement and imprecise question. Russell’s drastic banning of type–offending formulas gives the starting–point for queries about the connection of sense and formalism, and the conclusion may be summed up as the detection (...) of a contrast between mechanisation and sensefulness which is seen as constituting a line of tension, as it were a geological weakness in formal structures, which permits the insertion of a philosophic wedge. Interesting as such an idea is, it is not clear between what regions this line has been drawn. On the one hand the undecidability results of Gödel show that formal methods can be extended indefinitely beyond the scope of what is mechanisable; on the other the author methodically refrains from defining what he means by ‘sense’. In so far as he explicitly leaves his meaning on this point to be gathered form his treatment of non–sense, and the paradoxes are here taken as representative of the latter, we might suppose that he is equating sense with consistency. For expressions leading to paradox were only ruled senseless by Russell because they lead to inconsistency. But it is fairly clear that something more epistemologically interesting is intended, since the author dismisses from consideration ‘la déductivité structurale, sens immédiat d’une vaste architecture symbolique d’abord vide, et intégralement traduisible en syntaxe’. Such translatability has, incidentally, its limits, as Gödel’s results again show, and it is our belief that the discussion might have been put in a more exact and workmanlike frame if the list of works consulted had contained more than one, and that a relatively minor, publication of Gödel. (shrink)

To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

This book presents selected addresses presented before the Personalist Discussion Group meetings held in conjunction with the annual meetings of The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. It includes the central ideas of American Personalistic Idealism developed during the twentieth century, its major criticisms, and recent developments by philosophers who are either Personalistic Idealists of sympathetic to the position.

Bernson takes a fresh approach to the nature of knowledge in his emphasis on the cognitive situation. While indebted to Strawson, Husserl, and Zinkernagel, he forges new insights and new distinctions which, if taken seriously, require a new view of what counts as knowledge. The theme of the book is that "we cannot meaningfully put forward any assertion or use any word or concept without presupposing or assuming that we find ourselves confronted with existing reality in concrete situations and have (...) knowledge of the nature of objective reality". In an investigation of "fundamental epistemology" Bernson attempts to uncover the structure of our cognitive situation so that we can determine the extent we do or do not know reality as it exists in ordinary life and science. To achieve this goal four problem areas are discussed: the status of logic, the possibility of accounting for the natural distinction between necessarily valid knowledge and contingent knowledge, the language-reality relation, and the possibility of making consistent man as a knowing being, and naturalism. (shrink)

In this book, Professor McGarity reveals the complex and problematic relationship between the 'regulatory reform' movements initiated in the early l970s and the United States' federal bureaucracy. Examining both the theory and application of 'regulatory reform' under the Reagan administration, the author succeeds in offering both a relevant analysis and critique of 'regulatory reform' and its implementation through bureaucratic channels. Using several case studies from the early Reagan years, this book describes the clash of regulatory cultures resulting from the President's (...) attempt to incorporate 'regulatory analysis' into the bureaucratic decision-making process. Yet while McGarity recognizes the limitations of regulatory analysis, he concludes with suggestions for enhancing its effectiveness. This book could be used not only as a textbook for political science and government courses but also for graduate applications in public policy and public administration. (shrink)

Odegard's purpose is twofold: "to describe an ideal form of the knowledge of truth," and to "defend the view that such an ideal is realistic." While his description of knowledge is rooted in ordinary language, it is not bound by it; he reshapes ordinary language when necessary. The description includes those elements that are the necessary and sufficient conditions for an ideal knowledge. Odegard argues for its realism by giving an apologetic response to a sceptic. Accordingly the book is divided (...) into two parts. Part 1 is a description of the ideal form of the knowledge of truth, and Part 2 is a defense of this ideal against attacks by the sceptic. (shrink)

In the history of moral philosophy an important theme is that morality in some way and in part depends upon the will of God. Recently this view has been rejected because it is believed to be incompatible with accepted modern doctrines about morality. If human moral actions depend upon the will of God, then it is assumed human moral autonomy must be given up. And if this is so, the possibility of a defensible divine command theory of morality must be (...) relinquished. Quinn contends this assumption is mistaken, and he attempts a fresh look at the issue. (shrink)

This analysis of Austin Farrer's philosophical theology joins the distinguished work by contemporary personalists, Embers and the Stars by Erazim Kohak and Being and Value by Frederick Ferré. Conti's work is more than an analysis of Farrer's understanding of the relation of faith and reason, the nature of God, and God's relation to other persons. Through a detailed, rigorous investigation of the changes in Farrer's thought from Finite and Infinite through Freedom of the Will to Faith and Speculation, Conti provides (...) us not only a clear, well-argued defense of personalist metaphysics but also insight into central currents in mid-century thinking in philosophical theology. (shrink)

What is Plato attempting to accomplish in the Laches? A cursory reading leaves one with the strong impression that the main topic of discussion is the education of the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias. However, an equally cursory survey of the major interpretations of the Laches reveals that few, if any, scholars agree with that impression. Their view is that the main topic of conversation in the Laches is courage, the examination of which takes place in the second main section (...) of the dialogue. On this view, neither the first half of the dialogue nor the concluding short section is philosophically significant since neither adds to the discussion of courage. What is left obscure on that view is what Plato is doing in these “insignificant” sections. In addition, that view does not help us to understand Plato’s emphasis on education throughout the dialogue. It seems, then, that the initial question has led to a second one: is the Laches a unity both philosophical, and philologically? Both of these questions are inextricably intertwined. The question of the unity of the Laches can be dealt with fully through a consideration of a unifying theme or argument, and the question of the integrating theme can be considered only in the light of the structure of the dialogue. I contend that a unifying thread of argument can be found in the Laches and that the traditional view of the dialogue results in cutting it into two parts having little philosophical or literary relation to each other. I propose, first, to show that the traditional interpretation is untenable, and second, to offer a counterinterpretation which avoids the necessity of regarding the first and concluding parts of the dialogue as philosophically insignificant and which provides a unifying theme. These two goals will be achieved in the following way: it will be shown that the assumption that the main conversation of the Laches is about courage implies the destruction of the unity of the Laches and leaves unclear what Plato is doing in the first half of the dialogue. And, second, a counterinterpretation will be offered showing that the central theme of the dialogue is the educational consultant. It will be shown that this theme unifies the dialogue, makes clear what Plato is doing in otherwise obscure passages, and puts into proper perspective the discussion of courage. We must now consider the traditional interpretation of the Laches. (shrink)

In The Humboldtian Tradition, eleven scholars analyse Wilhelm von Humboldt as a historical phenomenon and a contemporary symbol. They put Humboldt's basic academic principles into context and discuss their significance for the current debate about the university.

A synodal church makes assumptions about our basic ecclesial experience which takes place when we assemble liturgically, especially when we act eucharistically. The basic assumption is that we are a genuine human community knowing and relating to one another as brothers and sisters in baptism. Only real communities can authentically image the church's nature. This is a ‘bottom – up’ activity. If we wish this, then we must rediscover our liturgy and celebrate it in a new way as flowing out (...) from a community and helping it to discover its own nature. This, in turn, makes demands on our understanding of ministry and its structures. While many Catholics endorse synodality, their willingness to change the shape of the presbyterate is uncertain. (shrink)

Vesey has collected fifteen essays from Royal Institute of Philosophy lectures on idealism, particularly that of Berkeley, Kant, the Post-Kantians, and, it is claimed, of Wittgenstein. The result is the presentation of idealism as a philosophical viewpoint that is diverse and rooted deeply in Western philosophy. While this volume is not organized into sections, the contributors address such questions as: Did Plato, in Parmenides, lean toward the idealism that holds that the world is essentially structured by categories of thought? How (...) did Descartes make Berkeley’s idealism possible? How do Kant’s “appearances” differ from Berkeley’s “ideas”? Is the traditional “double affection” interpretation of Kant’s idealism—that human experience is the product of unknown things-in-themselves interacting with equally unknown selves—fundamentally mistaken? Is the basic Kantian notion that of the unavoidable relativity of a framework? How did Hegel’s “absolute” idealism differ from Kant’s subjective idealism? How was Fichte a forerunner of Sartre and Wittgenstein? Are the idealist aspects of Marxism compatible with materialism? What is the linguistic philosopher’s equivalent of Bradley’s doctrine of internal relations? Is Bernard Williams right in thinking that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy points in the direction of a transcendental idealism? (shrink)

Vesey has collected fifteen essays from Royal Institute of Philosophy lectures on idealism, particularly that of Berkeley, Kant, the Post-Kantians, and, it is claimed, of Wittgenstein. The result is the presentation of idealism as a philosophical viewpoint that is diverse and rooted deeply in Western philosophy. While this volume is not organized into sections, the contributors address such questions as: Did Plato, in Parmenides, lean toward the idealism that holds that the world is essentially structured by categories of thought? How (...) did Descartes make Berkeley’s idealism possible? How do Kant’s “appearances” differ from Berkeley’s “ideas”? Is the traditional “double affection” interpretation of Kant’s idealism—that human experience is the product of unknown things-in-themselves interacting with equally unknown selves—fundamentally mistaken? Is the basic Kantian notion that of the unavoidable relativity of a framework? How did Hegel’s “absolute” idealism differ from Kant’s subjective idealism? How was Fichte a forerunner of Sartre and Wittgenstein? Are the idealist aspects of Marxism compatible with materialism? What is the linguistic philosopher’s equivalent of Bradley’s doctrine of internal relations? Is Bernard Williams right in thinking that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy points in the direction of a transcendental idealism? (shrink)