[Text is in German] Unsere Gegenwart scheint mehr und mehr Umbruechen zu unterliegen. Eine Innovation folgt der naechsten, Traditionen gelten schnell als ueberholt, moderne Trends werden altmodisch. Dieser permanente Wandel verlaeuft in unserer Wahrnehmung immer rasanter. Auch bei einem Blick in die Vergangenheit scheinen Umbrueche, neue Ideen und Erfindungen zu ueberwiegen und in staendigen Wertverschiebungen zu resultieren. Aber was ist mit den bestaendigen Dingen? Nicht nur Veraenderungen schaffen Werte, sondern auch Bestaendigkeit. Dabei stellt sich nicht nur die Frage, welche Werte (...) durch Kontinuitaet entstehen, sondern auch welche Werte sie bedingen. Traditionen sind identitaetsstiftend. Sie gehoeren zum kulturellen Gedaechtnis, bilden oftmals eine Basis fuer Innovationen und haben dadurch eine eigene Bedeutung im Hinblick auf Veraenderungen. Kontinuitaeten zu erkennen, ist in einer Welt im stetigen Wandel ein schwieriges Unterfangen und auch im Rueckblick nicht unproblematisch, vor allem wenn die Akteure selbst nicht mehr zu sprechen sind. Aber ein Blick auf die materielle Kultur erlaubt Aufschluesse ueber Bestaendigkeit. Von Menschen gefertigte Objekte sind Traditionstraeger, sie beherbergen die Ideen und Wertvorstellungen ihrer Gestalter und bleiben ueber Zeit und Raum hinweg erhalten. The Limits of Change umfasst Beitraege aus Archaeologie, Philosophie und Ethnologie, die sich auf unterschiedliche Weise mit der Thematik der Kontinuitaet auseinandersetzen und den Sachverhalt kritisch beleuchten. So wird zum einen der Blick in die Vergangenheit gerichtet und auf Basis archaeologischer ueberlieferungen das Thema untersucht. Zum anderen liefert die Diskussion zeitgenoessischer und globaler Sachverhalte wichtige Hinweise im Hinblick auf Kontinuitaet und Tradition. So wird beispielsweise diskutiert, welche Arten von Kontinuitaeten sich in heutigen Gesellschaften finden und wodurch sich diese auszeichnen bzw. sichtbar werden. Ferner wird die Frage gestellt, ob Tradition als kulturelles Marketing im Hinblick auf Tourismus genutzt werden kann. Mit Beitraegen von Torsten Bendschus, Arthur Depner, Stefan Eisenhofer, Martin Hensler, Elwira Janus, Thomas Knopf, Beate Loeffler, Bonka Nedeltscheva, Ton Otto, Laura Picht, Elnaz Rashidian und Geraldine Schmitz. (shrink)

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

This volume brings together for the first time a significant number of Reid's manuscript papers on natural history, physiology and materialist metaphysics. An important contribution not only to Reid studies but also to our understanding of eighteenth-century science and its context.

v. 1. Editorial introduction -- v. 2. The English and Latin texts (i) -- v. 3. The English and Latin texts (ii).

Thomas Reid was a philosopher who founded the Scottish school of 'common sense'. Much of Reid's work is a critique of his contemporary, David Hume, whose empiricism he rejects. In this work, written after Reid's appointment to a professorship at the university of Glasgow, and published in 1785, he turns his attention to ideas about perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgement, reasoning and taste. He examines the work of his predecessors and contemporaries, arguing that 'when we find philosophers maintaining that (...) there is no heat in the fire, nor colour in the rainbow … we may be apt to think the whole to be only a dream of fanciful men, who have entangled themselves in cobwebs spun out of their own brain'. Written by one of the Scottish Enlightenment's most important thinkers, this work brings to life the intellectual debates of the time. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas produced a voluminous body of work on moral theory, and much of that work is on virtue, particularly the status and value of the virtues as principles of virtuous acts, and the way in which a moral life can be organized around them schematically. Thomas Osborne presents Aquinas's account of virtue in its historical, philosophical and theological contexts, to show the reader what Aquinas himself wished to teach about virtue. His discussion makes the complexities of Aquinas's (...) moral thought accessible to readers despite the differences between Thomas's texts themselves, and the distance between our background assumptions and his. The book will be valuable for scholars and students in ethics, medieval philosophy, and theology. (shrink)

Anhand einer klinischen Vignette wird ausgeführt, dass das psychoanalytische Geschehen sich in mehreren Dimensionen entfaltet. Drei solcher Dimensionen – als Bedeutung (Erkenntnis), Berührung (Kontakt) und Bewegung (Ereignis) bezeichnet – werden beschrieben und deren dimensionale Charakteristik auf die Sinnesqualitäten des Sehens, des Berührungssinnes und des Hörens bezogen. Es wird gezeigt, dass sie Raum und Zeit auf je eigene Weise konstituieren und somit einander inkommensurable, durch keine logische oder dialektische Operation in eine Einheit überführbare Aprioritäten darstellen. Mit deren Unvereinbarkeit ist auch auf (...) Grenzen theoretisch-begrifflicher Bemächtigung verwiesen, womit die Frage nach der Reichweite metapsychologischer Begriffe, etwa des Begriffs des Unbewussten, aufgeworfen ist. Von hier aus wird in einem Ausblick nach der Begegnung als organisierendem Phantasma der analytischen Situation gefragt und – auf dem Weg einer Erörterung des Begegnungsbegriffs bei Martin Buber – versucht, Begegnung dimensional näher zu bestimmen. (shrink)

Vorgestellt wird der Versuch, »Jenseits des Lustprinzips« als Dokument einer Diskontinuität zu lesen. Als Vorarbeit hierzu entfaltet der Autor verschiedene Dimensionen, in und zwischen denen sich der Text bewegt, und arbeitet in ihnen aufkommende Disparitäten sowie Fragen heraus, die der Text stellt, indem er sie verhüllt. Leithypothese der Interpretation ist, dass der Text als ganzer Ausdruck, aber auch beginnende Auslegung und Entstellung eines undenkbaren »Gedankens« (des »Todesgedankens«) ist, auf den er zuläuft und vor dem er ausweicht, und dass das Todestriebkonzept (...) bereits eine defensive Ausarbeitung dieses »Gedankens« darstellt. (shrink)

There has been an explosion of interest in the metaphysics of fundamentality in recent decades. The consensus view, called metaphysical foundationalism, maintains that there is something absolutely fundamental in reality upon which everything else depends. However, a number of thinkers have chal- lenged the arguments in favor of foundationalism and have proposed competing non-foundationalist ontologies. This paper provides a systematic and critical introduction to metaphysical foundationalism in the current literature and argues that its relation to ontological dependence and substance should (...) be qualified in important ways. (shrink)

In a recent paper Weinberg (2007) claims that there is an essential mark of trustworthiness which typical sources of evidence as perception or memory have, but philosophical intuitions lack, namely that we are able to detect and correct errors produced by these “hopeful” sources. In my paper I will argue that being a hopeful source isn't necessary for providing us with evidence. I then will show that, given some plausible background assumptions, intuitions at least come close to being hopeful, if (...) they are reliable. If this is true, Weinberg's new challenge comes down to the claim that philosophical intuitions are not reliable since they are significantly unstable. In the second part of my paper I will argue that and why the experimentally established instability of folk intuitions about philosophical cases does not show that philosopher's expert intuitions about these cases are instable. (shrink)

Feeling good: four ways -- Finding that feeling -- The place of pleasure -- Knowing what's what -- Making things happen -- Being good -- Love and friendship -- Putting it together.

Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.

I critically examine some deflationary theories of properties, according to which properties are ‘shadows of predicates’ and quantification over them serves a mere quasi-logical function. I start by considering Hofweber’s internalist theory, and pose a problem for his account of inexpressible properties. I then introduce a theory of properties that closely resembles Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth. This theory overcomes the problem of inexpressible properties, but its formulation presupposes the existence of various kinds of abstract objects. I discuss some ways (...) to reduce these existence assumptions, but ultimately suggest that deflationists can hardly avoid quantification over abstract objects of one sort or another. I conclude that property deflationism is perhaps not as deflationary as some philosophers want it to be, but that it’s still apt to call the position ‘deflationary’. (shrink)

What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to an influential approach, they are intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff, within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the not-p worlds. This approach faces a well-known problem, however: it makes the wrong predictions for what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes p or believes not-p—for example, ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is (...) going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever, but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We substantiate this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other. (shrink)

Issues concerning patients' rights are at the center of bioethics, but the political basis for these rights has rarely been examined. In Bioethics in a Liberal Society: The Political Framework of Bioethics Decision Making , Thomas May offers a compelling analysis of how the political context of liberal constitutional democracy shapes the rights and obligations of both patients and health care professionals. May focuses on how a key feature of liberal society -- namely, an individual's right to make independent (...) decisions -- has an impact on the most important relational facets of health care, such as patients' autonomy and professionals' rights of conscience. Although a liberal political framework protects individual judgments, May asserts that this right is based on the assumption of an individual's competency to make sound decisions. May uses case studies to examine society's approach to medical decision making when, for reasons ranging from age to severe mental disorder, a person lacks sufficient competency to make independent and fully informed choices. To protect the autonomy of these vulnerable patients, May emphasizes the need for health care ethics committees and ethics consultants to help guide the decision-making process in clinical settings. Bioethics in a Liberal Society is essential reading for all those interested in understanding how bioethics is practiced within our society. (shrink)

The Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid first published Essays on Active Powers of Man in 1788 while he was Professor of Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen. The work contains a set of essays on active power, the will, principles of action, the liberty of moral agents, and morals. Reid was a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment and one of the founders of the 'common sense' school of philosophy. In Active Powers Reid gives his fullest exploration of sensus communis as (...) the basis of all philosophical inquiry. He uses common sense realism to argue for the existence of a stable external world, the existence of other minds, and to offer a powerful challenge to versions of the Theory of Ideas advocated by Hume and Locke . This is a key work of the Scottish Enlightenment that made important contributions to fundamental debates about the basis of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Tracking the development of Foucault's key concepts Lemke offers the most comprehensive and systematic account of Michel Foucault's work on power and government from 1970 until his death in 1984. He convincingly argues, using material that has only partly been translated into English, that Foucault's concern with ethics and forms of subjectivation is always already integrated into his political concerns and his analytics of power. The book also shows how the concept of government was taken up in different lines of (...) research in France before it gave rise to "governmentality studies" in the Anglophone world. A Critique of Political Reason provides a clear and well-structured exposition that is theoretically challenging but also accessible for a wider audience. Thus, the book can beread both as an original examination of Foucault's concept of government and as a general introduction to his "genealogy of power". (shrink)

T. H. Green's Prolegomena to Ethics is a classic of modern philosophy. It begins with Green's idealist attack on empiricist metaphysics and epistemology and develops a perfectionist ethical theory that aims to bring together the best elements in the ancient and modern traditions, and that provides the moral foundations for Green's own distinctive brand of liberalism. David Brink's new edition will restore this great work to prominence, after two decades in which it has been hard to obtain. The present edition (...) uses the text of the fifth edition, accompanied by a new introductory essay, bibliographical essay, and index. Translations are provided for Green's quotations from other languages. Of particular importance is the editor's extended introductory essay, which situates the Prolegomena in its intellectual context, sympathetically but critically engages its main themes, and explains Green's enduring significance for the history of philosophy and contemporary ethical theory. Students and scholars of the history of ethics, ethical theory, political philosophy, and nineteenth century philosophy will find this new edition an invaluable resource. (shrink)

Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...) example, is David Lewis on philosophy: Our “intuitions” are simply opinions: our philosophical theories are the same. Some are commonsensical, some are sophisticated; some are particular; some general; some are more firmly held, some less. But they are all opinions, and a reasonable goal for a philosopher is to bring them into equilibrium. Our common task it to find out what equilibria there are that can withstand examination, but it remains for each of us to come to rest at one or another of them… Once the menu of well-worked out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion. Is that to say that there is no truth to be had? Or that the truth is of our own making, and different ones of us can make it differently? Not at all! If you say flatly that there is no god, and I say that there are countless gods but none of them are our worldmates, then it may be that neither of us is making any mistake of method. We may each be bringing our opinions to equilibrium in the most careful possible way, taking account of all the arguments, distinctions, and counterexamples. But one of us, at least, is making a mistake of fact. Which one is wrong depends on what there is (1983: x-xi). In addition to philosophy in general, the method of reflective equilibrium has also been endorsed as the appropriate procedure for investigating various other subject.. (shrink)

This paper presents a new approach to the class-theoretic paradoxes. In the first part of the paper, I will distinguish classes from sets, describe the function of class talk, and present several reasons for postulating type-free classes. This involves applications to the problem of unrestricted quantification, reduction of properties, natural language semantics, and the epistemology of mathematics. In the second part of the paper, I will present some axioms for type-free classes. My approach is loosely based on the Gödel–Russell idea (...) of limited ranges of significance. It is shown how to derive the second-order Dedekind–Peano axioms within that theory. I conclude by discussing whether the theory can be used as a solution to the problem of unrestricted quantification. In an appendix, I prove the consistency of the class theory relative to Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. (shrink)

Der Beitrag fragt nach den historischen Bedingungen heutiger Einstellungen zum Bereich des Privaten, zeichnet insbesondere die Entstehung des europäischen autonomen Subjekts nach und formuliert die These, dass dessen gesellschaftliche Konstitution den Einzelnen mit einer unerfüllbaren Forderung nach Einheit und Allgemeinheit überfordert, wodurch er zu einem Wesen wird, das etwas zu verbergen hat. Deswegen muss ihm ein Raum des Geheimen zugebilligt werden, der jedoch unweigerlich zum Gegenstand der Erforschung wird. Die Psychoanalyse hat daran einen besonderen Anteil, weil sie durch die Grundregel (...) das Verbergen aufhebt und damit die Konstitution des individuellen Subjekts, die sie doch zu fördern verspricht, zugleich untergräbt. Dies führt zu der paradoxen Erkenntnis, dass Psychoanalyse nur unter dem Schutz absoluter Vertraulichkeit möglich ist, strikt eingehaltene absolute Vertraulichkeit aber gleichzeitig die Psychoanalyse als Praxis unmöglich macht. (shrink)

Anhand des Begriffspaars »Intuition« und »Konstruktion« wird diskutiert, mit welchen Begriffen von Wahrheit die Psychoanalyse operiert, und es wird dargelegt, dass der Psychoanalyse ein eigener Platz in der Geschichte der Wahrheit (d.h. dessen, was uns als Wahrheit gilt) zukommt. Den Raum für diese Erörterung des Wahrheitsbegriffs eröffnet die Spiegelung in einigen Äußerungen von Friedrich Nietzsche, der als einer der ersten Philosophen den Zusammenhang von Wahrheit und Repräsentation erkannt und kritisiert habe. Dies führt zu der These, dass in Freuds Rede vom (...) Psychischen eine im Empirisch-Biologischen verwurzelte Idee des psychischen Apparats mit einer transzendentalen Idee des repräsentationalen Raums interferiert. Illustriert durch eine klinische Erfahrung wird vorgeschlagen, den repräsentationalen Formen von Wahrheit eine nicht repräsentationale Wahrheit des »Jetzt« gegenüberzustellen, die erstere als Fiktionen und Abstraktionen erscheinen lässt. (shrink)