The paper maintains (1) that Frege's quantification of sentence positions motivates his identification of sentences as proper names of truth-values; (2) that this identification is fully compatible with the 'context principle'; (3) that the relation of a thought to its truth-value is the primary case of the relation of sense to meaning. The paper offers a reconstruction of Frege's defense of (1) in pp. 33-35 of "On Sense and Meaning".
The first section of the paper argues that, in the context of Wittgenstein’s intentional understanding of the truth-functional construction of sentences, the independence of elementary sentences is required for every application of a truth-operation to have the same significance. The second section of the paper presents a ‘top-down’ interpretation of Tractarian analysis. There is no characterization of the bottom level of analysis apart from the general sentence-form; the only constraint on analysis is that apparently manifest logical relationships among colloquial sentences (...) with sense be represented or otherwise accommodated using only the logical resources built into the general sentence-form. The third section of the paper considers how those logical resources might be applied in Tractarian analysis. Central here is the use of form-series to construct infinitary truth-functions. The section develops a view of Tractarian complexes which accommodates some colloquially manifest logical relations as presuppositions that are made explicit in analysis. Finally, I note that Tractarian analysis, as presented in this paper, is immune to the ‘color exclusion’ objection as formulated in Wittgenstein’s 1929 paper “Some Remarks on Logical Form.”. (shrink)
The paper maintains that Frege's quantification of sentence positions motivates his identification of sentences as proper names of truth-values; that this identification is fully compatible with the Context Principle; that the relation of a thought to its truth-value is the primary case of the relation of sense to meaning. The paper offers a reconstruction of Frege's defense of in pp. 33-5 of “On Sense and Meaning”O artigo sustenta que a quantificação Fregeana sobre posições de sentença motiva sua identificação de sentenças (...) como nomes próprios de valores de verdade; que esta identificação é inteiramente compatível com o Princípio do Contexto; que a relação de um pensamento com o seu valor de verdade é o caso primário da relação do sentido para com o significado. O artigo oferece uma reconstrução da defesa de Frege de nas pp. 33-5 de “Sobre o Sentido e o Significado”. (shrink)
