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    Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction.Thorsten Clausing - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (4):315-336.
    The problem of finding sufficient doxastic conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analyzed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. This allows to describe the structure of the game by a logical formula and consequently to treat beliefs about this structure in the same way as beliefs about rationality. A backward induction and a non-Nash equilibrium result based on higher level belief in rationality and the structure of the game are derived.
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  2.  22
    Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information.Thorsten Clausing - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.
    A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated (...)
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    A Syntactic Framework with Probabilistic Beliefs and Conditionals for the Analysis of Strategic Form Games.Thorsten Clausing - 2002 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (3):335-348.
    In this paper, I develop a syntactic framework for the analysis ofstrategic form games that is based on a straightforward combination ofstandard systems of doxastic, probabilistic and conditionalpropositional logic. In particular, for the probabilistic part I makeuse of the axiomatization provided in Fagin and Halpern (1994). The use ofconditionals allows to represent a strategic form game by a logicalformula in a very natural way. Also expected utility maximization can benaturally captured. I use this framework to prove a version of a (...)
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