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Profile: Tillmann Vierkant (University of Edinburgh)
  1.  16
    What Metarepresentation is For.Tillmann Vierkant - 2012 - In Brandl Beran (ed.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 279.
    Humans seem special, because they are able to think about thinking (to make their mentality the object of their thoughts). In this paper I distinguish two very different ways in which thinking about thinking could be understood and which role these understandings play in the control of the mind. I argue on the one hand that language enables humans to express and attend to the content of their thoughts. This is an incredibly powerful tool which allows for the intentional manipulation (...)
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  2.  58
    Mental Muscles and the Extended Will.Tillmann Vierkant - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):1-9.
    In the wake of Clark and Chalmers famous argument for extended cognition some people have argued that willpower equally can extend into the environment (e.g. Heath and Anderson in The thief of time: philosophical essays on procrastination. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 233–252, 2010). In a recent paper Fabio Paglieri (Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp 179–206, 2012) provides an interesting argument to the effect that there might (...)
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  3.  16
    Mindshaping and the Intentional Control of the Mind.Tillmann Vierkant & Andreas Paraskevaides - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction. John Benjamins.
    Understanding and controlling our minds is one of the most fascinating features of human cognition. It has often been assumed that this ability requires a theoretical understanding of psychological states. This assumption has recently been put under pressure by so called mindshaping approaches. We agree that these approaches provide us with a new way of self-understanding and that they enable a very powerful form of self-regulation which we label narrative control. However, we insist that there still is a crucial role (...)
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  4.  64
    Is Willpower Just Another Way of Tying Oneself to the Mast?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):779-790.
    This paper argues against the intuition that willpower and so called ‘tying to the mast’ strategies are fundamentally different types of mental actions to achieve self control. The argument for this surprising claim is that at least on the most plausible account of willpower an act of willpower consists in an intentional mental action that disables the mental agent and thereby creates a mental tie. The paper then defends this claim against the objection that tying to the mast strategies do (...)
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  5. Decomposing the Will.Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.
     
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  6.  47
    Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility.Tillmann Vierkant - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507-534.
    The article argues that there is a specific role for narrative consciousness in our understanding of justified responsibility ascription. Starting from a short review of empirical findings that suggest that we do not consciously control our actions, the article proceeds to spell out a concept of willed actions that does justice to the scientific results, conceptual requirements, and our most important intuitions on the ascription of responsibility. In order to do this, the article develops a concept of how narrative monitoring (...)
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  7.  37
    How Do You Know That You Settled a Question?Tillmann Vierkant - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
    It is commonly assumed in the philosophical literature that in order to acquire an intention, the agent has to settle a question of what to do in practical deliberation. Carruthers, P. has recently used this to argue that the acquisition of intentions can never be conscious even in cases where the agent asserts having the intention in inner speech. Because of that Carruthers also believes that knowledge of intentions even in first person cases is observational. This paper explores the challenge (...)
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  8. Zombie Mary and the Blue Banana. On the Compatibility of the 'Knowledge Argument' with the Argument From Modality.Tillmann Vierkant - 2002 - Psyche 8 (19).
    This paper is trying to show that it is not possible to use the Knowledge argument as independent evidence for the form of non-reductionism the Modal argument argues for. To show this, Jackson's famous 'Mary' thought experiment is imagined in a zombie world. This leads to the result that there are many problems in the Mary experiment, which cannot have anything to do with phenomenal Qualia, because the Zombie-Mary would encounter them as well, and once all these problems are accounted (...)
     
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  9.  25
    Explicit Reasons, Implicit Stereotypes and the Effortful Control of the Mind.Tillmann Vierkant & Rosa Hardt - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):251-265.
    Research in psychology clearly shows that implicit biases contribute significantly to our behaviour. What is less clear, however, is whether we are responsible for our implicit biases in the same way that we are responsible for our explicit beliefs. Neil Levy has argued recently that explicit beliefs are special with regard to the responsibility we have for them, because they unify the agent. In this paper we point out multiple ways in which implicit biases also unify the agent. We then (...)
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  10.  11
    Self Knowledge and Knowing Other Minds: The Implicit / Explicit Distinction as a Tool in Understanding Theory of Mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2012 - British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155.
    Holding content explicitly requires a form of self knowledge. But what does the relevant self knowledge look like? Using theory of mind as an example, this paper argues that the correct answer to this question will have to take into account the crucial role of language based deliberation, but warns against the standard assumption that explicitness is necessary for ascribing awareness. It argues in line with Bayne that intentional action is at least an equally valid criterion for awareness. This leads (...)
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  11.  3
    Choice in a Two Systems World: Picking & Weighing or Managing & Metacognition.Tillmann Vierkant - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-13.
    Intuitively, choices seem to be intentional actions but it is difficult to see how they could be. If our choices are all about weighing up reasons then there seems no room for an additional intentional act of choice. Richard Holton has suggested a solution to this puzzle, which involves thinking of choices in a two systems of cognition framework. Holton’s suggestion does solve the puzzle, but has some unsatisfactory consequences. This paper wants to take over the important insights from Holton (...)
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  12. From Voluntary to Relational Action : Responsibility in Question.Tillmann Vierkant - 2007 - In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-?-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan.
     
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  13. The Role of the Self-Model for Self-Determination.Tillmann Vierkant - 2007 - In Sabine Maasen & Barbara Sutter (eds.), On Willing Selves: Neoliberal Politics Vis-à-Vis the Neuroscientific Challenge. Plagrave Macmiilan. pp. 209.
     
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