Kant and Adorno alike have assumed that hope plays a central role in the relation between ethics and happiness. After comparing some of their different interpretations of hope, this paper traces the philosophical account of the concept of hope which Kant and Adorno, however, agree on. They both see hope as essential for bridging the gulf between normativity and realities. Hope, they argue, features a weaker doxastic state than belief but a stronger one than wishful thinking. For Kant, the question, (...) "what may I hope?" is part of the interests of human reason. By modifying this conception of hope, Adorno advocates a notion of hope, which accounts for a critique of religion and metaphysics. (shrink)
Property rights are often seen as a gateway to the destruction of nature. In view of the ecological crisis, criticism of property rights is therefore becoming louder and louder. On the one hand, rightly so, since global warming, resource depletion, global pollution and the loss of species have been made possible by the private ownership of natural assets. On the other hand, the criticism falls short. Even common and public property does not protect natural assets from being overexploited, resources depleted, (...) and values extracted. Moreover, it is questionable whether nature would actually be better off today without any property regulation. A new understanding of property that does justice to natural goods is therefore needed. The article considers the rights of nature as a way to rethink property in this sense and explores reasons to give rights of nature a general validity. (shrink)
In his latest book, Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, Jürgen Habermas attempts nothing less than a reconceptualisation of the history of human reason. Why, according to the central question that runs through the book like a red thread, can we, in the face of all social adversities and psychological obstacles, still be morally motivated to stand up for overcoming injustice in the world? This almost classic question about what I can hope for undoubtedly bears Kantian traits. And yet Habermas clearly (...) goes beyond Kant. We argue that this becomes visible, first, in his post-metaphysical conception of motivation, which links individual and collective moral learning processes. The enormous explosive power of this conception comes into its own, secondly, especially against the background of some additional assumptions (trust, grief, open future). Nevertheless, thirdly, the question arises to what extent the Habermasian narrative of progress does not have a blind spot because it is in some sense not dialectical enough. The negative side of reason, which Adorno and Benjamin emphasised, are not included in the progress narrative, or only indirectly, which makes the conception of moral motivation seem weaker than it ought to be. (shrink)
Hegel′s concept of truth and contemporary theories of truth could mutually profit from one another in two regards. Hegel′s unity of truth and rationality makes an attempt to undermine the antagonism of internal and external concepts of knowledge and gives an account for truth in ethics. Ethical truth is accounted for by an external concept of practical rationality without assigning truth an epistemic design. To understand practical rationality, we must account for irrationality as a case of self-deception which seems to (...) be incompatible with an external concept of rationality. Hegel′s 'inclusive monism′ elucidates a concept of rationality which complies with the requirements for ethical truth. (shrink)
Dans ce commentaire, je me pencherai brièvement sur une philosophie du discours performatif qui s’inscrit dans la foulée de l’exploration par Taylor des capacités linguistiques humaines. Cette philosophie vient compléter la pleine étendue de la capacité linguistique, et montrer comment la raison pénètre la pensée grâce au langage. Le langage crée en effet une ouverture à la raison grâce — et c’est ce sur quoi je me concentrerai — à une critique de l’auto-tromperie, qui peut être réalisée grâce à la (...) capacité linguistique. (shrink)
The basic thesis of this article is that with his book on legal revolution Brunkhorst rewrites a dialectic of enlightenment. According to Brunkhorst, learning processes, which lead to the revolutionary institutionalization of a new constitutional order, are triggered by negativity. This begs the following questions. What is the account of the belief in a concurrency of dialectics of enlightenment and the learning process? Why do extreme forms of exploitation and oppression still lead to the learning process?