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  1. 10. Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness (Pp. 632-637). [REVIEW]Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Way, Gregg Strauss, Tim Willenken, Matthew Talbert, Angela M. Smith, James A. Montmarquet, Nicole Hassoun, Virginia Held & Nicholas Wolterstorff - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3).
  2. Moorean Responses to Skepticism: A Defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.
    Few philosophers believe that G. E. Moore's notorious proof of an external world can give us justification to believe that skepticism about perceptual beliefs is false. The most prominent explanation of what is wrong with Moore's proof—as well as some structurally similar anti-skeptical arguments—centers on conservatism: roughly, the view that someone can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if he has p-independent justification to believe that all of the skeptical hypotheses that undermine the support (...)
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    Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality.Tim Willenken - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):545-561.
    A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate “deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A than C. Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense morality generates deontic cycling. This matters for two reasons. First, it creates a problem for the widely held view that agent-centered rankings can square consequentialism with commonsense morality. Second, it forces a choice between some deeply plausible views about rationality—wherein someone (...)
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    Rationalist Responses to Skepticism: A New Puzzle.Tim Willenken - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Most promising responses to skepticism fall into “Moorean” or “rationalist” camps. Mooreans believe that some apparently circular forms of reasoning allow us to have justification to believe that skeptical hypotheses are false. Rationalists believe that we have a priori justification to believe that skeptical hypotheses are false. It can seem that anti-skeptics are stuck choosing between fishy circular reasoning and mysterious a priori justification. I present a new difficulty for rationalism by focusing on skeptical scenarios wherein our faculties of a (...)
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