This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.

, David Bloor suggests that logical reasoning is radically relativistic in the sense that there are incompatible ways of reasoning logically, and no culturally transcendent rules of correct logical inference exist which could allow for adjudication of these different ways of reasoning. Bloor cites an example of reasoning used by the Azande as an illustration of such logical relativism. A close analysis of this reasoning reveals that the Azande's logic is in fact impeccably Aristotelian. I argue that the conclusions Bloor (...) can legitimately draw from his case study are not controversial and do nothing to make plausible the thesis of logical relativism. (shrink)

In a previous issue of this journal, Michael Hicks challenges my critique of Wilfrid Sellars’s arguments against the given and against the foundationalist epistemology that relies on the idea of a sensory given. I had argued that Sellars’s well-known claim that the given is a myth does not succeed because at a critical juncture he misconstrued sense-datum theorists such as Bertrand Russell and H. H. Price. In his response to my argument, Hicks makes the striking claim that Sellars was not (...) targeting foundationalism at all in his discussion of the myth of the given. Hicks reconstructs a key argument in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) in a way intended both to avoid any reference to foundationalism and to do a more effective job than does Sellars’s original argument in uncovering a dilemma for traditional empiricism. The present paper challenges Hicks on two fronts. First, it argues that Hicks’s reconstruction is not more successful than Sellars’s original argument. Second, a review of relevant passages in makes clear that the critique of foundationalism is a prominent aspect of Sellars’s multi-faceted attack on the given. The conclusion reasserts the significance of Sellars’s place in the history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. (shrink)

A striking empirical finding about color perception is that normal perceivers disagree about which hues are pure. (Pure hues contain no perceived admixture of any other color.) This finding poses a prima facie problem for color objectivism and representationalist accounts of perceptual experience. Michael Tye attempts to resolve this problem by arguing that pure hues do exist as objective properties of ordinary objects, but that human color detection mechanisms did not evolve with sufficient refinement to allow us to determine which (...) hues are the pure ones. I argue that Tye’s attempted solution fails, and that the most reasonable conclusion consistent with color objectivism is that pure hues do not exist. (shrink)

I argue that in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Wilfrid Sellars significantly misconstrued the early twentieth-century empiricists he was criticizing (empiricists such as Bertrand Russell, H.H. Price and C.I. Lewis). Because these philosophers and their theories were becoming passé (partly due to EPM itself but also due to broader trends), this misconstrual was not noted. As a result, Sellars’s most influential claim – that the given is a myth – did not receive the critical scrutiny that it should have (...) received prior to its widespread acceptance. (shrink)

In the following dialogue between TT - a foundationalist - and WdeV - a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of (...) the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.' In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge - that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars's principle. WdeV defends Sellars's metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars's principle are debated. (shrink)

In the intellectual autobiography that opens this book, Chisholm divides philosophers into “drones” and “commentators,” placing himself in the first group. As a drone, Chisholm proposed solutions to philosophical problems and asked his students and colleagues to try to refute him. He reports that they often did, sending him back to the drawing board. Chisholm’s wry self-description says much about his manner as well as his method. A more pretentious philosopher might have spoken of his dogged search for philosophical truth (...) in an age when many have come to disparage that quest. (shrink)

Antony Flew's ?A Strong Programme for the Sociology of Belief (Inquiry 25 {1982], 365?78) critically assesses the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge defended in David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery. I argue that Flew's rejection of the epistemological relativism evident in Bloor's work begs the question against the relativist and ignores Bloor's focus on the social relativity of mathematical knowledge. Bloor attempts to establish such relativity via a sociological analysis of Frege's theory of number. But this analysis only (...) succeeds if the rejection of an explanatory theory entails that there are reasonable grounds for the rejection of the set of propositions which that theory was intended to explain. I argue against such an entailment, and thus against Bloor's attempt to relativize mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Logical relativism is the view that a logical proposition is known just in case it is collectively endorsed in some culture. This striking and controversial view is defended by David Bloor and Richard C. Jennings. They cite in its support distinctive reasoning practices among the Azande as described by E. E. Evans-Pitchard. Jennings has challenged my critique of Bloor's logical relativism, claiming that my analysis is based on misunderstandings of Bloor and Evans-Pritchard. I argue that Jennings' clarifications of Bloor do (...) nothing to support the thesis of logical relativism, and that a direct examination of Evans-Pritchard's evidence suggests that the Azande reason just as we do. (shrink)

Jonathan barnes argues that heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is logically contradictory in that it requires the coinstantiation of contrary properties. but barnes relies on rather strained interpretations of the doxography. heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is better understood as consisting of two aspects: (1) a claim that opposing qualities, rather than being coinstantiated in one thing, are related to one another via a process of cyclic transformation; and (2) an attempt to illustrate the limited and incomplete perspectives through which (...) heraclitus believed humanity ordinarily viewed the world. (shrink)

In this engaging and accessible dialogue, four students offer contrasting arguments on the nature and scope of morality. While specific social policy issues, such as animal rights and racism, come into play, the discussions focus on more general--and fundamental--questions, including: Does morality limit personal freedom? Is morality relative to culture, or is it universal? What is the motivation to be moral? Is religion in tension with secular moral principles? Does science undermine morality? Can a common morality emerge out of the (...) diversity of human interests? A glossary of important terms and suggestions for further reading are included. (shrink)

I argue that we can achieve certainty about some empirical propositions. When someone is having a migraine and attending to it, she can be certain that she is in pain. I show that examples intended to undermine claims of certainty or to raise doubts about the reliability of introspection do not touch such cases. Traditional foundationalists have held that epistemically certain beliefs can serve as the basis for all one’s other justified beliefs. This is not so, because those beliefs that (...) are certain are spread too thinly to serve as broad justificatory foundations. Certainty has a different role. The best explanation for the existence of epistemically certain empirical beliefs is experientialism, the view that nondoxastic sensory experiences can justify beliefs. Experientialism then offers a framework for showing how the stream of sensory experiences can provide an adequate basis for the justification of our ordinary beliefs about the external world. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the description of a spectrum (...) inversion scenario, and that it cannot sustain a functionalist relationship between an object's color and its phenomenal properties. Functionalists must, however, come to terms with Shoemaker's recognition that intersubjective spectrum shifts are possible. (shrink)

In order to provide an alternative to the Cartesian myth that knowledge of our thoughts and sensations is "given," Sellars posits a community of "Rylean ancestors" - humans at an early stage of conceptual development who possess a language containing sophisticated concepts about the physical world and about their own language and behavior, but who lack any concepts of thoughts or sensations. Sellars's presentation of this thought experiment leaves many important details sketchy. In the following dialogue, we offer our differing (...) assessments of how well those details could be filled out. TT questions how the Rylean hypothesis could provide a plausible account of human thought and sensory experience at any stage of human conceptual development. WdeV responds to TT's challenge by filling out the picture of what the Ryleans' conceptual world would look like. TT and WdeV debate the merits and the plausibility of the resulting picture. (shrink)

Bernard Gert claims that the project of justifying morality is “the primary task” of his major work, Morality: Its Nature and Justification. However, the arguments for and the point of his justification are not entirely clear. Unfortunately, critical work on Gert’s theory of morality has not included detailed attention to his attempt to justify morality. Part I of this two-part essay offers a systematic examination and assessment of Gert’s justification. It is argued that Gert’s justification is successful, but limited in (...) its scope. (shrink)

Bernard Gert’s account of morality is straightforward, clear and, in its essentials, easily grasped. As such, it offers rich pedagogical resources for teaching morality, not just in undergraduate courses but also in pre-college philosophy classes or workshops, including those offered during the elementary school years. Gert’s account, properly calibrated to the age group in question, can provide a unified framework for students to think about morality, clarify their understanding of it, and engage in discussions with each other about it. After (...) summarizing Gert’s account, I illustrate several ways in which it can be applied in the classroom, beginning with applications at the elementary school level and working up to pedagogy appropriate to high school and college. I conclude by considering and responding to some possible objections to this approach. (shrink)

A dialogue between someone who finds Sellars's Rylean myth in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" quite implausible and another who defends it.

Bernard Gert argues that, while the moral system contains a procedure for resolving most moral disagreements, it does not allow for such resolution in all cases. For example, it does not allow for the resolution of disputes about whether animals and human fetuses should be included within the scope of those to whom the moral rules apply. I agree with Gert that not all moral debates can be resolved, but I believe that Gert does not use all the argumentative resources (...) available to philosophers to resolve them. I argue that considerations outside the moral system proper can be used to provide argumentative support favoring some positions over their rivals in moral controversies that Gert regards as intractable. I illustrate this with reference to the abortion debate. I also argue that reaching such conclusions about the superiority of one position over rivals need not result in moral arrogance. (shrink)

Bernard Gert’s account of morality is straightforward, clear and, in its essentials, easily grasped. As such, it offers rich pedagogical resources for teaching morality, not just in undergraduate courses but also in pre-college philosophy classes or workshops, including those offered during the elementary school years. Gert’s account, properly calibrated to the age group in question, can provide a unified framework for students to think about morality, clarify their understanding of it, and engage in discussions with each other about it. After (...) summarizing Gert’s account, I illustrate several ways in which it can be applied in the classroom, beginning with applications at the elementary school level and working up to pedagogy appropriate to high school and college. I conclude by considering and responding to some possible objections to this approach. (shrink)

Although Bernard Gert’s justification of morality is limited in what it accomplishes (as argued in Part I of this two-part essay), the deliberative structure he has set up in order to procure this justification is a quite fruitful one. With some modifications, this structure can be used to generate a significantly more powerful justification of morality than Gert’s. Part II of this essay shows how the moral system can be brought into direct engagement with common rejections of morality in a (...) way that Gert’s justification cannot do. It is shown how persuasive arguments can be brought to bear against these anti-moral alternatives and in favor of the moral system. (shrink)

Rorty's critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rorty's argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory (...) awareness justifies ordinary nonbasic propositions. Even classical foundationalism, then, remains untouched by Rorty's critique. (shrink)

Books reviewed in this article: Nicholas Rescher, Philosophical Standardism Nicholas Rescher, The Strife of Systems Nicholas Rescher, A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. III, Metaphysical Inquiries.