This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.

A striking empirical finding about color perception is that normal perceivers disagree about which hues are pure. (Pure hues contain no perceived admixture of any other color.) This finding poses a prima facie problem for color objectivism and representationalist accounts of perceptual experience. Michael Tye attempts to resolve this problem by arguing that pure hues do exist as objective properties of ordinary objects, but that human color detection mechanisms did not evolve with sufficient refinement to allow us to determine which (...) hues are the pure ones. I argue that Tye’s attempted solution fails, and that the most reasonable conclusion consistent with color objectivism is that pure hues do not exist. (shrink)

, David Bloor suggests that logical reasoning is radically relativistic in the sense that there are incompatible ways of reasoning logically, and no culturally transcendent rules of correct logical inference exist which could allow for adjudication of these different ways of reasoning. Bloor cites an example of reasoning used by the Azande as an illustration of such logical relativism. A close analysis of this reasoning reveals that the Azande's logic is in fact impeccably Aristotelian. I argue that the conclusions Bloor (...) can legitimately draw from his case study are not controversial and do nothing to make plausible the thesis of logical relativism. (shrink)

In the intellectual autobiography that opens this book, Chisholm divides philosophers into “drones” and “commentators,” placing himself in the first group. As a drone, Chisholm proposed solutions to philosophical problems and asked his students and colleagues to try to refute him. He reports that they often did, sending him back to the drawing board. Chisholm’s wry self-description says much about his manner as well as his method. A more pretentious philosopher might have spoken of his dogged search for philosophical truth (...) in an age when many have come to disparage that quest. (shrink)

I argue that in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” Wilfrid Sellars significantly misconstrued the early twentieth-century empiricists he was criticizing (empiricists such as Bertrand Russell, H.H. Price and C.I. Lewis). Because these philosophers and their theories were becoming passé (partly due to EPM itself but also due to broader trends), this misconstrual was not noted. As a result, Sellars’s most influential claim – that the given is a myth – did not receive the critical scrutiny that it should have (...) received prior to its widespread acceptance. (shrink)

Logical relativism is the view that a logical proposition is known just in case it is collectively endorsed in some culture. This striking and controversial view is defended by David Bloor and Richard C. Jennings. They cite in its support distinctive reasoning practices among the Azande as described by E. E. Evans-Pitchard. Jennings has challenged my critique of Bloor's logical relativism, claiming that my analysis is based on misunderstandings of Bloor and Evans-Pritchard. I argue that Jennings' clarifications of Bloor do (...) nothing to support the thesis of logical relativism, and that a direct examination of Evans-Pritchard's evidence suggests that the Azande reason just as we do. (shrink)

Antony Flew's ?A Strong Programme for the Sociology of Belief (Inquiry 25 {1982], 365?78) critically assesses the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge defended in David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery. I argue that Flew's rejection of the epistemological relativism evident in Bloor's work begs the question against the relativist and ignores Bloor's focus on the social relativity of mathematical knowledge. Bloor attempts to establish such relativity via a sociological analysis of Frege's theory of number. But this analysis only (...) succeeds if the rejection of an explanatory theory entails that there are reasonable grounds for the rejection of the set of propositions which that theory was intended to explain. I argue against such an entailment, and thus against Bloor's attempt to relativize mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Jonathan barnes argues that heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is logically contradictory in that it requires the coinstantiation of contrary properties. but barnes relies on rather strained interpretations of the doxography. heraclitus's unity of opposites doctrine is better understood as consisting of two aspects: (1) a claim that opposing qualities, rather than being coinstantiated in one thing, are related to one another via a process of cyclic transformation; and (2) an attempt to illustrate the limited and incomplete perspectives through which (...) heraclitus believed humanity ordinarily viewed the world. (shrink)

A dialogue between someone who finds Sellars's Rylean myth in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" quite implausible and another who defends it.

In the following dialogue between TT - a foundationalist - and WdeV - a Sellarsian, we offer our differing assessments of the principle for observational knowledge proposed in Wilfrid Sellars's 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars writes: 'For a Konstatierung "This is green" to "express observational knowledge", not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of "This is green" are symptoms of (...) the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual perception.' In the ensuing dialogue, TT argues that it sets the bar too high when knowledge about perceptual conditions is required for ordinary observational knowledge - that young children, for example, are implausibly excluded as knowers given Sellars's principle. WdeV defends Sellars's metaknowledge requirement against these charges. Results from developmental psychology are surveyed for what they show about the actual capabilities of young children. The implications of these results for the success of Sellars's principle are debated. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the description of a spectrum (...) inversion scenario, and that it cannot sustain a functionalist relationship between an object's color and its phenomenal properties. Functionalists must, however, come to terms with Shoemaker's recognition that intersubjective spectrum shifts are possible. (shrink)

Bernard Gert’s account of morality is straightforward, clear and, in its essentials, easily grasped. As such, it offers rich pedagogical resources for teaching morality, not just in undergraduate courses but also in pre-college philosophy classes or workshops, including those offered during the elementary school years. Gert’s account, properly calibrated to the age group in question, can provide a unified framework for students to think about morality, clarify their understanding of it, and engage in discussions with each other about it. After (...) summarizing Gert’s account, I illustrate several ways in which it can be applied in the classroom, beginning with applications at the elementary school level and working up to pedagogy appropriate to high school and college. I conclude by considering and responding to some possible objections to this approach. (shrink)

Bernard Gert’s account of morality is straightforward, clear and, in its essentials, easily grasped. As such, it offers rich pedagogical resources for teaching morality, not just in undergraduate courses but also in pre-college philosophy classes or workshops, including those offered during the elementary school years. Gert’s account, properly calibrated to the age group in question, can provide a unified framework for students to think about morality, clarify their understanding of it, and engage in discussions with each other about it. After (...) summarizing Gert’s account, I illustrate several ways in which it can be applied in the classroom, beginning with applications at the elementary school level and working up to pedagogy appropriate to high school and college. I conclude by considering and responding to some possible objections to this approach. (shrink)

Rorty's critique concentrates on one aspect of foundationalism: the claim that nonpropositional sensory awareness serves as the basis for propositional justification. This claim is an essential component of classical foundationalism, though not necessarily of the more moderate versions of foundationalism that have been proposed. Thus even if it were a successful critique it would tell against only one type of foundationalism. But nothing in Rorty's argument provides any reason to doubt the plausibility of a classical foundationalist explanation of why sensory (...) awareness justifies ordinary nonbasic propositions. Even classical foundationalism, then, remains untouched by Rorty's critique. (shrink)

Bernard Gert claims that the project of justifying morality is “the primary task” of his major work, Morality: Its Nature and Justification. However, the arguments for and the point of his justification are not entirely clear. Unfortunately, critical work on Gert’s theory of morality has not included detailed attention to his attempt to justify morality. Part I of this two-part essay offers a systematic examination and assessment of Gert’s justification. It is argued that Gert’s justification is successful, but limited in (...) its scope. (shrink)

Although Bernard Gert’s justification of morality is limited in what it accomplishes (as argued in Part I of this two-part essay), the deliberative structure he has set up in order to procure this justification is a quite fruitful one. With some modifications, this structure can be used to generate a significantly more powerful justification of morality than Gert’s. Part II of this essay shows how the moral system can be brought into direct engagement with common rejections of morality in a (...) way that Gert’s justification cannot do. It is shown how persuasive arguments can be brought to bear against these anti-moral alternatives and in favor of the moral system. (shrink)

In order to provide an alternative to the Cartesian myth that knowledge of our thoughts and sensations is "given," Sellars posits a community of "Rylean ancestors" - humans at an early stage of conceptual development who possess a language containing sophisticated concepts about the physical world and about their own language and behavior, but who lack any concepts of thoughts or sensations. Sellars's presentation of this thought experiment leaves many important details sketchy. In the following dialogue, we offer our differing (...) assessments of how well those details could be filled out. TT questions how the Rylean hypothesis could provide a plausible account of human thought and sensory experience at any stage of human conceptual development. WdeV responds to TT's challenge by filling out the picture of what the Ryleans' conceptual world would look like. TT and WdeV debate the merits and the plausibility of the resulting picture. (shrink)

In this engaging and accessible dialogue, four students offer contrasting arguments on the nature and scope of morality. While specific social policy issues, such as animal rights and racism, come into play, the discussions focus on more general--and fundamental--questions, including: Does morality limit personal freedom? Is morality relative to culture, or is it universal? What is the motivation to be moral? Is religion in tension with secular moral principles? Does science undermine morality? Can a common morality emerge out of the (...) diversity of human interests? A glossary of important terms and suggestions for further reading are included. (shrink)