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Profile: Timothy Endicott (Oxford University, Balliol College, Oxford)
  1.  61
    Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 1998 - Legal Theory 4 (3):283-300.
    Even to disagree, we need to understand each other. If I reject what you say without understanding you, we will only have the illusion of a disagreement. You will be asserting one thing and I will be denying another. Even to disagree, we need some agreement.
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  2.  31
    Putting Interpretation in its Place.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 1994 - Law and Philosophy 13 (4):451 - 479.
    What can a philosophical analysis of the concept of interpretation contribute to legal theory? In his recent book,Interpretation and Legal Theory, Andrei Marmor proposes a complex and ambitious analysis as groundwork for his positivist assault on “interpretive” theories of law and of language. I argue (i) that the crucial element in Marmor's analysis of interpretation is his treatment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules, and (ii) that a less ambitious analysis of interpretation than Marmor's can take better advantage of (...)
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  3.  10
    The Impossibility of the Rule of Law.Timothy A. O. Endicott - 1999 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 19 (1):1-18.
    No community fully achieves the ideal of the rule of law. Puzzles about the content of the ideal seem to make it necessarily unattainable (and, therefore, an incoherent ideal). Legal systems necessarily contain vague laws. They typically allow for change in the law, they typically provide for unreviewable official decisions, and they never regulate every aspect of the life of a community. It may seem that the ideal can never be achieved because of these features of legal practice. But I (...)
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