It is here argued that functionalist constraints on psychology do not preclude the applicability of classic forms of reduction and, therefore, do not support claims to a principled, or de jure, autonomy of psychology. In Part I, after isolating one minimal restriction any functionalist theory must impose on its categories, it is shown that any functionalism imposing an additional constraint of de facto autonomy must also be committed to a pure functionalist--that is, a computationalist--model for psychology. Using an extended parallel (...) to the reduction of Mendelian to molecular genetics, it is shown in Parts II and III that, contrary to the claims of Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor, there is no inconsistency between computational models and classical reductionism: neither plurality of physical realization nor plurality of function are inconsistent with reductionism as defended by Ernest Nagel. Employing the results of Part I, the conclusions of Parts II and III are generalized in Part IV to cover any version of functionalism whatsoever; thus, functionalism and reductionism are shown to be consistent. It is urged in conclusion that although a de facto form of autonomy is defensible, there are sound methodological grounds for unconditionally rejecting any principled version of the autonomy of psychology. (shrink)

How can we imagine a future not driven by capitalist assumptions about humans and the wider world? How are a range of contemporary artistic and popular cultural practices already providing pathways to post-capitalist futures? Authors from a variety of disciplines answer these questions through writings on blues and hip hop, virtual reality, post-colonial science fiction, virtual gaming, riot grrrls and punk, raku pottery, post-pornography fanzines, zombie films, and role playing. The essays in Art as Revolt are clustered around themes such (...) as technology and the future, aesthetics and resistance, and ethnographies of the self beyond traditional understandings of identity. Using philosophies of immanence – describing a system that gives rise to itself, independent of outside forces – drawn from a rich and evolving tradition that includes Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze, and Braidotti, the authors and editors provide an engrossing range of analysis and speculation. Together the essays, written by experts in their fields, stage an important collective, transdisciplinary conversation about how best to talk about art and politics today. Sophisticated in its theoretical and philosophical premises, and engaging some of the most pressing questions in cultural studies and artistic practice today, Art as Revolt does not provide comfortable closure. Instead, it is understood by its authors to be a “Dionysian machine,” a generator of open-ended possibility and potential that challenges readers to affirm their own belief in the futures of this world. Contributors include Timothy J. Beck, Mark Bishop, Dave Collins, David Fancy, Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw, Malisa Kurtz, Nicole Land, Eric Lochhead, Douglas Ord, Joanna Perkins, Peter Rehberg, Chris Richardson, Hans Skott-Myhre, and Kathleen Skott-Myhre. (shrink)

We apply the author's computational approach to groups to our empirical work studying and modelling riots. We suggest that assigning roles in particular gives insight, and measuring the frequency of bystander behaviour provides a method to understand the dynamic nature of intergroup conflict, allowing social identity to be incorporated into models of riots.

The influential public health ethics framework proposed by Childress et al. includes five “justificatory conditions,” two of which are “necessity” and “least infringement.” While the framework points to important moral values, we argue it is redundant for it to list both necessity and least infringement because they are logically equivalent. However, it is ambiguous whether Childress et al. would endorse this view, or hold the two conditions distinct. This ambiguity has resulted in confusion in public health ethics discussions citing the (...) Childress et al. framework, as demonstrated by debate between Resnik and Wilson and Dawson. We analyse this debate to resolve these ambiguities. Finally, we argue that the necessity/least infringement principle of the Childress et al. framework applies only in cases in which only one intervention is to be implemented to achieve one specific goal. In other cases, it is not essential to require that only the least infringing intervention be implemented. (shrink)

Despite its empirical prominence, there is very little extant organizational research on Big Data. However, there is reason to believe this is changing as organizational theory scholars are beginning to embrace new methods and data sources. In this essay, I present a view that suggests there are several latent opportunities, many of which have been simmering unattended for some time. This research approach is not without its challenges, as the ontological terrain of Big Data is untested and potentially disruptive. However, (...) we are observing a renewal of approaches to text and content analysis. By opening up the toolkit of computational linguistics methods for text analysis, Big Data may bring about fresh synthesis and reshape classic debates around social structure. (shrink)

Individuals higher on avoidant coping may remember fewer specific autobiographical memories and more nonspecific memories on the Autobiographical Memory Test in order to protect themselves from the painful emotions accompanying some specific memories. Habitually remembering this way may be a risk factor for depression. In Studies 1 and 2, avoidant coping was associated with more specific memories and fewer overgeneral memories, at odds with the functional avoidance view. In Study 3, there were no significant relationships between AMT indices and avoidant (...) coping. Results are discussed in light of ironic process theory. (shrink)

In her classic 1993 article, “The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance,” Deborah Stone contrasted the principle of mutual aid—“the essence of community” in the face of sickness—and the principle of actuarial fairness, under which “each person should pay for his own risk.” Stone claimed that “in most societies sickness is widely accepted as a condition that should trigger mutual aid,” while in the United States, a competitive insurance industry fosters in people “a sense of their difference, rather than (...) their commonalities, and their responsibility for themselves only, rather than their interdependence,” leading to the fragmentation of “communities into ever‐smaller, more homogeneous groups” and “the destruction of mutual aid.” The United States has, as Stone observes, long been an outlier in its approach to financing care for sickness. Over the past half century, we have developed mutual aid‐based programs to care for some, but most Americans have had to pay the “actuarially fair” cost of their care, either as individuals or as employee groups. Mutual aid has existed only on a limited scale. The Affordable Care Act is the most comprehensive attempt to date to remedy this situation. (shrink)

In this essay, I address the critical role of production (production) in Levinas’s Totality and Infinity. I argue that production functions as the terminological site of Levinas’s critique of onto-logic. Specifically, production overturns the most basic ontological presupposition, viz., that Something cannot come from Nothing. At stake in this inversion of Parmenides is a phenomenological re-thinking of the relation between the I and the Other, inaugurating what Levinas calls a “logic of interior-ity.” This logic, in its resistance to the Principle (...) of Non-Contradiction, enacts a paradoxical running-together of activity and passivity, autonomy and dependence, being and nothingness. It is the fact that both the I and Other are produced rather deduced which makes this strange intertwining possible. In conclusion, I reflect on the ways in which production allows for an approach to the Other as both bound up with, while at the same time, excessive to the self. (shrink)

In 209b.c.P. Cornelius Scipio captured the city of New Carthage. The victory was crucial for the Roman war effort in Spain, and indeed in Italy too, but Scipio's campaign is especially memorable—and the subject of much debate—on account of the manner in which the city was taken. New Carthage had in effect been built on a peninsula, with the sea to the south and a lagoon to the north, and with a canal joining the two to the west. The city, (...) therefore, could only be approached by land from the east; but, according to Polybius, Scipio had learnt from some fishermen that the lagoon was shallow and could be forded in most places and, moreover, that the waters in it usually receded each evening (10.8.7). It was this knowledge that Scipio exploited to take the city. But this same knowledge he also kept from his men (10.9.1, 10.9.4–5). In his address to his soldiers prior to the attack, Polybius says, Scipio told them that Poseidon had visited him in his sleep and had promised to assist the Romans in their operations in a way that would be apparent to all (10.11.7). (shrink)

Technology does not belong to the province of just one philosophical school, or even to philosophy itself. It is complex and deep enough to transcend the bounds of any one method of research and of any particular set of philosophical presuppositions.