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Timothy Schroeder [54]Timothy Allan Schroeder [1]
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Timothy Schroeder
Rice University
  1. In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Joining the debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue are simply acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good.
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  2. Three Faces of Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    To desire something is a condition familiar to everyone. It is uncontroversial that desiring has something to do with motivation, something to do with pleasure, and something to do with reward. Call these "the three faces of desire." The standard philosophical theory at present holds that the motivational face of desire presents its unique essence--to desire a state of affairs is to be disposed to act so as to bring it about. A familiar but less standard account holds the hedonic (...)
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  3. Praise, Blame and the Whole Self.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...)
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  4. Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.
    To desire is to be in a particular state of mind. It is a state of mind familiar to everyone who has ever wanted to drink water or desired to know what has happened to an old friend, but its familiarity does not make it easy to give a theory of desire. Controversy immediately breaks out when asking whether wanting water and desiring knowledge are, at bottom, the same state of mind as others that seem somewhat similar: wishing never to (...)
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  5. Moral Motivation.Timothy Schroeder, Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2010 - In John Doris (ed.), Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, we begin with a discussion of motivation itself, and use that discussion to sketch four possible theories of distinctively moral motivation: caricature versions of familiar instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist theories about morally worthy motivation. To test these theories, we turn to a wealth of scientific, particularly neuroscientific, evidence. Our conclusions are that (1) although the scientific evidence does not at present mandate a unique philosophical conclusion, it does present formidable obstacles to a number of popular philosophical (...)
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  6.  24
    On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts. [REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2003 - Dialogue 42 (1):148-149.
    Here is an apparently straightforward philosophical story about concepts. In the style of Jerry Fodor, a concept is a mental “word” ; it means what it does because of its causal dependencies, and it contributes this meaning to the meanings of the mental “sentences” it helps to form. The mental word OWL means owls because owls have a special causal relationship to OWLs, and when the mental word OWL is combined with other mental words, such as THERE, IS, AN and (...)
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  7. Donald Davidson's Theory of Mind is Non-Normative.Timothy Schroeder - 2003 - Philosophers' Imprint 3:1-14.
    Donald Davidson's theory of mind is widely regarded as a normative theory. This is a something of a confusion. Once a distinction has been made between the categorisation scheme of a norm and the norm's force-maker, it becomes clear that a Davidsonian theory of mind is not a normative theory after all. Making clear the distinction, applying it to Davidson's theory of mind, and showing its significance are the main purposes of this paper. In the concluding paragraphs, a sketch is (...)
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  8.  92
    On the Content of Experience.Timothy Schroeder & Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590–611.
    The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience.
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  9.  50
    Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.
    Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual’s tic as on a moral par with others’ actions. In this paper, I examine the options and (...)
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  10.  36
    Functions From Regulation.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - The Monist 87 (1):115-135.
    Here is a rather mundane set of claims about the stapler on my desk: The function of my stapler is to staple sheets of paper together. If the stapler is loaded with staples, but for some reason will not staple papers, the stapler is malfunctioning. That is, it is not doing what it is supposed to do. It is defective, or misshapen, misaligned or inadequate to its task, or in some other way normatively defective: there is something wrong with it. (...)
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  11.  53
    An Ontology of Ideas.Wesley D. Cray & Timothy Schroeder - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):757-775.
    Philosophers often talk about and engage with ideas. Scientists, artists, and historians do, too. But what is an idea? In this paper, we first motivate the desire for an ontology of ideas before discussing what conditions a candidate ontology would have to satisfy to be minimally adequate. We then offer our own account of the ontology of ideas, and consider various strategies for specifying the underlying metaphysics of the account. We conclude with a discussion of potential future work to be (...)
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  12. Propositional Attitudes.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.
    The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works.
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  13.  14
    A Casual Theory of Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):103-114.
    Amanda works in a library, and a patron asks for her help in learning about duty-to- rescue laws in China. She throws herself into the task, spending hours on retrieving documents from governmental and non-governmental sources, getting electronic translations, looking for literature on Scandinavian duty-to-rescue laws that mention Chinese laws for comparison, and so on. Why? She likes to gain this sort of general knowledge of the world; perhaps the reason she works so hard is that she is learning fascinating (...)
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  14. Alienation and Externality.Timothy Schroeder & Nomy Arpaly - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):371-387.
    Harry Frankfurt introduces the concept of externality. Externality is supposed to be a fact about the structure of an agent's will. We argue that the pre-theorethical basis of externality has a lot more to do with feelings of alienation than it does with the will. Once we realize that intuitions about externality are guided by intuitions about feelings of alienation surprising conclusions follow regarding the structure of our will.
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  15.  44
    Kelly, Daniel,. Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011. Pp. 194. $30.00.Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Ethics 122 (2):430-434.
  16.  52
    Pleasure, Displeasure, and Representation.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):507-530.
    The object of the present work is to rectify the neglect that pleasure and displeasure have been suffering from in the philosophy of mind, and to give an account of pleasure and displeasure which reveals a striking degree of unity and theoretical tractabiliy underlying the diverse phenomena: a representationalist account.
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  17.  59
    Desire and Pleasure in John Pollock’s Thinking About Acting. [REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):447–454.
    The first third of John Pollock’s Thinking about Acting is on the topics of pleasure, desire, and preference, and these topics are the ones on which this paper focuses. I review Pollock’s position and argue that it has at least one substantial strength (it elegantly demonstrates that desires must be more fundamental than preferences, and embraces this conclusion wholeheartedly) and at least one substantial weakness (it holds to a form of psychological hedonism without convincingly answering the philosophical or empirical objections (...)
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  18.  61
    The Impossibility of Conscious Desire.Donovan Hulse, Cynthia Read & Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):73 - 80.
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  19. Précis of In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):490-495.
  20.  27
    New Norms for Teleosemantics.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. pp. 1--91.
  21.  86
    Practical Rationality is a Problem in the Philosophy of Mind.Timothy Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):394-409.
    The philosophy of mind encompasses a familiar set of topics: consciousness, intentionality, mental causation, emotion, whatever topics in psychology happen to capture our interest (concepts, mindreading . . .), and so on. There is a topic deserving of addition to this list, a topic that should be receiving regular attention from philosophers of mind but is not: practical rationality. The philosophy of mind bears directly upon what can be called the ‘meta-theory’ of practical rationality, and meta-theories of rationality likewise impose (...)
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  22.  54
    Unexpected Pleasure.Timothy Schroeder - 2008 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. pp. 255-272.
    As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive (...)
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  23.  48
    On Romantic Love: Simple Truths About a Complex Emotion.Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (2):287-289.
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  24.  86
    Unexpected Pleasure.Timothy Schroeder - 2007 - In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. pp. 255-272.
    As topics in the philosophy of emotion, pleasure and displeasure get less than their fair share of attention. On the one hand, there is the fact that pleasure and displeasure are given no role at all in many theories of the emotions, and secondary roles in many others.1 On the other, there is the centrality of pleasure and displeasure to being emotional. A woman who tears up because of a blustery wind, while an ill-advised burrito weighs heavily upon her digestive (...)
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  25.  3
    On the Content of Experience.Timothy Schroeder & Ben Caplan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):590-611.
    The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience, “what it's like,” is determined by the contents of a select group of special intentional states of the subject. Fred Dretske, Mike Thau, Michael Tye and many others have embraced intentionalism, but these philosophers have not generally appreciated that, since we are intimately familiar with the qualitative character of experience, we thereby have special access to the nature of these contents. In this paper, we take advantage of this fact (...)
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  26.  3
    Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106-123.
    Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual’s tic as on a moral par with others’ actions. In this paper, I examine the options and (...)
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  27.  49
    Reply to Critics.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):165-174.
  28.  13
    An Unexpected Pleasure.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):255-272.
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  29.  34
    Reflection, Reason, and Free Will.Timothy Schroeder - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):77 – 84.
    Ju¨rgen Habermas has a familiar style of compatibilism to offer, according to which a person has free will insofar as that person responds appropriately to her reasons. But because of the ways in which Habermas understands reasons and causes, he sees a special objection to his style of compatibilism: it is not clear that our reasons can suitably cause our responses. This objection, however, takes us out of the realm of free will and into the realm of mental causation. In (...)
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  30.  20
    The Causal Map and Moral Psychology.Timothy Schroeder - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):347-369.
    Some philosophers hold that the neuroscience of action is, in practice or in principle, incapable of touching debates in action theory and moral psychology. The role of desires in action, the existence of basic actions, and the like are topics that must be sorted out by philosophers alone: at least at present, and perhaps by the very nature of the questions. This paper examines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the relevance of neuroscience to such questions and argues that neither (...)
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  31. Colin McGinn, Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning Reviewed By.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (3):213-216.
     
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  32.  40
    Reasons, Causes, and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Daniel Pearlberg & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):41-57.
    In this paper we develop a novel argument against the extended mind hypothesis. Our argument constitutes an advance in the debate, insofar as we employ only premises that are acceptable to a coarse-grained functionalist, and we do not rely on functional disanalogies between putative examples of extended minds and ordinary human beings that are just a matter of fine detail or degree. Thus, we beg no questions against proponents of the extended mind hypothesis. Rather, our argument consists in making use (...)
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  33.  39
    Replies to Critics.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):509-515.
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  34.  23
    Book Forum on In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):425-432.
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  35.  68
    Précis of Three Faces of Desire.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (1):125-130.
  36.  17
    Response to Swanton and Badhwar.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):445-448.
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  37.  40
    Moravcsik and the Contents of Consciousness.Timothy Schroeder - unknown
    There is a doctrine in the theory of consciousness known as representationalism, or intentionalism. According to this doctrine, what it feels like to be in a particular state of consciousness — the qualitative character of that state — is identical to the content of some mental representation(s) For instance, the state of consciousness I am enjoying just now as I see a pattern of sunlight and shadow falling on my wall is, in part, a state of consciousness that presents to (...)
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  38.  17
    Monsters Among Us.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - In J. S. McIntosh (ed.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 167-184.
  39.  10
    Monsters Among Us.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):167-184.
    There are monsters that scare children and monsters that scare grownups, and then there are monsters that scare philosophers of mind. This paper is concerned with this third sort of monster, whose primary representative is the zombie—a living being, physically just like a person but lacking consciousness. Though zombies act like normal people and appear to have normal brains, everything is blank inside. Unfortunately, the term ‘zombie’ covers a narrower class of deficits than is convenient, failing to cover apparently normal (...)
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  40.  11
    A Sentimentalist Theory of Mind, by Michael Slote.Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):228-231.
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  41.  24
    Two Ways of Seeing Ways of Seeing.Timothy Schroeder - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (2):341-345.
    A brief critical essay on Marc Jeannerod and Pierre Jacob's book, Ways of Seeing. The essay praises Jeannerod and Jacob for their insightful treatment of the recent neuroscience of vision, and raises questions about their teleosemantic theory of mind.
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  42.  20
    Lawlor, Krista. New Thoughts About Old Things: Cognitive Policies as the Ground of Singular Concepts.Timothy Schroeder - 2003 - Review of Metaphysics 56 (3):661-662.
    Imagine you are looking at a cat and make the following inference: That cat sneezed; That cat is missing an ear; thus There exists a sneezing cat missing an ear. Such an inference is valid only if there is no equivocation on the term “that cat.” If “that cat” in refers to Puss, but in refers to Midnight, then the inference is invalid. This much is elementary. Now imagine that Puss is the cat in front of you when you think, (...)
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  43. Michael Tye, Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity Reviewed By.Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophy in Review 24 (4):303-305.
     
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  44.  18
    Blindsight and the Nature of Consciousness.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):196-198.
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  45.  8
    Book Forum on In Praise of Desire, Oxford University Press, 2013.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):425-432.
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  46.  18
    Blindsight and the Nature of Consciousness Jason Holt Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2003, 153 Pp., $24.95 Paper. [REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):196-.
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  47.  14
    Review of Bruno Mölder, Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism[REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
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  48. Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism Reviewed By.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Philosophy in Review 21 (4):235-237.
  49.  11
    Review of Graham MacDonald, David Papineau (Eds.), Teleosemantics: New Philosophical Essays[REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (4).
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  50.  11
    Review of Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, Michael Smith, Mind, Morality, and Explanation: Selected Collaborations[REVIEW]Timothy Schroeder - 2004 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (11).
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