Maria Morales’s striking and thought-provoking argument in Perfect Equality is that John Stuart Mill’s egalitarianism unifies his practical philosophy and that this element of his thought has been neglected in recent revisionary scholarship. Placing Mill’s arguments for the substantive value of “perfect equality” in The Subjection of Women at the center of her analysis, Morales develops a distinctive interpretation of Mill as an egalitarian liberal. Morales also aims to counter many recent communitarian critiques of liberalism as founded upon a conception (...) of the self as atomistic and individualistic. Like other Mill scholars, Morales sees Mill’s liberalism as an appealing alternative to the dominant Rawlsian theory, and she offers Mill’s approach as a response to “the still popular view that liberalism is structurally incompatible with a rich conception of the human good, particularly with a substantive commitment to equality”. Mill’s theory is not “doggedly individualistic,” and it rejects the model of liberal social life as atomistic and abstract. The well-constituted communities of the title are based upon “sympathetic, cooperative, and egalitarian values”. (shrink)
C’est au « jeune Morgan » que cet article est consacré. En mettant en lumière la collaboration entre Lewis Henry Morgan et son informateur Ely Stone Parker, il examine une situation de rapports entre cultures vécue comme une rencontre entre des personnes. Il s’agit de restituer le contexte historique et politique de l’adoption de Morgan par les Indiens Seneca afin de donner sens à cette rencontre, en considérant les échanges qu’elle a entraînés sur les plans intellectuel, matériel et affectif, (...) les relations de parenté qu’elle a engendrées, les engagements civiques et politiques qu’elle a suscités. Le projet de documentation anthropologique s’est aussi construit dans une situation de voisinage et d’affinité.By shedding light on the collaboration between the young Lewis Henry Morgan and his informant, Ely Stone Parker, a meeting of cultures comes to be seen as a meeting between persons. The historical and political context wherein the Seneca adopted Morgan endows this encounter with a specific meaning stemming from : the intellectual, material and affective exchanges that occurred, the bonds of kinship that were engendered, and the civic and political commitments that were generated. Plans for anthropological studies are also produced by a situation of geographic propinquity. (shrink)
Upshot: Is education about memorising or about making meaning? Critics of constructivist instruction argue that it is more efficient to teach directly. However, there is an empowering engagement to making meaning and teachers need to know how to guide students in this process.
J. N. Adams, Michael Lapidge, and Tobias Reinhardt: IntroductionJ. H. W. Penney: Connections in Archaic Latin ProseJ. Briscoe: Language and Style of the Fragmentary Republican HistoriansJ. N. Adams: The Bellum AfricumChristina Shuttleworth Kraus: Hair, Hegemony, and Historiography: Caesar's Style and its Earliest CriticsJ. G. F. Powell: Cicero's Adaptation of Legal Latin in the De legibusTobias Reinhardt: Language of Epicureanism in Cicero: The Case of AtomismG. O. Hutchinson: Pope's Spider and Cicero's WritingR. G. Mayer: The Impracticability of 'Kunstprosa'H. M. Hine: (...) Poetic Influence on Prose: The Case of the Younger SenecaHarm Pinkster: The Language of Pliny the ElderD. R. Russell: Omisso speciosiore stili genereS. J. Harrison: The Poetics of Fiction: Poetic Influence on the Languages of Apuleius' MetamorphosesD. R. Langslow: 'Langues réduites au lexique'? The Languages of Latin Technical ProseDanuta Shanzer: of Tours and Poetry: Prose into Verse and Verse into ProseMichael Lapidge: Poeticism in Pre-Conquest Anglo-Latin ProseRichard Sharpe: The Varieties of Bede's ProseCarlotta Dionisotti: Translator's LatinWalter Berschin: Realistic Writing in the Tenth Century: : Gerhard of Ausburg's Vita S. UodalriciR. M. Thomson: William of Malmesbury and the Latin Classics RevisitedGiovanni Orlandi: Metrical and Rhythmical Clausulae in Medieval Latin Prose: Some Aspects and Problems. (shrink)
This article presents a critical reevaluation of the thesis—closely associated with H. L. A. Hart, and central to the views of most recent legal philosophers—that the idea of state coercion is not logically essential to the definition of law. The author argues that even laws governing contracts must ultimately be understood as “commands of the sovereign, backed by force.” This follows in part from recognition that the “sovereign,” defined rigorously, at the highest level of abstraction, is that person or entity (...) identified by reference to game theory and the philosophical idea of “convention” as the source of signals with which the subject population has become effectively locked, as a group, into conformity. (shrink)
An intricate, long, and occasionally heated debate surrounds Boltzmann’s H-theorem (1872) and his combinatorial interpretation of the second law (1877). After almost a century of devoted and knowledgeable scholarship, there is still no agreement as to whether Boltzmann changed his view of the second law after Loschmidt’s 1876 reversibility argument or whether he had already been holding a probabilistic conception for some years at that point. In this paper, I argue that there was no abrupt statistical turn. In the first (...) part, I discuss the development of Boltzmann’s research from 1868 to the formulation of the H-theorem. This reconstruction shows that Boltzmann adopted a pluralistic strategy based on the interplay between a kinetic and a combinatorial approach. Moreover, it shows that the extensive use of asymptotic conditions allowed Boltzmann to bracket the problem of exceptions. In the second part I suggest that both Loschmidt’s challenge and Boltzmann’s response to it did not concern the H-theorem. The close relation between the theorem and the reversibility argument is a consequence of later investigations on the subject. (shrink)
This article traces Kurt H. Wolff’s involvement with Italy, from his first sojourn in the 1930s as a German Jewish intellectual in exile to the end of his life. Wolff developed profound ties with the country that hosted him, and that he was forced to abandon once racial laws were introduced there on the eve of World War II. Nonetheless, throughout his life he regarded Italy as an elective homeland of sorts. Wolff’s Italian experience is revisited through a detailed examination (...) of the places where he resided, his activities as a student, teacher, and scholar, and the many individuals with whom he associated, many of whom became his lifelong friends and collaborators. The documentary evidence collected here includes unpublished conversations with some of Wolff’s Italian connections and serves for a consideration of how his ties to Italy had an impact on the development of his sociological and esthetic theories. (shrink)
George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz proposed foundations for an interpretative sociology from opposite standpoints. Mead accepted the objective meaning structure a priori. His problem became therefore the explanation of the individuality and creativity of human actors in his social behavioristic approach. In contrast, Schutz started from the subjective consciousness of an isolated actor as a result of a phenomenological reduction. He was concerned with the problem of explaining the possibility of this isolated actor’s perceiving other actors in their existence, (...) their concreteness, and the motives for their behavior. I treat these two approaches and their associated problems as equally relevant. My evaluation is based on their success in solving their specific problems. The aim is to decide which of the two approaches provides the more adequate foundation for an interpretative sociology. (shrink)
During the British socialist revival of the 1880s competing theories of evolution were central to disagreements about strategy for social change. In News from Nowhere (1891), William Morris had portrayed socialism as the result of Lamarckian processes, and imagined a non-Malthusian future. H.G. Wells, an enthusiastic admirer of Morris in the early days of the movement, became disillusioned as a result of the Malthusianism he learnt from Huxley and his subsequent rejection of Lamarckism in light of Weismann's experiments on mice. (...) This brought him into conflict with his fellow Fabian, George Bernard Shaw, who rejected neo-Darwinism in favour of a Lamarckian conception of change he called "creative evolution.". (shrink)
Theory in the traditional sense of the word comprises a deductive system in which hypotheses and their logical consequences are compared with empirical observations. Such comparison is usually regarded as a verification of the theory. The ideal for this conception of theory is a universal scientific system in which the theories of the different scientific disciplines are brought together under the head of a few fundamental principles.Traditional theory and reality belong to two distinct and separate provinces. Insofar as men make (...) forecasts with the help of theory and attempt to change reality, they do not act as theoreticians. Theory remains in the realm of contemplation. Philosophers have frequently made something absolute out of this aspect of theory and, under the title of,logosf or.spirit', have deified the subject of these intellectual activities. It appears in their systems as the creator of the world. What they are really doing, however, is treating the scholar’s activity, which is based on the division of labor in modern society, as an dbjective and independent substance. The real subject of theory in its traditional aspect is not pure spirit but the scholar who performs definite and necessary functions in modem society.If such an analysis is accepted, the philosophical naiveté of the theoretician disappears. He perceives that not only thinking as such, but also its task, its direction, and the structure of the objective world are ultimately connected with human activity and work. Out of the historical process by which men wrest their living from nature, there emerges the separation of material and intellectual work, as well as the structure and the content of the latter. The dogmatic differentiation between the logical and historical premises of science cannot be maintained. The theoretician is himself part and parcel of the subject which forms the real objective world. To take an active part in the direction of the social life of humanity, therefore, becomes a function and a requirement of science.So it is as theory, in the critical sense of the word, that the author regards the type of reasoning which attempts to impart to social life in its totality a rational form and which does not limit itself to working within the framework of the given system of the division of labor. The history of different scientific theories shows theory, with its unity and clarity, in contrast and opposition to the heterogeneity and disharmony of the real world. In the attempts to achieve harmony in society, thought may play an important role.The author analyses the logical structure of critical theory in the performance of such a function. Its content is the description of present society in terms of a development towards a rational form. Critical theory, therefore, always remains intimately linked up with the reality of existence. It needs for its development in each and every instance the existence and assistance of the various scientific disciplines. Its logical structure, however, is more complicated than that of theory in the traditional sense, because it does not regard its objectives as a separate and foreign province. Science, in the traditional sense, even where it formulates developments in nature and human history, regards interests and purposes as given facts and guideposts that are foreign to its own structure. It has a utilitarian character in a directly understandable sense. Critical theory, however, is confronted with the task of justifying its own problems and their differentiation and has to adjust its internal structure accordingly. It does not set up an unchanging system but sees as its purpose the attempt to apply the knowledge that has been accumulated in the traditional theories to the social totality in the direction that critical theory itself indicates.La théorie, au sens traditionnel, est un système déductif. La confrontation des connaissances obtenues par voie déductive avec les faits constatés permet la vérification de la théorie. L'idéal est un système universel de la science dans lequel les théories des différentes disciplines, toutes ensemble, sont rattachées à un petit nombre de propositions premières.La réalité demeure extérieure à une théorie ainsi conçue. Dans la mesure où les hommes utilisent la théorie pour faire des prévisions et pour modifier la réalité, ils ne sont plus des théoriciens. En ce sens, la théorie est purement contemplative. Les philosophes qui ont analysé la connaissance ont souvent porté à l'absolu cet aspect de la théorie et ont fait du sujet des opérations intellectuelles, sous les noms de,Logos4 ou de,Esprit4, le démiurge du monde. En vérité, ils ont ainsi hypostasié l'activité, qui dans la société moderne revient au savant du fait de la division du travail. Le sujet réel de la théorie sous sa forme traditionnelle, loin d'être l'esprit pur, est le savant qui remplit dans la société bourgeoise une fonction nécessaire, bien déterminée.Après cette prise de conscience, la naïveté philosophique du théoricien doit disparaître. Il comprend que la pensée, ses tâches et son orientation, l'organisation du monde qui lui est donné, se ramènent en dernière analyse au travail humain. Le combat de l'homme avec la nature est la condition de l’évolution historique, dans laquelle le travail matériel se sépare du travail intellectuel, il détermine la structure et le contenu de ce dernier. La séparation rigide des hypothèses logiques et historiques de la science est impossible à maintenir. L'activité du théoricien exprime le sujet concret qui ne donne pas forme à la seule théorie, mais aussi au monde réel. Prendre position dans la vie sociale, l'influencer consciemment devient une tâche immanente à la science.Par théorie au sens critique, H. entend la connaissance qui ne se contente pas de construire ses systèmes en respectant les cadres de la division du travail existante, mais qui s'efforce de donner à la totalité sociale une forme raisonnable. Dans l'histoire, la cohérence logique et comme transparente qui caractérise les théories traditionnelles, était en contradiction avec les rapports réels. Dans les tentatives pour rendre la société conforme à l'harmonie de la pensée, celle-ci peut jouer un rôle important.H. étudie la structure logique que présente la pensée lorsqu'elle exerce une telle fonction. Elle a pour contenu la représentation de la société actuelle, envisagée par rapport à révolution vers la raison. La théorie critique forme par conséquent un jugement existentiel unique. Pour développer et justifier celui-ci, elle a besoin, à chaque instant, de la science spéciale. Mais comme la théorie ne conçoit pas les buts qu'elle s'assigne comme extérieurs à elle, elle est logiquement plus compliquée que la théorie traditionnelle. Même lorsque la discipline spéciale construit des évolutions comme dans l'histoire naturelle et humaine, elle est orientée par des objectifs et des intérêts. Elle est, en un sens immédiatement compréhensible, utile. La théorie critique, au contraire, doit justifier elle-même la manière dont elle pose les problèmes, qui d'ailleurs sans cesse se transforment, elle doit modifier en conséquence l'ordre de son développement. Elle ne travaille pas en vue d'un système fixe, mais se comprend elle-même comme une tentative pour appliquer le savoir accumulé par les théories traditionnelles, à la marche historique de l'ensemble social, afin d'exercer une action dans un sens bien déterminé.Aussi bien, cette fonction de la théorie est-elle la réalisation des intentions authentiques de la philosophie idéaliste classique. (shrink)
This article is an investigation of parallel themes in Heinrich Hertz's philosophy science and Kant's theory of schemata, symbols and regulative ideas. It is argued that Hertz's "pictures" bears close similarities to Kantian "schemata", that is, they are rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning. Kant's distinction between symbols and schemata is discussed and related to Hertz's three pictures of mechanics. It is argued that Hertz considered his own picture of mechanics as symbolic in a different (...) way than the force and energy pictures. In the final part of the article it is described how Harald Høffding soon after the publication of Hertz's Principles of Mechanics developed a general theory of analogical reasoning, relying on the ideas of Hertz and Kant. (shrink)
This article is an investigation of parallel themes in Heinrich Hertz's philosophy science and Kant's theory of schemata, symbols and regulative ideas. It is argued that Hertz's "pictures" bears close similarities to Kantian "schemata", that is, they are rules linking concepts to intuitions and provide them with their meaning. Kant's distinction between symbols and schemata is discussed and related to Hertz's three pictures of mechanics. It is argued that Hertz considered his own picture of mechanics (the "hidden mass" picture) as (...) symbolic in a different way than the force and energy pictures. In the final part of the article it is described how Harald Høffding soon after the publication of Hertz's Principles of Mechanics developed a general theory of analogical reasoning, relying on the ideas of Hertz and Kant. (shrink)
Ernst H. Gombrich criticized abstract painting with several remarks scattered around his wide oeuvre. I argue that his view of abstract paintings is coherent with the account of pictorial representation he put forward in Art and Illusion, show some limits of such view, and maintain that, although several of Gombrich’s criticisms of abstract painting should be rejected, some of his remarks are insightful and worth of consideration.
Virtually all the earlier critics — including Sidgwick and the Oxford Idealists — thought J. S. Mill’s arguments for qualities of pleasure and their ranking unacceptable. More recently there has been something of a reversal of this opinion, with commentators such as Skorupski, Donner, Berger and Wilson supporting Mill, and other writers, such as Edwards and Sprigge, arguing that qualitative hedonism is plausible. This paper reconsiders some of the arguments of F.H. Bradley and other earlier critics who dismissed Mill’s (...) quantity-quality distinction. (shrink)
T. H. Morgan (1866–1945), the founder of the Drosophila research group in genetics that established the chromosome theory of Mendelian inheritance, has been described as a radical empiricist in the historical literature. His empiricism, furthermore, is supposed to have prejudiced him against certain scientific conclusions. This paper aims to show two things: first, that the sense in which the term empiricism has been used by scholars is too weak to be illuminating. It is necessary to distinguish between empiricism as an (...) epistemological position and the so-called methodological empiricism. I will argue that the way the latter has been presented cannot distinguish an empiricist methodology from a non-empiricist one. Second, I will show that T. H. Morgan was not an epistemological empiricist as this term is usually defined in philosophy. The reason is that he believed in the existence of genes as material entities when they were unobservable entities when they were unobservable entities introduced to account for the phenotypic ratios found in breeding experiments. These two points, of course, are interrelated. If we were to water down the meaning of empiricis, perhaps we could call Morgan an empiricist. But then we would also fail to distinguish empiricism from realism. (shrink)
These critical remarks attempt to point out the role which modern philosophical anthropology can play in historical theories of the present day. In order to grasp correctly the historical tendencies of the present period, it is necessary to take into account the special characteristics of modern man. Modern philosophical anthropology is criticized by H. because it attempts to picture man in his fundamental essence as a permanent and unchangeable entity, instead of studying him from the viewpoint of a theory of (...) historical change. Today it is necessary to emphasize the difference in human qualities between different social groups and to understand the interconnection between the changes of human types and the whole social development. But philosophical anthropology attempts to consider the essence of man as permanent and independent of historical change, and thus to impart meaning to individual and social life. In this way it proves its relationship to metaphysics and religion. In contradiction to this, H. indicates the results that might be achieved on the basis of an historical approach. He shows how the attitude of modern man towards contracts has changed in the last decades ; how the principle of equality has taken on an entirely different meaning ; how the human qualities of sympathy and understanding change their essence and their functions and are being transferred from one social group to another.Pour saisir exactement les tendances historiques de l'époque actuelle, il est nécessaire de tenir compte aussi du caractère propre et des transformations des hommes d'aujourd'hui. L'anthropologie philosophique moderne est critiquée par H. parce qu'elle cherche à dessiner une image éternelle de l'homme, alors que les études anthropologiques devraient être pénétrées d'esprit historique. Alors qu’il importe aujourd’hui de dégager les différences des qualités humaines dans les divers groupes sociaux, de comprendre le lien des transformations des types humains et de l’évolution de la société dans son ensemble, l’anthropologie philosophique veut fixer une fois pour toutes l'essence de l’homme et donner par là un sens à l’existence individuelle et sociale. Elle montre ainsi qu’elle est solidaire de la métaphysique et de la religion. H. oppose à cette méthode une recherche anthropologique qui serait orientée aux problèmes historiques, et il donne quelques indications sur cette anthropologie. J1 montre comment l’attitude de l’homme actuel à l’égard des engagements et des traités s’est transformée dans les dernières dizaines d’années, comment la categorie d'égalité comme détermination des hommes prend des significations toutes différentes, comment les qualités humaines de compréhension et de sympathie changent de nature et de fonction, passent d’un groupe social à un autre. (shrink)
From 2012 to 2015 I was the first Eugene H. Fram Chair in Applied Critical Thinking at Rochester Institute of Technology, in Rochester, NY. To the best of my knowledge it is the only such endowed position devoted solely to this at a major North American university. It was made possible by a generous 3 million dollar gift from an anonymous alumnus who wished to honor a retired faculty member who had taught for 51 years. The honoree was revered for (...) his devotion to Bloom’s taxonomy and his academic rigor, which infused case studies and the Socratic method. A primary motivation for the chair was a belief that an alarming number of college graduates lack the necessary critical thinking skills in order to advance successfully in their careers. My responsibilities included collaborative leadership, advocacy and oversight for critical thinking across the entire campus. It provided a unique opportunity to reflect on the current state of critical thinking instruction–very broadly construed, as well as to examine its specific role at RIT, an institution with its own unique history, mission, and character. (shrink)
In this essay, I reconstruct H. Richard Niebuhr's interpretation of George Herbert Mead's account of the social constitution of the self. Specifically, I correct Niebuhr's interpretation, because it mischaracterizes Mead's understanding of social constitution as more dialogical than ecological. I also argue that Niebuhr's interpretation needs completing because it fails to engage one of Mead's more significant notions, the I/me distinction within the self. By reconstructing Niebuhr's account of faith and responsibility as theologically self-constitutive through Mead's I/me distinction, I demonstrate (...) Niebuhr's deep yet unacknowledged agreement with Mead: the self is constituted by its participation in multiple communities, but responds to them creatively by enduring the moral perplexity of competing communal claims. I conclude by initiating a constructive account of conscience that follows from this agreement. Conscience is more ecological than dialogical because it regards our creative participation in multiple ecologies of social roles oriented by patterns of responsive relations. (shrink)
W. H. Auden and Hannah Arendt belonged to a generation that experienced the catastrophic events of the mid-twentieth century, and they both sought to respond to the enormity of the novel phenomena they witnessed.