The paper aims to develop an adequate account of macroeconomic causality. It discusses the definition that is central to Woodward’s interventionist account and the definitions that can be extracted from Hoover’s remarks on privileged parameterization and from the potential outcome approach that Angrist and Kuersteiner have introduced into macroeconomics more recently. The definition to be defended can be regarded as the gist that is common to all three definitions when they are relieved of overly restrictive conditions. It says that X (...) causes Y if and only if there is a possible intervention on X that changes Y, where X and Y stand for macroeconomic aggregates, where an intervention is understood as a manipulation of an intervention variable I that satisfies conditions requiring that I be a cause of X, and that there be no confounders of X and Y, and where an intervention variable is either a variable or a parameter. (shrink)
The paper analyzes the methods that macroeconomists can use to provide evidence in support of causal hypotheses: the instrumental variable method and econometric causality tests. It argues that the evidence that macroeconomists provide when using these methods is in principle too inconclusive to support the hypothesis that X directly type-level causes Y, where X and Y stand for macroeconomic aggregates like the real interest rate and aggregate demand. The evidence provided by the IV method is too inconclusive because it derives (...) from conditions requiring that there be no confounders of I and X and X and Y, and because in macroeconomics, confounders that cannot be controlled for or measured are likely to be present. The evidence provided by econometric causality tests is too inconclusive because they can be shown to rely on the conditions of the IV method at least tacitly. (shrink)
The paper uses a de-relativized variant of Woodward’s definition of direct type-level causation to develop an account of causal ceteris paribus laws. It argues that the relation between X and Y needs to satisfy three conditions in order to qualify as one of direct type-level causation, that satisfaction of these conditions guarantees the applicability of claims of direct type-level causation, that the context of applicability motivates referring to these conditions as cp conditions, and that claims of direct type-level causation qualify (...) as laws if they are explanatorily deep. The account of causal cp laws defended by the paper derives from a de-relativized variant of Woodward’s definition of direct type-level causation but can be shown not to conflict with Woodward’s thesis that there is no such thing as a cp law. (shrink)
This article offers a definition of the term "pragmatic", as it is used in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The definition offered does not make any reference to the affinities between Kant's pragmatism and the philosophies of the American or other pragmatists but draws its definiens entirely from the Kantian conceptual framework. It states that the term "pragmatic" denotes imperatives, laws and beliefs of a specific type: an imperative is pragmatic if and only if it is concerned with the choice (...) of means to individual or universal happiness; a law is pragmatic if and only if our willingness to presuppose it results from our obedience to a pragmatic imperative; and a belief is pragmatic if and only if it relates to the objective validity of pragmatic laws. This article also discusses two rival definitions of the term "pragmatic" (as used by Kant) that have been brought forward by Sidney Axinn and Nicholas Rescher. (shrink)
The argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and others, famously concludes that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. The paper aims to show that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated – that philosophers who endorse its conclusion fail to refute two of the most important objections that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to hypotheses, and Levi’s objection that the argument is (...) ambiguous about decisions about how to act and decisions about what to believe, that only the former presuppose value judgments, and that qua scientist, the scientist only needs to decide what to believe. (shrink)
This paper attempts a new interpretation of Heidegger’s existential analysis of the phenomena of fear and anxiety. Heidegger is shown to analyze both phenomena as basic states-of-mind . Basic states-of-mind are taken to differ from other states-of mind in that they are formal phenomena, i.e. phenomena that are not apparent or experienced themselves, but only concretize in apparent and experienced phenomena. As an instance of phenomena, in which the formal phenomena of fear and anxiety concretize, the paper presents hüzün, a (...) collective mood described by Orhan Pamuk in his latest novel. (shrink)
This paper tries to read some structure into the perplexing diversity of the literature on Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity. It argues that many of the interpretations available rely on views that are false and cannot be Heidegger ’s. It also shows that the only correct interpretation of Heidegger ’s concept of authenticity emerges from a synthesis of Dreyfus ’ later interpretation and Haugeland’s interpretation of this concept. A synthesis of these interpretations yields an interpretation, according to which Dasein’s being (...) is authentic only if it is capable of using tools or language in radically new ways. (shrink)
In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for (...) and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics. (shrink)
This paper attempts a new interpretation of Heidegger’s existential analysis of the phenomena of fear and anxiety. Heidegger is shown to analyze both phenomena as basic states-of-mind. Basic states-of-mind are taken to differ from other states-of mind in that they are formal phenomena, i.e. phenomena that are not apparent or experienced themselves, but only concretize in apparent and experienced phenomena. As an instance of phenomena, in which the formal phenomena of fear and anxiety concretize, the paper presents hüzün, a collective (...) mood described by Orhan Pamuk in his latest novel. (shrink)
ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIn seinem 1927 gehaltenen Vortrag Phänomenologie und Theologie vertritt Heidegger die These, dass die Philosophie theologische Grundbegriffe korrigiere, indem sie sie auf ihren rein rational fassbaren Gehalt reduziere und die ontologischen Bedingungen dieses Gehalts formal anzeige. Dieses Prinzip der »Korrektion« kann durch seine Anwendung auf Thomas von Aquins Begriff des göttlichen Worts veranschaulicht werden. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass Heidegger diesen Begriff auf einen rein rational fassbaren Gehalt reduziert, den er mit einer neuen praktischen oder sprachlichen Bedeutung identifiziert, die ein (...) Dasein erfindet, das Zeug oder Sprache in einer radikal neuen Weise gebraucht. Es kann ferner gezeigt werden, dass die ontologischen Bedingungen dieses rein rational fassbaren Gehalts nach Heidegger in der Erschlossenheit des Daseins liegen. Eine Veranschaulichung von Heideggers Prinzip der Korrektion durch Anwendung auf Aquins Begriff des göttlichen Worts lässt erkennen, dass ein weit verbreitetes Verständnis des für Heideggers Philosophie in Sein und Zeit zentralen Begriffs der Eigentlichkeit verfehlt ist: Eigentlichkeit ist nicht der Modus der Existenz eines Daseins, das zu einer philosophischen Einsicht in seine existenziale Struktur fähig ist, sondern ein existenzieller Modus der Existenz eines Daseins, das über existenzielle Möglichkeiten zur Erfindung neuer Bedeutung durch einen neuartigen Gebrauch von Zeug oder Sprache verfügt.SUMMARYIn a lecture delivered in 1927, Heidegger claims that philosophy ‘corrects’ basic theological concepts by reducing them to their purely rational content and by formally indicating the ontological conditions of this content. This principle of ‘correction’ can be specified by applying it to Aquinas's concept of the divine word. Heidegger can be presented as reducing this concept to a purely rational content that he identifies with a new practical or linguistic meaning invented by a Dasein using tools or language in a radically new way. He can further be shown to hold that the ontological conditions of this purely rational content lie in the Dasein's disclosedness. His correction of Aquinas's concept of the divine word reveals that a common understanding of Heidegger's concept of authenticity, which is of central importance to his philosophy in Being and Time, is misguided: authenticity is not a mode exhibited by someone with a philosophical insight into Dasein's existential structure, but the existentiell mode of the existence of a Dasein who has the existentiell possibilities to invent new meaning by introducing new ways of using tools or language. (shrink)
