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Profile: Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
  1.  16
    Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience.Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):393-414.
    In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in (...)
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  2.  45
    Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content.Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht & Albert Newen - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):309 - 328.
    This paper presents arguments from empirical research and from philosophical considerations to the effect that phenomenality and content are two distinct and independent features of mental representations, which are both relational. Thus, it is argued, classical arguments that infer phenomenality from content have to be rejected. Likewise, theories that try to explain the phenomenal character of experiences by appeal to specific types of content cannot succeed. Instead, a dynamic view of consciousness has to be adopted that seeks to explain consciousness (...)
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  3. Understanding Other Minds: A Criticism of Goldman's Simulation Theory and an Outline of the Person Model Theory.Albert Newen & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):209-242.
    What exactly do we do when we try to make sense of other people e.g. by ascribing mental states like beliefs and desires to them? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory, Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory of understanding others as well as an extended criticism of the Simulation Theory in Goldman's recent version (2006), we suggest an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory . Person models are the basis for our ability to register and evaluate persons having mental as (...)
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  4. Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 10:113-136.
    The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some version of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or entities. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these (...)
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  5.  75
    Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.
    Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity (...)
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  6.  3
    Experiencing Organisms: From Mineness to Subject of Experience.Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-28.
    Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and (...)
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  7.  51
    Mind in Life. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (4):615-619.
  8.  10
    Individualism Versus Interactionism About Social Understanding.Judith Martens & Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of (...)
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  9.  45
    Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht & Ulrike Pompe - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (2):250-254.
  10. Phenomenal Consciousness, Attention and Accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
    This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in (...)
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  11.  9
    A Second-Person Neuroscience in Interaction.Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):441-462.
    In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...)
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  12.  74
    Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations.Alexandra Zinck, Daniela Simon, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Gottfried Vosgerau, Kirsten G. Volz, Anne Springer & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687-709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  13. Editorial.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):6-9.
     
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  14.  13
    Folk Psychological Narratives. The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):341-346.
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