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Tobias Schlicht
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
  1.  62
    Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience.Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):393-414.
    In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in (...)
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  2.  55
    Individualism Versus Interactionism About Social Understanding.Judith Martens & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):245-266.
    In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of (...)
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  3. Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content.Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht & Albert Newen - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):309 - 328.
    This paper presents arguments from empirical research and from philosophical considerations to the effect that phenomenality and content are two distinct and independent features of mental representations, which are both relational. Thus, it is argued, classical arguments that infer phenomenality from content have to be rejected. Likewise, theories that try to explain the phenomenal character of experiences by appeal to specific types of content cannot succeed. Instead, a dynamic view of consciousness has to be adopted that seeks to explain consciousness (...)
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  4. Understanding Other Minds: A Criticism of Goldman’s Simulation Theory and an Outline of the Person Model Theory.Albert Newen & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):209-242.
    What exactly do we do when we try to make sense of other people e.g. by ascribing mental states like beliefs and desires to them? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory, Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory of understanding others as well as an extended criticism of the Simulation Theory in Goldman's recent version (2006), we suggest an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory . Person models are the basis for our ability to register and evaluate persons having mental as (...)
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  5. Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.
    Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity (...)
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  6.  32
    A Second-Person Neuroscience in Interaction.Leonhard Schilbach, Bert Timmermans, Vasudevi Reddy, Alan Costall, Gary Bente, Tobias Schlicht & Kai Vogeley - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):441-462.
    In this response we address additions to as well as criticisms and possible misinterpretations of our proposal for a second-person neuroscience. We map out the most crucial aspects of our approach by (1) acknowledging that second-person engaged interaction is not the only way to understand others, although we claim that it is ontogenetically prior; (2) claiming that spectatorial paradigms need to be complemented in order to enable a full understanding of social interactions; and (3) restating that our theoretical proposal not (...)
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  7.  55
    Does Separating Intentionality From Mental Representation Imply Radical Enactivism?Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  8. Phenomenal Consciousness, Attention and Accessibility.Tobias Schlicht - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):309-334.
    This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in (...)
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  9. Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 10:113-136.
    The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some version of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or entities. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these (...)
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  10.  28
    Prospects of Enactivist Approaches to Intentionality and Cognition.Tobias Schlicht & Tobias Starzak - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):89-113.
    We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of (...)
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  11.  56
    Introduction.Krzysztof Dołęga, Luke Roelofs & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):179-186.
    The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular (...)
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  12. What Are Mental Representations?Joulia Smortchkova, Tobias Schlicht & Krzysztof Dolega - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    Mental representation is one of core theoretical constructs within cognitive science and, together with the introduction of the computer as a model for the mind, is responsible for enabling the ‘cognitive turn’ in psychology and associated fields. Conceiving of cognitive processes, such as perception, motor control, and reasoning, as processes that consist in the manipulation of contentful vehicles representing the world has allowed us to refine our explanations of behavior and has led to tremendous empirical advancements. Despite the central role (...)
     
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  13.  87
    Self as Cultural Construct? An Argument for Levels of Self-Representations.Alexandra Zinck, Daniela Simon, Martin Schmidt-Daffy, Gottfried Vosgerau, Kirsten G. Volz, Anne Springer & Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):687-709.
    In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...)
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  14.  4
    Kant and Cognitive Science Revisited.Tobias Schlicht & Albert Newen - 2015 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 18 (1):87-113.
    To which extent is it justified to adopt Kant as a godfather of cognitive science? To prepare the stage for an answer of this question, we need to set aside Kant’s general transcendental approach to the mind which is radically anti-empiricist and instead turn our attention to his specific topics and claims regarding the mind which are often not focus of Kant’s epistemological investigations. If someone is willing to take this stance, it turns out that there are many bridges connecting (...)
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  15. Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht & Ulrike Pompe - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (2):250-254.
  16. Editorial.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (5-6):6-9.
     
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  17.  3
    Erkenntnistheoretischer Dualismus.Tobias Schlicht - 2007 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 10 (1):113-136.
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  18.  21
    Explaining or Redefining Mindreading?Krzysztof Dołęga, Tobias Schlicht & Daniel C. Dennett - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    Veissière et al. disrupt current debates over the nature of mindreading by bringing multiple positions under the umbrella of free-energy. However, it is not clear whether integrating the opposing sides under a common formal framework will yield new insights into how mindreading is achieved, rather than offering a mere redescription of the target phenomenon.
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  19.  29
    A Methodological Dilemma for Investigating Consciousness Empirically.Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 66:91-100.
  20.  53
    Experiencing Organisms: From Mineness to Subject of Experience.Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2447-2474.
    Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and (...)
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  21.  95
    Folk Psychological Narratives. The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):341-346.
  22. Mind in Life. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (4):615-619.
  23.  2
    Mentale Repräsentationen - Grundlagentexte.Tobias Schlicht & Joulia Smortchkova - 2018 - Berlin: Suhrkamp.
    Der Begriff der mentalen Repräsentation spielt eine zentrale Rolle in Theorien über geistige Phänomene und Mechanismen der Informationsverarbeitung. Philosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler diskutieren lebhaft darüber, wie es uns beziehungsweise unserem Gehirn gelingt, die Welt zu repräsentieren, und was mentale Repräsentationen genau sind. Der Band versammelt die zentralen Texte der Debatte – von Ned Block und Fred Dretske bis zu Jerry Fodor und Ruth Millikan – erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung. Ein Grundlagenwerk zur Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognitionswissenschaft.
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  24. Soziale Wahrnehmung.Tobias Schlicht & Judith H. Martens - 2017 - In Bedeutung und Gefährdung der Sinne im Digitalen Zeitalter. Wittener Kolloquium für Humanismus, Philosophie und Medizin. Witten:
    Dieser Beitrag nimmt als Ausganspunkt die gegenwärtige kontroverse Debatte um den adäquaten Erklärungsansatz in der Kognitionswissenschaft, und zwar zwischen Enaktivisten einerseits und Repräsentationalisten andererseits. Beispielhaft wurde aufgezeigt, dass in Bezug auf die soziale Kognition der enaktivistische Ansatz eine Voraussetzung machen muss, die er mit seinen eigenen Mitteln nicht einzufangen in der Lage ist. Denn der Versuch, das Verstehen des Anderen durch gemeinsame Sinnstiftung der Akteure innerhalb ihrer sozialen Interaktion zu erklären, gerät in einen Zirkel, da nicht erklärt wird, wie die (...)
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  25.  80
    Structure of Perceptual Objects: Introduction to the Synthese Topical Collection.Alfredo Vernazzani, Błażej Skrzypulec & Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    Introduction to the topical collection "The Structure of Perceptual Objects"—with contributions by Mohan Matthen, EJ Green, Alisa Mandrigin, Blazej Skrzypulec, and Anna Drożdżowicz.
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