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  1. The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects (...)
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  2.  63
    Personal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a stimulating and vivid area of philosophical research, but it has tended to monopolize the notion of 'good-for', linking it necessarily to welfare or ...
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  3. A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things (or persons) in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values (...)
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  4. Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120.
    The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation (...)
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  5.  75
    A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Springer. pp. 115--129.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object-i.e., its value for its own sake-need not be intrinsic. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational rather than internal features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the contrary, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The endeavour to reduce thing-values to state-values is largely (...)
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  6.  18
    II-A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33-51.
    The paper argues that the final value of an object, i.e., its value for its own sake, need not be intrinsic. It need not supervene on the object’s internal properties. Extrinsic final value, which accrues to things in virtue of their relational features, cannot be traced back to the intrinsic value of states that involve these things together with their relations. On the opposite, such states, insofar as they are valuable at all, derive their value from the things involved. The (...)
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  7.  65
    Recent Work on Intrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.) - 2005 - Springer.
    Recent Work on Intrinsic Value brings together for the first time many of the most important and influential writings on the topic of intrinsic value to have appeared in the last half-century. During this period, inquiry into the nature of intrinsic value has intensified to such an extent that at the moment it is one of the hottest topics in the field of theoretical ethics. The contributions to this volume have been selected in such a way that all of the (...)
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  8.  90
    Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA.
    Section 2.1 identifies three notions of intrinsic value: the finality sense understands it as value for its own sake, the supervenience sense identifies it with value that depends exclusively on the bearer’s internal properties, and the nonderivative sense describes intrinsic value as value that provides justification for other values and is not justified by any other value. A distinction between final intrinsic and final extrinsic value in terms of supervenience is subsequently introduced. Section 2.2 contains a discussion of the debate (...)
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  9.  86
    Analysing Personal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2007 - The Journal of Ethics 11 (4):405-435.
    It is argued that the so-called fitting attitude- or buck-passing pattern of analysis may be applied to personal values too if the analysans is fine-tuned in the following way: An object has personal value for a person a, if and only if there is reason to favour it for a’s sake. One benefit with it is its wide range: different kinds of values are analysable by the same general formula. Moreover, by situating the distinguishing quality in the attitude rather than (...)
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  10. On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):137-152.
    The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and (...)
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  11. Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):389-403.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion pre-supposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  12.  78
    Good and Good For.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.
  13.  40
    Instrumental Values €“ Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23-43.
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it (...)
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  14.  80
    Value Taxonomy.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), Handbook of Value. Oxford: Oxfocd University Press. pp. 23-42.
    The paper presents main conceptual distinctions underlying much of modern philosophical thinking about value. The introductory Section 1 is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the contrast between non-relational value and relational value. In Section 3, the focus is on the distinction between final and non-final value as well as on different kinds of final value. In Section 4, we consider value relations, such as being better/worse/equally good/on a par. Recent discussions suggest that we might need to considerably (...)
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  15. Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
    The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit (...)
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  16.  77
    Instrumental Values – Strong and Weak.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):23 - 43.
    What does it mean that an object has instrumental value? While some writers seem to think it means that the object bears a value, and that instrumental value accordingly is a kind of value, other writers seem to think that the object is not a value bearer but is only what is conducive to something of value. Contrary to what is the general view among philosophers of value, I argue that if instrumental value is a kind of value, then it (...)
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  17.  70
    Love, Value and Supervenience.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):495-508.
    People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non?fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, (...)
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  18.  79
    Tropic of Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2001 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. pp. 213--226.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value , which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question.Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  19. Locating Value in Moral Progress.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (1):137-52.
    The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and (...)
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  20.  13
    Introduction to Recent Work on Intrinsic Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman - 2005 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer.
  21.  4
    Tropic of Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2001 - In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of ethics and applied philosophy. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 213-228.
    The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value, which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a (...)
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  22.  51
    On-Conditionalism: On the Verge of a New Metaethical Theory.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2016 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 11 (2-3):88-107.
    Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen | : This paper explores a novel metaethical theory according to which value judgments express conditional beliefs held by those who make them. Each value judgment expresses the belief that something is the case on condition that something else is the case. The paper aims to reach a better understanding of this view and to highlight some of the challenges that lie ahead. The most pressing of these revolves around the correct understanding of the nature of the relevant (...)
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  23.  84
    Hedonism, Preferentialism, and Value Bearers.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2002 - Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):463-472.
    While hedonism has been subjected to much criticism over the years, it is still a widely endorsed axiological view. One objection that appears to be generally recognised as especially troublesome to hedonists is that their central claim, that final value accrues only to experiences of pleasure gives us a narrow view of value. Much more than pleasure is valuable for its own sake. A competing theory, preferentialism, is another widespread theory about value. According to one version of preferentialism, only the (...)
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  24. On For Someone’s Sake Attitudes.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):397-411.
    Personal value, i.e., what is valuable for us, has recently been analysed in terms of so- called for-someone's-sake attitudes. This paper is an attempt to add flesh to the bone of these attitudes that have not yet been properly analysed in the philosophical literature. By employing a distinction between justifiers and identifiers, which corresponds to two roles a property may play in the intentional content of an attitude, two different kinds of for-someone's-sake attitudes can be identified. Moreover, it is argued (...)
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  25.  29
    Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Rysiek Sliwinski - 2011 - Neither/nor-Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday 58:243 - 257.
    The much endorsed idea that reasons are facts, gives raise to several issues, not least when it is applied to the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. The paper distinguish in broad terms between two important views on the nature of facts. Given in particular a view that conceives of facts as abstract entities, the dichotomy is not particularly problematic. We might run into problems when it comes to identifying which facts are reasons and which are not, but the very (...)
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  26.  28
    Reasons and Two Kinds of Fact.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2011 - In Sliwinski Rysiek & Svensson Frans (eds.), Neither/Nor - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala Philosophical Studies. pp. 95 - 113.
    Reasons are facts, i.e., they are constituted by facts. Given a popular view that conceives of facts as thin abstract rather than thick concrete entities, the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons is not particularly problematic. It is argued that it would be preferable if we could understand the dichotomy even if we had a thick noton of fact in mind. It would be preferable because it is better if our notion of a reason is consistent with a wider rather (...)
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  27.  43
    Motivation and Motivating Reason.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 464--485.
    For quite some time now philosophers have stressed the need to distinguish between explanatory (motivating) reasons and justifying (good) reasons. The distinction is often illustrated with an example of someone doing something that is intended to strike the reader or listener, at least at the outset, as incomprehensible. The story of Abraham on Mount Moriah, who decided to sacrifice his son, Isaac, illustrates this pattern. Killing one’s own child is a horrific thing to do, and it is hard to understand (...)
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  28.  8
    Love, Value and Supervenience∗.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):495-508.
    People are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non-fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, (...)
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  29.  3
    Ethics Discussions at PEA Soup: Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen on Schroeder.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2012 - Ethics at PEA Soup.
    Invited Critical Précis of Mark Schroeder’s “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons”.
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  30.  46
    Particularism and Principles.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1999 - Theoria 65 (2-3):114-126.
  31.  6
    Moral Realists and Moral Experts.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1998 - In Bengt-Pedersen Carsten & Niels Thomasse (eds.), Nature and Lifeworld; Theoretical and practical Metaphysics. pp. 281-299.
  32.  6
    On an Apparent Asymmetry in Attitude Desert.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Björn Petersson - 2007 - In J. Josefsson D. Egonsson (ed.), Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
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  33.  31
    Explaining Value: On Orsi and Garcia’s Explanatory Objection to the Fitting-Attitude Analysis.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies.
    Orsi and Garcia argue that fitting-attitude analysis of value is vulnerable to an explanatory objection. On FA-analysis, for an object to be valuable is for it to be a fitting target of an attitude—a pro-attitude if its value is positive and a con-attitude if it is negative. For different kinds of value different kinds of attitudes are fitting: desire for desirability, admiration for admirability, etc. To explain the fittingness relation we therefor need to appeal to the features of the relevant (...)
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  34. Finala och intrinsikala värden.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1999 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 3.
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  35.  4
    Patterns of Value - Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (eds.) - 2003 - Lund University Department of Philosophy.
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  36.  4
    Patterns of Value- Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, Vol. 2.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
    Discussions about values are common in many contexts. Often, what is debated is the choice of means to realize or protect various values, but sometimes the discussion concerns the very values that ought to be realized or protected. Philosophical debate in this area has mainly been focused on two kinds of issues. Philosophers have tried to identify the set of fundamental values, i.e., to provide what might be called a substantive axiology, but they have also aimed to clarify the general (...)
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  37.  2
    Patterns of Value : Essays on Formal Axiology and Value Analysis, Vol. 1.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2003 - Department of Philosophy, Lund University.
    Discussions about values are common in many contexts. Often, what is debated is the choice of means to realize or protect various values, but sometimes the discussion concerns the very values that ought to be realized or protected. Philosophical debate in this area has mainly been focused on two kinds of issues. Philosophers have tried to identify the set of fundamental values, i.e., to provide what might be called a substantive axiology, but they have also aimed to clarify the general (...)
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  38. Value Taxonomy.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), Handbook of Value: Perspectives From Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociology. pp. 23-42.
    The paper presents main conceptual distinctions underlying much of modern philosophical thinking about value. The introductory Section 1 is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the contrast between non-relational value and relational value. In Section 3, the focus is on the distinction between final and non-final value as well as on different kinds of final value. In Section 4, we consider value relations, such as being better/worse/equally good/on a par. Recent discussions suggest that we might need to considerably (...)
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  39.  2
    Buck-Passing Personal Values.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2008 - In David Chan (ed.), Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Springer. pp. 37-51.
    in UndeterminedSo-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value (...)
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  40.  3
    Comments on John Skorupski’s Holism and Individualism in Ethics.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
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  41.  4
    Dual-Reason Analyses Revisited.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
    in UndeterminedClassical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of it being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. However, recently such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason notions rather than only one. The general idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring vis- à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; (...)
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  42.  48
    Dislodging Butterflies From the Supervenient.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:103-112.
    Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: (i) the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the (supervenient) value of an object and some (or all) of the natural properties of the object; (ii) the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It (...)
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  43. Dislodging Butterflies From the Supervenient.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:103-112.
    Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the value of an object and some of the natural properties of the object; the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It is argued that the influential (...)
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  44.  86
    Då-för-nu preferenser och preferensutilitarism.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 1999 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 1.
  45.  8
    Ett problem för Hares supervenienstes.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - SATS 5 (2):47-58.
    The supervenience thesis about value customarily expresses two intuitions: (i) that there is some kind of dependence between the value and the natural properties of the value bearer; (ii) that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. R M Hare’s account of supervenience is problematic since it only expresses (ii) but not (i). A (...)
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  46.  41
    Fitting-Attitude Analysis and the Logical Consequence Argument.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):560-579.
    A fitting-attitude analysis which understands value in terms of reasons and pro- and con-attitudes allows limited wriggle room if it is to respect a radical division between good and good-for. Essentially, its proponents can either introduce two different normative notions, one relating to good and the other to good-for, or distinguish two kinds of attitude, one corresponding to the analysis of good and the other to good-for. It is argued that whereas the first option faces a counterintuitive scope issue, an (...)
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  47.  3
    Fitting Attitudes and Value; the Buck-Passing Account.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
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  48.  1
    Fitting-Attitude Analyses and Personal Value.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
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  49.  8
    Favouring and Motivating Reasons.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - unknown
  50.  53
    Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour (...)
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