We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain (...) cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in a way that is in accordance with some recent experimental findings. (shrink)
Providing an alternative to pyschoanalytically based descriptions, this major study presents a unique, new theoretical account of the way emotions and thought patterns interact in creating aesthetic effects in films. Using diverse examples, Torben Grodal shows how films activate effects in the viewer and how these effects are moulded by genres which determine the way in which characters will react in given situations.
Right-wing populism and authoritarianism are often thought to be closely linked to each other: conceptually, ideologically, historically. This article challenges that assumption by reinterpreting right-wing populism as an essentially anti-authoritarian movement. Right-wing populism diverges from the clearly authoritarian movements of the past, such as classic conservatism and fascism, in at least two important ways: first, it follows a distinctive epistemology with a different idea what constitutes the truth and who has access to it. Second, populism has a peculiar understanding of (...) the ultimate source of political authority and the function of political leadership. My article shows how right-wing populists pursue a project of self-empowerment and appropriate notions of emancipation and autonomy for their own narrative. (shrink)
Resumen El propósito de este artículo es introducir al concepto de rakiduam del pueblo mapuche como término relevante para la revisión crítica de una filosofía intercultural. Se propone este término como parte de un diálogo de racionalidades con el que se pretende, como segundo objetivo, vincular el conocimiento de este horizonte-otro con el reconocimiento de nuestros propios horizontes y límites de comprensión, desde dentro de la tradición de la filosofía occidental, y además, en diálogo con la antropología.The purpose of this (...) article is to introduce and make a critical revision of the mapuche peoples notion of rakiduam as part of an intercultural philosophy. Ajpart of a dialogue between rationalities we propose to link the recognition of rakiduam as a different horizon to the recognition of our own horizon and limits of understanding from within the western tradition of philosophy, and furthermore, in a dialogue with anthropology. (shrink)
This article aims to outline a perspective on democratic ideology centred on orientation and justification, which is discussed in relation to the right?left dyad and public reason. Ideology is approached in terms of the orientational structuring of identification processes, which is discussed in relation to the articulation between four pairs of orientational metaphors (up?down, in?out, front?back and right?left), which shape the political terrain and the terms of political justification. The latter is expressed in public reason based on political equality, pluralism (...) and contingency as opposed to hierarchy, monism and objectivism. A modern democratic ideology is based on right/left orientation to underpin the autonomy of the political symbolic order vis?à?vis cultural and religious orders, and on public reason as freestanding in relation to comprehensive reasons, which is a political justification of the priority of right/left in matters of common concerns. (shrink)
In Le mythe de Sisyphe Camus deals with the problem of suicide because of the absurdity of life. He sees people committing suicide because they think life, being absurd, is no longer worthwhile. But does the absurdity of life imply that life is not worthwhile? He argues this is not the case. The logic of the absurd leads to revolt, freedom and passion for life. These make life worthwhile. So suicide is not the conclusion of the logic of the absurd. (...) However, his argument, though inspiring, fails to recognize the problem of suicide. Why do people who commit suicide because of the absurd believe life is no longer worthwhile? In my article I try to answer this question. In L’homme révolté Camus states that revolt can be contaminated by ressentiment. I think this contamination can explain why people believe life in an absurd world is no longer worthwhile. Based on Scheler’s analysis of ressentiment in Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen I try to describe the process of this contamination. It is argued first that ressentiment is a consequence of the final impotence of revolt to protect what is valuable, second that revolt will not transform in ressentiment only when it is capable of overcoming itself in resignation. (shrink)
Dr Thrane makes an original contribution to one of the central topics in syntax and semantics: the nature and mechanisms of reference in natural language. He makes a fundamental distinction between syntactic analyses that are internal to the structure of a language and analyses of the referential properties that connect a language with the 'outside world' - and therefore derive in some sense from common human capacities for perceptual discrimination. Dr Thrane argues that the failure to make this distinction and (...) to attend separately to both kinds of analysis has vitiated previous general accounts of linguistic structure. The book focuses particularly on pronouns and on the role of determiners, quantifiers and other components of the noun phrase. Most of the data come from the modern Germanic languages, especially English, but Dr Thrane considers also the structural peculiarities of 'classifier languages' like Vietnamese. The book will be important for students of English language as well as for general linguists. (shrink)
This is the first book-length treatment of hybrid logic and its proof-theory. Hybrid logic is an extension of ordinary modal logic which allows explicit reference to individual points in a model. This is useful for many applications, for example when reasoning about time one often wants to formulate a series of statements about what happens at specific times. There is little consensus about proof-theory for ordinary modal logic. Many modal-logical proof systems lack important properties and the relationships between proof systems (...) for different modal logics are often unclear. In the present book we demonstrate that hybrid-logical proof-theory remedies these deficiencies by giving a spectrum of well-behaved proof systems for a spectrum of different hybrid logics. (shrink)
Explains the concept of legal competence (or power). This book then discusses the analysis and definition of legal concepts in general; the relation between the concept of competence and (in)validity; what it means to exercise competence; different types of competence; and competence norms.
The article looks critically at the Schmitt revival among radical leftists, how they try to insulate his work from his political conviction and make a problematic distinction between liberalism and democracy, which undercuts the specificity of modern democracy and plays into reactionary identity politics. I then turn to how Schmitt conceptualizes the political and argue that the structure of his argument is antithetic to modern democracy. Against those who hold that it is possible to use Schmitt against himself, I argue (...) that to adopt Schmitt for the purpose of strengthening liberal democracy runs into serious difficulties, because the whole set-up is geared to combat this regime form. Finally, I show that the political undermines right/left orientation because it is structured in terms of other orientational metaphors, which sustain a restrictive view on membership (in/out), unconditional loyalty to the state (up/down) and a strong sense of belonging and destiny (front/back). (shrink)
Foucault’s discussions of parrhesia provide fertile ground for raising a number of classical and pertinent issues in political theory related to critique, citizenship, and political authority. Foucault situates parrhesia in his analytical grid of power/knowledge/ethics, which maps political participation and experience, and he looks at how those who pursue or contest political power articulate and integrate these three facets of politics, which might well pull in opposite directions. Power concerns the ability and the audacity to face up to important political (...) tasks and to take action at the right time authoritatively and with resolve. Knowledge is vital for telling the truth from a partisan viewpoint and for making informed and balanced decisions. Ethics concerns the trustworthiness of those who either exercise or criticize political power and touches upon their dedication, sense of judgement, and personal integrity. The personal integrity of the citizen acting politically as well as his or her responsibility to the political community are among the main issues to be raised in relation to these themes. The same goes for the issues related to the nature of the political community, its institutional set-up and its culture, and whether it is authoritarian and marked by hierarchy and obedience or democratic and egalitarian. Thus, parrhesia captures some of the most vital dimensions of political life of how to exercise the political power of authority in a way that is both truthful and trustworthy. Foucault’s discussions of parrhesia shed light on the democratic challenges and possibilities related to political power as governmentality. (shrink)
This article explores the differences between two strategies of persuasion. The first strategy, called drawing things together, is Actor-Network Theory's classic analysis of how modern science has gained tremendous persuasive powers through systematic inscription and centralized accumulation of information traces. The second strategy, called drawing contrasts together, is derived from the author's empirical analysis of the rhetorics and materialities of a Scandinavian New Economy firm. The persuasive powers of this firm, it is argued, are based on its ability to evoke (...) and articulate a series of pointed contrasts between the attractive working life within the firm and the ordinary and problematic work life elsewhere. The article argues that both persuasive strategies work in a pragmatic sense. But where “drawing things together” enacts a relatively stable and knowable world, the persuasive strategy of “drawing contrasts together” depends on, and enacts, a world of dramatic epochal changes. (shrink)
Drawing on actor-network theory, this paper challenges the traditional analytical separation of the socalled social and the so-called technical. First, observational data of an interactional event between a social worker and a client is introduced. Second, the techno-social heterogeneity of the event is elucidated through an analysis based on the concept of translation. Third, the precarious and temporary natures of the techno-social hybrids are discussed through the concept of performance. Finally, the techno-social is proposed as a new object for social (...) science. (shrink)
How and from where can power be criticized and resisted? The advent of new managerial forms of power has brought the question once more to the fore. One of the salient issues is whether the ubiquity and apparent omnipotence of contemporary forms of managerial power renders critique and resistance difficult. This article compares the critical potential of French pragmatic sociology and Foucauldian-inspired genealogy. We argue that both approaches offer viable critiques of contemporary forms of power. Yet, whereas the critique of (...) pragmatic sociology hinges on the position of those who exercise critique and/or resist, genealogical critique depends on the concrete form of power that is being scrutinized. We argue that even though we see critique as modus as more convincing than critique as locus, the two approaches can inspire each other in order to advance effective critique. (shrink)
Hybrid logics are a principled generalization of both modal logics and description logics, a standard formalism for knowledge representation. In this paper we give the first constructive version of hybrid logic, thereby showing that it is possible to hybridize constructive modal logics. Alternative systems are discussed, but we fix on a reasonable and well-motivated version of intuitionistic hybrid logic and prove essential proof-theoretical results for a natural deduction formulation of it. Our natural deduction system is also extended with additional inference (...) rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations expressed by so-called geometric theories. Thus, we give natural deduction systems in a uniform way for a wide class of constructive hybrid logics. This shows that constructive hybrid logics are a viable enterprise and opens up the way for future applications. (shrink)
This is a companion paper to Braüner where a natural deduction system for propositional hybrid logic is given. In the present paper we generalize the system to the first-order case. Our natural deduction system for first-order hybrid logic can be extended with additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations and the quantifier domains expressed by so-called geometric theories. We prove soundness and completeness and we prove a normalisation theorem. Moreover, we give an axiom system first-order hybrid logic.
The main aim of the present paper is to use a proof system for hybrid modal logic to formalize what are called false-belief tasks in cognitive psychology, thereby investigating the interplay between cognition and logical reasoning about belief. We consider two different versions of the Smarties task, involving respectively a shift of perspective to another person and to another time. Our formalizations disclose that despite this difference, the two versions of the Smarties task have exactly the same underlying logical structure. (...) We also consider the Sally-Anne task, having a more complicated logical structure, presupposing a “principle of inertia” saying that a belief is preserved over time, unless there is belief to the contrary. (shrink)
In the paper (Braüner, 2001) we gave a minimal condition for the existence of a homophonic theory of truth for a modal or tense logic. In the present paper we generalise this result to arbitrary modal logics and we also show that a modal logic permits the existence of a homophonic theory of truth if and only if it permits the definition of a socalled master modality. Moreover, we explore a connection between the master modality and hybrid logic: We show (...) that if attention is restricted to bidirectional frames, then the expressive power of the master modality is exactly what is needed to translate the bounded fragment of first-order logic into hybrid logic in a truth preserving way. We believe that this throws new light on Arthur Prior's fourth grade tense logic. (shrink)
In this paper two different natural deduction systems forhybrid logic are compared and contrasted.One of the systems was originally given by the author of the presentpaper whereasthe other system under consideration is a modifiedversion of a natural deductionsystem given by Jerry Seligman.We give translations in both directions between the systems,and moreover, we devise a set of reduction rules forthe latter system bytranslation of already known reduction rules for the former system.
In this article, I shall consider a method for conceptual analysis which has been called the Canberra Plan and which might perhaps be conceived as an alternative approach to conceptual analysis in the classical sense. The Canberra Plan is not, however, aimed primarily at the elucidation of the relevant concept, but at the metaphysical question of identifying the descriptive property that corresponds to the concept. The idea of the Canberra Plan is, more specifically, to clarify the import of the concept (...) by reference to the role the concept plays in a network of concepts, principles, and claims, and to investigate and see what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept thus analyzed. What I want to do in this article, then, is first to introduce the Canberra Plan and give some consideration to its advantages and disadvantages and, secondly, to apply it to the concept of law, in order not only to clarify the import of this concept, but also to find out what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept. The question of what descriptive property, if any, corresponds to the concept of law should be of considerable interest to jurisprudents, not only because the meta-ethical question of whether legal properties are descriptive, or even natural or physical, is generally interesting, but also because the existence of such descriptive legal properties is precisely what is asserted by legal positivists through the so-called social thesis, which has it that we determine what the law is using factual criteria. That is to say, if the analyst succeeds in establishing that the property of being law is a descriptive property, he would seem to have offered at least some support for the social thesis of legal positivism and, therefore, for legal positivism. In order to investigate this interesting question, I shall carry out a Canberra-style analysis of the concept of law, and I shall argue, tentatively, that X is law if, and only if, X is a relation between a system of norms all of which can be traced back to one of several recognized sources of law that can be handled on the basis of exclusively factual considerations, and an organization that is constituted and regulated by the norms of the system and whose task it is to interpret and apply these norms, X aspires to regulate social life in general, X is non-optional, and X claims to trump competing normative systems. In addition, I shall argue, equally tentatively, that the property of being law is precisely the descriptive property that satisfies the conditions -, that this property is a role property, not a realizer property, and that there is very little to be said about the legal realizer property on a general level and that the legal realizer property differs in this regard from moral and mental realizer properties. I shall, however, also argue that the analyst who applies the Canberra Plan to the concept of law will almost certainly find it very difficult to come up with a collection of sufficiently rich analytic platitudes, especially what Frank Jackson calls input and output clauses, that he is not likely to get much help from the idea of mature legal thinking, and that the so-called permutation problem, which is very problematic, will arise as a result of the above-mentioned lack of input and output clauses. And I shall therefore argue that, as things stand, the Canberra Plan will not help us clarify the nature of law or lend support to the strong social thesis of legal positivism. (shrink)
ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to see whether we can account for the normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in this endeavour. I argue, inter alia, that we should distinguish between the problem of accounting for the normativity of law, conceived as a necessary property of law, and the problem of accounting for the use of normative legal language on the part of legal actors; (...) that the debate about the normativity of law, which mainly concerns, is more or less identical to the debate between legal positivists and non-positivists; that one cannot account for the normativity of law, conceived along the lines of, within the framework of legal positivism, and that the question of the normativity of law considered within the framework of legal positivism is not an open question. (shrink)
In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study (...) of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence . I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law . I proceed to argue that legal decision‐making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision‐making thus conceived . Having done that, I discuss law's normativity , the normative force of legal justification , and the relation between the former and the latter . I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz’ understanding of the question of law's normativity. (shrink)
In this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis (...) deserves our continued attention, because the fundamental idea—that the concept of a legal right must be understood functionally—is sound. (shrink)
I argue in this article (i) that Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy, especially the critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, is a significant contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. I also argue (ii) that Olivecrona fails to substantiate some of his most important empirical claims, and (iii) that the distinction espoused by Olivecrona between the truth and (...) the correctness of legal statements is problematic but not needed in Olivecrona's legal philosophy. (shrink)