Relevant logics have traditionally been viewed as paraconsistent. This paper shows that this view of relevant logics is wrong. It does so by showing forth a logic which extends classical logic, yet satisfies the Entailment Theorem as well as the variable sharing property. In addition it has the same S4-type modal feature as the original relevant logic E as well as the same enthymematical deduction theorem. The variable sharing property was only ever regarded as a necessary property for a logic (...) to have in order for it to not validate the so-called paradoxes of implication. The Entailment Theorem on the other hand was regarded as both necessary and sufficient. This paper shows that the latter theorem also holds for classical logic, and so cannot be regarded as a sufficient property for blocking the paradoxes. The concept of suppression is taken up, but shown to be properly weaker than that of variable sharing. (shrink)

Restall set forth a "consecution" calculus in his "An Introduction to Substructural Logics." This is a natural deduction type sequent calculus where the structural rules play an important role. This paper looks at different ways of extending Restall's calculus. It is shown that Restall's weak soundness and completeness result with regards to a Hilbert calculus can be extended to a strong one so as to encompass what Restall calls proofs from assumptions. It is also shown how to extend the calculus (...) so as to validate the metainferential rule of reasoning by cases, as well as certain theory-dependent rules. (shrink)

It is known that many relevant logics can be conservatively extended by the truth constant known as the Ackermann constant. It is also known that many relevant logics can be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. This essay, however, shows that a range of relevant logics with the Ackermann constant cannot be conservatively extended by a Boolean negation.

Many relevant logics can be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Mares showed, however, that E is a notable exception. Mares’ proof is by and large a rather involved model-theoretic one. This paper presents a much easier proof-theoretic proof which not only covers E but also generalizes so as to also cover relevant logics with a primitive modal operator added. It is shown that from even very weak relevant logics augmented by a weak K-ish modal operator, and up to the strong (...) relevant logic R with a S5 modal operator, all fail to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. The proof, therefore, also covers Meyer and Mares’ proof that NR—R with a primitive S4-modality added—also fails to be conservatively extended by Boolean negation. (shrink)

This paper shows how to conservatively extend theories formulated in non-classical logics such as the Logic of Paradox, the Strong Kleene Logic and relevant logics with Skolem functions. Translations to and from the language extended by Skolem functions into the original one are presented and shown to preserve derivability. It is also shown that one may not always substitute s=f(t) and A(t, s) even though A determines the extension of a function and f is a Skolem function for A.

Many relevant logics are conservatively extended by Boolean negation. Not all, however. This paper shows an acute form of non-conservativeness, namely that the Boolean-free fragment of the Boolean extension of a relevant logic need not always satisfy the variable-sharing property. In fact, it is shown that such an extension can in fact yield classical logic. For a vast range of relevant logic, however, it is shown that the variable-sharing property, restricted to the Boolean-free fragment, still holds for the Boolean extended (...) logic. (shrink)

This paper gives an account of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria for an adequate theory of entailment. The criteria are grouped into three categories: criteria pertaining to modality, those pertaining to relevance, and those related to expressive strength. The leitmotif of both this paper and its prequel is the relevant legitimacy of disjunctive syllogism. Relevant logics are commonly held to be paraconsistent logics. It is shown in this paper, however, that both E and R can be extended to explosive logics (...) which satisfy all of Anderson and Belnap’s selection criteria, provided the truth-constant known as the Ackermann constant is available. One of the selection criteria related to expressive strength is having an “enthymematic” conditional for which a deduction theorem holds. I argue that this allows for a new interpretation of Anderson and Belnap’s take on logical consequence, namely as committing them to pluralism about logical consequence. (shrink)

Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan argued from their joint paper The Semantics of First Degree Entailment and onward that the variable sharing property is but a mere consequence of a good entailment relation, indeed they viewed it as a mere negative test of adequacy of such a relation, the property itself being a rather philosophically barren concept. Such a relation is rather to be analyzed as a sufficiency relation free of any form of premise suppression. Suppression of premises, therefore, gained (...) center stage. Despite this, however, no serious attempt was ever made at analyzing the concept. This paper shows that their suggestions for how to understand it, either as the Anti-Suppression Principle or as the Joint Force Principle, turn out to yield properties strictly weaker than that of variable sharing. A suggestion for how to understand some of their use of the notion of suppression which clearly is not in line with these two mentioned principles is given, and their arguments to the effect that the Anderson and Belnap logics T, E and R are suppressive are shown to be both technically and philosophically wanting. Suppression-freedom, it is argued, cannot do the job Plumwood and Sylvan intended it to do. (shrink)

This essay discusses rules and semantic clauses relating to Substitution—Leibniz’s law in the conjunctive-implicational form s=t ∧ A(s) → A(t)—as these are put forward in Priest’s books "In Contradiction" and "An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is." The stated rules and clauses are shown to be too weak in some cases and too strong in others. New ones are presented and shown to be correct. Justification for the various rules are probed and it is argued that Substitution ought (...) to fail. (shrink)

Priest argued in Fusion and Confusion (Priest in Topoi 34(1):55–61, 2015a) for a new concept of logical consequence over the relevant logic B, one where premises my be “confused” together. This paper develops Priest’s idea. Whereas Priest uses a substructural proof calculus, this paper provides a Hilbert proof calculus for it. Using this it is shown that Priest’s consequence relation is weaker than the standard Hilbert consequence relation for B, but strictly stronger than Anderson and Belnap’s original relevant notion of (...) consequence. Unlike the latter, however, Priest’s consequence relation does not satisfy a variant of the variable sharing property. This paper shows that how it can be modified so as to do so. Priest’s consequence relation turns out to be surprisingly weak in some respects. The prospects of strengthening it is raised and discussed in a broader philosophical context. (shrink)

The naive theory of properties states that for every condition there is a property instantiated by exactly the things which satisfy that condition. The naive theory of properties is inconsistent in classical logic, but there are many ways to obtain consistent naive theories of properties in nonclassical logics. The naive theory of classes adds to the naive theory of properties an extensionality rule or axiom, which states roughly that if two classes have exactly the same members, they are identical. In (...) this paper we examine the prospects for obtaining a satisfactory naive theory of classes. We start from a result by Ross Brady, which demonstrates the consistency of something resembling a naive theory of classes. We generalize Brady’s result somewhat and extend it to a recent system developed by Andrew Bacon. All of the theories we prove consistent contain an extensionality rule or axiom. But we argue that given the background logics, the relevant extensionality principles are too weak. For example, in some of these theories, there are universal classes which are not declared coextensive. We elucidate some very modest demands on extensionality, designed to rule out this kind of pathology. But we close by proving that even these modest demands cannot be jointly satisfied. In light of this new impossibility result, the prospects for a naive theory of classes are bleak. (shrink)

This paper presents a range of new triviality proofs pertaining to naïve truth theory formulated in paraconsistent relevant logics. It is shown that excluded middle together with various permutation principles such as A → (B → C)⊩B → (A → C) trivialize naïve truth theory. The paper also provides some new triviality proofs which utilize the axioms ((A → B)∧ (B → C)) → (A → C) and (A → ¬A) → ¬A, the fusion connective and the Ackermann constant. An (...) overview over various ways to formulate Leibniz’s law in non-classical logics and two new triviality proofs for naïve set theory are also provided. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence receives attention in media as well as in academe and business. In media coverage and reporting, AI is predominantly described in contrasted terms, either as the ultimate solution to all human problems or the ultimate threat to all human existence. In academe, the focus of computer scientists is on developing systems that function, whereas philosophy scholars theorize about the implications of this functionality for human life. In the interface between technology and philosophy there is, however, one imperative aspect (...) of AI yet to be articulated: how do intelligent systems make inferences? We use the overarching concept “Artificial Intelligent Behaviour” which would include both cognition/processing and judgment/behaviour. We argue that due to the complexity and opacity of artificial inference, one needs to initiate systematic empirical studies of artificial intelligent behavior similar to what has previously been done to study human cognition, judgment and decision making. This will provide valid knowledge, outside of what current computer science methods can offer, about the judgments and decisions made by intelligent systems. Moreover, outside academe—in the public as well as the private sector—expertise in epistemology, critical thinking and reasoning are crucial to ensure human oversight of the artificial intelligent judgments and decisions that are made, because only competent human insight into AI-inference processes will ensure accountability. Such insights require systematic studies of AI-behaviour founded on the natural sciences and philosophy, as well as the employment of methodologies from the cognitive and behavioral sciences. (shrink)

Purpose: To survey the attitudes of the general public in Sweden to biobank research and to discuss the findings in the light of some well-known ethical principles.Methods: A questionnaire was used to survey the opinions of the general public in Sweden, and an ethical analysis (using the principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice) was performed to discuss the possible conditions of such research.Findings: Between 3 and 9% answered that they did not want their samples to be collected and stored (...) in a biobank. Many respondents required information about the purpose of the research and wanted to be able to consent or refuse. About one third of the respondents said they would have answered differently if financial gain was involved and those who commented indicated a more negative attitude. The principle of autonomy maintains that the right to self-determination should be respected, and the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence that the probable harms and benefits resulting from a particular project by using samples from a biobank should be balanced. The general public disagree about how these principles are to be balanced. Interpretation: In the light of the findings different interpretations of the situation as well as possible alternatives are discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Although many ecofeminists acknowledge heterosexism as a problem, a systematic exploration of the potential intersections of ecofeminist and queer theories has yet to be made. By interrogating social constructions of the "natural," the various uses of Christianity as a logic of domination, and the rhetoric of colonialism, this essay finds those theoretical intersections and argues for the importance of developing a queer ecofeminism.

Anna Elisabetta Galeotti?s theory of ?toleration as recognition? has been criticised by Peter Jones for being conceptually incoherent, since liberal toleration presupposes a negative attitude to differences, whereas multicultural recognition requires positive affirmation hereof. The paper spells out Galeotti?s justification for recognition as a requirement of liberal justice in detail and asks in what sense the policies supported by Galeotti are policies of recognition. It is argued that Jones misrepresents Galeotti?s theory, insofar as this sense of recognition actually is compatible (...) with liberal toleration. This does not prove Jones?s criticism to be wrong, since the justification may have implications unacknowledged by Galeotti, which might be liberally problematic. The paper considers this problem and possible ways of responding to it, but concludes that Galeotti?s theory is incomplete in respects that need to be filled out in order to secure compatibility with liberalism, and that this may prove problematic. (shrink)

This article discusses fundamental problems in "rational choice theory," as outlined by Jon Elster. Elster's discussion of why institutions may not be said to act shows his fundamental presupposition that only "monolithic," unitary entities are capable of action. This is, for him, a reason why only individual human beings may be said to act. Furthermore, human beings may be said to act only insofar as they "maximize" on the basis of a unitary, complete, consistent "preference structure." All action that is (...) not maximization in this sense is for Elster not really human action, but rather instances of "pure causality." Elster distinguishes between the "real," intentional person, who "maximizes," and "purely causal forces" within the person. This article tries to show that this radical, sharp dichotomy between "intentionality," in this narrow sense, and "pure causality" is inadequate as a basis for understanding human action. This radical dichotomy is central to important arguments made by Elster more generally. (shrink)

Political theory is contextualist when factual claims about context are part of the justification of normative political judgments. There are different kinds of contextualism depending on whether context is relevant for the formulation and justification of political principles, whether principles themselves are contextually specific, or whether context is only relevant for the application of principles. An important challenge to contextualism is the problem of critical distance: how can theories ensure a critical perspective if facts about the context to be evaluated (...) are also part of the justification for the normative judgments? Tariq Modood and Simon Thompson have defended what they call iterative contextualism, which combines elements of all three kinds of contextualism in an attempt to avoid the problem of critical distance. The present paper discusses Modood and Thompson’s iterative contextualism and whether it manages to avoid the problem of critical distance. (shrink)

Numerous studies have replicated the finding of mentation in both rapid eye movement (REM) and nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. However, two different theoretical models have been proposed to account for this finding: (1) a one-generator model, in which mentation is generated by a single set of processes regardless of physiological differences between REM and NREM sleep; and (2) a two-generator model, in which qualitatively different generators produce cognitive activity in the two states. First, research is reviewed demonstrating conclusively that (...) mentation can occur in NREM sleep; global estimates show an average mentation recall rate of about 50% from NREM sleep – a value that has increased substantially over the years. Second, nine different types of research on REM and NREM cognitive activity are examined for evidence supporting or refuting the two models. The evidence largely, but not completely, favors the two-generator model. Finally, in a preliminary attempt to reconcile the two models, an alternative model is proposed that assumes the existence of covert REM sleep processes during NREM sleep. Such covert activity may be responsible for much of the dreamlike cognitive activity occurring in NREM sleep. Key Words: cognition in sleep; dreaming; NREM sleep; REM sleep; sleep mentation. (shrink)

Cheyne and Girard characterize felt presence during sleep paralysis attacks as a pre-hallucinatory expression of a threat-activated vigilance system. While their results may be consistent with this interpretation, they are nonetheless correlational and do not address a parsimonious alternative explanation. This alternative stipulates that FP is a purely spatial, hallucinatory form of a common cognitive phenomenon—social imagery—that is often, but not necessarily, linked with threat and fear and that may induce distress among susceptible individuals. The occurrence of both fearful and (...) non-fearful FPs in a multiplicity of situations other than sleep paralysis attacks supports the notion that FPs are hallucinatory variants of social imagery and that they are not necessarily bound to threat-activated vigilance. Evidence linking FPs with anxiety disorders supports the notion that the distress they evoke may be mediated by a more general affective distress personality factor. To illustrate the predominantly spatial character of FP hallucinations, similarities between FP and phantom limbs are summarized and the possibility that these two phenomena are parallel expressions of a mirror neuron system is considered. (shrink)

It is normally taken for granted that states have a right to control immigration into their territory. When immigration is raised as a normative issue two questions become salient, one about what the right to exclude is, and one about whether and how it might be justified. This paper considers the first question. The paper starts by noting that standard debates about immigration have not addressed what the right to exclude is. Standard debates about immigration furthermore tend to result either (...) in fairly strong cases for open borders or in denials that considerations of justice apply to immigration at all, which results in state discretion positions. This state of debate is both theoretically unsatisfactory and normatively implausible. The paper therefore explores an alternative approach to the right to exclude immigrants from the perspective of recent debates about the territorial rights of states. The right to exclude claimed by states is analysed and it is shown to differ both conceptually and normatively from rights to impose political authority within a territory. The paper finally indicates how this analysis might broaden the focus of debates about immigration and suggest alternative regimes of migration regulation the possibility of which is obscured by traditional justice approaches. (shrink)

The paper concerns the specific transnational aspects of the ‘cartoons controversy’ over the publication of 12 drawings of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. Transnationalism denotes the relationships that are not international or domestic. The paper considers whether the specifically transnational aspects of the controversy are normatively significant, that is, whether transnationalism makes a difference for the applicability or strength of normative considerations concerning publications such as the Danish cartoons. It is argued that, although some of the usual (...) arguments about free speech only or mainly apply domestically, many also apply transnationally; that standard arguments for multicultural recognition are difficult to apply transnationally; and that requirements of respect may have problematic implications if applied to transnational relationships. Keywords: civility; Muhammad cartoons; freedom of speech; global civil society; multicultural recognition; respect; transnational relations Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 101-121. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v3i2.1977. (shrink)

Many political theorists of multiculturalism describe their theories as “contextualist.” But it is unclear what “contextualism” means and what difference it makes for political theory. I use a specific prominent example of a multiculturalist discussion, namely Tariq Modood’s argument about “moderate secularism,” as a test case and distinguish between different senses of contextualism. I discuss whether the claim that political theory is contextual in each sense is novel and interesting, and whether contextualism is a distinct feature of political theory of (...) multiculturalism. I argue that the forms of contextualism which concern the scope and methodology of political theory are sensible, but not novel or distinctive of multiculturalism. I then discuss the more controversial forms of contextualism, which I call political and theoretical contextualism. Finally, I apply the distinctions to Modood’s argument. I argue that it is not a form of theoretical contextualism and that theoretical contextualism would in fact undermine arguments for multiculturalist policies of accommodation. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to analyse experiences of moral concerns in intensive care nursing. The theoretical perspective of the study is based on relational ethics, also referred to as ethics of care. The participants were 36 intensive care nurses from 10 general, neonatal and thoracic intensive care units. The structural characteristics of the units were similar: a high working pace, advanced technology, budget restrictions, recent reorganization, and shortage of experienced nurses. The data consisted of the participants’ examples of (...) ethical situations they had experienced in their intensive care unit. A qualitative content analysis identified five themes: believing in a good death; knowing the course of events; feelings of distress; reasoning about physicians’ ‘doings’ and tensions in expressing moral awareness. A main theme was formulated as caring about - caring for: moral obligations and work responsibilities. Moral obligations and work responsibilities are assumed to be complementary dimensions in nursing, yet they were found not to be in balance for intensive care nurses. In conclusion there is a need to support nurses in difficult intensive care situations, for example, by mentoring, as a step towards developing moral action knowledge in the context of intensive care nursing. (shrink)

Many contributions to the philosophical debate about conceptual and normative issues raised by the refugee crisis fail to take properly account of the difference between ideal and nonideal theory. This makes several otherwise interesting and apparently plausible contributions to the philosophy of the refugee crisis problematic. They are problematic in the sense that they mix up ideal and nonideal aspirations and assumptions in an incoherent way undermining the proposed views. Two examples of this problem are discussed. The first example is (...) David Miller’s contribution to the conceptual debate about how we should understand refugeehood. The second example is a common argument from the normative debate about how states should discharge their duties to help refugees, namely the claim that states should help in neighboring countries rather than by taking in more asylum seekers. Both are examples of arguments about how we should understand or respond to the refugee crisis, which appear to offer coherent principles for the moral guidance of political actors but which are actually incoherent as principles of practical reasoning for the context they aim to address. (shrink)

Toleration and respect are types of relations between different agents. The standard analyses of toleration and respect are attitudinal; toleration and respect require subjects to have appropriate types of attitudes towards the objects of toleration or respect. The paper investigates whether states can sensibly be described as tolerant or respectful in ways theoretically relevantly similar to the standard analyses. This is a descriptive question about the applicability of concepts rather than a normative question about whether, when and why states should (...) be tolerant or respectful. The problem of institutional application is that institutions in general and the state in particular arguably cannot have attitudes of the required kind. This problem is distinct from, and broader than, well-known problems about whether political toleration is normatively legitimate. To make sense of political toleration or respect, the paper proposes that the analysis of institutional toleration and respect should not be solely agent-centred or patient-centred. The analysis should also include features about the relation itself. We can describe institutions as tolerant or respectful in a sense relevantly similar to the standard analyses if we focus on the public features of the relation between institutions and citizens or groups, without ascribing attitudes in the problematic sense. (shrink)

Human dignity is grounded in basic human attributes such as life and self-respect. When people cannot stand up for themselves they may lose their dignity towards themselves and others. The aim of this study was to elucidate if dignity remains intact for family members during care procedures in a children’s hospital. A qualitative approach was adopted, using open non-participation observation. The findings indicate that dignity remains intact in family-centred care where all concerned parties encourage each other in a collaborative relationship. (...) Dignity is shattered when practitioners care from their own perspective without seeing the individual in front of them. When there is a break in care, family members can restore their dignity because the interruption helps them to master their emotions. Family members’ dignity is shattered and remains damaged when they are emotionally overwhelmed; they surrender themselves to practitioners’ care, losing their self-esteem and self-respect. (shrink)

Multiculturalist theories of recognition consist of explanatory-descriptive social theoretical accounts of the position of the minorities whose predicaments the theories seek to address, together with normative principles generating political implications. Although theories of recognition are often based on illiberal principles or couched in illiberal-sounding language, it is possible to combine proper liberal principles with the kind of social theoretical accounts of minority groups highlighted in multiculturalism. The importance of ‘the social bases of self-respect’ in Rawls’s political liberalism is used to (...) illustrate how a liberal theory of recognition might be constructed, and it is argued that such a theory can capture some, though not all, of the concerns of multiculturalism, even though the resulting ‘politics of recognition’ is neither a ‘politics of difference’ nor a kind of ‘identity politics’. (shrink)

Arguments from stability for liberal nationalism rely on considerations about conditions for the feasibility or stability of liberal political ideals and factual claims about the circumstances under which these conditions are fulfilled in order to argue for nationalist conclusions. Such reliance on factual claims has been criticised by among others G. A. Cohen in other contexts as ideological reifications of social reality. In order to assess whether arguments from stability within liberal nationalism, especially as formulated by David Miller, are vulnerable (...) to a comparable critique, the rationale for their reliance on factual claims is discussed on the basis of a number of concerns in John Rawls’s political liberalism. The concern with stability in liberal nationalism differs from stability in Rawls’s work, mainly because of the stronger non-ideal or ‘realist’ focus of the former. In so far as the ‘realism’ of arguments from stability for liberal nationalism is recognized, they are not vulnerable to the reification charge. But if the arguments are construed as realist, this at the same time makes for other tensions within liberal nationalism. (shrink)

Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, provided (...) that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi-dimensional and how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing ideals of respect-based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies. (shrink)

: Antiracist white feminists and ecofeminists have the tools but lack the strategies for responding to issues of social and environmental justice cross-culturally, particularly in matters as complex as the Makah whale hunt. Distinguishing between ethical contexts and contents, I draw on feminist critiques of cultural essentialism, ecofeminist critiques of hunting and food consumption, and socialist feminist analyses of colonialism to develop antiracist feminist and ecofeminist strategies for cross-cultural communication and cross-cultural feminist ethics.

This paper argues against Jon Elster's contention that there is a fundamentalincompatibility between, on one hand, autonomy and rationality and, on theother hand, adaptation to conditions of one's existence in the sense that one'sdesires or preferences are adjusted to what it is possible to achieve. While thefirst part of the paper more narrowly concentrated on Elster's discussion ofthese ideas, this second part goes on to a more general discussion of the conceptof rationality. On the basis of this discussion, it is (...) claimed that Elster's conclusionsconcerning autonomy and adaptation are premised on a defective conceptionof human experience and rationality. Moreover, the claim is made that thesedefects are also characteristic of "rational choice theory" more generally. (shrink)

Antiracist white feminists and ecofeminists have the tools but lack the strategies for responding to issues of social and environmental justice cross-culturally, particularly in matters as complex as the Makah whale hunt. Distinguishing between ethical contexts and contents, I draw on feminist critiques of cultural essentialism, ecofeminist critiques of hunting and food consumption, and socialist feminist analyses of colonialism to develop antiracist feminist and ecofeminist strategies for cross-cultural communication and cross-cultural feminist ethics.