74 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Trenton Merricks [75]Trenton Douglas Merricks [1]
  1. Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
  2. Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   142 citations  
  3.  9
    Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727-744.
  4. Propositions.Trenton Merricks - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Trenton Merricks presents an original argument for the existence of propositions, and defends an account of their nature. He draws a variety of controversial conclusions, for instance about supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  5. Review of Peter van Inwagen's The Problem of Evil.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Times Literary Supplement (5444):26.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Good-Bye Growing Block.Trenton Merricks - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:103-110.
  7. Persistence, Parts, and Presentism.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Noûs 33 (3):421-438.
  8. Composition and Vagueness.Trenton Merricks - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):615-637.
    ‘Restricted composition’ says that there are some composite objects. And it says that some objects jointly compose nothing at all. The main threat to restricted composition is the influential and widely defended Vagueness Argument. We shall see that the Vagueness Argument fails. In seeing how this argument fails, we shall discover a new focus for the debate over composition's extent.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  9. Endurance and Indiscernibility.Trenton Merricks - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):165-184.
  10. Truth and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
    Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  11. The Only Way To Be.Trenton Merricks - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):593-612.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  12. There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time.Trenton Merricks - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):106-124.
  13. Do Ordinary Objects Exist? No.Trenton Merricks - forthcoming - In Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics. Routledge.
  14. On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities.Trenton Merricks - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):521-531.
  15. Propositional Attitudes?Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.
  16. Varieties of Vagueness.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
    According to one account, vagueness is "metaphysical." The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  17. Three Comments on Writing the Book of the World.Trenton Merricks - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):722-736.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  18. The End of Counterpart Theory.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (10):521 - 549.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  19. Warrant Entails Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):841-855.
    Warrant is “that, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” S knows that p, therefore, if and only if S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true. This is a purely formal characterization of warrant. Warrant may, no doubt, be a messy item: a substantive analysis might be full of disjuncts and conjuncts and conditionals and caveats. But if there are true beliefs that are not knowledge, then there is something that (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  20.  71
    Foreknowledge and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.
    The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” (Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks” (Philosophical Review 120 [2011]: 97–115), John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd raise a number of objections (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  21. Split Brains and the Godhead.Trenton Merricks - 2006 - In Thomas Crisp, David Vander Laan & Matthew Davidson (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 299-326.
  22. Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):192 – 195.
  23. Locating Vagueness.Trenton Merricks - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (5):221-250.
    The claim that all vagueness must be a feature of language or thought is the current orthodoxy. This is a claim about the “location” of vagueness. “Locating Vagueness” argues that this claim is false, largely by defending the possibility of borderline cases in the absence of language and thought. If the orthodoxy about the location of vagueness is false, then so too is any account of the “nature” of vagueness that implies that orthodoxy. So this paper concludes that various accounts (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Replies to Wang, Speaks, and Pautz.Trenton Merricks - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):487-505.
    Replies for a symposium on Propositions.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25.  48
    On Behalf of the Coherentist.Trenton Merricks - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):306 - 309.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  26. Replies to Cameron, Schaffer, and Soames.Trenton Merricks - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (4):328-343.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience.Trenton Merricks - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):59-71.
    The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  28. Replies to Glick, Hanks, and Magidor.Trenton Merricks - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):393-411.
  29. More on Warrant’s Entailing Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
    Warrant is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In "Warrant Entails Truth" (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief be warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her "Does Warrant Entail Truth?" (PPR, March 1996). In "More on Warrant's Entailing Truth" I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  30. How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 183-201.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  31. Replies.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727–744.
  32. Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
    This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for the claim that identity does (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  33.  86
    Précis of Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):700-703.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  34. Maximality and Consciousness.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
    Being conscious is intrinsic. Suppose P, a conscious human being, “shrinks” by losing an atom from her left index finger. Suppose that at the very first instant at which P has lost that atom, the atoms that then compose her remain just as they were immediately before “the loss.” This implies—assuming MS for reductio—that, just as those atoms compose a conscious object after the loss, so they composed a conscious object before the loss. Name that latter object ‘the atom-complement’.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  35. Perdurance and Psychological Continuity.Trenton Merricks - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-198.
    If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my "Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity". Rea and Silver claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is sound (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Realism About Personal Identity Over Time.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):173 - 187.
  37.  31
    The Resurrection of the Body.Trenton Merricks - 2008 - In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
    This article focuses on two questions about the doctrine of the resurrection, questions that will occur to most philosophers and theologians interested in identity in general, and in personal identity in particular. The first question is: how? How could a body that at the end of this life was frail and feeble be the very same body as a resurrection body, a body which will not be frail or feeble, but will instead be glorified? Moreover, how could a body that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38.  72
    Singular Propositions.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - In Kelly James Clark & Michael C. Rea (eds.), Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  39. Fission and Personal Identity Over Time.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):163-186.
  40.  29
    Substance Among Other Categories.Trenton Merricks - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):480-482.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  41. Remarks on Vagueness and Arbitrariness.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):115-119.
    other things, that the Vagueness Argument for unrestricted composition fails. In ‘Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition’, Elizabeth Barnes objects to my argument. This paper replies to Barnes, and also offers further support for the views defended in my original paper.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. The Structure of Objects.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):301-307.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  80
    The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281-301.
  44.  1
    How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Cornell University Press.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  45. Conditional Probability and Defeat.Trenton Merricks - 2002 - In James Beilby (ed.), Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press. pp. 165-175.
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46.  21
    Warrant Entails Truth.Trenton Merricks - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):841-855.
    Warrant is “that, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” S knows that p, therefore, if and only if S’s belief that p is warranted and p is true. This is a purely formal characterization of warrant. Warrant may, no doubt, be a messy item: a substantive analysis might be full of disjuncts and conjuncts and conditionals and caveats. But if there are true beliefs that are not knowledge, then there is something that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  47. ‘No Statues’1.Trenton Merricks - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):47 – 52.
  48. Précis of Propositions.Trenton Merricks - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):460-461.
  49. Review of Katherine Hawley's How Things Persist.Trenton Merricks - 2003 - Mind 112 (445):146-148.
  50. Truth and Molinism.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 50--72.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 74