Results for 'Triviality problem'

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  1.  80
    Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem.Jerzy Gołosz - 2013 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (1):45-61.
    It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the (...)
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  2.  6
    Solving the Triviality Problem in the B-Edition Transcendental Deduction.Tom Vinci - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 471-482.
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  3. Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality.Daan Evers - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some (...)
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  4.  21
    The Triviality of the Red-Green Problem.Lionel Kenner - 1965 - Analysis 25 (March):147-153.
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  5. Conditionals, Indeterminacy, and Triviality.Justin Khoo - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):260-287.
    This paper discusses and relates two puzzles for indicative conditionals: a puzzle about indeterminacy and a puzzle about triviality. Both puzzles arise because of Ramsey's Observation, which states that the probability of a conditional is equal to the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent. The puzzle of indeterminacy is the problem of reconciling this fact about conditionals with the fact that they seem to lack truth values at worlds where their antecedents are false. The puzzle of (...)
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  6.  86
    Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.
    Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it (...)
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  7. The triviality of the red-green problem.Lionel Kenner - 1965 - Analysis 25 (4):147.
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  8. The Triviality of the Debate Over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of "Moral".Peter Singer - 1973 - American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):51-56.
    "THE central problem in moral philosophy is commonly known as the is-ought problem." So runs the opening sentence of the introduction to a recent volume of readings on this issue. [1] Taken as a statement about the preoccupations of moral philosophers of the present century, we can accept this assertion. The problem of how statements of fact are related to moral judgments has dominated recent moral philosophy. Associated with this problem is another, which has also been (...)
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  9.  80
    The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information.Marie Duží - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.
    The classical theory of semantic information (ESI), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. This problem is connected with Cohen and Nagel's paradox of inference: Since the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in (...)
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  10.  16
    A State of Belief K If and Only If the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A Also Requires Accepting C. The Preservation Criterion Says That If a Prop-Osition B is Accepted in a Given State of Belief K and A is Consistent with the Beliefs in K, Then B is Still Accepted in the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A. It is Proved That, on Pain of Triviality, the Ramsey Test And.No Problem far Actualism - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (235).
  11. Reply to Mr Kenner's the Triviality of the Red-Green Problem.Colin Radford - 1965 - Analysis 25 (June):207-208.
     
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  12. The Problem of the Many.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2016.
    As anyone who has flown out of a cloud knows, the boundaries of a cloud are a lot less sharp up close than they can appear on the ground. Even when it seems clearly true that there is one, sharply bounded, cloud up there, really there are thousands of water droplets that are neither determinately part of the cloud, nor determinately outside it. Consider any object that consists of the core of the cloud, plus an arbitrary selection of these droplets. (...)
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  13. The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals.David Etlin - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688.
    I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 (...)
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  14. "Ceteris Paribus", There Is No Problem of Provisos.John Earman & John &Roberts - 1999 - Synthese 118 (3):439 - 478.
    Much of the literature on "ceteris paribus" laws is based on a misguided egalitarianism about the sciences. For example, it is commonly held that the special sciences are riddled with ceteris paribus laws; from this many commentators conclude that if the special sciences are not to be accorded a second class status, it must be ceteris paribus all the way down to fundamental physics. We argue that the (purported) laws of fundamental physics are not hedged by ceteris paribus clauses and (...)
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  15.  12
    How to Be Concrete: Mechanistic Computation and the Abstraction Problem.Luke Kersten - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):251-266.
    This paper takes up a recent challenge to mechanistic approaches to computational implementation, the view that computational implementation is best explicated within a mechanistic framework. The challenge, what has been labelled “the abstraction problem”, claims that one of MAC’s central pillars – medium independence – is deeply confused when applied to the question of computational implementation. The concern is that while it makes sense to say that computational processes are abstract (i.e. medium-independent), it makes considerably less sense to say (...)
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  16. Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  17.  11
    Meyer’s Struggle with Presentism or How We Can Understand the Debate Between Presentism and Eternalism.Jerzy Gołosz - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    The paper consists of two parts. The first critically analyses Meyer’s [2005] version of the triviality objection to presentism (according to which, presentism is either trivial or untenable), and tries to show that his argument is untenable because – contrary to what he claimed – he did not take into account the entire possible spectrum of interpretations of the presentist’s thesis. In the second, positive part of the paper, it is shown that a leading form of tensed theory of (...)
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  18. Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons From Moore and Parfit.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):87-107.
    The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection. (...)
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  19.  43
    The Impossibility of Natural Necessity.David Oderberg - unknown
    I build a case for the impossibility of natural necessity as anything other than a species of metaphysical necessity – the necessity obtaining in virtue of the essences of natural objects. Aristotelian necessitarianism about the laws of nature is clarified and defended. I contrast it with E.J. Lowe’s contingentism about the laws. I examine Lowe’s solution to the circularity/triviality problem besetting natural necessity understood as relative necessity. Lowe’s way out is subject to serious problems unless it is given (...)
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  20.  85
    Extensionality and Restriction in Naive Set Theory.Zach Weber - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (1):87-104.
    The naive set theory problem is to begin with a full comprehension axiom, and to find a logic strong enough to prove theorems, but weak enough not to prove everything. This paper considers the sub-problem of expressing extensional identity and the subset relation in paraconsistent, relevant solutions, in light of a recent proposal from Beall, Brady, Hazen, Priest and Restall [4]. The main result is that the proposal, in the context of an independently motivated formalization of naive set (...)
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  21.  48
    Trivial and Non-Trivial (yet Difficult) Physicalism.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2015 - Philosophical Inquiries 3 (1):29-38.
    According to physicalism, everything is physical, namely there are no entities (or no more restricted sorts of entities) that are not physical. In this paper, I shall examine the truth of this thesis by presenting a triviality objection against physicalism that is somehow similar to the one advanced against presentism. Firstly, I shall distinguish between two different definitions of the physical (roughly, every entity is physical-1 iff it has some feature F, such as impenetrability or exact spatio-temporal location, while (...)
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  22.  73
    Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2017 - Erkenntnis (5):1-30.
    One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational, which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with (...)
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  23.  70
    Conditional Predictions.Stefan Kaufmann - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (2):181 - 231.
    The connection between the probabilities of conditionals and the corresponding conditional probabilities has long been explored in the philosophical literature, but its implementation faces both technical obstacles and objections on empirical grounds. In this paper I ?rst outline the motivation for the probabilistic turn and Lewis’ triviality results, which stand in the way of what would seem to be its most straightforward implementation. I then focus on Richard Jeffrey’s ’random-variable’ approach, which circumvents these problems by giving up the notion (...)
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  24.  6
    Disquotation and Infinite Conjunctions.Thomas Schindler & Lavinia Picollo - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):899-928.
    One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational, which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with (...)
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  25. Desire-as-Belief Revisited.Richard Bradley & Christian List - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  26. A Foundation for Presentism.Robert Pezet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1809–1837.
    Presentism states that everything is present. Crucial to our understanding of this thesis is how we interpret the ‘is’. Recently, several philosophers have claimed that on any interpretation presentism comes out as either trivially true or manifestly false. Yet, presentism is meant to be a substantive and interesting thesis. I outline in detail the nature of the problem and the standard interpretative options. After unfavourably assessing several popular responses in the literature, I offer an alternative interpretation that provides the (...)
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  27. Pragmatic Causation.Antony Eagle - 2003 - In Huw Price & Richard Corry (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell's Republic Revisited. Oxford University Press.
    Russell famously argued that causation should be dispensed with. He gave two explicit arguments for this conclusion, both of which can be defused if we loosen the ties between causation and determinism. I show that we can define a concept of causation which meets Russell’s conditions but does not reduce to triviality. Unfortunately, a further serious problem is implicit beneath the details of Russell’s arguments, which I call the causal exclusion problem. Meeting this problem involves deploying (...)
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  28. Demarcating Presentism.Christian Wuthrich - 2010 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 441--450.
    This paper argues that recent arguments to the effect that the debate between presentism and eternalism lacks any metaphysical substance ultimately fail, although important lessons can be gleaned from them in how to formulate a non-vacuous version of presentism. It suggests that presentism can best be characterized in the context of spacetime theories. The resulting position is an ersatzist version of presentism that admits merely non-present entities as abstracta deprived of physical existence. Ersatzist presentism both escapes the charges of (...) and promises to offer a route to solving the grounding problem which befalls its more traditional cousins. (shrink)
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  29.  81
    A Sketch of (an Actually Serious) Meinongian Presentism.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (1):1-18.
    In this paper I shall “draw” a sketch of a version of Meinongian Presentism. After having briefly presented some data that presentists need to explain and three problems that typically affect presentism (the triviality objection, the problem of the reference of true propositions’ constituents that seem to involve merely past and merely future objects, the truthmaking problem), I shall clarify the bases of my theory. First, I shall reject the actualist presentist assumption, according to which there are (...)
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  30.  16
    Presentism and the Notion of Existence.Jerzy Gołosz - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (4):395-417.
    The aim of this paper is to make presentism a dynamic view of reality by basing it on a notion of dynamic existence, that is, on a notion of existence which has a dynamic character. The paper shows that both of the notions of existence which are used in metaphysical theories of time have a static character and, while such a notion is useful for eternalists, it is useless for presentists if they want to make their view able to remain (...)
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  31. Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):87-107.
    The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek (...)
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  32. Practical Reasoning and Normative Relevance: A Reply to Ridge and McKeever.Alan Thomas - unknown
    The central concern of McKeever & Ridge’s paper is with whether or not the moral particularist can formulate a defensible distinction between default and non-default reasons. [McKeever & Ridge 2004] But that issue is only of concern to the particularist, they argue, because it allows him or her to avoid a deeper problem, an unacceptable “flattening of the normative landscape”. The particularist ought, McKeever & Ridge claim, to view this corollary of his or her position as a serious embarrassment. (...)
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  33. Triviality Results and the Relationship Between Logical and Natural Languages.Justin Khoo & Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):485-526.
    Inquiry into the meaning of logical terms in natural language (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’) has generally proceeded along two dimensions. On the one hand, semantic theories aim to predict native speaker intuitions about the natural language sentences involving those logical terms. On the other hand, logical theories explore the formal properties of the translations of those terms into formal languages. Sometimes, these two lines of inquiry appear to be in tension: for instance, our best logical investigation into conditional connectives may (...)
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  34. Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
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  35.  39
    Making Sense of Response-Dependence.Eline Busck Gundersen - unknown
    This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter, and response-dependence of (...)
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  36.  48
    What Are the Aims of Science.A. Sloman - 1976 - Radical Philosophy 13:7-17.
    If we are to understand the nature of science, we must see it as an activity and achievement of the human mind alongside others, such as the achievements of children in learning to talk and to cope with people and other objects in their environment, and the achievements of non-scientists living in a rich and complex world which constantly poses problems to be solved. Looking at scientific knowledge as one form of human knowledge, scientific understanding as one form of human (...)
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  37.  9
    Profinite Structures Interpretable in Fields.Krzysztof Krupiński - 2006 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 142 (1):19-54.
    We investigate profinite structures in the sense of Newelski interpretable in fields. We show that profinite structures interpretable in separably closed fields are the same as profinite structures weakly interpretable in . We also find a strong connection with the inverse Galois problem. We give field theoretic constructions of profinite structures weakly interpretable in and satisfying some model theoretic properties, like smallness, m-normality, non-triviality, being -rank 1. For example we interpret in this way the profinite structure consisting of (...)
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  38.  24
    “On a Supposed Right to Lie [to the Public] From Benevolent Motives” Communicating Health Risks to the Public.Darren Shickle - 2000 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 3 (3):241-249.
    There are three main categories of rationale for withholding information or telling lies: if overwhelming harm can only be averted through deceit; complete triviality such that it is irrelevant whether the truth is told; a duty to protect the interests of others. Public health authorities are frequently having to form judgements about the public interest, whether to release information or issue warnings. In June 1992, routine surveillance detected patulin levels (a known carcinogen) in samples of apple juice exceeding safety (...)
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  39. Triviality Arguments Against Functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.
    Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
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  40. The Triviality Argument Against Presentism.Daniel Deasy - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3369-3388.
    Presentism is typically characterised as the thesis that everything is present, and therefore there are no dinosaurs or Martian presidential inaugurations. Putting aside the vexed question of exactly what it is to be present in this context, this thesis seems quite straightforward. However, a number of authors—such as Merricks, Lombard, Meyer, Tallant and Sakon —have argued that Presentism so characterised is either trivially true or false even by Presentist lights. This is the so-called Triviality Argument against Presentism. In this (...)
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  41. Triviality Pursuit.Alan Hájek - 2011 - Topoi 30 (1):3-15.
    The thesis that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities has putatively been refuted many times by so-called ‘triviality results’, although it has also enjoyed a number of resurrections. In this paper I assault it yet again with a new such result. I begin by motivating the thesis and discussing some of the philosophical ramifications of its fluctuating fortunes. I will canvas various reasons, old and new, why the thesis seems plausible, and why we should care about its fate. I (...)
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  42. Razão e irracionalidade na representação do conhecimento.Walter A. Carnielli & Mamede Lima Marques - 1991 - Trans/Form/Ação 14:165-177.
    How is it possible that beginning from the negation of rational thoughts one comes to produce knowledge? This problem, besides its intrinsic interest, acquires a great relevance when the representation of a knowledge is settled, for example, on data and automatic reasoning. Many treatment ways have been tried, as in the case of the non-monotonic logics; logics that intend to formalize an idea of reasoning by default, etc. These attempts are incomplete and are subject to failure. A possible solution (...)
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  43.  92
    Triviality Arguments Reconsidered.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):287-308.
    Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation (...)
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  44. Presentism, Triviality, and the Varieties of Tensism.Peter Ludlow - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:21-36.
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  45.  22
    Superweniencja – Pytanie o Trywialność.Błażej Brzostek - 2011 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (2).
    When it comes to the mind-body problem, different kinds of physicalism were the most popular approaches among philosophers. The presence of anomalous monism with its lack of laws concerning mental events and multiple realizability led to a doubt regarding reductionism and a slow movement away from it. It did not, however, weaken the popularity of physicalism. Thus, the problem that had to be faced was to create such a form of physicalism that would reject the reduction of what (...)
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  46.  8
    Triviality and Interrogative Embedding: Context Sensitivity, Factivity, and Neg-Raising.Clemens Mayr - 2019 - Natural Language Semantics 27 (3):227-278.
    Why do predicates like know embed both declarative and interrogative clauses, whereas closely related ones like believe only embed the former? The standard approach following Grimshaw to this issue has been to specify lexically for each predicate which type of complement clause it can combine with. This view is challenged by predicates such as be certain, which embed interrogative clauses only in certain contexts. To deal with this issue, this paper proposes a novel, unified semantics for declarative and interrogative embedding (...)
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  47. Triviality Results For Probabilistic Modals.Goldstein Simon - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):188-222.
    In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can (...)
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  48.  82
    A Triviality Result for the “Desire by Necessity” Thesis.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2535-2556.
    A triviality result for what Lewis called “the Desire by Necessity Thesis” and Broome : 265–267, 1991) called “the Desire as Expectation Thesis” is presented. The result shows that this thesis and three other reasonable conditions can be jointly satisfied only in trivial cases. Some meta-ethical implications of the result are discussed. The discussion also highlights several issues regarding Lewis ’ original triviality result for “the Desire as Belief Thesis” that have not been properly understood in the literature.
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  49.  12
    Descriptivism in Meta-Ontology of Music: A Plea for Reflective Equilibrium.Lisa Giombini - 2019 - Espes 9 (2):59-73.
    In this paper, I investigate one popular view in current methodological debate about musical ontology, namely, descriptivism. According to descriptivism, the task of musical ontology is to offer a description of the ‘structure of our thought’ about musical works, as it manifests itself in actual musical practices. In this regard, descriptivists often appeal to our pre-theoretical intuitions to ground ontological theories of musical works. This practice, however, is worrisome, as such intuitions are unstable and contradictory. For example, there is a (...)
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  50. The Simplicity of the Simple Approach to Personal Identity.Andrea Sauchelli - 2019 - In Luca Bellotti, Luca Gili, Giacomo Turbanti & Enrico Moriconi (eds.), Third Pisa Colloquium in Logic, Language and Epistemology. Pisa, Province of Pisa, Italy: pp. 347-358.
    I provide a simple solution to the problem of determining the characterising feature(s) of the simple approach to personal identity, sometimes also called the simple view: instead of focusing on claims regarding the analysability, reducibility, or triviality of the concepts used in simple theories of personal identity, I propose instead a metaphysical criterion to define this approach. In particular, I claim that the simple approach is (best seen as) that family of theories according to which personal identity is (...)
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