Results for 'Triviality problem'

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  1.  85
    Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem.Jerzy Gołosz - 2013 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 22 (1):45-61.
    It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the (...)
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  2.  79
    General Terms, Rigidity and the Trivialization Problem.Genoveva Martí & José Martínez-Fernández - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):277 - 293.
    We defend the view that defines the rigidity of general terms as sameness of designated universal across possible worlds from the objection that such a characterization is incapable of distinguishing rigid from non-rigid readings of general terms and, thus, that it trivializes the notion of rigidity. We also argue that previous attempts to offer a solution to the trivialization problem do no succeed.
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  3.  52
    Rigidity for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem.Dan López de Sa - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-13.
    According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid (roughly) if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal (...)
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  4.  27
    General Terms and Rigidity: Another Solution to the Trivialization Problem.Eleonora Orlando - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (1):49-80.
    In this paper I am concerned with the problem of applying the notion of rigidity to general terms. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke has clearly suggested that we should include some general terms among the rigid ones, namely, those common nouns semantically correlated with natural substances, species and phenomena, in general, natural kinds -'water', 'tiger', 'heat'- and some adjectives -'red', 'hot', 'loud'. However, the notion of rigidity has been defined for singular terms; after all, the notion that Kripke has (...)
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  5.  6
    Solving the Triviality Problem in the B-Edition Transcendental Deduction.Tom Vinci - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 471-482.
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  6. Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality.Daan Evers - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some (...)
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  7. Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals.Nate Charlow - 2016 - Noûs 50 (3):533-564.
    I present two Triviality results for Kratzer's standard “restrictor” analysis of indicative conditionals. I both refine and undermine the common claim that problems of Triviality do not arise for Kratzer conditionals since they are not strictly conditionals at all.
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  8.  21
    The Triviality of the Red-Green Problem.Lionel Kenner - 1965 - Analysis 25 (March):147-153.
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  9.  23
    Solving Inductive Reasoning Problems in Mathematics: Not‐so‐Trivial Pursuit.Lisa A. Haverty, Kenneth R. Koedinger, David Klahr & Martha W. Alibali - 2000 - Cognitive Science 24 (2):249-298.
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  10. The triviality of the red-green problem.Lionel Kenner - 1965 - Analysis 25 (4):147.
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  11.  40
    Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands.William Sin - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1):3-15.
    Suppose that people in the affluent countries can easily save the lives of the starving needy in poor countries. Then, three points seem to follow. First, it is wrong for these people not to make the easy rescue . Second, it is wrong to stop making the easy rescue even if they have made many rescues already . Third, if we accept the first two points, the demands of morality are super-extreme. That is, people have to keep making trivial sacrifices (...)
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  12.  95
    Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.
    Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it (...)
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  13. Conditionals, Indeterminacy, and Triviality.Justin Khoo - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):260-287.
    This paper discusses and relates two puzzles for indicative conditionals: a puzzle about indeterminacy and a puzzle about triviality. Both puzzles arise because of Ramsey's Observation, which states that the probability of a conditional is equal to the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent. The puzzle of indeterminacy is the problem of reconciling this fact about conditionals with the fact that they seem to lack truth values at worlds where their antecedents are false. The puzzle of (...)
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  14.  64
    Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization.Dan López de Sa - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):117 - 123.
    The simple proposal for a characterization of general term rigidity is in terms of sameness of designation in very possible world. Critics like Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002) have argued that such a proposal would trivialize rigidity for general terms. Martí (2004) claims that the objection rests on the failure to distinguish what is expressed by a general term and the property designated. I argue here against such a response by showing that the trivialization problem reappears even if one (...)
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  15.  3
    An Attempt to Formalise a Non-Trivial Benchmark Problem in Common Sense Reasoning.Murray Shanahan - 2004 - Artificial Intelligence 153 (1-2):141-165.
  16. The Triviality of the Debate Over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of "Moral".Peter Singer - 1973 - American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1):51-56.
    "THE central problem in moral philosophy is commonly known as the is-ought problem." So runs the opening sentence of the introduction to a recent volume of readings on this issue. [1] Taken as a statement about the preoccupations of moral philosophers of the present century, we can accept this assertion. The problem of how statements of fact are related to moral judgments has dominated recent moral philosophy. Associated with this problem is another, which has also been (...)
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  17.  20
    Computing K-Trivial Sets by Incomplete Random Sets.Laurent Bienvenu, Adam R. Day, Noam Greenberg, Antonín Kučera, Joseph S. Miller, André Nies & Dan Turetsky - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):80-90.
    EveryK-trivial set is computable from an incomplete Martin-Löf random set, i.e., a Martin-Löf random set that does not compute the halting problem.
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  18.  23
    The Nontriviality of Trivial General Covariance: How Electrons Restrict ‘Time’ Coordinates, Spinors Fit Into Tensor Calculus, and of a Tetrad is Surplus Structure.J. Brian Pitts - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (1):1-24.
    It is a commonplace in the philosophy of physics that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions, such as electrons, is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky and Polubarinov constructed (...)
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  19. The Problem of the Many.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2016.
    As anyone who has flown out of a cloud knows, the boundaries of a cloud are a lot less sharp up close than they can appear on the ground. Even when it seems clearly true that there is one, sharply bounded, cloud up there, really there are thousands of water droplets that are neither determinately part of the cloud, nor determinately outside it. Consider any object that consists of the core of the cloud, plus an arbitrary selection of these droplets. (...)
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  20.  31
    The Nontriviality of Trivial General Covariance: How Electrons Restrict ‘Time’ Coordinates, Spinors Fit Into Tensor Calculus, and of a Tetrad is Surplus Structure.J. Brian Pitts - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (1):1-24.
    It is a commonplace in the philosophy of physics that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions, such as electrons, is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky and Polubarinov constructed (...)
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  21.  20
    The Nontriviality of Trivial General Covariance: How Electrons Restrict 'Time' Coordinates, Spinors (Almost) Fit Into Tensor Calculus, and of a Tetrad is Surplus Structure.J. Brian Pitts - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (1):1-24.
    It is a commonplace in the philosophy of physics that any local physical theory can be represented using arbitrary coordinates, simply by using tensor calculus. On the other hand, the physics literature often claims that spinors \emph{as such} cannot be represented in coordinates in a curved space-time. These commonplaces are inconsistent. What general covariance means for theories with fermions, such as electrons, is thus unclear. In fact both commonplaces are wrong. Though it is not widely known, Ogievetsky and Polubarinov constructed (...)
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  22.  19
    Reputation Among Logicians as Being Essentially Trivial. I Hope to Convince the Reader That It Presents Some of the Most Challenging and Intriguing Problems in Modern Logic. Although the Problem of the Complexity of Propositional Proofs is Very Natural, It has Been Investigated Systematically Only Since the Late 1960s. [REVIEW]Alasdair Urquhart - 1995 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):425-467.
    §1. Introduction. The classical propositional calculus has an undeserved reputation among logicians as being essentially trivial. I hope to convince the reader that it presents some of the most challenging and intriguing problems in modern logic. Although the problem of the complexity of propositional proofs is very natural, it has been investigated systematically only since the late 1960s. Interest in the problem arose from two fields connected with computers, automated theorem proving and computational complexity theory. The earliest paper (...)
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  23.  14
    X1. Introduction. The Classical Propositional Calculus has an Undeserved Reputation Among Logicians as Being Essentially Trivial. I Hope to Convince the Reader That It Presents Some of the Most Challenging and Intriguing Problems in Modern Logic. Although the Problem of the Complexity of Propositional Proofs is Very. [REVIEW]Alasdair Urquhart - 1995 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):425-467.
    §1. Introduction. The classical propositional calculus has an undeserved reputation among logicians as being essentially trivial. I hope to convince the reader that it presents some of the most challenging and intriguing problems in modern logic. Although the problem of the complexity of propositional proofs is very natural, it has been investigated systematically only since the late 1960s. Interest in the problem arose from two fields connected with computers, automated theorem proving and computational complexity theory. The earliest paper (...)
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  24.  16
    A State of Belief K If and Only If the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A Also Requires Accepting C. The Preservation Criterion Says That If a Prop-Osition B is Accepted in a Given State of Belief K and A is Consistent with the Beliefs in K, Then B is Still Accepted in the Minimal Change of K Needed to Accept A. It is Proved That, on Pain of Triviality, the Ramsey Test And.No Problem far Actualism - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (235).
  25.  51
    Trivial and Non-Trivial (yet Difficult) Physicalism.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2015 - Philosophical Inquiries 3 (1):29-38.
    According to physicalism, everything is physical, namely there are no entities (or no more restricted sorts of entities) that are not physical. In this paper, I shall examine the truth of this thesis by presenting a triviality objection against physicalism that is somehow similar to the one advanced against presentism. Firstly, I shall distinguish between two different definitions of the physical (roughly, every entity is physical-1 iff it has some feature F, such as impenetrability or exact spatio-temporal location, while (...)
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  26.  17
    The “Trivial Neuron Doctrine” is Not Trivial.Dale Jamieson - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):841-842.
    I argue that the trivial neuron doctrine as characterized by Gold & Stoljar is not trivial; it appears to be inconsistent with property dualism as well as some forms of functionalism and externalism. I suggest that the problem is not so much with the particular way in which Gold & Stoljar draw the distinction as with the unruliness of the distinction itself. Their failure to see this may be why they misunderstand the views of the Churchlands.
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  27. Trivial Languages.Arvid Båve - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):1-17.
    I here present and defend what I call the Triviality Theory of Truth, to be understood in analogy with Matti Eklund’s Inconsistency Theory of Truth. A specific formulation of is defended and compared with alternatives found in the literature. A number of objections against the proposed notion of meaning-constitutivity are discussed and held inconclusive. The main focus, however, is on the problem, discussed at length by Gupta and Belnap, that speakers do not accept epistemically neutral conclusions of Curry (...)
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  28. Reply to Mr Kenner's the Triviality of the Red-Green Problem.Colin Radford - 1965 - Analysis 25 (June):207-208.
     
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  29.  30
    No Problem of Consistent Incompatible Desires: a Reply to Baumann.Daniel Coren - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):465-474.
    In a brief and deeply interesting 2017 Acta Analytica paper, Peter Baumann argues that there are cases of necessarily incompatible but mutually consistent desires, that this is a common problem, and that there is no solution in sight. I’ll argue that Baumann fails to note certain non-trivial assumptions that must be made for the possibility of consistent incompatible desires; if consistent incompatible desires do exist then they’re sometimes beneficial; and if they are sometimes involved with problematic outcomes then the (...)
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  30. The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S6):1-18.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll (...)
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  31.  82
    The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information.Marie Duží - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (5):473 - 510.
    The classical theory of semantic information (ESI), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. This problem is connected with Cohen and Nagel's paradox of inference: Since the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in (...)
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  32.  2
    Exact Pairs for the Ideal of the K-Trivial Sequences in the Turing Degrees.George Barmpalias & Rod G. Downey - 2014 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 79 (3):676-692.
    TheK-trivial sets form an ideal in the Turing degrees, which is generated by its computably enumerable members and has an exact pair below the degree of the halting problem. The question of whether it has an exact pair in the c.e. degrees was first raised in [22, Question 4.2] and later in [25, Problem 5.5.8].We give a negative answer to this question. In fact, we show the following stronger statement in the c.e. degrees. There exists aK-trivial degreedsuch that (...)
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  33.  53
    Believing More, Risking Less: On Coherence, Truth and Non-Trivial Extensions.Luc Bovens & Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):137 - 150.
    If you believe more things you thereby run a greater risk of being in error than if you believe fewer things. From the point of view of avoiding error, it is best not to believe anything at all, or to have very uncommitted beliefs. But considering the fact that we all in fact do entertain many specific beliefs, this recommendation is obviously in flagrant dissonance with our actual epistemic practice. Let us call the problem raised by this apparent conflict (...)
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  34. The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion.Stephen Carter, William Dean, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Robin W. Lovin & Cornel West - 1997 - Journal of Religious Ethics 25 (2):367-392.
    Recent critics have called attention to the alienation of contemporary academics from broad currents of intellectual activity in public culture. The general complaint is that intellectuals are finding a professional home in institutions of higher learning, insulated from the concerns and interests of a wider reading audience. The demands of professional expertise do not encourage academics to work as public intellectuals or to take up social, literary, or political matters in imaginative and perspicuous ways. More problematic is the relative absence (...)
     
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  35. Does Quantum Mechanics Play a Non-Trivial Role in Life?P. C. W. Davies - unknown
    There have been many claims that quantum mechanics plays a key role in the origin and/or operation of biological organisms, beyond merely providing the basis for the shapes and sizes of biological molecules and their chemical affinities. These range from Schr¨odinger’s suggestion that quantum fluctuations produce mutations, to Hameroff and Penrose’s conjecture that quantum coherence in microtubules is linked to consciousness. I review some of these claims in this paper, and discuss the serious problem of decoherence. I advance some (...)
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  36.  42
    Hilbert, Trivialization and Paraconsistent Logic.Andrés Bobenrieth - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:37-43.
    The origin of Paraconsistent Logic is closely related with the argument that from the assertion of two mutually contradictory statements any other statement can be deduced, which can be referred to as ex contradict!one sequitur quodlibet (ECSQ). Despite its medieval origin, only in the 1930s did it become the main reason for the unfeasibility of having contradictions in a deductive system. The purpose of this paper is to study what happened before: from Principia Mathematica to that time, when it became (...)
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  37.  8
    The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1151-1168.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll (...)
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  38. Is There a Supervenience Problem for Robust Moral Realism?Jamie Dreier - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1391-1408.
    The paper describes the problem for robust moral realism of explaining the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, and examines five objections to the argument: The moral does not supervene on the descriptive, because we may owe different obligations to duplicates. If the supervenience thesis is repaired to block, it becomes trivial and easy to explain. Supervenience is a moral doctrine and should get an explanation from within normative ethics rather than metaethics. Supervenience is a conceptual truth and (...)
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  39. The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals.David Etlin - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688.
    I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 (...)
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  40.  72
    Problems with the Deductivist Image of Scientific Reasoning.Philip Catton - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):473.
    There seem to be some very good reasons for a philosopher of science to be a deductivist about scientific reasoning. Deductivism is apparently connected with a demand for clarity and definiteness in the reconstruction of scientists' reasonings. And some philosophers even think that deductivism is the way around the problem of induction. But the deductivist image is challenged by cases of actual scientific reasoning, in which hard-to-state and thus discursively ill-defined elements of thought nonetheless significantly condition what practitioners accept (...)
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  41. Symplectic Reduction and the Problem of Time in Nonrelativistic Mechanics.Karim P. Y. Thébault - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):789-824.
    Symplectic reduction is a formal process through which degeneracy within the mathematical representations of physical systems displaying gauge symmetry can be controlled via the construction of a reduced phase space. Typically such reduced spaces provide us with a formalism for representing both instantaneous states and evolution uniquely and for this reason can be justifiably afforded the status of fun- damental dynamical arena - the otiose structure having been eliminated from the original phase space. Essential to the application of symplectic reduction (...)
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  42.  20
    Is the Public's Ignorance of Politics Trivial?Stephen Earl Bennett - 2003 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 15 (3-4):307-337.
    Abstract Examination of a comprehensive database of political knowledge, constructed from pooled 1988 and 1992 National Election Studies, refutes criticisms that haue sometimes been lodged against standard tests that seem to reveal profound levels of public ignorance. Although most people know something about politics, the typical citizen is poorly informed, and only a small group is very knowledgeable about politics. Differentiating people according to their perceptions of the most important national problem does not reveal pockets of well?informed ?issue publics? (...)
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  43. Warranting the Use of Causal Claims: A Non-Trivial Case for Interdisciplinarity.Menno Rol & Nancy Cartwright - 2012 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 27 (2):189-202.
    To what use can causal claims established in good policy studies be put? We isolate two reasons inferences from study to target fail. First, policy variables do not produce results on their own; they need helping factors. The distribution of helping factors is likely to be unique or local for each study, so one cannot expect external validity to be all that common. Second, researchers often give too concrete a description of the cause in the study for it to carry (...)
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  44.  16
    Warranting the Use of Causal Claims: A Non-Trivial Case for Interdisciplinarity.Menno Rol & Nancy Cartwright - 2012 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 27 (2):189-202.
    To what use can causal claims established in good studies be put? We give examples of studies from which inaccurate inferences were made about target policy situations. The usual diagnosis is that the studies in question lack external validity, which means that the same results do not hold in the target as in study. That’s a label that just repeats what we already knew. We offer a deeper analysis. Our analysis points to the need for interdisciplinarity and to the demand (...)
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  45.  96
    The Over-Generalization Problem: Predicates Rigidly Signifying the "Unnatural".Dan López de Sa - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):263 - 272.
    According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such (...)
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  46. There is a Problem of Change.Michael Raven - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):23-35.
    Impostors are pseudo-problems masquerading as genuine problems. Impostors should be exposed. The problem of change appears genuine. But some, such as Hofweber ( 2009 ) and Rychter ( 2009 ), have recently denounced it as an impostor. They allege that it is mysterious how to answer the meta - problem of saying what problem it is: for even if any problem is genuinely about change per se, they argue, it is either empirical or trivially dissolved by (...)
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  47.  27
    The Problem with Methodological Pragmatism.Mark A. Michael - 2012 - Environmental Ethics 34 (2):135-157.
    Methodological pragmatists argue that, given the dire state of the environment, the primary goal of environmentalists, including philosophers who work in environmental ethics, must be to work together to ensure that environmentally friendly policies are put into place. They must set aside their differences and not argue over their competing theoretical justifications of environmental policies, as that contributes to divisiveness among environmentalists and prevents this cooperation from occurring. The proposal to ignore disagreements over theory gets cashed out in three distinct (...)
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  48. Coincidence Avoidance and Formulating the Access Problem.Sharon Berry - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article, I discuss a trivialization worry for Hartry Field’s official formulation of the access problem for mathematical realists, which was pointed out by Øystein Linnebo (and has recently been made much of by Justin Clarke-Doane). I argue that various attempted reformulations of the Benacerraf problem fail to block trivialization, but that access worriers can better defend themselves by sticking closer to Hartry Field’s initial informal characterization of the access problem in terms of (something like) general (...)
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  49.  12
    On Some Non-Trivial Implications of the View That Good Explanations Increase Our Understanding of Explained Phenomena.Lilia Gurova - 2017 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):45-52.
    The central argument in this paper is the following: if we agree that one of the aims of explanation is to provide or increase understanding, and if we assess understanding on the basis of the inferences one can draw from the knowledge of the phenomenon which is understood, then the value of an explanation, i.e. its capacity to provide or increase understanding of the explained phenomenon, should be assessed on the basis of the extra-inferences which this explanation allows for. The (...)
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    Charity and the Reiteration Problem for Enthymemes.Dale Jacquette - 1996 - Informal Logic 18 (1).
    Any enthymeme can be made logically valid by adding as a suppressed premise a conditional that reiterates the argument's stated content and inferential structure in if-then form, We cannot blanketly prohibit reiteration to avoid this sort of trivialization, because some enthymemes legitimately require completion by reiterative conditionals, The solution proposed here is to allow reiterative expansions, but to rank them, other things being equal, as less charitable than nonreiterative expansions. Reiterative expansions can then be chosen as the most charitable only (...)
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