Results for 'True Antecedents'

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  1.  44
    True Antecedents.Michael McDermott - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):333-335.
    In this note I discuss what seems to be a new kind of counterexample to Lewis’s account of counterfactuals. A coin is to be tossed twice. I bet on ‘Two heads’, and I win. Common sense says that (1) is false. But Lewis’s theory says that it is true. (1) If at least one head had come up, I would have won.
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  2. Possible World Semantics and True-True Counterfactuals.Lee Walters - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):322-346.
    The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting (...)
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  3. An Argument for Conjunction Conditionalization.Lee Walters & Robert Williams - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):573-588.
    Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction (...)
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  4. The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):276-285.
    Early commentators on David Lewis's account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis's account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis's account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, (...)
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  5.  42
    Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, True Premises, and Knowledge.Igal Kvart - 1994 - Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164.
    In this paper I explore the ambiguity that arises between two readings of the counterfactual construction, then–d and thel–p, analyzed in my bookA Theory of Counterfactuals. I then extend the analysis I offered there to counterfactuals with true antecedents, and offer a more precise formulation of the conception of temporal divergence points used in thel–p interpretation. Finally, I discuss some ramifications of these issues for counterfactual analyses of knowledge.
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  6.  6
    Reasoned Ethical Engagement: Ethical Values of Consumers as Primary Antecedents of Instrumental Actions Towards Multinationals.Maxwell Chipulu, Alasdair Marshall, Udechukwu Ojiako & Caroline Mota - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 147 (1):221-238.
    Consumer actions towards multinationals encompass not just expressions of dissatisfaction and ethical identity but also what are problematically termed ‘instrumental actions’ entailing perceived purposes and likely impacts. This term may seem inappropriate where insufficient information exists for instrumentally linking means to ends, yet we consider it useful for describing purposive consumer action in its subjective aspect because it reflects the psychological reality whereby complexity-reducing social constructions give consumer actions instrumentally rational form for purposes of meaningful understanding and justification. This paper (...)
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  7. Impossible Antecedents and Their Consequences: Some Thirteenth-Century Arabic Discussions.Khaled El-Rouayheb - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (3):209-225.
    The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a necessarily true proposition is implied by any proposition, was apparently first propounded in twelfth century Latin logic, and came to be widely, though not universally, accepted in the fourteenth century. These principles seem never to have been accepted, or even seriously entertained, by Arabic logicians. In the present study, I explore some thirteenth century Arabic discussions of conditionals with impossible antecedents. The Persian-born scholar Afdal al-Dīn (...)
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  8. Reply to Ahmed.Lee Walters - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):123-133.
    I reply to Ahmed’s rejection (2011) of my argument (Walters 2009) that all counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents are themselves true.
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  9.  38
    Counterfactuals for Consequentialists.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (2):103 - 125.
    That all subjunctive conditionals with true antecedents and trueconsequents are themselves also true is implied by every plausibleand popularly endorsed account. But I am wary of endorsing thisimplication. I argue that all presently endorsed accounts fail tocapture the nature of certain subjunctive conditionals in contextsof consequentialist reasoning. I attempt to show that we must allowfor the possibility that some subjunctive conditionals with trueantecedents and true consequents are false, if we are to believethat certain types of straightforward (...)
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  10.  35
    How Reaction Time Measures Elucidate the Matching Bias and the Way Negations Are Processed.Jérôme Prado & Ira A. Noveck - 2006 - Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):309 – 328.
    Matching bias refers to the non-normative performance that occurs when elements mentioned in a rule do not correspond with those in a test item. One aim of the present work is to capture matching bias via reaction times as participants carry out truth-table evaluation tasks. Experiment 1 requires participants to verify conditional rules, and Experiment 2 to falsify them as the paradigm employs four types of conditional sentences that systematically rotate negatives in the antecedent and consequent; and presents predominantly cases (...)
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  11. Remarks on Counterpossibles.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
    Since the publication of David Lewis’ Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’ is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis’ semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant (...)
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  12. Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–C.Tamer Nawar - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1052-1070.
    This paper examines a passage in the Theaetetus where Plato distinguishes knowledge from true belief by appealing to the example of a jury hearing a case. While the jurors may have true belief, Socrates puts forward two reasons why they cannot achieve knowledge. The reasons for this nescience have typically been taken to be in tension with each other . This paper proposes a solution to the putative difficulty by arguing that what links the two cases of nescience (...)
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  13. Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment.George E. Newman, Julian De Freitas & Joshua Knobe - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (1):96-125.
    Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about what a person values, whether a person is happy, whether a person has shown weakness of will, and whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these (...)
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  14. Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures.Julian De Freitas, Hagop Sarkissian, George E. Newman, Igor Grossmann, Felipe De Brigard, Andres Luco & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (S1):134-160.
    People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To (...)
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  15. Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals.R. Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that (...)
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  16. On Counterpossibles.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (2):1-27.
    The traditional Lewis–Stalnaker semantics treats all counterfactuals with an impossible antecedent as trivially or vacuously true. Many have regarded this as a serious defect of the semantics. For intuitively, it seems, counterfactuals with impossible antecedents—counterpossibles—can be non-trivially true and non-trivially false. Whereas the counterpossible "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then the mathematical community at the time would have been surprised" seems true, "If Hobbes had squared the circle, then sick children in the mountains of Afghanistan (...)
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  17. Counterpossibles.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):357-368.
    The paper clarifies and defends the orthodox view that counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents are vacuously true against recent criticisms. It argues that apparent counterexamples to orthodoxy result from uncritical reliance on a fallible heuristic used in the processing of conditionals. A comparison is developed between such counterpossibles and vacuously true universal generalizations.
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  18.  19
    To Believe is to Believe True.Howard Sankey - forthcoming - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology.
    It is argued that to believe is to believe true. That is, when one believes a proposition one thereby believes the proposition to be true. This is a point about what it is to believe rather than about the aim of belief or the standard of correctness for belief. The point that to believe is to believe true appears to be an analytic truth about the concept of belief. It also appears to be essential to the state (...)
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  19. Against Hypothetical Syllogism.Lee Walters - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (5):979-997.
    The debate over Hypothetical Syllogism is locked in stalemate. Although putative natural language counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism abound, many philosophers defend Hypothetical Syllogism, arguing that the alleged counterexamples involve an illicit shift in context. The proper lesson to draw from the putative counterexamples, they argue, is that natural language conditionals are context-sensitive conditionals which obey Hypothetical Syllogism. In order to make progress on the issue, I consider and improve upon Morreau’s proof of the invalidity of Hypothetical Syllogism. The improved proof (...)
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  20.  72
    Individual and Organizational Antecedents of Misconduct in Organizations.Nicole Andreoli & Joel Lefkowitz - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 85 (3):309-332.
    A heterogeneous survey sample of for-profit, non-profit and government employees revealed that organizational factors but not personal characteristics were significant antecedents of misconduct and job satisfaction. Formal organizational compliance practices and ethical climate were independent predictors of misconduct, and compliance practices also moderated the relationship between ethical climate and misconduct, as well as between pressure to compromise ethical standards and misconduct. Misconduct was not predicted by level of moral reasoning, age, sex, ethnicity, job status, or size and type of (...)
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  21. True Detective: Buddhism, Pessimism or Philosophy?Finn Janning - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 4 (4).
    The aim of this paper is to raise two questions. The first question is: How is pessimism related to Buddhism (and vice versa)? The second question is: What relation does an immanent philosophy have to pessimism and Buddhism, if any? Using True Detective, an American television crime drama, as my point of departure, first I will outline some of the likenesses between Buddhism and pessimism. At the same time, I will show how the conduct of one of the main (...)
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  22. Counterpossibles in Science: The Case of Relative Computability.Matthias Jenny - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):530-560.
    I develop a theory of counterfactuals about relative computability, i.e. counterfactuals such as 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then the halting problem would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is true, and 'If the validity problem were algorithmically decidable, then arithmetical truth would also be algorithmically decidable,' which is false. These counterfactuals are counterpossibles, i.e. they have metaphysically impossible antecedents. They thus pose a challenge to the orthodoxy about counterfactuals, which would treat them as uniformly true. (...)
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  23.  33
    Peers Versus National Culture: An Analysis of Antecedents to Ethical Decision-Making.James W. Westerman, Rafik I. Beekun, Yvonne Stedham & Jeanne Yamamura - 2007 - Journal of Business Ethics 75 (3):239-252.
    Given the recent ethics scandals in the United States, there has been a renewed focus on understanding the antecedents to ethical decision-making in the research literature. Since ethical norms and standards of behavior are not universally consistent, an individual’s choice of referent may exert a large influence on his/her ethical decision-making. This study used a social identity theory lens to empirically examine the relative influence of the macro- and micro-level variables of national culture and peers on an individual’s intention (...)
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  24. An Extended Lewis-Stalnaker Semantics and The New Problem of Counterpossibles.Jeffrey Goodman - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):35-66.
    Closest-possible-world analyses of counterfactuals suffer from what has been called the ‘problem of counterpossibles’: some counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents seem plainly false, but the proposed analyses imply that they are all (vacuously) true. One alleged solution to this problem is the addition of impossible worlds. In this paper, I argue that the closest possible or impossible world analyses that have recently been suggested suffer from the ‘new problem of counterpossibles’: the proposed analyses imply that some plainly (...) counterpossibles (viz., ‘counterlogicals’) are false. After motivating and presenting the ‘new problem’, I give reasons to think that the most plausible objection to my argument is not compelling. (shrink)
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  25. Laws and Their Stability.Marc Lange - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):415Ð432.
    Many philosophers have believed that the laws of nature differ from the accidental truths in their invariance under counterfactual perturbations. Roughly speaking, the laws would still have held had q been the case, for any q that is consistent with the laws. (Trivially, no accident would still have held under every such counterfactual supposition.) The main problem with this slogan (even if it is true) is that it uses the laws themselves to delimit qs range. I present a means (...)
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  26. Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?Michael Hannon - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1069-1076.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is (...)
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  27.  63
    Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan.Rik Peels - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):345-355.
    In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that ignorance is (...)
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  28. Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge (...)
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  29. ¿Una creencia verdadera justificada es conocimiento? [Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?].Edmund L. Gettier & Paulo Vélez León - 2013 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 2 (3):185-193.
    [ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, (1963) by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».
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  30. A Counterfactual Account of Essence.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - forthcoming - The Reasoner.
    Kit Fine (1994. “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives 8: 1-16) argues that the standard modal account of essence as de re modality is ‘fundamentally misguided’ (p. 3). We agree with his critique and suggest an alternative counterfactual analysis of essence. As a corollary, our counterfactual account lends support to non-vacuism the thesis that counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are not always vacuously true.
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  31.  67
    Too Good to Be “Just True”.Marcus Rossberg - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-8.
    Paraconsistent and dialetheist approaches to a theory of truth are faced with a problem: the expressive resources of the logic do not suffice to express that a sentence is just true—i.e., true and not also false—or to express that a sentence is consistent. In his recent book, Spandrels of Truth, Jc Beall proposes a ‘just true’-operator to identify sentences that are true and not also false. Beall suggests seven principles that a ‘just true’-operator must fulfill, (...)
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  32. Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief.Pierre le Morvan - 2011 - Theoria 77 (1):32-41.
    Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss (...)
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  33.  13
    The Defective Conditional in Mathematics.Mathieu Vidal - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):169-179.
    This article focuses on defective conditionals ? namely indicative conditionals whose antecedents are false and whose truth-values therefore cannot be determined. The problem is to decide which formal connective can adequately represent this usage. Classical logic renders defective conditionals true whereas traditional mathematics dismisses them as irrelevant. This difference in treatment entails that, at the propositional level, classical logic validates some sentences that are intuitively false in plane geometry. With two proofs, I show that the same flaw is (...)
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  34. Williamson on Counterpossibles.Joe Salerno & Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - The Reasoner.
    Lewis/Stalnaker semantics has it that all counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. Non-vacuism, by contrast, says the truth-values of counterpossibles are affected by the truth-values of the consequents. Some counterpossibles are true, some false. Williamson objects to non-vacuism. He asks us to consider someone who answered ‘11’ to ‘What is 5 + 7?’ but who mistakenly believes that he answered ‘13’. For the non-vacuist, (1) is false, (2) true: (1) If 5 + (...)
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  35.  12
    Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio‐Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the (...)
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  36.  90
    Counterpossibles and the Nature of Impossible Worlds.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen - 2016 - SATS 17 (2):145-158.
    One well-known objection to the traditional Lewis-Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals is that it delivers counterintuitive semantic verdicts for many counterpossibles (counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents). To remedy this problem, several authors have proposed extending the set of possible worlds by impossible worlds at which necessary falsehoods may be true. Linguistic ersatz theorists often construe impossible worlds as maximal, inconsistent sets of sentences in some sufficiently expressive language. However, in a recent paper, Bjerring (2014) argues that the “extended” Lewis-Stalnaker (...)
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  37.  97
    The Aesthetic Relevance of Empirical Findings.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Kongress-Akten der Deutschen Gesellschaft Für Ästhetik 2:1-21.
    Empirical findings may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation in at least two ways. First — within criticism — they may help us to identify the aesthetic value of objects. Second— whithin philosophy — they may help us to decide which theory of aesthetic value and evaluation to prefer. In this paper, I address both kinds of relevance. My focus is thereby on empirical evidence gathered, not by means of first-personal experiences, but by means of third-personal scientific investigations of individual artworks (...)
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  38.  71
    The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism.JEAN-PAUL VESSEL - 2007 - Theoria 73 (1):46 - 67.
    Theorists have consistently maintained that the most plausible forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic if and only if indeterminism is true. This standard position, however popular, lacks sufficient motivation. Assume determinism to be true and an attempt will be made to show that attractive forms of objective consequentialism must be probabilistic - and not for reasons related to our epistemic limitations either. -/- Here it is argued that all extant objective formulations of consequentialism fail to deliver the (...)
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  39. Hale's Dilemma.Daniel Nolan - manuscript
    Bob Hale in Hale 1995b posed a dilemma for modal fictionalism (more specifically, Rosen's version of modal fictionalism). A modal fictionalist who maintains the version outlined in Rosen 1990 believes that the fiction of possible worlds (PW, to use Rosen and Hale's abbreviation) is not literally true. The question arises, however, about its modal status. Is it necessarily false, or contingently false? In either case, Hale argues, the modal fictionalist is in trouble. Should the modal fictionalist claim that the (...)
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  40. A Very Large Fly in the Ointment: Davidsonian Truth Theory Contextualized.Mark Sainsbury - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning.
    one hand, it raises fundamental doubts about the Davidsonian project, which seems to involve isolating specifically semantic knowledge from any other knowledge or skill in a way reflected by the ideal of homophony. Indexicality forces a departure from this ideal, and so from the aspiration of deriving the truth conditions of an arbitrary utterance on the basis simply of axioms which could hope to represent purely semantic knowledge. In defence of Davidson, I argue that once his original idea for dealing (...)
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  41.  62
    Linguistic-Pragmatic Factors in Interpreting Disjunctions.Ira A. Noveck, Gennaro Chierchia, Florelle Chevaux, Raphaelle Guelminger & Emmanuel Sylvestre - 2002 - Thinking and Reasoning 8 (4):297 – 326.
    The connective or can be treated as an inclusive disjunction or else as an exclusive disjunction. Although researchers are aware of this distinction, few have examined the conditions under which each interpretation should be anticipated. Based on linguistic-pragmatic analyses, we assume that interpretations are initially inclusive before either (a) remaining so, or (b) becoming exclusive by way of an implicature ( but not both ). We point to a class of situations that ought to predispose disjunctions to inclusive interpretations and (...)
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  42.  47
    Corporeal Substances and True Unities.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4 (2):9-10.
    In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.
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  43.  54
    Breaking de Morgan's Law in Counterfactual Antecedents.Lucas Champollion, Ivano Ciardelli & Linmin Zhang - manuscript
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between the meaning of a sentence and its truth conditions. We report on a comprehension experiment on counterfactual conditionals, based on a context in which a light is controlled by two switches. Our main finding is that the truth-conditionally equivalent clauses (i) "switch A or switch B is down" and (ii) "switch A and switch B are not both up" make different semantic contributions when embedded in a conditional antecedent. (...)
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  44.  17
    Fragments of Arithmetic and True Sentences.Andrés Cordón-Franco, Alejandro Fernández-Margarit & F. Félix Lara-Martín - 2005 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 51 (3):313-328.
    By a theorem of R. Kaye, J. Paris and C. Dimitracopoulos, the class of the Πn+1-sentences true in the standard model is the only consistent Πn+1-theory which extends the scheme of induction for parameter free Πn+1-formulas. Motivated by this result, we present a systematic study of extensions of bounded quantifier complexity of fragments of first-order Peano Arithmetic. Here, we improve that result and show that this property describes a general phenomenon valid for parameter free schemes. As a consequence, we (...)
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  45.  58
    Chrysippus's Response to Diodorus's Master Argument.Harry Ide - 1992 - History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):133-148.
    Chrysippus claims that some propositions perish. including some true conditionals whose consequent is impossible and antecedent is possible, to which he appeals against Diodorus?s Master Argument. On the standard interpretation. perished propositions lack truth values. and these conditionals are true at the same time as their antecedents arc possible and consequents impossible. But perished propositions are false, and Chrysippus?s conditionals are true when their antecedent and consequent arc possible, and false when their antecedent is possible and (...)
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  46.  22
    Why to Believe Weakly in Weak Knowledge: Goldman on Knowledge as Mere True Belief.Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):19-40.
    In a series of influential papers and in his groundbreaking book Knowledge in a Social World Alvin Goldman argues that sometimes “know” just means “believe truly” (Goldman 1999; 2001; 2002b; Goldman & Olsson 2009). I argue that Goldman's (and Olsson's) case for “weak knowledge”, as well as a similar argument put forth by John Hawthorne, are unsuccessful. However, I also believe that Goldman does put his finger on an interesting and important phenomenon. He alerts us to the fact that sometimes (...)
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  47.  47
    Modal Fictionalism and Compositionality.Josh Dever - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (3):223 - 251.
    Modal fictionalists propose to defuse the unwanted ontological commitments of modal realism by treating modal realism as a fictional story, and modal assertions as assertions, prefixed by a fictionalist operator, that something is true in that story. However, consideration of conditionals with modal antecedents raises the problem ofembedding, which shows that the simple prefixing strategy cannotsucceed. A compositional version of the fictionalist strategy isdeveloped and critiqued, and some general semantic morals aredrawn from the failures of both strategies.
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  48.  5
    On the Pragmatic Approach to Counterpossibles.Maciej Sendłak - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-10.
    Nina Emery and Christopher Hill proposed a pragmatic approach toward the debate about counterpossibles—i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. The core of this approach is to move the burden of the problem from the notion of truth value into the notion of assertion. This is meant to explain our pre-theoretical intuitions about counterpossibles while claiming that each and every counterpossible is vacuously true. The aim of this paper is to indicate a problematic aspect of this view.
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  49. Spanish de-Clauses Are Not Always in the Right Mood.Luis Alonso-Ovalle - manuscript
    The benchmark theory of conditionals maintains that conditionals quantify over a contextually restricted domain of worlds (Kratzer 1991). They are modal statements. The antecedent contributes to the interpretation of the whole conditional a proposition, a set of worlds. Conditionals quantify over a contextually restricted domain of worlds in which the proposition that the antecedent expresses is true. This is all antecedents do. In particular, the semantic import of its tense and mood inflection is neglected: it is - at (...)
     
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  50.  35
    The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia.Christopher B. Gray (ed.) - 1999 - Garland.
    For the first time, full coverage of the intersections of philosophy and law From articles centering on the detailed and doctrinal exposition of the law to those which reside almost wholly within the realm of philosophical ethics, this volume affords comprehensive treatment to both sides of the philosophicolegal equation. Systematic and sustained coverage of the many dimensions of legal thought gives ample expression to the true breadth and depth of the philosophy of law, with coverage of: *The modes of (...)
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