Results for 'True belief'

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  1. Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–C.Tamer Nawar - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (6):1052-1070.
    This paper examines a passage in the Theaetetus where Plato distinguishes knowledge from true belief by appealing to the example of a jury hearing a case. While the jurors may have true belief, Socrates puts forward two reasons why they cannot achieve knowledge. The reasons for this nescience have typically been taken to be in tension with each other . This paper proposes a solution to the putative difficulty by arguing that what links the two cases (...)
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  2. Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information?Michael Hannon - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):1069-1076.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view (...)
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  3.  53
    Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan.Rik Peels - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):345-355.
    In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and factive ignorance. Finally, I provide two arguments in favor of the thesis that (...)
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  4.  6
    Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the TrueBelief Default.Paula Rubio‐Fernández - 2015 - Cognitive Science 40 (4).
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention (...)
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  5. Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief.Pierre le Morvan - 2011 - Theoria 77 (1):32-41.
    Suppose that knowledge and ignorance are complements in the sense of being mutually exclusive: for person S and fact p, either S knows that p or is ignorant that p. Understood in this way, ignorance amounts to a lack or absence of knowledge: S is ignorant that p if and only if it is not the case that S knows that p. Let us call the thesis that knowledge and ignorance are opposites the “Complement Thesis”. In this article, I discuss (...)
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    Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the TrueBelief Default.Paula Rubio‐Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention (...)
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  7.  21
    Why to Believe Weakly in Weak Knowledge: Goldman on Knowledge as Mere True Belief.Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):19-40.
    In a series of influential papers and in his groundbreaking book Knowledge in a Social World Alvin Goldman argues that sometimes “know” just means “believe truly” (Goldman 1999; 2001; 2002b; Goldman & Olsson 2009). I argue that Goldman's (and Olsson's) case for “weak knowledge”, as well as a similar argument put forth by John Hawthorne, are unsuccessful. However, I also believe that Goldman does put his finger on an interesting and important phenomenon. He alerts us to the fact that sometimes (...)
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  8.  32
    ¿Una creencia verdadera justificada es conocimiento? [Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?].Edmund L. Gettier & Paulo Vélez León - 2013 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 2 (3):185-193.
    [ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, (1963) by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».
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  9. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? / ¿Una creencia verdadera justificada es conocimiento?Edmund L. Gettier - 2013 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 2 (3):185--193.
    [ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».
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  10. True Belief Belies False Belief: Recent Findings of Competence in Infants and Limitations in 5-Year-Olds, and Implications for Theory of Mind Development.Joseph A. Hedger & William V. Fabricius - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):429-447.
    False belief tasks have enjoyed a monopoly in the research on children?s development of a theory of mind. They have been granted this status because they promise to deliver an unambiguous assessment of children?s understanding of the representational nature of mental states. Their poor cousins, true belief tasks, have been relegated to occasional service as control tasks. That this is their only role has been due to the universal assumption that correct answers on true belief (...)
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  11. A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Allan Hazlett challenges the philosophical assumption of the value of true belief. He critiques the view that true belief is better for us than false belief, and the view that truth is "the aim of belief". An alternative picture is provided, on which the fact that some people love truth is all there is to "the value of true belief".
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  12. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  13. Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
    Is knowledge justified true belief? Most philosophers believe that the answer is clearly ‘no’, as demonstrated by Gettier cases. But Gettier cases don’t obviously refute the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB). There are ways of resisting Gettier cases, at least one of which is partly successful. Nevertheless, when properly understood, Gettier cases point to a flaw in JTB, though it takes some work to appreciate just what it is. The nature of the (...)
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  14. Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.Keith Lehrer & Thomas Paxson Jr - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):225-237.
    The recently offered, Purported counter-Examples to justified, True belief analyses of knowledge are looked at with some care and all found to be either incoherent or inconclusive. It is argued that justified, True belief analyses are based on sound insight into the concept of knowledge. The distinction between having been justified in claiming to know something and actually having known it is used in an effort to get the discussion of knowledge back on the right track.
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  15. The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
    There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has (...)
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  16.  90
    True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs.Heimir Geirsson - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342.
    In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur), including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and how (...)
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  17.  20
    When is True Belief Knowledge?Richard Foley - 2012 - Princeton University Press.
    Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief.
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  18. Naturalism, Evolution and True Belief.S. Law - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):41-48.
    Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism aims to show that naturalism is, as he puts it, ‘incoherent or self defeating’. Plantinga supposes that, in the absence of any God-like being to guide the process, natural selection is unlikely to favour true belief. Plantinga overlooks the fact that adherents of naturalism may plausibly hold that there exist certain conceptual links between belief content and behaviour. Given such links, natural selection will favour true belief. A further rather surprising (...)
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  19.  70
    Is Mere True Belief Knowledge?Le Morvan Pierre - 2002 - Erkenntnis 56 (2):151-168.
    Crispin Sartwell ingeniously defends the provocative thesis that mere true belief suffices for knowledge. In doing so, he challenges one of the most deeply entrenched epistemological tenets, namely that knowledge must be more than mere true belief. Particularly interesting is the way he defends his thesis by appealing to considerations adduced by such prominent epistemologists as William Alston, Laurence BonJour, Alvin Goldman and Paul Moser, each of whom denies that knowledge is merely true belief. (...)
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  20.  67
    Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief.Le Morvan Pierre - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):145-155.
    Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had (...)
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  21.  20
    Knowledge as de Re True Belief?Paul Egré - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1517-1529.
    In “Facts: Particulars of Information Units?”, Kratzer proposed a causal analysis of knowledge in which knowledge is defined as a form of de re belief of facts. In support of Kratzer’s view, I show that a certain articulation of the de re/de dicto distinction can be used to integrally account for the original pair of Gettier cases. In contrast to Kratzer, however, I think such an account does not fundamentally require a distinction between facts and true propositions. I (...)
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  22.  95
    Is Undefeated Justified True Belief Knowledge?Jeffrey Olen - 1976 - Analysis 36 (3):150 - 152.
    Discussion of the sufficiency of the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief has focused on cases in which justified true belief does not constitute knowledge because one's justification depends essentially on a false belief or is defeated by a false statement. I propose three cases designed to show that the traditional account is insufficient for other reasons and that, Consequently, Even undefeated justified true belief does not constitute knowledge.
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  23.  70
    Knowledge as 'True Belief Plus Individuation' in Plato.Theodore Scaltsas - 2012 - Topoi 31 (2):137-149.
    In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the (...)
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  24.  35
    Knowledge as Doubly Anchored True Belief.Lawrence G. Becker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:223-241.
    Some ambiguities in the verb ‘to know’ are analyzed, and it is argued that “undefeatably justified true belief” is the meaning of most philosophical interest with respect to specifying truth conditions for ‘S knows that p’. Two general conditions for an adequate definition of ‘S knows that p’ are discussed. Then a proposal for a quasi-causal theory of knowledge is introduced and defended.
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  25.  92
    Can Knowledge Be Justified True Belief? (Pdf 69k).Ken Binmore - manuscript
    Knowledge was traditionally held to be justified true belief. This paper examines the implications of maintaining this view if justication is interpreted algorithmically. It is argued that if we move sufficiently far from the small worlds to which Bayesian decision theory properly applies, we can steer between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism only by explicitly building into our framing of the underlying decision problem the possibility that its attempt to describe the world is inadequate.
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  26.  17
    Information Gain and Approaching True Belief.Jonas Clausen Mork - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):77-96.
    Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the philosophical study of information. In this paper a two-part analysis of information gain—objective and subjective—in the context of doxastic change is presented and discussed. Objective information gain is analyzed in terms of doxastic movement towards true belief, while subjective information gain is analyzed as an agent’s expectation value of her objective information gain for a given doxastic change. The resulting expression for subjective information gain turns out to be a (...)
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  27.  13
    Knowledge and True Belief in Early Analytic Philosophy.D. B. Martens - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):576-599.
    I argue that the sufficiency of true belief for knowledge was accepted by some principal figures in the early history of analytic philosophy, including Russell, Schlick, McTaggart, and Moore, among others.
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  28.  11
    True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52:127-135.
    Distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and true belief that is knowledge implies scepticism as regards facts. That is because it falsely reduces knowledge to mere true belief To remove the scepticism, it might be held that sense and referent are the same in both. But this over-correction makes the opposite mistake of reducing mere true belief to knowledge. It also implies either assimilating false belief to (...)
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  29.  18
    Knowledge as Doubly Anchored True Belief.Lawrence C. Becker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:223-241.
    Some ambiguities in the verb ‘to know’ are analyzed, and it is argued that “undefeatably justified true belief” is the meaning of most philosophical interest with respect to specifying truth conditions for ‘S knows that p’. Two general conditions for an adequate definition of ‘S knows that p’ are discussed. Then a proposal for a quasi-causal theory of knowledge is introduced and defended.
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  30.  4
    Knowledge as ‘True Belief Plus Individuation’ in Plato.Theodore Scaltsas - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiry 38 (3):20-41.
    In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the (...)
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  31. Chapter 10. The Value of True Belief.Richard Foley - 2012 - In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press. pp. 59-64.
     
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  32. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 2007 - Analytica 1:123-126.
    Russian translation of Gettier E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? // Analysis, vol. 23, 1963. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.
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  33. True Belief and Knowledge Revisited.John Peterson - 1996 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 52:127-135.
    Distinguishing sense and referent in true belief that is not knowledge and true belief that is knowledge implies scepticism as regards facts. That is because it falsely reduces knowledge to mere true belief To remove the scepticism, it might be held that sense and referent are the same in both. But this over-correction makes the opposite mistake of reducing mere true belief to knowledge. It also implies either assimilating false belief to (...)
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  34. ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief".John Greco - 2003 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 111-134.
    The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a (...)
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  35. True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs.Heimir Geirsson - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:331-342.
    In recent years Russell’s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians, including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and how it is believed. While it is generally agreed upon among Russellians that this distinction needs to be drawn there is considerable disagreement as to what exactly the distinction amounts (...)
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  36. What Makes Knowledge the Most Highly Prized Form of True Belief?Peter D. Klein - 2012 - In Tim Black & Kelly Becker (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology.
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for (...)
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  37.  60
    Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures.Julian De Freitas, Hagop Sarkissian, George Newman, Igor Grossmann, Felipe De Brigard, Andres Luco & Joshua Knobe - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (4).
    People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? (...)
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  38. Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167-180.
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  39. Accidentally True Belief and Warrant.Andrew Chignell - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put (...)
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  40.  60
    Reliability and Future True Belief: Reply to Olsson and Jönsson.Christoph Jäger - 2011 - Theoria 77 (3):223-237.
    In “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem” I argue that Erik Olsson and Alvin Goldman's conditional probability solution to the value problem in epistemology is unsuccessful and that it makes significant internalist concessions. In “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs” Olsson and Martin Jönsson try to show that my argument does “not in the end reduce the plausibility” of Olsson and Goldman's account. Here I argue that, while Olsson and Jönsson clarify and amend the conditional (...)
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  41.  17
    Knowledge as True Belief.Isaac Levi - 2011 - In Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 269--302.
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  42.  5
    Is Implicit Theory of Mind the ‘Real Deal’? The Own‐Belief/TrueBelief Default in Adults and Young Preschoolers.Lu Wang & Alan M. Leslie - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (2):147-176.
    Recent studies reveal spontaneous implicit false-belief understanding in infancy. But is this early ability genuine theory-of-mind? Spontaneous tasks may allow early success by eliminating the selection-response bias thought to underlie later failure on standard tasks. However, using anticipatory eye gaze, we find the same bias in non-verbal tasks in both preschoolers and adults. We argue that the bias arises from theory-of-mind competence itself and takes the form of a rational prior to attribute one's own belief to others. Our (...)
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  43.  92
    Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief.Nathan Ballantyne - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  44. Knowledge is Merely True Belief.Crispin Sartwell - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):157-165.
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  45. Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno.Gail Fine - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27 (1):41-81.
  46. Knowledge as Credit for True Belief.John Greco - 2007 - In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Clarendon Press.
     
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  47.  27
    When Is True Belief Knowledge? By Richard Foley. [REVIEW]Lisa Warenski - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):894-98.
  48.  5
    True Belief is Not Instrumentally Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This paper argues against the almost universally held view that truth is an instrumentally valuable property of beliefs. For truth to be instrumentally valuable in the way usually supposed, it must play a causal role in the satisfaction of our desires. As it happens, truth can play no such role, because it is screened off from causal relevance by some of the truth-like properties first discussed by Stephen Stich. Because it is not causally relevant to the success of our actions, (...)
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  49. Warrant and Accidentally True Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):140–145.
  50. Justified True Belief.Fred Dretske - 2013 - The Philosophers' Magazine 61 (61):31-36.
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