Extant counterfactual accounts of causation (CACs) still cannot handle preemptive causation. I describe a new variety of preemption, defend its possibility, and use it to show the inadequacy of extant CACs. Imagine that it is a law of nature that the first spell cast on a given day match the enchantment that midnight.

Jonathan Schaffer introduced a new type of causal structure called 'trumping'. According to Schaffer, trumping is a species of causal preemption. Both Schaffer and I have argued that causation has a contrastive structure. In this paper, I analyze the structure of trumping cases from the perspective of contrastive causation, and argue that the case is much more complex than it first appears. Nonetheless, there is little reason to regard trumping as a species of causal (...) class='Hi'>preemption. (shrink)

Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example.

This paper aims to outline a counterfactual theory of divine atemporal causation that avoids problems of preemption. As a result, the presentation of the analysis is structured such that my counterfactual analysis directly addresses preemption issues. If these problems can be avoided, the theist is well on her way to proposing a usable metaphysical concept of atemporal divine causation. In the first section, I outline Lewis’ original counterfactual analysis as well as how these cases of preemption cause (...) problems for his analysis. In particular, two cases of preemption have proven problematic for counterfactual analyses: late preemption and trumping preemption. In the second section, I propose a counterfactual analysis of divine causation that is not subject to these problems of preemption. I present a counterfactual analysis of timeless divine causation, supplemented by a definition of what it means for God to allow an event to happen. In the third section, I argue this analysis is not prey to problems of preemption. (shrink)

This paper argues that so-called “trumping preemption” is in fact overdetermination or early preemption, and is thus not a distinctive form of redundant causation. I draw a novel lesson from cases thought to be trumping: that the boundary between preemption and overdetermination should be reconsidered.

The problem of two relativistically-moving pointlike particles of constant mass is undertaken in an arbitrary Lorentz frame using the classical Lagrangian mechanics of Stückelberg, Horwitz, and Piron. The particles are assumed to interact at events along their world lines at a common “world time,” an invariant dynamical parameter which is not in general synchronous with the particle proper time. The Lorentz-scalar interaction is assumed to be the Coulomb potential (i.e., the inverse square spacetime potential) of the spacetime event separation. The (...) classical orbit equations are found in 1 + 1 spacetime dimensions in the hyperbolic angle coordinates for the reduced problem. The solutions to the reduced motion in these coordinates are the spacetime generalizations of the nonrelativistic Kepler solutions. and they introduce an invariant eccentricity which is a function of other known constants of the motion for the reduced problem. Solutions compatible with physical scattering are obtained by the assumption that the eccentricity is a given function of the ratio of the particle masses. (shrink)

In the covariant Hamiltonian mechanics with action-at-a-distance, we compare the proper time and dynamical time representations of the coordinate space world line using the differential geometry of nongeodesic curves in 3+1 Minkowski spacetime. The covariant generalization of the Serret-Frenet equations for the point particle with interaction are derived using the arc length representation. A set of invariant point particle kinematical properties are derived which are equivalent to the solutions of the equations of motion in coordinate space and which are functions (...) of either the proper time or the dynamical time. Expressions for the quantities are given for the example of the covariant harmonic oscillator and comments are offered regarding the measurability of the dynamical time. (shrink)

The classical two-body system with Lorentz-invariant Coulomb work function V = -k/ρ is solved in 3+1 dimensions using the manifestly covariant Hamiltonian mechanics of Stückelberg. Particular solutions for the reduced motion are obtained which correspond to bound attractive, unbound attractive, and repulsive scattering motion. A lack of perihelion precession is found in the bound attractive orbit, and the semiclassical hydrogen spectrum subsequently contains no fine structure corrections. It is argued that this prediction is indicative of the correct classical special relativistic (...) two-body theory. (shrink)

In the classical Stueckelberg-Horwitz-Piron relativistic Hamiltonian mechanics, a significant aspect of evolution of the classical n-body particle system with mutual interaction is the method by which events along distinct particle world lines are put into correspondence as a dynamical state. Approaches to this procedure are discussed in connection with active and passive symmetry principles.

In December 1967, Louis Washkansky, a grocer living in South Africa, became the first person to awaken after a heart transplant. Some accounts say that his first words were, “I am the new Frankenstein.” Others claim that Christiaan Barnard, his transplant surgeon, uttered these. Much as people have long mixed up who Frankenstein is—creature or creator?—in Mary Shelley's novel, so patient and surgeon, repaired and repairer, are confused in retellings of this post‐op Frankensteinian moment. Whether Washkansky identified with Frankenstein's monster (...) or not, he was probably feeling a bit monstrous after taking the donor heart of Denise Darvall into his chest. I know I was, over thirty years later, standing naked before a mirror and gazing at my shorn and bloated torso for the first time since a kidney transplant. My boundaries had been rearranged: a crescentic scar marked the frontier between me and not‐me. (shrink)

Suppose that Billy and Suzy each throw a rock at window, and either rock is sufficient to shatter the window. While some consider this a paradigmatic case of causal overdetermination, in which multiple cases are sufficient for an outcome, others consider it a case of joint causation, in which multiple causes are necessary to bring about an effect. Some hold that every case of overdetermination is a case of joint causation underdescribed: at a maximal level of description, every cause is (...) necessary to bring about the outcome in precisely the way that it occurs. -/- This paper shows the latter principle to be false. I introduce a novel class of events that are insensitive to the additive force of multiple causes. They are to be contrasted with sensitive events, which physically and counterfactually vary according to the number and sorts of causes they have. I argue that sensitive effects are symptoms of joint causation; insensitive effects are symptoms of overdetermination. Insensitive effects resulting from multiple causes cannot be classified as "joint causation underdescribed," but only as overdetermination. -/- I suggest that cases of "trumping preemption" should be understood as cases of overdetermination with insensitive effects. Consequently, Lewis' influence account of causation cannot handle these cases. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical overview of Lewis’ theory of singular causation running from his origins to his last words on the issue . In sections 1 and 2, I characterize Lewis’ original theory of causation backed in terms of counterfactual dependence as opposed to regularity theories and also his two 1986a proposals of modification, prompted by cases of late preemption. In section 4, I examine the main problems of the 1986a proposals which lead Lewis to his last analysis (...) of causation in terms of influence . In section 5, I discuss the merits of Lewis last proposal as to the problems of late preemption and spurious causation. I also argue against Lewis’ idea that his theory of influence can deal with trumping preemption cases. Besides, a general and severe problem of the overall counterfactual conception of causality is highlighted: the status of backtracking counterfactuals. (shrink)

Causation is defined as a relation between facts: C causes E if and only if C and E are nomologically independent facts and C is a necessary part of a nomologically sufficient condition for E. The analysis is applied to problems of overdetermination, preemption, trumping, intransitivity, switching, and double prevention. Preventing and allowing are defined and distinguished from causing. The analysis explains the direction of causation in terms of the logical form of dynamic laws. Even in a universe (...) that is deterministic in both temporal directions, not every fact must have a cause and present facts may have no future causes. (shrink)

As a general rule, whenever a hearer is justified in forming the belief that p on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, she will also be justified in assuming that the speaker has formed her belief appropriately in light of a relevantly large and representative sample of the evidence that bears on p. In simpler terms, a justification for taking someone’s testimony entails a justification for trusting her assessment of the evidence. This introduces the possibility of what I will call (...) “evidential preemption.” Evidential preemption occurs when a speaker, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer of the likelihood that she will subsequently be confronted with apparently contrary evidence: this is done, however, not so as to encourage the hearer to temper her confidence in p in anticipation of that evidence, but rather to suggest that the (apparently) contrary evidence is in fact misleading evidence or evidence that has already been taken into account. Either way, the speaker is signalling to the hearer that the subsequent disclosure of this evidence will not require her to significantly revise her belief that p. Such preemption can effectively inoculate an audience against future contrary evidence, and thereby creates an opening for a form of exploitative manipulation that I will call “epistemic grooming.” Nonetheless, I argue, not all uses of evidential preemption are nefarious; it can also serve as an important tool for guiding epistemically limited agents though complex evidential scenarios. (shrink)

Preemption is a substantial threat to achieving racial equity. Since 2011, states have increasingly preempted local governments from enacting policies that can improve health and reduce racial inequities such as increasing minimum wage and requiring paid leave.

According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, (...) and that the preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account. (shrink)

Experiments are presented showing that visual search for Mueller-Lyer (ML) stimuli is based on complete configurations, rather than component segments. Segments easily detected in isolation were difficult to detect when embedded in a configuration, indicating preemption by low-level groups. This preemption—which caused stimulus components to become inaccessible to rapid search—was an all-or-nothing effect, and so could serve as a powerful test of grouping. It is shown that these effects are unlikely to be due to blurring by simple spatial (...) filters at early visual levels. It is proposed instead that they are due to more sophisticated processes that rapidly bind contour fragments into spatially-extended assemblies. These results support the view that rapid visual search cannot access the primitives formed at the earliest stages of visual processing; rather, it can access only higher-level, more ecologically-relevant structures. (shrink)

The present paper explores not only the psychological effects of 11 September in the political fields, but also connects with the risk of pre-emption in USinternational affairs. What is important to discuss in this work is the role played by the media in portraying news, and a pejorative image of Islam. This ancient religion is presented as being backward and barbaric in many senses. Beyond having an encompassing understanding of the history of Islam, the media dissuades public opinion the preventive (...) war is the only valid resource. The project of Enlightenment has been gone forever. It was replaced by modernity. As civilization West developed a technophile sentiment of superiority that fulfilled the gap given by secularization. It is hypothesized that 9/11 represents the encounter of two civilizations whose cultural values are at odds. This belief is oriented at creating a demonization of Islam. First and foremost, both religions, Islam and Christianity have coexisted in peace over centuries. Secondly, Arabs even supported Judaism in its attempts to achieve independence from Rome. This begs a striking question, to what groups these stereotypes are conducive? While demonization paves the ways to reduce the sentiment of culprit, preemption give a reason to act. (shrink)

The authors challenge the reigning “causal power framework” as an explanation for whether a particular outcome was actually caused by a specific potential cause. They test a new measure of causal attribution in two experiments by embedding the measure within the Structure Induction model of Singular Causation (SISC, Stephan & Waldmann, 2016).

The seeming absence of negative evidence in the input that children receive during language acquisition has long been regarded as a serious problem for non-nativist linguistic theories. Among the solutions that have been suggested for this problem, preemption by competing structures is doubtless the most intensively researched and widely accepted. However, while preemption works well in the domain of morphology, it cannot apply categorically in the domain of syntax, as this would preclude the existence of semantically overlapping constructions, (...) such as the ditransitive and the prepositional dative, which can be used alternatively with many, but not all, verbs of literal or metaphorical transfer. This paper investigates one specific version of preemption briefly entertained by Pinker (Language learnability and language development, Harvard University Pressm, 1984), which would account both for the existence of semantically overlapping constructions and for the fact that these constructions may preempt each other in the case of individual verbs. Typically, such pairs of grammatical constructions differ in their information-structural restrictions and speakers tend to choose the construction that best fits a given discourse context; when speakers use a construction even though there is an alternative that fits the discourse context better, children may take this as evidence that the alternative is not available for the specific verb in question. Two corpus studies are presented, comparing the information-structural profile of prepositional dative constructions containing verbs that may alternate between the dative and the ditransitive with the information structural profile of verbs that are restricted to the prepositional dative. For Pinker's preemptive mechanism to be feasible, there should be a clear and systematic difference in the information-structural profile of these two classes of verbs. However, no such difference can be found in actual usage. (shrink)

What kind of reasons for belief are provided by the testimony of experts? In a world where we are often inundated with fake news, misinformation, and conspiracy theories, this question is more pressing than ever. A prominent view in the philosophical literature maintains that the reasons provided by experts are preemptive in that they normatively screen off, or defeat, other relevant reasons. In this paper, I raise problems for this conception of expertise, including a wholly new one that I call (...) the Problem of the Predatory Expert, which targets both original versions of preemption as well as new, modified ones that aim to avoid some of the standard objections. (shrink)

Preemption is a powerful strategy used by special interest groups to undermine strong, local public health standards. Currently, 20 states in the U.S. have preemption ordinances in place related to clean indoor air initiatives. These preemption laws are the direct result of an ongoing and aggressive campaign of tobacco companies to thwart clean indoor air initiatives, which ultimately, according to tobacco industry internal documents, cause significant reductions in their annual revenues. Clean indoor air policies have arisen from (...) a greater understanding of the documented health risks associated with exposure to secondhand smoke and action by local government to protect the public from these hazards. The efforts of the tobacco industry undermine local authority and seek to shift policy action to the state and federal levels, where the industry has greater political influence. (shrink)

Preemption is a powerful strategy used by special interest groups to undermine strong, local public health standards. Currently, 20 states in the U.S. have preemption ordinances in place related to clean indoor air initiatives. These preemption laws are the direct result of an ongoing and aggressive campaign of tobacco companies to thwart clean indoor air initiatives, which ultimately, according to tobacco industry internal documents, cause significant reductions in their annual revenues. Clean indoor air policies have arisen from (...) a greater understanding of the documented health risks associated with exposure to secondhand smoke and action by local government to protect the public from these hazards. The efforts of the tobacco industry undermine local authority and seek to shift policy action to the state and federal levels, where the industry has greater political influence. (shrink)

This chapter gives an account of epistemic trust. It argues that trust in general is a matter of declining to take precautions against the trustee’s failing to come through, and that this amounts in the epistemic case to declining to rely on evidence for the testified proposition, instead relying solely on the testifier. But if this is so, how can trust play a positive role in securing knowledge? The key, it is argued, lies in recognizing that trust is preemptive: Trusting (...) someone entails believing that she is trustworthy, and this belief preempts other evidence about whether she will come through. In other words, this belief gives the truster himself a good reason to desist from relying on evidence other than the trustee’s word. But if trust is preemptive, how is it compatible with epistemic responsibility, which seems to involve relying on your own evidence? Because, it is claimed, preempting your own evidence in favor of the testifier’s say-so enables your belief to be supported by her evidence – which, we may assume, is superior to your own. Far from forfeiting epistemic responsibility, then, epistemic trust on the preemptive account gives you justificatory access to a swathe of evidence that you would not otherwise have had. (shrink)

By revisiting late-Weimar debates between Carl Schmitt and two left-wing critics, Otto Kirchheimer and Franz L Neumann, we can shed light on the surprising alliance of populist politics with key tenets of economic liberalism, an alliance that vividly manifests itself in the political figure and retrograde policies of Donald Trump. In the process, we can begin to fill a striking lacuna in recent scholarly literature on populism, namely its failure to pay proper attention to matters of political economy. We can (...) also perhaps begin to make sense of the roots of Trump’s assault on the US federal state: formal law and its organizational basis, modern bureaucracy, represent potential restraints on the alliance of populism with neoliberalism. (shrink)

Donald Trump has been a godsend for those of us who teach critical thinking. For he is a fount of manipulative rhetoric, glaring fallacies, conspiracy theories, fake news, and bullshit. In this paper I draw on my own recent teaching experience in order to discuss both the usefulness and the limits of using Trump examples in teaching critical thinking. In Section One I give the framework of the course; in Section Two I indicate Trump’s relevance to many important concepts in (...) the course; and in Section Three I argue that critical thinking instructors should restrain themselves from overreliance on Trump-examples. (shrink)

Elimination of state laws that preempt local antismoking ordinances is a national health objective. However, the tobacco industry and its supporters have continued to pursue statelevel preemption of local tobacco control ordinances as part of an apparent strategy to avoid the difusion of grassroots antismoking initiatives. And, an increasing number of challenges to local ordinances by the tobacco industry and persons supported by the tobacco industry are being decided in state supreme courts and courts of appeals. The outcomes of (...) seemingly similar cases about the validity of local smoke-free air ordinances vary signifcantly by state. This paper examines the common and unique aspects of the decisions and the potential implications of court rulings on preemption for future state tobacco control eforts and achievement of national health objectives around the elimination of preemption. Using a search strategy developed for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation System, cases where a state or federal appellate level court made a fnding on the validity of a local smoke-free air ordinance or regulation were identifed in 19 states. In contrast to previous studies, we found that cases in approximately half of states were decided for local governments. We also found that across the states, courts were considering similar factors in their decisions including the extent to which: the local government possessed the authority to pass the ordinance, the ordinance conficted with the state constitution, and state statutes preempt the ordinance. (shrink)

Sometimes it is epistemically beneficial to form a belief on authority. When you do, what happens to other reasons you have for that belief? Linda Zagzebski’s total-preemption view says that these reasons are “preempted”: you still have them, but you do not use them to support your belief. I argue that this situation is problematic, because having reasons for a belief while not using them forfeits you doxastic justification. I present an alternative account of belief on authority, the proper-basing (...) view, which enables the agent to base her belief on as many reasons as she has. A salient result is that the notion of a preemptive reason, useful though it may be in accounting for acting on authority, does not have any place in an account of believing on authority or in epistemology more generally. (shrink)

Following the storming of the US Capitol building, Donald Trump became digitally toxic, and was deplatformed from Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube—as well as a host of other social media networks. Subsequent debate has centred on the questions of whether these companies did the right thing and the possible ramifications of their actions for the future of digital societies along with their democratic organisation. This article seeks to answer this question through examining complex, and seemingly contradictory notions (legality and the (...) protection of public interest vs issues of democratic legitimacy and digital sovereignty) and argues that reform is needed to determine who, in the future, will control the infosphere—and how. (shrink)

Questions of ethics and politics have a long tradition in the classroom as well as the political world. Those who act in the political realm¿including the media, political strategists and consultants, educators, and religious leaders¿are in professions for which a clear code of conduct or an accepted set of ethical norms exists. By contrast, Donald J. Trump, as candidate and as President, has upended the political and ethical context in which he and others operate. This book explores emerging ethical questions (...) that face professionals interacting with a new executive order. Some say the age of Trump is unique and that the norms of ethical professional behavior must be bent to meet this challenge. Others maintain that responding to someone like Trump is precisely why their profession has ethical norms, and that they must put their judgments on hold and respond in what has always been deemed the appropriate professional manner. Each chapter opens with an introduction setting the framework of ethical analysis for a particular profession, is followed by original contributions by notable practitioners, and concludes with a set of questions for students and other readers to ponder and discuss. (shrink)

In September of 2002, the administration of President George W. Bush announced its policy of preemption. This policy is actually equivalent to a policy of preventive war. The principal difficulty with this policy is that it will incite fear in governments who would not otherwise attack us, and thereby incite them to hostile action. Thus the policy actually makes the world a more dangerous place.

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when (...) one discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it. (shrink)

The present paper explores not only the psychological effects of 11 September in the political fields, but also connects with the risk of pre-emption in USinternational affairs. What is important to discuss in this work is the role played by the media in portraying news, and a pejorative image of Islam. This ancient religion is presented as being backward and barbaric in many senses. Beyond having an encompassing understanding of the history of Islam, the media dissuades public opinion the preventive (...) war is the only valid resource. The project of Enlightenment has been gone forever. It was replaced by modernity. As civilization West developed a technophile sentiment of superiority that fulfilled the gap given by secularization. It is hypothesized that 9/11 represents the encounter of two civilizations whose cultural values are at odds. This belief is oriented at creating a demonization of Islam. First and foremost, both religions, Islam and Christianity have coexisted in peace over centuries. Secondly, Arabs even supported Judaism in its attempts to achieve independence from Rome. This begs a striking question, to what groups these stereotypes are conducive? While demonization paves the ways to reduce the sentiment of culprit, preemption give a reason to act. (shrink)