Results for 'Truth Conditions'

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  1. Propositional Structure and Truth Conditions.Michael McGlone - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225.
    This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames.
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  2.  23
    Modal Truthmakers, Truth Conditions, and Analyses: Or, How to Avoid the Humphrey Objection.Chad Vance - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):145-159.
    Truthmakers, truth conditions, and analyses are closely related, but distinct in rather important ways. A failure to properly appreciate their differences has led to some confusion regarding the role that possible worlds ought to play with respect to modality. Those philosophers who initially proposed the existence of possible worlds were understood as providing an analysis of modality. More recently, many have interpreted them as providing modal truthmakers. But, possible worlds are only suited to serve as truth (...) for modal truths. My goals are as follows: First, to dispel this confusion by detailing the differences between these three concepts. Second, to apply the lesson learned to the famous Humphrey objection against possible worlds. While this objection, if successful, does undermine Lewisian modal realism, it only partially undermines ersatzism, and leaves available a route by which ersatzers may avoid the objection altogether. (shrink)
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  3.  77
    Logical Form and Truth-Conditions.Andrea Iacona - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (3):439-457.
    This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. Section 1 provides some preliminary clarifications. Section 2 shows that the main motivation for the view is the fact that fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented. Sections 3 and 4 articulate the view and dwell on its affinity with a (...)
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  4.  85
    Ontology: Minimalism and Truth-Conditions.Juan José Lara Peñaranda - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):683-696.
    In this paper, I develop a criticism to a method for metaontology, namely, the idea that a discourse’s or theory’s ontological commitments can be read off its sentences’ truth- conditions. Firstly, I will put forward this idea’s basis and, secondly, I will present the way Quine subscribed to it. However, I distinguish between two readings of Quine’s famous ontological criterion, and I center the focus on the one currently dubbed “ontological minimalism”, a kind of modern Ockhamism applied to (...)
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  5.  60
    Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with (...)
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  6.  67
    Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1.Alex Silk - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:195.
  7. On Specifying Truth-Conditions.A. Rayo - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):385-443.
    This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse. It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters. The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in (...)
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  8. On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those (...)
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  9.  2
    The Expressive Truth Conditions of Two-Valued Logic.Stephen Pollard - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (4):221-230.
    In a finitary closure space, irreducible sets behave like two-valued models, with membership playing the role of satisfaction. If f is a function on such a space and the membership of in an irreducible set is determined by the presence or absence of the inputs in that set, then f is a kind of truth function. The existence of some of these truth functions is enough to guarantee that every irreducible set is maximally consistent. The closure space is (...)
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  10. Truth-Conditions, Truth-Bearers and the New B-Theory of Time.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure (...)
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  11. Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions.Heather Dyke - 2002 - Synthese 131 (3):329 - 351.
    There are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date versionand the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, whichof them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version isunsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of truth conditions, (...)
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  12.  7
    Children's Developing Intuitions About the Truth Conditions and Implications of Novel Generics Versus Quantified Statements.Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman & Jenna Hedglen - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (4):711-738.
    Generic statements express generalizations about categories and present a unique semantic profile that is distinct from quantified statements. This paper reports two studies examining the development of children's intuitions about the semantics of generics and how they differ from statements quantified by all, most, and some. Results reveal that, like adults, preschoolers recognize that generics have flexible truth conditions and are capable of representing a wide range of prevalence levels; and interpret novel generics as having near-universal prevalence implications. (...)
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  13.  99
    Emotivism and Truth Conditions.Daniel Stoljar - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):81 - 101.
    By distinguishing between pragmatic and semantic aspects of emotivism, and by distinguishing between inflationary and deflationary conceptions of truth conditions, this paper defends emotivism against a series of objections. First, it is not the case (as Blackburn has argued) that emotivism must explain the appearance that moral sentences have truth conditions. Second, it is not the case (as Boghossian has argued) that emotivism presupposes that non-moral sentences have inflationary truth conditions. Finally, it is not (...)
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  14. Truth Conditions and Communication.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):827-862.
    The paper addresses itself to the "Homeric struggle" in the theory of meaning between those (e.g., Grice) who try to analyze declarative meaning in terms of an intention to induce a belief and those (e.g., Davidson) for who declarative meaning consists in truth conditions. (The point of departure is Strawson's celebrated discussion of this issue, in his Inaugural Lecture.) I argue that neither style of analysis is satisfactory, and develop a "hybrid" that may be-although what I take from (...)
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  15.  91
    Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types.L. A. Paul - 1997 - Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
    Quentin Smith has argued that the new tenseless theory of time is faced with insurmountable problems and should be abandoned in favour of the tensed theory of time. Smith;s main argument attacks the fundamental premise of the tenseless theory: that tenseless truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences adequately capture the meaning of tensed sentences. His position is that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical relations between tensed sentences, thus the tensed theory must be accepted. (...)
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  16. Radical and Moderate Pragmatics: Does Meaning Determine Truth Conditions?Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore - 2005 - In Zoltán Gendler Szabó (ed.), Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press.
    But the sort of context sensitivity exhibited in such sentences does not compromise the claim that meaning determines truth conditions, since recourse to context here is directed and restricted by conventional meaning alone. Anyone who understands sentence (2) knows that its utterances are true just in case whatever object is demonstrated in the context of utterance is nice; and he also knows that any utterance of (2) says of, or expresses about, whichever object is demonstrated that it’s nice. (...)
     
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  17. Tense and Truth Conditions.Michelle Beer - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):265-269.
    The B-theory of time holds that McTaggart’s A-series of past, present, and future is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. According to the date-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by by D.H. Mellor—the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given in terms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribe any A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as Nathan Oaklander has argued, the date-theory does not (...)
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  18.  58
    Meaning and Truth-Conditions: A Reply to Kemp.Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):82–87.
    In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself (...)
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  19.  10
    Singular Truth-Conditions Without Singular Propositions.Gregory Bochner - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    In this paper I argue that propositionalism is what generates a tension between referentialism and harmony. Harmony can be preserved if we replace propositionalism by centred referentialism, according to which referential thoughts and utterances about an object have descriptive contents that must be evaluated relative to a world centred on that object at the relevant time. By disentangling truth-conditions and contents, this move allows us to dissolve the tension between referentialism and descriptivism. The view that emerges has three (...)
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  20.  11
    Linguistic Understanding and Knowledge of Truth-Conditions.Chase Wrenn - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (3):355-370.
    What do you know when you know what a sentence means? According to some theories, understanding a sentence is, in part, knowing its truth-conditions. Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan have defended such theories on the grounds of an “epistemic determination argument”. That argument turns on the ideas that understanding a sentence, along with knowledge of the non-linguistic facts, suffices to know its truth-value, and that being able to determine a sentence’s truth-value given knowledge of (...)
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  21.  46
    Reply to Heck on Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):233-236.
    Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument.
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  22. Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical: Further Support for Subjective Consequentialism.Scott Forschler - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (3):337-346.
    Two meanings of "subjective consequentialism" are distinguished: conscious deliberation with the aim of producing maximally-good consequences, versus acting in ways that, given one's evidence set and reasoning capabilities, is subjectively most likely to maximize expected consequences. The latter is opposed to "objective consequentialism," which demands that we act in ways that actually produce the best total consequences. Peter Railton's arguments for a version of objective consequentialism confuse the two subjective forms, and are only effective against the first. After reviewing the (...)
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  23.  6
    Tokens, Dates And Tenseless Truth Conditions.Heather Dyke - 2002 - Synthese 131 (3):329-351.
    There are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date version and the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, which of them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version is unsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of (...) conditions, and of the connection between truth and reality on the one hand, and that between truth and meaning on the other. I argue that Smith's objections to the token-reflexive theory stem from his confusing these two aspects of the notion of truth. (shrink)
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  24. Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No!Nate Charlow - 2016 - In Nate Charlow Matthew Chrisman (ed.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    This essay makes the case for, in the phrase of Angelika Kratzer, packing the fruits of the study of rational decision-making into our semantics for deontic modals—specifically, for parametrizing the truth-condition of a deontic modal to things like decision problems and decision theories. Then it knocks it down. While the fundamental relation of the semantic theory must relate deontic modals to things like decision problems and theories, this semantic relation cannot be intelligibly understood as representing the conditions under (...)
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  25. Linguistic Meaning, Truth Conditions and Relevance: The Case of Concessives.Corinne Iten - 2005 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Many linguists and philosophers of language explain linguistic meaning in terms of truth conditions. This book focuses on the meanings of expressions that escape such truth-conditional treatment, in particular the concessives: but , even if , and although . Corinne Iten proposes semantic analyses of these expressions based on the cognitive framework of relevance theory. A thoroughly cognitive approach to linguistic meaning is presented in which linguistic forms are seen as mapping onto mental entities, rather than individuals (...)
     
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  26.  80
    Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning.Lionel Shapiro - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
    Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the 'naïve' version of the truth-conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a different connection) to assimilate the naïve truth-conditional (...)
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  27.  48
    Truth Conditions and Their Recognition.Alex Barber - 2003 - In Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers and defends a particular version of the view that it is the intentions with which it is performed that determine the truth conditions of an utterance. A competing version, implied by Grice's work on meaning, is rejected as inadequate. This latter is incompatible with the phenomenon of anti-lying: performing a true utterance with the intention that one's audience believe it to be false. In place of the quasi-Gricean version, the paper maintains that an utterance is (...)
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  28.  48
    Talking About Trees and Truth-Conditions.Reinhard Muskens - 2001 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (4):417-455.
    We present Logical Description Grammar (LDG), a model ofgrammar and the syntax-semantics interface based on descriptions inelementary logic. A description may simultaneously describe the syntacticstructure and the semantics of a natural language expression, i.e., thedescribing logic talks about the trees and about the truth-conditionsof the language described. Logical Description Grammars offer a naturalway of dealing with underspecification in natural language syntax andsemantics. If a logical description (up to isomorphism) has exactly onetree plus truth-conditions as a model, it (...)
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  29.  40
    On Specifying Truth-Conditions.Jason M. Byron - manuscript
    I develop a technique for specifying truth-conditions.
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  30.  4
    Truth-Conditions and Contradiction.Douglas Odegard - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):363 - 372.
    Applying truth-conditions to sentences about the world seems to generate paradoxes unless their application is restricted. We can avoid such restrictions by refusing to apply logical laws to sentences the truth-values of which cannot possibly be established by applying truth-conditions. Such a refusal is reasonable, since the point of logic is to help us make justified truth claims. And the basis for the refusal allows us to avoid a surprisingly wide range of contradictions, without (...)
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  31. Truth Conditions and Behaviourism.Kai Michael Büttner - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):41-57.
    Quine tries to combine truth conditional semantics with linguistic behaviourism. To this end, he identifies the truth conditions of a sentence with the conditions that prompt speakers to assign truth or falsity to the sentence. The first problem with this conception is that truth conditions determine not when truth-value assignments are made, but when they are correct. This fact vitiates Quine’s account of observation sentences. A second difficulty pertains only to theoretical sentences. (...)
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  32. Semantics, Tense, and Time: A Note on Tenseless Truth-Conditions for Token-Reflexive Tensed Sentences.Peter Ludlow - 1997 - ProtoSociology 10:191-196.
    According to a number of authors it is possible to give tenseless truth conditions for tensed sentences by utilizing token indexicals in something like the following fashion. An utterance u of 'Past S' is true iff at some time earlier than u, S is true An utterance u of 'Pres S' is true iff at some time overlapping u, S is true This strategy has been challenged on the grounds that it will break down in cases like. There (...)
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  33.  98
    Why Content Must Be a Matter of Truth Conditions.Angus Ross - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275.
    It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make (...)
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  34.  72
    Intensional Specifications of Truth-Conditions: 'Because', 'in Virtue Of', and 'Made True By…'.Gerald Vision - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):109-123.
    Although a number of truth theorists have claimed that a deflationary theory of ‘is true’ needs nothing more than the uniform implication of instances of the theorem ‘the proposition that p is true if and only if p ’, reflection shows that this is inadequate. If deflationists can’t support the instances when replacing the biconditional with ‘because’, then their view is in peril. Deflationists sometimes acknowledge this by addressing, occasionally attempting to deflate, ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ formulas and (...)
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  35. Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Richard Heck - 2007 - In D. Greimann & G. Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 349--76.
    Defends the view that understanding can be identified with knowledge of T-sentences against the classical criticisms of Foster and Soames.
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  36. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):313-48.
  37. Conceptual Role and Truth Conditions.Brian Loar - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):272-83.
  38.  66
    Functional Role and Truth Conditions.Ned Block - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
  39. Truth-Conditions and the Nature of Truth: Re-Solving Mixed Conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
    Alethic pluralism, on one version of the view , is the idea that truth is to be identified with different properties in different domains of discourse. 1 Whilst we operate with a univocal concept of truth, and a uniform truth predicate, the thought is that the truth property changes from one domain to the next. So the truth property for talk about the nature and state of the material world may be different from the (...) property for moral discourse .Tappolet challenged alethic pluralism by asking how it can account for the truth of mixed compounds, such as a mixed conjunction like ‘this cat is wet and funny’, where each of the conjuncts are from different domains of discourse, and thus assessable in terms of different truth properties. She argues that the alethic pluralist is left in a dilemma: either admit of a ‘generic’ truth property, which can be possessed by propositions from all domains, thus rendering the plural ways of being true obsolete, or deny the truth of mixed conjunctions.In Edwards 2008, I argued that there is route out of Tappolet's dilemma. Briefly, I suggested that we acknowledge that the truth of a mixed conjunction is dependent on the truth of its conjuncts, and we should explain the truth of the conjunction by saying that it is true just in case each of its conjuncts is true. This, I argued, gives us an account of the truth of the conjunction without needing to appeal to a troublesome ‘generic’ truth property.Aaron Cotnoir criticizes my solution to Tappolet's problem. Cotnoir argues that my solution to the problem admits of an unacceptable ‘proliferation’ of truth properties, and smuggles in a generic truth property. I …. (shrink)
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  40.  66
    Epistemic Modality and Truth Conditions.Anna Papafragou - unknown
    Within the linguistics literature it is often claimed that epistemic modality, unlike other kinds of modality, does not contribute to truth-conditional content. In this paper I challenge this view. I reanalyze a variety of arguments which have been used in support of the non-truth-conditional view and show that they can be handled on an alternative analysis of epistemic modality. # 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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  41. Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verification.John McDowell - 1976 - In G. Evans & J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning. Clarendon Press.
  42.  72
    Understanding a Sentence Does Not Entail Knowing its TruthConditions: Why the Epistemological Determination Argument Fails.Daniel Cohnitz & Jaan Kangilaski - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (2):223-242.
    The determination argument is supposed to show that a sentence's meaning is at least a truth-condition. This argument is supposed to rest on innocent premises that even a deflationist about truth can accept. The argument comes in two versions: one is metaphysical and the other is epistemological. In this paper we will focus on the epistemological version. We will argue that the apparently innocent first premise of that version of the argument is not as innocent as it seems. (...)
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    Meaning, TruthConditions, Proposition: Frege's Doctrine of Sense Retrieved, Resumed and Redeployed in the Light of Certain Recent Criticisms.David Wiggins - 1992 - Dialectica 46 (1):61-90.
    This article first recounts the history of the truth‐conditional conception of meaning from Frege to the present day, emphasizing both points that are neglected in receidev accounts of this history and points of permanent philosophical interest. It then concludes with a review of certain current objections to the truth‐conditional conception and seeks to answer the difficulties pressed by Stephen Schiffer in Remnants of Meaning, offering certain fresh considerations upon the question what it is for two speech action to (...)
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  44. Postscript to '€˜Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions'.D. Baron, C. Horisk & W. G. Lycan - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court.
     
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  45.  74
    Determining Truth Conditions in Signaling Games.William F. Harms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):23 - 35.
    Evolving signaling systems can be said to induce partitions on the space of world states as they approach equilibrium. Formalizing this claim provides a general framework for understanding what it means for language to “cut nature at its seams”. In order to avoid taking our current best science as providing the adaptive target for all evolving systems, the state space of the world must be characterized exclusively in terms of the coincidence of stimuli and payoffs that drives the evolution of (...)
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  46.  31
    Intention, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Robert C. Cummins - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (4):345 - 360.
    In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a familiar trick of tarski's, We can then (...)
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  47.  69
    Anti-Realism, Truth-Conditions and Verificationism.WR Stirton - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):697-716.
    The article begins by distinguishing a number of theses which, in the past, have sometimes been lumped together under the heading of 'anti-realism'. One of the theses is that there is something wrong with truth-conditional theories of meaning (what a truth-conditional theory of meaning is a matter discussed at some length), another is what I take to be the central thesis of anti-realism, that all truths are knowable. Several writers on the subject, such as Wright and Prawitz, have (...)
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  48. Truth Conditions Without Interpretation.John Collins - 2001 - Sorites 13:52-71.
    Davidson has given us two theses: Tarski's format for truth definitions provides a format for theories of meaning and that the justification for a theory of language L as one of meaning is based upon the theory affording an informative interpretation of L-speakers. It will be argued, on the basis of a consideration of compositionality, that the Tarski format can indeed be re-jigged in line with . On the other hand, in opposition to , I shall commend a cognitive (...)
     
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  49.  14
    II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.
    A response to certain parts of Rumfitt : I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.
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  50.  1
    II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions.Kemp Gary - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.
    A response to certain parts of Rumfitt : I defend Davidson's project in semantics, suggest that Rumfitt's use of sentential quantification renders his definition of truth needlessly elaborate, and pose a question for Rumfitt's handling of the strengthened Liar.
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