Results for 'Truth ascriptions'

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  1.  63
    Truth Ascriptions, Falsity Ascriptions, and the Paratactic Analysis of Indirect Discourse.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2015 - Logique Et Analyse (232):527-534.
    This paper argues that the obvious validity of certain inferences involving indirect speech reports as premises and truth or falsity ascriptions as conclusions is incompatible with Davidson's so-called "paratactic" analysis of the logical form of indirect discourse. Besides disqualifying that analysis, this problem is also claimed to indicate that the analysis is doubly in tension with Davidson's metasemantic views. Specifically, it can be reconciled neither with one of Davidson's key assumptions regarding the adequacy of the kind of semantic (...)
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  2. Singular Truth-Ascriptions: Truth-Operator Vs. Truth-Predicate.Dolf Rami - manuscript -
    In this paper I am concerned with the semantic analysis of sentences of the form 'It is true that p'. I will compare different proposals that have been made to analyse such sentences and will defend a view that treats this sentences as a mere sytactic variation of sentences of the form 'That p is true'.
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  3. Explicit Truth Ascriptions.Claire Horisk - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  4.  42
    Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers.Jody Azzouni - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.
    A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are (...)
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  5. Deflationism: A Use-Theoretic Analysis of the Truth-Predicate.Arvid Båve - 2006 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to (...)
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  6. Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who (...)
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  7. New Waves in Truth.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    New Waves in Truth offers eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty promising young scholars working on truth today. Contributions to the volume span truth ascriptions, deflationism, realism and the correspondence theory, the value of truth, and kinds of truth and truth-apt discourse. The research programs of the contributors are beginning to reset that agenda, and each is positioned to make new waves throughout the subject.
     
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  8. 'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary (...)
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  9.  69
    Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry.David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):84-101.
    Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ‘ is true because Rex is barking’ but reject ‘Rex is barking because is true’. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry : they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. (...)
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  10.  80
    The Transparency of Truth.ME Kalderon - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):475-497.
    Transparency is the following (alleged) property of truth: if one possesses the concept of truth, then to assert, believe, inquire whether it is true that S just is to assert, believe, inquire whether S (and conversely). It might appear (as it did to Frege in 'Thoughts') that if truth ascriptions were transparent, then the truth predicate must be redundant; but the fact that some truth ascriptions are not transparent-for instance, those that quantify over, (...)
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  11. Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
    Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called ?need-for-closure?) relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy of (...)
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  12.  16
    Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson & Bart van Bezooijen - unknown -
    It is a natural assumption in mainstream epistemological theory that ascriptions of knowledge of a proposition p track strength of epistemic position vis-à-vis p. It is equally natural to assume that the strength of one’s epistemic position is maximally high in cases where p concerns a simple analytic truth. For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that one's epistemic position vis-à-vis “a cat is a cat” is harder to improve than one's position vis-à-vis “a cat is on the (...)
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  13.  85
    The Context Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.N. Kompa - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):1-18.
    According to contextualist accounts, the truth value of a given knowledge ascription may vary with features of the ascriber's context. As a result, the following may be true: "X doesn't know that P but Y says something true in asserting 'X knows that P'". The contextualist must defend his theory in the light of this unpleasant but inevitable consequence. The best way of doing this is to construe the context sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions not as deriving from an (...)
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  14. Contextualism, Relativism, and the Semantics of Knowledge Ascriptions.Elke Brendel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):101-117.
    It is argued that neither contextualism nor relativism can provide a satisfying semantics of knowledge ascriptions. According to contextualism, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions of the form “S knows that p” vary with the epistemic standards operative in the contexts of utterance. These epistemic standards are determined, in particular, by the speaker’s stakes with regard to p or the consideration of error-possibilities. It is shown that the absolute concept of utterance truth together with a knowledge (...)
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  15.  34
    Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson & Bart van Bezooijen - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.
    It is a natural assumption in mainstream epistemological theory that ascriptions of knowledge of a proposition p track strength of epistemic position vis-à-vis p. It is equally natural to assume that the strength of one’s epistemic position is maximally high in cases where p concerns a simple analytic truth. For instance, it seems reasonable to suppose that one’s epistemic position vis-à-vis “a cat is a cat” is harder to improve than one’s position vis-à-vis “a cat is on the (...)
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  16. 'Knowledge' Ascriptions, Social Roles and Semantics.Robin McKenna - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):335-350.
    The idea that the concept ‘knowledge’ has a distinctive function or social role is increasingly influential within contemporary epistemology. Perhaps the best-known account of the function of ‘knowledge’ is that developed in Edward Craig’s Knowledge and the state of nature (1990, OUP), on which (roughly) ‘knowledge’ has the function of identifying good informants. Craig’s account of the function of ‘knowledge’ has been appealed to in support of a variety of views, and in this paper I’m concerned with the claim that (...)
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  17. Dispositions and Their Ascriptions.Michael Fara - 2001 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    The central question addressed in this dissertation is, What, in the most general terms, is required for an object to have a disposition? In the formal mode, this is just the question, What are the truth conditions of disposition ascriptions, sentences of the form "N is disposed to M when C"? The dissertation begins by criticizing existing answers to this question, answers which consist in accounts of disposition ascriptions according to which they entail conditionals of one form (...)
     
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  18.  17
    The Argument From Ignorance Against Truth-Conditional Semantics.Paul Saka - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):157 - 169.
    According to orthodox semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-conditions. Against this view I observe that we typically do not know the truth-conditions of the sentences we understand. We do not know the truth-conditions, for instance, of empty definite descriptions, non-declaratives, subjunctive conditionals, causal ascriptions, belief ascriptions, probability statements, figurative language, category mistakes, normative judgments, or vague statements. Appealing to tacit knowledge does not help, for the problem goes beyond (...)
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  19.  21
    The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions.A. Minh Nguyen - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (01):103-.
    ABSTRACT: What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. (...)
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  20.  10
    Lewis, Loar and the Logical Form of Attitude Ascriptions.S. Beck - 1988 - South African Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):100-104.
    In this article, the attempts by David Lewis and Brian Loar to make perspicuous the logical form of sentences ascribing propositional attitudes to individuals are set out and criticized. Both work within the assumption of the truth of 'type' physicalism, and require that logically perspicuous attitude ascriptions be compatible with the demands of such a doctrine. It is argued that neither carry out this task successfully - Lewis's perspicuous ascriptions have counter-intuitive implications, while Loar's avoidance of these (...)
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  21.  24
    A Deflationist Theory of Intentionality? Brandom's Analysis of de Re Specifying Attitude-Ascriptions.Sebastian Knell - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):73-90.
    The paper presents an interpretation of Brandom¿s analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. According to this interpretation, his analysis amounts to a deflationist conception of intentionality. In the first section I sketch the specific role deflationist theories of truth play within the philosophical debate on truth. Then I describe some analogies between the contemporary constellation of competing truth theories and the current confrontation of controversial theories of intentionality. The second section gives a short summary of Brandom¿s (...)
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  22. Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions.Graeme Forbes - unknown -
    This paper is about a substitution-failure in attitude ascriptions, but not the one you think. A standard view about the semantic shape of ‘that’-clause attitude ascriptions is that they are fundamentally relational. The attitude verb expresses a binary relation whose extension, if not empty, is a collection of pairs each of which consists in an individual and a proposition, while the ‘that’-clause is a term for a proposition. One interesting problem this view faces is that, within the scope (...)
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  23.  11
    Belief, Truth and Virtue.Michael-John Turp - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):91-104.
    In this paper, I defend the view that truth is a constitutive norm of belief formation, argue in favour of a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic evaluation and respond to possible objections. In §1, I argue that belief necessarily aims at truth. In §2, I defend a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemic evaluation in response to concerns about epistemic luck and doxastic control. In §3, I distinguish between evaluative and deontic norms in order to avoid the charge that we are (...)
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  24.  3
    A Deflationist Theory of Intentionality?: Brandom’s Analysis of de Re Specifying Attitude-Ascriptions.Sebastian Knell - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):73-90.
    The paper presents an interpretation of Brandom's analysis of de re specifying attitude-ascriptions. According to this interpretation, his analysis amounts to a deflationist conception of intentionality. In the first section I sketch the specific role deflationist theories of truth play within the philosophical debate on truth. Then I describe some analogies between the contemporary constellation of competing truth theories and the current confrontation of controversial theories of intentionality. The second section gives a short summary of Brandom's (...)
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  25. Review of Terms and Truth[REVIEW]Ben Caplan - unknown -
    Alan Berger’s Terms and Truth covers various expressionsparticularly names and anaphoric pronouns, but also demonstratives and general termsas they occur in various linguistic contexts, including identity sentences, belief ascriptions, and negative existentials. A central thesis of Berger’s book is that all of these expressions are rigid designators. (So I assume that Berger would say, contrary to what the subtitle might suggest, that anaphoric reference is direct reference.).
     
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  26. 'Knows’ Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary (...)
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  27.  71
    Zombies Defeated: A Projectivist Account of Third-Person Consciousness Ascriptions.Howard J. Simmons - manuscript -
    I defend an argument from Lauren Ashwell and Eric Marcus to the effect that the zombie idea is meaningless. I consider whether this idea could be saved from the force of the argument by adopting a projectivist account of third-person consciousness ascriptions. I decide that it cannot, but commend that account anyway.
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  28.  49
    A Short Outline of the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge.Igal Kvart - manuscript -
    Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate sub-accounts in terms of chances should (...)
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  29.  35
    Sellars on the Function of Semantic Vocabulary.Lionel Shapiro - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):792-811.
    This paper examines two explanations Sellars gives, at successive stages of his career, of how semantic vocabulary lets us relate linguistic expressions to extra-linguistic reality. Despite their differences, both explanations reveal a distinctive pragmatist approach. According to Sellars, we do not use semantic vocabulary to describe language-world relations. Rather, our taking language to relate to the world is implicit in the moves licensed by our semantic assertions. I argue that Sellars's discussions of the function of semantic vocabulary point to an (...)
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  30.  13
    A Sense-Based, Process Model of Belief.Robert F. Hadley - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):279-320.
    A process-oriented model of belief is presented which permits the representation of nested propositional attitudes within first-order logic. The model (NIM, for nested intensional model) is axiomatized, sense-based (via intensions), and sanctions inferences involving nested epistemic attitudes, with different agents and different times. Because NIM is grounded upon senses, it provides a framework in which agents may reason about the beliefs of another agent while remaining neutral with respect to the syntactic forms used to express the latter agent's beliefs. Moreover, (...)
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  31. Dispositions and Interferences.Gabriele Contessa - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.
    The Simple Counterfactual Analysis (SCA) was once considered the most promising analysis of disposition ascriptions. According to SCA, disposition ascriptions are to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. In the last few decades, however, SCA has become the target of a battery of counterexamples. In all counterexamples, something seems to be interfering with a certain object’s having or not having a certain disposition thus making the truth-values of the disposition ascription and of its associated counterfactual come (...)
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  32.  43
    Conditionals and Propositions in Semantics.Daniel Rothschild - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):781-791.
    IntroductionThe project of giving an account of meaning in natural languages goes largely by assigning truth-conditional content to sentences. I will call the view that sentences have truth-conditional content propositionalism as it is common to identify the truth-conditional content of a sentence with the proposition it expresses. This content plays an important role in our explanations of the speech-acts, attitude ascriptions, and the meaning of sentences when they appear as parts of longer sentences. Much work in (...)
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  33.  61
    Too Good to Be “Just True”.Marcus Rossberg - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-8.
    Paraconsistent and dialetheist approaches to a theory of truth are faced with a problem: the expressive resources of the logic do not suffice to express that a sentence is just true—i.e., true and not also false—or to express that a sentence is consistent. In his recent book, Spandrels of Truth, Jc Beall proposes a ‘just true’-operator to identify sentences that are true and not also false. Beall suggests seven principles that a ‘just true’-operator must fulfill, and proves that (...)
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  34.  54
    The Pragmatics of Pragmatic Encroachment.Matt Lutz - 2013 - Synthese 191 (8):1-24.
    The goal of this paper is to defend Simple Modest Invariantism (SMI) about knowledge from the threat presented by pragmatic encroachment. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical circumstances are relevant in some way to the truth of knowledge ascriptions—and if this is true, it would entail the falsity of SMI. Drawing on Ross and Schroeder’s recent Reasoning Disposition account of belief, I argue that the Reasoning Disposition account, together with Grice’s Maxims, gives us an attractive pragmatic account (...)
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  35.  62
    Action-Directed Pragmatics Secures Semantically Autonomous Knowledge.Igal Kvart - manuscript -
    In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic infringement – that a significant pragmatic ingredient figures significantly in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. As candidates, epistemic contextualism and Relativism flaunted conversational standards, and Stanley's SSI promoted stakes. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by obviously pragmatic examples of knowledge ascriptions that seem to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to (...)
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  36. Trumping Assessments and the Aristotelian Future.Crispin Wright - 2008 - Synthese 166 (2):309 - 331.
    In the paper we argue that truth-relativism is potentially hostage to a problem of exhibiting witnesses of its own truth. The problem for the relativist stems from acceptance of a trumping principle according to which there is a dependency between ascriptions of truth of an utterance and ascriptions of truth to other ascriptions of truth of that utterance. We argue that such a dependency indeed holds in the case of future contingents and (...)
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  37.  86
    True Belief Reports and the Sharing of Beliefs.Heimir Geirsson - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342.
    In recent years Russell´s view that there are singular propositions, namely propositions that contain the individuals they are about, has gained followers. As a response to a number of puzzles about attitude ascriptions several Russellians (as I will call those who accept the view that proper names and indexicals only contribute their referents to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur), including David Kaplan and Nathan Salmon, have drawn a distinction between what proposition is believed and (...)
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  38.  50
    Curing Folk Psychology of Arthritis.Michael McKinsey - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.
    Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither (...)
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  39.  12
    How to Be an Expressivist About Avowals Today.Ángel García Rodríguez - forthcoming - Nordic Wittgenstein Review.
    According to expressivism about avowals, the meaning of typical self-ascriptions of mental states is a matter of expressing an attitude, rather than describing a state of affairs. Traditionally, expressivism has been glossed as the view that, qua expressions, avowals are not truth-evaluable. Contemporary neoexpressivists like Finkelstein and Bar-On have argued that avowals are expressions, and truth-evaluable besides . In contrast, this paper provides a defence of the view that avowals are, qua expressions, truth-evaluable. This defence is (...)
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  40. Expression, Truth, and Reality : Some Variations on Themes From Wright.Dorit Bar-On - 2012 - In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.
    Expressivism, broadly construed, is the view that the function of utterances in a given area of discourse is to give expression to our sentiments or other (non-cognitive) mental states or attitudes, rather than report or describe some range of facts. This view naturally seems an attractive option wherever it is suspected that there may not be a domain of facts for the given discourse to be describing. Familiarly, to avoid commitment to ethical facts, the ethical expressivist suggests that ethical utterances (...)
     
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  41.  14
    Pretense and Pathology: Philosophical Fictionalism and its Applications.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish various species of fictionalism, locating and defending their own version of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that arise from ordinary language, they consider such issues as the problem of non-being, plural identity claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, meaning attributions, and truth-talk. They consider 'deflationism about truth', explaining why deflationists should be fictionalists, and show how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar (...)
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  42. Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them.Mark Richard - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way (...)
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  43. Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
    Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is the most recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, (...)
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  44. Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, (...)
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  45. Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.
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  46. Reason, Truth, and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
    Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.
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  47. Truth and Ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.
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  48. Arguing for Shifty Epistemology.J. Fantl & M. McGrath - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 55--74.
    Shifty epistemologists allow that the truth value of “knowledge”-ascriptions can vary not merely because of such differences, but because of factors not traditionally deemed to matter to whether someone knows, like salience of error possibilities and practical stakes. Thus, contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists are both examples. This paper examines two strategies for arguing for shifty epistemology: the argument-from-instances strategy, which attempts to show that the truth-value of knowledge-ascriptions can vary by proposing cases in which they vary (...)
     
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  49. Competing Epistemic Spaces.Mark Navin - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (2):241-264.
    Recent increases in the rates of parental refusal of routine childhood vaccination have eroded many countries’ “herd immunity” to communicable diseases. Some parents who refuse routine childhood vaccines do so because they deny the mainstream medical consensus that vaccines are safe and effective. I argue that one reason these vaccine denialists disagree with vaccine proponents about the reasons in favor of vaccination is because they also disagree about the sorts of practices that are conducive to good reasoning about healthcare choices. (...)
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  50.  51
    Diachronic Realism About Successful Theories.Alberto Cordero - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 43:51-66.
    The success of a scientific theory T is not an all-or-nothing matter; nor is a theory something one can usually accept or reject in toto (i.e. one may take T as being "approximately true", or take as true just certain "parts" of it, without necessarily affirming every posit and claim specific to T as being either completely right or completely wrong). This, however, raises questions about precisely which parts of T deserve to be taken as approximately true. on the basis (...)
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