Results for 'Truth-conditions'

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  1.  25
    Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule‐Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Noûs 32 (S12):313-348.
  2. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.Anne Bezuidenhout - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:105-134.
    Introduction The mainstream view in philosophy of language is that sentence meaning determines truth-conditions. A corollary is that the truth or falsity of an utterance depends only on what words mean and how the world is arranged. Although several prominent philosophers (Searle, Travis, Recanati, Moravcsik) have challenged this view, it has proven hard to dislodge. The alternative view holds that meaning underdetermines truth-conditions. What is expressed by the utterance of a sentence in a context goes (...)
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  3. Why Truth-Conditional Semantics in Generative Linguistics is Still the Better Bet.Toby Napoletano - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):673-692.
    In his “Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar” (Erkenntnis 2015, 61–87), Stephen Schiffer argues that truth-conditional semantics is a poor fit with generative linguistics. In particular, he thinks that it fails to explain speakers’ abilities to understand the sentences of their language. In its place, he recommends his “Best Bet Theory”—a theory which aims to directly explain speakers’ abilities to mean things by their utterances and know what others mean by their utterances. I argue that Schiffer does not (...)
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  4. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.François Recanati - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This book argues against the traditional understanding of the semantics/pragmatics divide and puts forward a radical alternative. Through half a dozen case studies, it shows that what an utterance says cannot be neatly separated from what the speaker means. In particular, the speaker's meaning endows words with senses that are tailored to the situation of utterance and depart from the conventional meanings carried by the words in isolation. This phenomenon of ‘pragmatic modulation’ must be taken into account in theorizing about (...)
  5. Truth Conditions and the Meanings of Ethical Terms1.Alex Silk - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:195.
  6. Truth conditions and communication.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):827-862.
    The paper addresses itself to the "Homeric struggle" in the theory of meaning between those (e.g., Grice) who try to analyze declarative meaning in terms of an intention to induce a belief and those (e.g., Davidson) for who declarative meaning consists in truth conditions. (The point of departure is Strawson's celebrated discussion of this issue, in his Inaugural Lecture.) I argue that neither style of analysis is satisfactory, and develop a "hybrid" that may be-although what I take from (...)
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  7. The truth conditions of sentences with referentially used definite descriptions.Wenqi Li - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (34):1-22.
    Keith Donnellan’s distinction between the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions has spurred debates regarding the truth conditions of the utterance “the F is G” with definite descriptions used referentially. In this article, I present a semantic account of referential descriptions, grounded in the contextual factors of the utterance, including the speaker’s intention and presupposition as well as the interlocutor’s recognition of them. This account is called the IPR-semantic account, according to which the speaker’s intention (I), presupposition (...)
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  8. On truth-conditions for if (but not quite only if ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those (...)
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  9. Truth-conditional pragmatics.Francois Recanati - 1998 - In Asa Kasher (ed.), Pragmatics: Critical Concepts. pp. 509-511.
  10. Truth conditions of tensed sentence types.L. A. Paul - 1997 - Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
    Quentin Smith has argued that the new tenseless theory of time is faced with insurmountable problems and should be abandoned in favour of the tensed theory of time. Smith;s main argument attacks the fundamental premise of the tenseless theory: that tenseless truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences adequately capture the meaning of tensed sentences. His position is that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical relations between tensed sentences, thus the tensed theory must be accepted. (...)
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  11.  84
    Truth conditions and their recognition.Alex Barber - 2003 - In Epistemology of language. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers and defends a particular version of the view that it is the intentions with which it is performed that determine the truth conditions of an utterance. A competing version, implied by Grice's work on meaning, is rejected as inadequate. This latter is incompatible with the phenomenon of anti-lying: performing a true utterance with the intention that one's audience believe it to be false. In place of the quasi-Gricean version, the paper maintains that an utterance is (...)
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  12. Truth-conditional content and conversational implicature.Robyn Carston - 2004 - In Claudia Bianchi (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. CSLI Publications. pp. 65--100.
     
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  13. Truth-conditions, truth-bearers and the new B-theory of time.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344.
    In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure (...)
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  14. Truth-conditions, bivalence, and verification.John McDowell - 1976 - In Gareth Evans & John Henry McDowell (eds.), Truth and meaning: essays in semantics. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press.
  15. Truth Conditions: A Causal Theory.Anthony Appiah - 1986 - In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, mind and logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 25--45.
  16.  68
    A truth-conditional formulation of Karttunen's account of presupposition.Stanley Peters - 1979 - Synthese 40 (2):301-316.
    Karttunen's seminal 1973 article Presuppositions of compound sentences, lays the groundwork for the elegant and fruitful theory of this subject which he subsequently presented in (1974). In (1973, pp. 185–8), however, he fallaciously argued that the regularities he discovered concerning the behavior of and, or, and if ... then in English cannot be embodied in any three-valued logic giving a truth-functional interpretation to these connectives. The present paper refutes Karttunen's argument by exhibiting an interpretation with the desired properties, and (...)
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  17.  23
    Truth Conditions and Behaviourism.Kai Michael Büttner - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):41-57.
    Quine tries to combine truth conditional semantics with linguistic behaviourism. To this end, he identifies the truth conditions of a sentence with the conditions that prompt speakers to assign truth or falsity to the sentence. The first problem with this conception is that truth conditions determine not when truth-value assignments are made, but when they are correct. This fact vitiates Quine’s account of observation sentences (section 2). A second difficulty pertains only to (...)
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  18. Functional role and truth conditions.Ned Block - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):157-181.
    Ned Block, John Campbell; Functional Role and Truth Conditions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 273–292, https:/.
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  19.  98
    Singular truth-conditions without singular propositions.Gregory Bochner - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2741-2760.
    In this paper I argue that propositionalism is what generates a tension between referentialism and harmony. Harmony can be preserved if we replace propositionalism by centred referentialism, according to which referential thoughts and utterances about an object have descriptive contents that must be evaluated relative to a world centred on that object at the relevant time. By disentangling truth-conditions and contents, this move allows us to dissolve the tension between referentialism and descriptivism. The view that emerges has three (...)
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  20.  74
    Meaning, TruthConditions, Proposition: Frege's Doctrine of Sense Retrieved, Resumed and Redeployed in the Light of Certain Recent Criticisms.David Wiggins - 1992 - Dialectica 46 (1):61-90.
    This article first recounts the history of the truth‐conditional conception of meaning from Frege to the present day, emphasizing both points that are neglected in receidev accounts of this history and points of permanent philosophical interest. It then concludes with a review of certain current objections to the truth‐conditional conception and seeks to answer the difficulties pressed by Stephen Schiffer in Remnants of Meaning, offering certain fresh considerations upon the question what it is for two speech action to (...)
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  21.  31
    Truth-Conditional Cognitivism and the Lexical Problem.Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2019 - Topoi 40 (1):43-54.
    When dealing with ‘meaning’ or related notions, one cannot ignore what for a long time was the dominant paradigm in semantics. According to such paradigm, truth-conditional formal semantics for natural language is a theory of semantic competence. In this article, I shall discuss a foundational problem for such semantic program. I shall first be following authors who claim that truth-conditional formal semantics is unable to provide a complete account of lexical competence, and, therefore, it suffers from incompleteness. Moreover, (...)
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  22.  30
    Truth-Conditions and Contradiction.Douglas Odegard - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (4):363 - 372.
    Applying truth-conditions to sentences about the world seems to generate paradoxes unless their application is restricted. We can avoid such restrictions by refusing to apply logical laws to sentences the truth-values of which cannot possibly be established by applying truth-conditions. Such a refusal is reasonable, since the point of logic is to help us make justified truth claims. And the basis for the refusal allows us to avoid a surprisingly wide range of contradictions, without (...)
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  23. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica, Unam.
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  24. Outline for a Truth-Conditional Semantics for Tense.Ernest Lepore & Kirk Ludwig - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Tense, Time and Reference. MIT Press. pp. 49-105.
    Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or (...)
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  25. How important are truth-conditions for truth-conditional semantics?Toby Napoletano - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (6):541-575.
    In this paper, I argue that while truth-conditional semantics in generative linguistics provides lots of good semantic explanations, truth-conditions do not play an important role in these explanations. That is, the fact that expressions have the particular truthconditional contents they have does not even partly explain facts about semantic phenomena. Rather, explanations of semantic phenomena appeal to extra-truth-conditional properties attributed to expressions via their lexical entries. Focusing on recent truth-conditional work on gradable adjectives and degree (...)
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  26. Truth-conditional variability of color ascriptions: empirical results concerning the polysemy hypothesis.Adrian Ziółkowski & Tomasz Zyglewicz - forthcoming - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Recent experimental work has shown that the truth-value judgments of color predications, i.e. utterances of the form “the leaves on my tree are green” or “these walls are brown,” are influenced by slight changes in the context of utterance (Hansen and Chemla 2013, Ziółkowski, 2021). Most explanations of this phenomenon focus on the semantics of color adjectives. However, it is not clear if these explanations do justice to the nuances of the empirical data on context-sensitivity of color predications (Ziółkowski, (...)
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  27. Tokens, Dates And Tenseless Truth Conditions.Heather Dyke - 2002 - Synthese 131 (3):329-351.
    There are two extant versions of the new tenseless theory of time: the date versionand the token-reflexive version. I ask whether they are equivalent, and if not, whichof them is to be preferred. I argue that they are not equivalent, that the date version isunsatisfactory, and that the token-reflexive version is correct. I defend the token-reflexive version against a string of objections from Quentin Smith. My defence involves a discussion of the ontological and semantic significance of truth conditions, (...)
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  28. Analogical Truth-Conditions for Metaphors.Eric Steinhart - 1994 - Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 9 (3):161-178.
    It has often been said that metaphors are based on analogies, but the nature of this relation has never been made precise. This article rigorously and formally specifies two semantic relations that do obtain between some metaphors and analogies. We argue that analogies often provide conditions of meaningfulness and truth for metaphors. An analogy is treated as an isomorphism from a source to topic domain. Metaphors are thought of as surface structures. Formal analogical conditions of meaningfulness and (...)
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  29. Decision Theory: Yes! Truth Conditions: No!Nate Charlow - 2016 - In Nate Charlow Matthew Chrisman (ed.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    This essay makes the case for, in the phrase of Angelika Kratzer, packing the fruits of the study of rational decision-making into our semantics for deontic modals—specifically, for parametrizing the truth-condition of a deontic modal to things like decision problems and decision theories. Then it knocks it down. While the fundamental relation of the semantic theory must relate deontic modals to things like decision problems and theories, this semantic relation cannot be intelligibly understood as representing the conditions under (...)
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  30. Propositional structure and truth conditions.Michael McGlone - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):211-225.
    This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s immediate structural features are related to its core truth-conditional features. The leading idea is that for a proposition to have a certain immediate structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Jeffery King and Scott Soames.
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  31. Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions.Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
  32. Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.William G. Lycan - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  33. Truth-conditions and the nature of truth: Re-solving mixed conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
    Alethic pluralism, on one version of the view , is the idea that truth is to be identified with different properties in different domains of discourse. 1 Whilst we operate with a univocal concept of truth, and a uniform truth predicate, the thought is that the truth property changes from one domain to the next. So the truth property for talk about the nature and state of the material world may be different from the (...) property for moral discourse .Tappolet challenged alethic pluralism by asking how it can account for the truth of mixed compounds, such as a mixed conjunction like ‘this cat is wet and funny’, where each of the conjuncts are from different domains of discourse, and thus assessable in terms of different truth properties. She argues that the alethic pluralist is left in a dilemma: either admit of a ‘generic’ truth property, which can be possessed by propositions from all domains, thus rendering the plural ways of being true obsolete, or deny the truth of mixed conjunctions.In Edwards 2008, I argued that there is route out of Tappolet's dilemma. Briefly, I suggested that we acknowledge that the truth of a mixed conjunction is dependent on the truth of its conjuncts, and we should explain the truth of the conjunction by saying that it is true just in case each of its conjuncts is true. This, I argued, gives us an account of the truth of the conjunction without needing to appeal to a troublesome ‘generic’ truth property.Aaron Cotnoir criticizes my solution to Tappolet's problem. Cotnoir argues that my solution to the problem admits of an unacceptable ‘proliferation’ of truth properties, and smuggles in a generic truth property. I …. (shrink)
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  34.  58
    Truth-conditions and Criteria.Crispin Wright - 1976 - In Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. pp. 47--69.
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  35.  88
    Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?Lionel Shapiro - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):1-27.
    Hartry Field has proposed a fundamental division of theories of linguistic and mental content into those that do, and those that don’t, give a central role to ‘that’-clause ascriptions. Here I investigate the commitments of theories that (in accord with Field’s position) deny ‘that’-clause ascriptions a central role, but (in contrast to Field’s position) give truth conditions a central role. Such non-oblique truth-conditionalism promises significant advantages. However, the stance is costlier than it may appear. Non-oblique truth-conditionalists, (...)
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  36. Are utterance truth-conditions systematically determined?Claudia Picazo - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (8):1020-1041.
    ABSTRACT Truth-conditions are systematically determined when they are the output of an algorithmic procedure that takes as input a set of semantic and contextual features. Truth-conditional sceptics have cast doubts on the thesis that truth-conditions are systematic in this sense. Against this form of scepticism, Schoubye and Stokke : 759–793) and Dobler : 451–474.) have provided systematic analyses of utterance truth-conditions. My aim is to argue that these theories are not immune to the (...)
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  37. Truth Conditions and Criteria.Roger Scruton & Crispin Wright - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:193-245.
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  38. What’s wrong with truth-conditional accounts of slurs.Bianca Cepollaro & Tristan Thommen - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (4):333-347.
    The aim of this paper is to provide arguments based on linguistic evidence that discard a truth-conditional analysis of slurs and pave the way for more promising approaches. We consider Hom and May’s version of TCA, according to which the derogatory content of slurs is part of their truth-conditional meaning such that, when slurs are embedded under semantic operators such as negation, there is no derogatory content that projects out of the embedding. In order to support this view, (...)
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  39. Chomskyan Arguments Against Truth-Conditional Semantics Based on Variability and Co-predication.Agustín Vicente - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):919-940.
    In this paper I try to show that semantics can explain word-to-world relations and that sentences can have meanings that determine truth-conditions. Critics like Chomsky typically maintain that only speakers denote, i.e., only speakers, by using words in one way or another, represent entities or events in the world. However, according to their view, individual acts of denotations are not explained just by virtue of speakers’ semantic knowledge. Against this view, I will hold that, in the typical cases (...)
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  40. Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:313-48.
  41. Truth conditional discourse semantics for parentheticals.Asher Nicholas - 2000 - Journal of Semantics 17 (1).
     
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  42. Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Critica 18 (52):3-39.
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  43. Determining truth conditions in signaling games.William F. Harms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):23 - 35.
    Evolving signaling systems can be said to induce partitions on the space of world states as they approach equilibrium. Formalizing this claim provides a general framework for understanding what it means for language to “cut nature at its seams”. In order to avoid taking our current best science as providing the adaptive target for all evolving systems, the state space of the world must be characterized exclusively in terms of the coincidence of stimuli and payoffs that drives the evolution of (...)
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  44.  52
    Truth Conditions for "Might" Counterfactuals.Kenneth G. Ferguson - 1987 - Review of Metaphysics 40 (3):483 - 494.
    According to david lewis, When the conditional excluded middle is accepted for would-Asserting counterfactuals, It becomes difficult or impossible to define their might-Asserting counterparts. But I provide a definition of "might" counterfactuals that does agree with cem: a "might" counterfactual is true iff its consequent is true at some antecedent-World within a set whose membership is determined by appeal to various categories of possibility.
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  45. Truth Conditions Without Interpretation.John Collins - 2001 - Sorites 13:52-71.
    Davidson has given us two theses: Tarski's format for truth definitions provides a format for theories of meaning and that the justification for a theory of language L as one of meaning is based upon the theory affording an informative interpretation of L-speakers. It will be argued, on the basis of a consideration of compositionality, that the Tarski format can indeed be re-jigged in line with . On the other hand, in opposition to , I shall commend a cognitive (...)
     
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  46. Logical Form and Truth-Conditions.Andrea Iacona - 2013 - Theoria 28 (3):439-457.
    This paper outlines a truth-conditional view of logical form, that is, a view according to which logical form is essentially a matter of truth-conditions. The main motivation for the view is a fact that seems crucial to logic. As _§_1 suggests, fundamental logical relations such as entailment or contradiction can formally be explained only if truth-conditions are formally represented.§2 spells out the view. _§_3 dwells on its anity with a conception of logical form that has (...)
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  47. Truth-conditional relativism and faultless disagreements.Marian Zouhar - 2013 - Filozofia 68 (7):549-561.
     
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  48.  7
    From Truth Conditions to Structured Propositions.Richard Schantz - 2012 - In Prospects for Meaning. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 259-286.
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  49. On Specifying Truth-Conditions.Agustín Rayo - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):385-443.
    This essay is a study of ontological commitment, focused on the special case of arithmetical discourse. It tries to get clear about what would be involved in a defense of the claim that arithmetical assertions are ontologically innocent and about why ontological innocence matters. The essay proceeds by questioning traditional assumptions about the connection between the objects that are used to specify the truth-conditions of a sentence, on the one hand, and the objects whose existence is required in (...)
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  50.  27
    Meaning, Truth Conditions and the Internal Point of View.Ch Goossens - 1989 - Philosophical Inquiry 11 (3-4):27-45.
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