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Tsung-Hsing Ho
National Chung Cheng University
  1. Epistemic Normativity as Performance Normativity.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2016 - Theoria 82 (3):274–284.
    Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is (...)
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    反思機器人的道德擬人主義.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2020 - EurAmerica 50 (2):179-205.
    如果機器人的發展要能如科幻想像一般,在沒有人類監督下自動地工作,就必須確定機器人不會做出道德上錯誤的行為。 根據行為主義式的道德主體觀,若就外顯行為來看,機器人在道德上的表現跟人類一般,機器人就可被視為道德主體。從這很自然地引伸出機器人的道德擬人主義:凡適用於人類的道德規則就適用於機器人。我反對道德擬人主義 ,藉由史特勞森對於人際關係與反應態度的洞見,並以家長主義行為為例,我論述由於機器人缺乏人格性,無法參與人際關係,因此在關於家長主義行為上,機器人應該比人類受到更嚴格的限制。.
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  3. Are There Any Epistemic Consequentialists?Tsung-Hsing Ho - forthcoming - Episteme:1-11.
    Selim Berker argues that epistemic consequentialism is pervasive in epistemology and that epistemic consequentialism is structurally flawed. is incorrect, however. I distinguish between epistemic consequentialism and epistemic instrumentalism and argue that most putative consequentialists should be considered instrumentalists. I also identify the structural problem of epistemic consequentialism Berker attempts to pinpoint and show that epistemic instrumentalism does not have the consequentialist problem.
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  4. 評:謝世民編《理由轉向:規範性之哲學研究》. [REVIEW]Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2017 - Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies 36:133-144.
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    Contrived Self‐Defense: A Case of Permissible Wrongdoing.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (3):211-220.
    It is widely held that a morally wrong action is morally impermissible. I discuss a case of contrived self-defense and argue that it is morally both wrong and permissible. I compare it with other kinds of morally permissible misbehavior (suberogation, moral dilemma, and right to do wrong) and show that it is significant and original.
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  6. Epistemic Value and Virtue Epistemology.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Southampton
    My contributions to the research on epistemic value can be divided into two parts: first, I pinpoint some causes of the problems about epistemic value which have not previously been identified; and, second, I offer novel accounts of epistemic value which offer better solutions to the problems about epistemic value. First, there are two trends in the literature on epistemic value that are rarely challenged: epistemologists tend to understand epistemic value in terms of intrinsic value from the epistemic point of (...)
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    How to Locate Pain in Mandarin: Reply to Liu and Klein.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2021 - National Taiwan University Philosophical Review 61:75-80.
    Some philosophers argue that pain is an object located in bodily parts because the locative form of pain report is permissible in English. To examine this argument, Liu and Klein recently argue that the linguistic argument cannot work because the locative form is impermissible in Mandarin. They are wrong, however. I demonstrate that the locative form in Mandarin is not only permissible but also common.
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  8. Kant and McDowell on Skepticism and Disjunctivism.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltburgerlicher Absicht: Akten Des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 761-770.
    This paper is to propose a new form of Kant’s anti-skepticism argument in light of John McDowell’s works on disjunctivism. I first discuss recent debates between McDowell and Crispin Wright on disjunctivism. I argue that Wright wrongly downplays McDowell’s disjunctivism, whose metaphysical claim that our perceptual faculties directly engage in the world has an epistemological implication that should be able to dismiss the skeptic’s imagery as fictitious. However, McDowell does not clearly offer such an argument. I will show that we (...)
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    Moral Difference Between Humans and Robots: Paternalism and Human-Relative Reason.Tsung-Hsing Ho - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    According to some philosophers, if moral agency is understood in behaviourist terms, robots could become moral agents that are as good as or even better than humans. Given the behaviourist conception, it is natural to think that there is no interesting moral difference between robots and humans in terms of moral agency. However, such moral differences exist: based on Strawson’s account of participant reactive attitude and Scanlon’s relational account of blame, I argue that a distinct kind of reason available to (...)
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  10. The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):379-388.
    It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p. This approach fails because it confuses two kinds of correctness norm: (1) It is correct for S to believe p if and only p; and (2) believing p is correct qua belief if and only if p. Only can (2) be said to be a (...)
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  11. The Suberogation Problem for Lei Zhong's Confucian Virtue Theory of Supererogation.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2019 - Philosophy East and West 69 (3):779-784.
    A virtue-based theory of right action aims to explain deontic moral principles in terms of virtue and vice. For example, it may maintain the following account of moral obligation: It is morally obligatory for an agent A to ϕ in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous and relevantly informed person V would characteristically ϕ in C. However, this account faces the so-called supererogation problem. A supererogatory action is an action that is morally praiseworthy but not morally obligatory. (...)
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