Tu (Chinese history and philosophy, Harvard U.) offers a panoramic view of the core values of Confucian intellectual thought that have kept it vital for more than two millennia, and underlie the recent resurgence in eastern Asia. Of interest to students of either China or religion and ethics. Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Mencius’ claim that human nature is good is well known among students of classical Confucian thought. It has been taken for granted that underlying Mencius’ deceptively simple thesis is an appeal to intuition. No persuasive argument is offered, except the insistence that the moral propensities, such as the “four germinations” are inherent in human nature. A corollary of this insistence is the unquestioned belief that human beings all have the inner ability to commiserate with others, to feel ashamed of themselves, (...) to have a sense of humbleness, and to differentiate right from wrong. And the only example of an attempt to “prove” the thesis which approximates a kind of empiricist procedure seems no more than a commensense observation. (shrink)

Tu Wei-ming is the foremost exponent of Confucian thought in the United States today. Over the last two decades he has been developing a creative scholarly interpretation of Confucian humanism as a living tradition. The result is a work of interpretive brilliance that revitalizes Confucian thought, making it a legitimate concern of contemporary philosophical reflections.

The primary purpose of Confucian education is character-building, and the starting point and source of inspiration for character-building is self-cultivation. This deceptively simple assertion is predicated on the vision of the human as a learner, who is endowed with the authentic possibility of transforming given structural constraints into dynamic processes of self-realization. The true function of education as characterbuilding is learning to be human. Paideia or humanitas is, in its core concern, educating the art of embodiment. Through embodiment we realize (...) ourselves (body, mind-heart, soul, and spirit) in community, nature, and Heaven. (shrink)

This is an excerpted version of a plenary address entitled “Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality Humanity and Rightness: Exploring Confucian Democracy”, presented at the 7th East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the East-West Center, Honolulu, January 1995. Published with permission of the author.

This paper compares the idea of embodied reasoning by Confucian Tu Wei-Ming and Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. They have similar concerns about the problems of secular modernity, that is, the domination of instrumental reason and disembodied rationality. Both of them suggest that we have to explore a kind of embodied moral reasoning. I show that their theories of embodiment have many similarities: the body is an instrument for our moral knowledge and self-understanding; such knowledge is inevitably a kind of (...) bodily knowledge. I will also demonstrate how the differences between their theories can be mutually enriched. While Taylor has provided a philosophical account of the foundation of moral epistemology, Tu’s emphasis of ritual practice and the integration of knowing, doing and being seems to offer a more fully embodied understanding of the moral self. (shrink)

Wei-ming’s discourse has been badly understood by some Western philosophers who study Confucianism. I suggest that this misunderstanding stems from the fact that these philosophers fail to realize that Confucian discourse is in an entirely different register from Western philosophical discourse. I then propose my own preliminary definition of Confucian discourse in five points and present a structural analysis of a text by Tu Wei-ming. Finally, I consider which features of Tu’s discourse can properly be called Confucian. The answer (...) to this question reflects not only on Tu but also on Confucian discourse and the study of Confucianism in general. (shrink)

Du Weiming xian sheng shi dang dai yan jiu he chuan bo ru jia wen hua de zhong yao si xiang jia. Ta 1940 nian chu sheng yu Kunming, xian hou qiu xue yu Taiwan dong hai da xue he Meiguo Hafo da xue, ren jiao yu Pulinsidun da xue, Bokeli Jiazhou da xue. Zi 1981 nian, Du Weiming xian sheng yi zhi zai Hafo da xue Dong Ya xi dan ren li shi ji zhe xue jiao shou,qi jian huo (...) xuan Meiguo ren wen she hui ke xue yuan yuan shi, hai ceng dan ren Hafo Yanjing xue she she zhang. Chang qi yi lai, Du Weiming xian sheng zhi li yu ru xue di 3 qi fa zhan, quan shi Zhongguo wen hua, fan si xian dai jing shen, chang dao wen ming dui hua, zai hai nei wai xiang you hen gao de xue shu sheng yu. Du xian sheng fei chang re xin Zhongguo you xiu chuan tong wen hua zai ben tu de chuan bo, duo ci hui guo can jia jiao yu he xue shu jiao liu huo dong. Ta yu Beijing da xue you zhe te shu de yuan fen,zao zai 1985 nian jiu lai Beijing da xue jiang shou ru jia zhe xue. Zui jin Du Weiming xian sheng yi zheng shi shou pin wei Beijing da xue gao deng ren wen yan jiu yuan yuan zhang. (shrink)

Abstract:Tu develops his idea of tizhi 体知 primarily or at least initially to characterize the Neo-Confucian idea of knowledge of/as virtue in contrast to knowledge from hearing and seeing. Instead of depending upon our sense organs' perceptions of external things and events, it relies upon the comprehension of our xin; instead of purely intellectual understanding of the mind aspect of xin, it is more due to the affective experiences of the heart aspect of xin; and instead of merely a piece (...) of knowledge added to its possessor, it is existentially transformative of its possessor. Knowledge of such a nature can be accounted for neither by our traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief nor by Ryle's knowing-how. It is a third type of knowledge, knowing-to. In this sense, it is a significant contribution that Tu's Confucian idea can make to contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

This paper evaluates Tu Wei-ming's proposal that the Confucian ideal model of human society should be viewed as a fiduciary community. To do the evaluation, I provide a systematic elaboration of Tu's proposal, which is essentially absent in Tu's writings, and a systematic explication of the Confucian theory of fiduciarity, which is supposed to be the theoretical foundation of Tu's proposal but is completely absent in the studies of Confucianism, including Tu's own. On the basis of these studies, I (...) conclude that the notion of fiduciary community is entailed by the Confucian tradition; tapping the resource of the Confucian tradition for appreciating, supporting and justifying a properly defined model of fiduciary society is practically relevant and important to the modern world; however, given Tu's own definition, the model of fiduciary community does not sufficiently characterise the Confucian ideal society. In the end, I suggest a new way to study Confucian social ideals. (shrink)

本书以近代文明冲突为视角,通过对梁漱溟与陈序经这样两个思想极端对立的代表性人物的比较研究,对中国伦理社会的历史由来、内在特质、近代考验、未来可能等作了一番梳理,并对中国传统文化的出路等问题作了进一步的 认识和思考 --.