Se propone rastrear la interpretación que Schiller lleva a cabo en las Cartas sobre la educación estética del hombre del análisis kantiano del juicio de gusto puro como asociado con una suspensión de toda determinación que hace posible la experiencia de la belleza. Para Schiller, esto resulta en una temporalidad de lo bello experimentada como suspensión, que se torna adicionalmente en una suspensión de la temporalidad. El artículo muestra cómo este concepto resulta esencial para el concepto de crítica estética en (...) Schiller, que se relaciona con una capacidad de la experiencia estética de desactivar formas de violencia que, según el diagnóstico que Schiller propone en las Cartas, saturan su presente histórico. Con ello, el artículo pretende mostrar la pertinencia de la obra de Schiller para la configuración de este aspecto de la crítica filosófica-histórica. (shrink)

This study of Walter Benjamin’s ‘theory of fortune,’ understood as a contribution to the ‘theory of events,’ focuses on a detailed reading of a notebook entry from 1932, published under the title ‘Practice.’ In that note Benjamin cites one ordinary example of a ‘fortunate event’: you lose an object, look for it, fail to find it, forget about it; later on, you look for a second object and find the first one. Benjamin describes this event, the finding of an object (...) that you are no longer looking for, as an event that can be attributed to your hand. The concept of a “remnant volition” determines the singular sense in which, in this example, you still wanted to find the first object, although the volition to do so was not active when you were looking for the second object. A volition can be remnant, generally speaking, when it is disjoined from the agent’s anticipation of its fulfillment. Thus, a fortunate event is the fulfillment of a remnant volition by an agent’s body, and practice is a form of activity that makes this possible, for it allows an agent’s will to “abdicate in favor of the body.” In my reading of this notebook entry I contrast Benjamin’s account of practice to Aristotle’s; I argue for a reactivation of the concept of ‘lucre’; and I determine the relevance of this account to Benjamin’s understanding of Proust’s theory of ‘aesthetic commitment.’ I also consider some implications of this odd conceptual construction for the philosophy of action. (shrink)

This study of Walter Benjamin’s ‘theory of fortune,’ understood as a contribution to the ‘theory of events,’ focuses on a detailed reading of a notebook entry from 1932, published under the title ‘Practice.’ In that note Benjamin cites one ordinary example of a ‘fortunate event’: you lose an object, look for it, fail to find it, forget about it; later on, you look for a second object and find the first one. Benjamin describes this event, the finding of an object (...) that you are no longer looking for, as an event that can be attributed to your hand. The concept of a “remnant volition” determines the singular sense in which, in this example, you still wanted to find the first object, although the volition to do so was not active when you were looking for the second object. A volition can be remnant, generally speaking, when it is disjoined from the agent’s anticipation of its fulfillment. Thus, a fortunate event is the fulfillment of a remnant volition by an agent’s body, and practice is a form of activity that makes this possible, for it allows an agent’s will to “abdicate in favor of the body.” In my reading of this notebook entry I contrast Benjamin’s account of practice to Aristotle’s; I argue (by way of Benveniste) for a reactivation of the concept of ‘lucre’; and I determine the relevance of this account to Benjamin’s (and our) understanding of Proust’s theory of ‘aesthetic commitment.’ I also consider some implications of this odd conceptual construction for the philosophy of action. (shrink)

This reading of the ‘Erkenntnis-kritische Vorrede’ to the Ursprungdes deutsches Trauerspiels attempts to determine the way in which Benjamin carries out, in the theory of ideas sketched in that text, what he later called a ‘transposition’ of Goethe’s concept of the Urphänomen. A comparison with some of Goethe’s naturwissenschaftliche Schriften suggests that both authors suggest a way of thinking the relation between the concepts of truth and totality, by means of a confrontation and forceful manipulation of distinctions introduced in Kant’s (...) critical philosophy. In this sense, their logical and epistemological sketches can be read as markers for the inaugural and closing moments of the project of German idealism. (shrink)

Una lectura de la "Erkenntnis-kritische Vorrede" a Ursprung des deutsches Trauerspiels busca determinar en qué sentido Benjamin efectúa, en la teoría de las ideas allí esbozada, lo que él mismo llamó después una "tranposicion" del concepto goetheano de Urphänomen. El cotejo con algunos de los naturw..