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Michael Tye [179]Michael John Tye [1]
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Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin
  1. Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
  2. Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
  3. Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2008 - MIT Press.
    We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called "the phenomenal-concept strategy," which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. In Consciousness Revisited, the philosopher Michael Tye, until now a proponent of the the phenomenal-concept strategy, argues that the strategy (...)
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  4. Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Michael Tye - 2003 - MIT Press.
    In Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, Michael Tye takes on the thorny issue of the unity of consciousness and answers these important questions: What exactly is the unity of consciousness? Can a single person have a divided consciousness? What is a single person? Tye argues that unity is a fundamental part of human consciousness -- something so basic to everyday experience that it is easy to overlook. For example, when we hear the sound of waves crashing on a beach (...)
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  5. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
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  6. Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness.Michael Tye - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):410-437.
  7. Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain.Michael Tye - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 504–30.
  8. Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
    In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years or (...)
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  9. Vague Objects.Michael Tye - 1990 - Mind 99:535.
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  10. Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
  11. Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  12. The Puzzle of True Blue.Michael Tye - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):173-178.
    Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights (...)
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  13. Qualia Ain't in the Head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  14.  62
    Is There a Phenomenology of Thought?Michael Tye & Briggs Wright - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.
  15. The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:25--50.
    The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is (...)
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  16.  49
    The Metaphysics of Mind.Michael Tye - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be regarded as asserting relations between events. This adverbial theory has (...)
  17. Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  18. Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content.Michael Tye - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  19.  98
    Pains and Reasons: Why It is Rational to Kill the Messenger.Brian Cutter & Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):423-433.
    In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If (...)
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  20. Knowing What It is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument.Michael Tye - 2000 - In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield.
  21. Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited.Michael Tye - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences (...)
     
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  22.  1
    Consciousness, Colour, and Content.Michael Tye - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.
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  23.  71
    The Truth About True Blue.Michael Tye - 2006 - Analysis 66 (4):340–344.
    Cohen, Hardin, and McLaughlin (2006) complain that my solution to the puzzle of true blue (Tye 2006) depends upon my assuming that 'all variation in colour experience among standard perceivers in standard circumstances is at the level of fine-grained hues (4)'. That assumption, they say, is false: 'there is in fact variation in colour experience among.
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  24. Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness. [REVIEW]Michael Tye - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):891-6.
  25. Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.
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  26.  85
    Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention?Michael Tye - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):154-158.
    Ned Block says ‘yes’ (, ). His position is based on the phenomenon of identity-crowding. According to Block, in cases of identity-crowding, something is consciously seen even though one cannot attend to it. In taking this view, Block is opposing a position I have taken in recent work (Tye 2009a, 2009b, 2010). He is also contributing to a vigorous recent debate in the philosophy of mind over the relation, if any, between consciousness and attention. Who is right? Not surprisingly, I (...)
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  27.  94
    Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.
  28. Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness.Michael Tye - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:189-206.
  29. Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500-503.
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  30. Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves.Peter Bradley & Michael Tye - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):469.
    According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts, the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous systems that is causally involved in the perception (...)
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  31. A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character.Michael Tye - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
  32. Yes, Phenomenal Character Really Is Out There In The World.Michael Tye - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):483-488.
  33. What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience?Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press.
    Keith has just taken a hallucinogenic drug. A few minutes earlier, he was occupied with the beginning of H.H. Price's well-known book on perception. The combined effect of these activities is that Keith is now hallucinating a ripe tomato. This is not a de re hallucination. There is no particular tomato located elsewhere out of Keith's vision such that he is hallucinating that tomato as being before him. Keith is hallucinating a tomato without there being any particular tomato that he (...)
     
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  34.  71
    Externalism and Memory.Michael Tye - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):77-94.
    [Michael Tye] Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certain memories. /// [Jane Heal] Tye claims (...)
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  35. Naturalism and the Mental.Michael Tye - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):421-441.
  36. Visual Qualia and Visual Content.Michael Tye - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158--176.
  37.  62
    Speaks on Strong Property Representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):85-86.
    Strong property representationalism, as applied to visual experience, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is one and the same as the property complex or ‘sensible profile’ represented by that experience. Speaks discusses the following argument against this thesis:Let ‘RED’ stand for the phenomenal character of the experience of red.(1) Red = RED (strong property representationalism).(2) My pen has no representational properties, but is red.Hence,(3) My pen has a phenomenal character but no representational properties.Since (3) is (...)
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  38. Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism?Michael Tye - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
     
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  39.  2
    Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.
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  40. A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.
    1) There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, Papineau 1993, Sturgeon 1994, Tye 1995, 2000, Perry 2001) . There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
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  41. The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience.Michael Tye - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
    My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of (...)
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  42.  83
    Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts.R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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  43.  68
    The PANIC Theory: Reply to Byrne. [REVIEW]Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):287-290.
  44. The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience.Michael Tye - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.
  45. An Originalist Theory of Concepts.R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  46.  77
    The Imagery Debate.Michael Tye - 1991 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Michael Tye untangles the complex web of empirical and conceptual issues of the newly revived imagery debate in psychology between those that liken mental...
  47. The Subjective Qualities of Experience.Michael Tye - 1986 - Mind 95 (January):1-17.
  48.  50
    Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing.Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.
  49.  48
    Vagueness and Reality.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):195--210.
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  50.  44
    Cohen on Color Relationism.Michael Tye - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):297-305.
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