Explores the understanding of self-consciousness and personal identity - two fundamendtal features of human subjectivity - as it developed in early modern philosophy. Udo Thiel presents a critical evaluation of these features as they were conceived in the sevententh and eighteenth centuries. He explains the arguments of thinkers such as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Hume, as well as their early critics, followers, and other philosophical contemporaries, and situates them within their historical contexts. Interest in the issues of self-consciousness and (...) personal identity is in many ways characteristic [of] and even central to early modern thought, but Thiel argues here that this is also an interest that continues to this day, in a form still strongly influenced by the conceptual frameworks of early modern thought. In this book he attempts to broaden the scope of the treatment of these issues considerably, covering more than a hundred years of philosophical debate in France, Britain, and Germany while remaining attentive to the details of the arguments under scrutiny and discussing alternative interpretations in many cases"--Publisher's description, p. [4] of dust jacket. (shrink)

The notion of relating to one's own mental states and acts plays a prominent role in present-day philosophy of mind. To a considerable extent, this notion has its roots in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century accounts of inner sense. This paper examines German theories of inner sense of the 1770s. It focuses, in particular, on two Göttingen-based thinkers, Christoph Meiners and Michael Hissmann, who provided the first detailed analysis of the "varieties of inner consciousness" (Meiners's phrase). For example, they distinguish between apperception, (...) self-consciousness, and the feeling of personality. The paper analyzes and evaluates Meiners's and Hissmann's account of distinctions such as these. (shrink)

Between Wolff and Kant: Merian's Theory of Apperception UDO THIEL IT IS WELL KNOWN that the nodon of apperception or self-consciousness is central to Kant's theoretical philosophy. Kant introduces the notion in one of the crucial parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, and assigns it an important role in his critique of traditional metaphysics of the soul in the Transcendental Dialectic.' It is also well known that Kant did not invent the term "apperception." (...) Leibniz had introduced the French 'Tapperception" into philosophical terminology early in the eigh- teenth century. Kant scholars generally stress, rightly, that Kant's notion of apperception differs significandy from that of his predecessors. However, the precise relation between Kant's concept of apperception and earlier accounts has not been considered in any detail. Wolfgang Carl, for example, simply states that the main difference is that, prior to Kant, apperception was under- stood as relating only to mental acts and their contents, and not to the subject that thinks and has ideas, whereas in Kant apperception relates essentially to the thinking subject. 2 This very general thesis is questionable even in regard to some of the philosophers that Carl cites in this context . It is clearly not true of some other pre-Kantian philoso- phers who deal with self-consciousness. ' References to the Critique of Pure.. (shrink)

Charles Bonnet’s account of self-consciousness and personal identity is part of his physiology-based psychology. It is similar to earlier views in some respects, but there are also significant differences. This paper analyzes and contextualizes Bonnet’s comments on the topic in relation to Lockean and Leibnizian strands of thought, pulling together his various remarks into a systematic presentation. Central to Bonnet’s account are his distinctions between (1) the feeling of existence and the concept of existence, (2) memory-based personal identity and reflective (...) personal identity, and (3) first-person and the third-person perspectives on personal identity. By introducing these distinctions and by integrating aspects of several traditions into his own independent position, Bonnet’s contribution constitutes a new and important step in the development of early modern debates about self-consciousness and personal identity. (shrink)

This volume brings together journal articles reflecting some of the most recent developments in Locke's scholarship. The selected essays present a variety of approaches, thus conveying many of the distinctive characteristics of Locke's scholarship at the end of the century.

This volume examines the philosophical sources of the Kantian concepts "apperception" and "self-consciousness", the historical development of the theories of apperception and deduction of categories within the pre-critical period, the structure and content of A- as well as B-deduction of categories, and finally the Kantian meaning of "apperception" and "self-consciousness".

Es wurde in der Vergangenheit viel darüber debattiert, ob das Zentrum der Kritik der reinen Vernunft in der Erkenntnistheorie der „Transzendentalen Analytik“ oder in der Metaphysikkritik der „Transzendentalen Dialektik“ liegt. Stellt man den Begriff der Einheit des Bewusstseins in den Mittelpunkt der Auseinandersetzung, dann verliert diese Debatte an Bedeutung. Die „Einheit des Bewusstseins“ ist einerseits von zentraler Wichtigkeit für Kants Theorie der Objektivität, wie er sie in der „Deduktion der Kategorien“ entwickelt. Sie gehört andererseits in die Seelenlehre und wird daher (...) von Kant in den der Rationalen Psychologie gewidmeten Teilen der „Transzendentalen Dialektik“ thematisiert. Die vorliegenden Analysen von Henny Blomme, Bernd Dörflinger, Corey W. Dyck, Dietmar H. Heidemann, Thomas Höwing, Toni Kannisto, Heiner F. Klemme, Rudolf Mösenbacher, Giuseppe Motta, Dennis Schulting, Camilla Serck-Hanssen, Thomas Sturm, Udo Thiel, Violetta Waibel und Falk Wunderlich vertiefen das Verständnis dieses zentralen Begriffes der Kantischen Philosophie. (shrink)

Johann Nikolaus Tetens (1736-1807) gehörte zu den prägenden Gestalten der europäischen Aufklärung, und zwar sowohl innerhalb der Philosophie, im Kontext sprachtheoretischer und ästhetischer Diskurse, als auch in einer Reihe von Einzelwissenschaften (etwa der Mathematik und der Naturforschung). All diese Werkbereiche werden im vorliegenden Band von international renommierten Forschern eingehend betrachtet. Tetens hat als einer der ersten deutschsprachigen Autoren die Philosophie John Lockes und David Humes systematisch studiert und für die epistemologischen und moralphilosophischen Diskussionen der Zeit fruchtbar gemacht. Nicht zufällig wurde (...) ihm in den britischen Debatten der Zeit der Titel eines 'deutschen Locke' verliehen. Er prägte wichtige Debatten, Kontroversen und Forschungsentwicklungen zwischen 1760 und 1790 insbesondere in seinem namhaften Einfluss auf Immanuel Kant. Tetens großer philosophischer Entwurf, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung von 1777, zeigt mit allem Nachdruck, dass es eine bedeutende und nachhaltige Rezeption und affirmative Aufnahme des britischen und französischen Empirismus in Deutschland gegeben hat. Dennoch suchte Tetens zugleich, die neuen Einflüsse dieses Empirismus mit den wolffianischen und leibnizianischen Lehren seiner Ausbildung zu vermitteln. Dieser spezifischen Vermittlungsleistung gilt ein besonderes Augenmerk aller Beiträge des Bandes. (shrink)

John Lockes Essay uber den menschlichen Verstand (zuerst 1690 erschienen) ist eines der einflussreichsten Bucher der Philosophiegeschichte. Es behandelt vorwiegend erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretische Themen, nimmt aber auch Stellung zu Fragen aus der Philosophie des Geistes, der Religionsphilosophie und der Ethik. Locke war einer der Initiatoren und fuhrenden Kopfe der europaischen Aufklarung. Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Essay wird auch in der Philosophie der Gegenwart vehement fortgesetzt. Die elf Beitrage dieses Bandes, die Bibliographie und ein ausfuhrliches Glossar machen das Buch zu einem (...) wichtigen Begleittext zu Lockes Werk. Mit Beitragen von: Michael Ayers, Reinhard Brandt, John Colman, Bertram Kienzle, Heiner F. Klemme, Lorenz Kruger, Michel Malherbe, Rolf W. Puster, G.A.J. Rogers, Rainer Specht, Jurgen Sprute und Udo Thiel". (shrink)

John Lockes Essay über den menschlichen Verstand ist eines der einflussreichsten Bücher der Philosophiegeschichte. Es behandelt vorwiegend erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretische Themen, nimmt aber auch Stellung zu Fragen aus der Philosophie des Geistes, der Religionsphilosophie und der Ethik. Locke war einer der Initiatoren und führenden Köpfe der europäischen Aufklärung. Die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Essay wird auch in der Philosophie der Gegenwart vehement fortgesetzt. Die elf Beiträge dieses Bandes, die Bibliographie und ein ausführliches Glossar machen das Buch zu einem wichtigen Begleittext zu (...) Lockes Werk. (shrink)

Udo Thiel has published a critical notice of Mark Kulstad’s book, Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection. The notice is entitled ‘Leibniz and the Concept of Apperception’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 76, no. 2, 1994, pp. 195-209.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 145-146 [Access article in PDF] Nicholas Jolley. Locke. His Philosophical Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. 233. $55.00, cloth; $19.95, paper. One of the main aims of this lean and clearly set out book is "to argue for the fundamental unity of Locke's thought" in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Thus while it deals with many of the usual 'central (...) themes' (ideas, knowledge, freedom, personal identity, etc.), this Locke is more ambitious than are other general surveys of the Essay. Another, related aim of the book is to defend Locke against charges of inconsistency. Here, it is successful in many instances. But even as sympathetic a reader as Jolley has to admit several times that there are in Locke's text "elements of inconsistency," positions that are "hard to reconcile" with each other, and "tensions" if not contradictions.For the most part Jolley's exposition follows the structure of the Essay, beginning with "the origin and nature of ideas," going through the various topics from Book II, then moving to themes in Book III ("Classification and Language") and ending with an account of Book IV ("Knowledge and Faith"). He proceeds by giving brief expositions of Locke's arguments on the issues at hand, sometimes reflecting on alternative readings, and considering objections to, and defences of Locke. There is some discussion of other major seventeenth-century philosophers, and there are—fairly general—references to the corpuscular philosophy and to Aristotelianism. But on the whole, Jolley does not burden his account with much historical context, focusing instead on individual "issues" and arguments concerning Locke's own text.Yet, sometimes Jolley's discussion of Locke's arguments leaves the reader with statements that require considerable elaboration. For example, in his treatment of Reid's critique of Locke's account of personal identity (according to which Locke's theory is inconsistent with the transitivity of identity), he ends his discussion by simply stating that "it is not obviously foolish to question whether the transitivity relation holds for identity over time" (121). Foolish or not, what is obvious is that more needs to be said to make this suggestion plausible, both in itself and as part of a reading of Locke.At other times Jolley's expositions are not as clear as they might be and remain unconvincing. Thus, in defending Michael Ayers's much debated view that all Lockean ideas are of the nature of mental images, he concedes that it is difficult to accommodate Locke's ideas of reflection (i.e., ideas of mental operations) to this reading. Yet he defends it, saying that Locke interprets the imagist programme "with some latitude." But if ideas of reflection are excluded, it would seem rather difficult to persist with the claim that Locke "is indeed an imagist." This relates to another issue that is much discussed in Locke scholarship: the notion of what Locke calls "substratum" or "pure substance in general." As Jolley reports, Michael Ayers has argued that 'substratum' does not stand for a bare particular but must be understood in the light of Locke's doctrine of real essence: real essence and substance are not to be equated but they pick out the same thing. Thus, according to Ayers, when Locke draws attention to our ignorance of both substance and real essence, he is not preaching agnosticism at two distinct metaphysical levels. Jolley rejects this reading. But while he points out, rightly in my view, that substratum concerns our thinking about objects, in places he appears to accept that the notion is a metaphysical one, for he holds (against Ayers) [End Page 145] that the distinction between substratum and real essence does concern different metaphysical levels (73). Locke himself is clear enough about the status of the "notion of pure substance in general." When he introduces it (II.xxiii.2), he does so as part of his account of how complex ideas of substances are formed: the notion is part of our ideas of particular kinds of substances. Now this notion cannot be derived... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Kant's Target The First and Second Edition Versions of the Paralogisms Logical Subject versus Substantial Subject Logical versus Substantial Simplicity of the Subject Materialism, Spiritualism, Immaterialism Logical versus Substantial Identity of the Subject The Thinking Subject and the Existence of External Objects From Rational Psychology to Empirical Psychology From Logical Subject to Moral Subject Conclusion.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 3 Seiten: 554-566.