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Uku Tooming
Hokkaido University
  1.  44
    Aesthetics of Food Porn.Uku Tooming - 2021 - Critica 53 (157):123-146.
    Enticing food photography which stimulates its viewers’ cravings, often given a dismissive label “food porn,” is one of the most popular contents in contemporary digital media. In this paper, I argue that the label disguises different ways in which a viewer can engage with it. In particular, food porn enables us to engage in cross-modal gustatory imaginings of a specific kind and an image’s capacity to afford such imaginings can contribute to its artistic merit.
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  2.  37
    There is Something About the Image: A Defence of the Two-Component View of Imagination.Uku Tooming - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):121-139.
    According to the two-component view of sensory imagination, imaginative states combine qualitative and assigned content. Qualitative content is the imagistic component of the imaginative state and is provided by a quasi-perceptual image; assigned content has a language-like structure. Recently, such a two-component view has been criticized by Daniel Hutto and Nicholas Wiltsher, both of whom have argued that postulating two contents is unnecessary for explaining how imagination represents. In this paper, I will defend the two-component theory by arguing that it (...)
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  3.  34
    Beliefs and Desires: From Attribution to Evaluation.Uku Tooming - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):359-369.
    The ability to attribute beliefs and desires is taken by many to be an essential component of human social cognition, enabling us to predict, explain and shape behaviour and other mental states. In this paper, I argue that there are certain basic responses to attributed attitudes which have thus far been overlooked in the study of social cognition, although they underlie many of the moves we make in our social interactions. The claim is that belief and desire attributions allow for (...)
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  4.  69
    Imaginative Resistance as Imagistic Resistance.Uku Tooming - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):684-706.
    When we are invited to imagine an unacceptable moral proposition to be true in fiction, we feel resistance when we try to imagine it. Despite this, it is nonetheless possible to suppose that the proposition is true. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of imaginative resistance are unable to explain why only attempts to imagine the truth of moral propositions cause resistance. My suggestion is that imagination, unlike supposition, involves mental imagery and imaginative resistance arises when imagery that (...)
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  5.  15
    Mental State Attribution for Interactionism.Uku Tooming - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):184-207.
    Interactionists about folk psychology argue that embodied interactions constitute the primary way we understand one another and thus oppose more standard accounts according to which the understanding is mostly achieved through belief and desire attributions. However, also interactionists need to explain why people sometimes still resort to attitude ascription. In this paper, it is argued that this explanatory demand presents a genuine challenge for interactionism and that a popular proposal which claims that belief and desire attributions are needed to make (...)
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  6.  34
    Without Pretense: A Critique of Goldman’s Model of Simulation.Uku Tooming - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):561-575.
    In this paper I criticize Alvin Goldman's simulation theory of mindreading which involves the claim that the basic method of folk psychologically predicting behaviour is to form pretend beliefs and desires that reproduce the transitions between the mental states of others, in that way enabling to predict what the others are going to do. I argue that when it comes to simulating propositional attitudes it isn't clear whether pretend beliefs need to be invoked in order to explain relevant experimental results, (...)
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  7.  49
    Active Desire.Uku Tooming - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):945-968.
    Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by (...)
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  8.  28
    Being Familiar with What One Wants.Uku Tooming - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):690-710.
    Self‐ascriptions of desire seem to differ in their epistemic security. There are easy cases in which a sincere self‐ascription immediately counts as knowledgeable, and there are hard cases in which it is an open question whether an agent actually knows that they have the desire that they take themselves to have. In this paper, I suggest an explanation according to which whether a self‐ascription of desire is easy or hard depends on whether one is familiar with the content of the (...)
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  9.  56
    Desire's Own Reasons.Uku Tooming - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    This paper asks if there are reasons that count in favor of having a desire in virtue of its attitudinal nature. Let us call those considerations Desire’s Own Reasons (DOR). I argue that DOR are considerations that explain why a desire meets its constitutive standard of correctness and that it meets this standard when its satisfaction would also be satisfactory to the subject who has it. Reasons that bear on subjective satisfaction are fit to directly and accessibly regulate desires through (...)
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  10.  9
    Politics of Folk Psychology: Believing What Others Believe.Uku Tooming - forthcoming - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science.
    In this paper, I argue that by attributing beliefs the attributer is pushed toward taking a stand on the content of those beliefs and that what stand they take partially depends on the relationship between the attributer and the attributee. In particular, if the attributee enjoys a higher social standing than the attributer, the latter is disposed to adopt the attributed belief, as long as certain other conditions are met. I will call this view the Adoption-by-Attribution model. Because of the (...)
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  11.  11
    Pleasures of the Communicative Conception.Uku Tooming - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1):253-272.
    In this paper, I criticize Christopher Gauker’s approach to the attributions of desire which identi es them with commands on behalf of others. ese are sup- posed to be needed in situations wherein such commands have to be quali ed in some way. I argue that his account doesn’t manage to make explicit the need for the concept of desire, and I defend my alternative according to which desires are related to our understanding of how commands on a person’s behalf (...)
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  12.  19
    The Communicative Significance of Beliefs and Desires.Uku Tooming - 2014 - Dissertation, Universitatis Tartunesis
    When we think about what others believe and want, we are usually affected by what we know about their attitudes. If I’m aware that another person believes something, I have an opportunity to agree or disagree with it. If I think that another person wants something, I can endorse or disapprove of her desire. The importance of such reactions to attributed beliefs and desires has thus far been overlooked in philosophy of mind where the focus has been on explanatory and (...)
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  13.  41
    The Puzzle of Good Bad Movies.Uku Tooming - 2020 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 54 (3):31-46.
    There are bad movies, and there are movies that are so bad that they are good. So-called good bad movies have received a lot of attention from critics and moviegoers in recent years. Many people, including those with good taste, are willing to invest their time and resources in watching and discussing them. In this paper, I will argue that the fact that aesthetically competent consumers of cinema are engaging with good bad movies challenges an intuitive assumption according to which (...)
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  14.  15
    Vividness as a Natural Kind.Uku Tooming & Kengo Miyazono - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on the vividness of mental imagery and contrasts with those accounts (...)
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