33 found
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  1. Why Replication is Overrated.Uljana Feest - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):895-905.
    Current debates about the replication crisis in psychology take it for granted that direct replication is valuable and focus their attention on questionable research practices in regard to statistical analyses. This paper takes a broader look at the notion of replication as such. It is argued that all experimentation/replication involves individuation judgments and that research in experimental psychology frequently turns on probing the adequacy of such judgments. In this vein, I highlight the ubiquity of conceptual and material questions in research, (...)
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  2. Construct validity in psychological tests – the case of implicit social cognition.Uljana Feest - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
    This paper looks at the question of what it means for a psychological test to have construct validity. I approach this topic by way of an analysis of recent debates about the measurement of implicit social cognition. After showing that there is little theoretical agreement about implicit social cognition, and that the predictive validity of implicit tests appears to be low, I turn to a debate about their construct validity. I show that there are two questions at stake: First, what (...)
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  3. Data quality, experimental artifacts, and the reactivity of the psychological subject matter.Uljana Feest - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (1):1-25.
    While the term “reactivity” has come to be associated with specific phenomena in the social sciences, having to do with subjects’ awareness of being studied, this paper takes a broader stance on this concept. I argue that reactivity is a ubiquitous feature of the psychological subject matter and that this fact is a precondition of experimental research, while also posing potential problems for the experimenter. The latter are connected to the worry about distorted data and experimental artifacts. But what are (...)
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  4. Phenomena and Objects of Research in the Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences.Uljana Feest - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):1165-1176.
    It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I situate my (...)
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  5. What exactly is stabilized when phenomena are stabilized?Uljana Feest - 2011 - Synthese 182 (1):57-71.
    The last two decades have seen a rising interest in (a) the notion of a scientific phenomenon as distinct from theories and data, and (b) the intricacies of experimentally producing and stabilizing phenomena. This paper develops an analysis of the stabilization of phenomena that integrates two aspects that have largely been treated separately in the literature: one concerns the skills required for empirical work; the other concerns the strategies by which claims about phenomena are validated. I argue that in order (...)
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  6. Concepts as Tools in the Experimental Generation of Knowledge in Cognitive Neuropsychology.Uljana Feest - 2010 - Spontaneous Generations 4 (1):173-190.
    This paper asks (a) how new scientific objects of research are onceptualized at a point in time when little is known about them, and (b) how those conceptualizations, in turn, figure in the process of investigating the phenomena in question. Contrasting my approach with existing notions of concepts and situating it in relation to existing discussions about the epistemology of experimentation, I propose to think of concepts as research tools. I elaborate on the conception of a tool that informs my (...)
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  7.  96
    Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice.Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.) - 2012 - de Gruyter.
    Combining philosophical and historical scholarship, the articles in this volume focus on scientific concepts, rather than theories, as units of analysis. They thereby contribute to a growing literature about the role of concepts in scientific research. The authors are particularly interested in exploring the dynamics of research; they investigate the ways in which scientists form and use concepts, rather than in what the concepts themselves represent. The fields treated range from mathematics to virology and genetics, from nuclear physics to psychology, (...)
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  8. Gestalt psychology, frontloading phenomenology, and psychophysics.Uljana Feest - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 9):2153-2173.
    In his 1935 book Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Kurt Koffka stated that empirical research in perceptual psychology should begin with “a phenomenological analysis,” which in turn would put constraints on the “true theory.” In this paper, I take this statement as a point of departure to investigate in what sense Gestalt psychologists practiced a phenomenological analysis and how they saw it related to theory construction. I will contextualize the perceptual research in Gestalt psychology vis-a-vis Husserlian phenomenology on the one hand (...)
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  9. Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data.Uljana Feest - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):927-939.
    This paper argues that whereas philosophical discussions of first-person methods often turn on the veridicality of first-person reports, more attention should be paid to the experimental circumstances under which the reports are generated, and to the purposes of designing such experiments. After pointing to the ‘constructedness’ of first-person reports in the science of perception, I raise questions about the criteria by which to judge whether the reports illuminate something about the nature of perception. I illustrate this point with a historical (...)
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  10. What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? Editors' Introduction.Uljana Feest & Thomas Sturm - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):285-302.
    We provide an overview of three ways in which the expression “Historical epistemology” (HE) is often understood: (1) HE as a study of the history of higher-order epistemic concepts such as objectivity, observation, experimentation, or probability; (2) HE as a study of the historical trajectories of the objects of research, such as the electron, DNA, or phlogiston; (3) HE as the long-term study of scientific developments. After laying out various ways in which these agendas touch on current debates within both (...)
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  11.  84
    The experimenters' regress reconsidered: Replication, tacit knowledge, and the dynamics of knowledge generation.Uljana Feest - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 58:34-45.
    This paper revisits the debate between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, concerning the experimenters’ regress. Focusing my attention on a case study from recent psychology (regarding experimental evidence for the existence of a Mozart Effect), I argue that Franklin is right to highlight the role of epistemological strategies in scientific practice, but that his account does not sufficiently appreciate Collins’s point about the importance of tacit knowledge in experimental practice. In turn, Collins rightly highlights the epistemic uncertainty (and skepticism) surrounding (...)
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  12.  73
    Remembering (Short-Term) Memory: Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing.Uljana Feest - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):391-411.
    This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology . I argue that Rheinberger’s approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (“epistemic things”)—especially in the contexts of exploratory experimentation—namely our lack of knowledge about them. I argue that (...)
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  13. Introspection as a Method and Introspection as a Feature of Consciousness.Uljana Feest - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):1 - 16.
    Abstract If we take for granted that introspection is indispensable for the study of conscious mental states, the question arises what criteria have to be met in order for introspective reports to qualify as scientific evidence. There have been some attempts to argue (implicitly or explicitly) that it is possible to provide a satisfactory answer to this question while remaining agnostic with respect to questions about the nature of consciousness. Focusing on the aim of using introspection in order to generate (...)
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  14. Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen.Uljana Feest (ed.) - 2009 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This is a collection of original papers that look at the ways in which the dichotomy between explanation and understanding was conceptualized by various late 19th- and early 20th-century writers both in Germany and in other (mostly) European countries.
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  15. Operationism in Psychology - What the Debate is About, What the Debate Should Be About.Uljana Feest - 2005 - Journal for the Histoty of the Behavioral Sciences 41 (2):131-150.
    I offer an analysis of operationism in psychology, which is rooted in an historical study of the investigative practices of two of its early proponents (S. S. Stevens and E. C. Tolman). According to this analysis, early psychological operationists emphasized the importance of experimental operations and called for scientists to specify what kinds of operations were to count as empirical indicators for the referents of their concepts. While such specifications were referred to as “definitions,” I show that such definitions were (...)
     
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  16.  64
    Exploratory Experiments, Concept Formation, and Theory Construction in Psychology.Uljana Feest - 2012 - In Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. de Gruyter. pp. 167-189.
  17. Experiment.Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle - 2014 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 274-295.
    The authors provide an overview of philosophical discussions about the roles of experiment in science. First, they cover two approaches that took shape under the heading of “new experimentalism” in the 1980s and 1990s. One approach was primarily concerned with questions about entity realism, robustness, and epistemological strategies. The other has focused on exploratory experiments and the dynamic processes of experimental research as such, highlighting its iterative nature and drawing out the ways in which such research is grounded in experimental (...)
     
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  18. What is the Replication Crisis a Crisis of?Uljana Feest - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.
    In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: one that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects versus in terms of complexity. I argue that each gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the (...)
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  19. “Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen: Introduction”.Uljana Feest - 2010 - In “Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen: Introduction”.
    The conceptual pair of "Erklären" and "Verstehen" (explanation and understanding) has been an object of philosophical and methodological debates for well over a century. Discussions – to this day – are centered around the question of whether certain objects or issues, such as those dealing with humans or society, require a special approach, different from that of the physical sciences. In the course of such philosophical discussions, we frequently find references to historical predecessors, such as Dilthey’s discussion of the relationship (...)
     
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  20.  33
    (1 other version)‘Hypotheses, everywhere only hypotheses!!’: on some contexts of Dilthey’s critique of explanatory psychology.Uljana Feest - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1):43-62.
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  21. Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology.Uljana Feest - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):937-948.
    This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a reinterpretation of Robert Cummins's notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components (...)
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  22. Progress in psychology.Uljana Feest - 2022 - In Yafeng Shan (ed.), New Philosophical Perspectives on Scientific Progress. New York: Routledge. pp. 184-203.
    The chapter argues that whereas traditional accounts of progress have typically focused on scientific theories (evaluating them with regards to their truthlikeness or their explanatory and predictive success), we should pay closer attention to efforts of forming and developing scientific concepts (evaluating them with regards to how well such concepts serve the respective aims of research, which can include, but are not limited to, explanation and prediction). If we focus on concepts rather than theories, our attention is drawn to the (...)
     
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  23.  57
    Husserl’s Crisis as a crisis of psychology.Uljana Feest - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2):493-503.
    This paper places Husserl’s mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with – and critique of – experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology – due to its naturalism – as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide an (...)
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  24.  34
    (1 other version)Physicalism, Introspection, and Psychophysics: The Carnap/Duncker Exchange.Uljana Feest - 2017 - In Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 113-125.
    In 1932, Rudolf Carnap published his article “Psychology in a Physical Language.” The article prompted a critical response by the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker. The exchange is marked by mutual lack of comprehension. In this paper I will provide a contextualized explication of the exchange. I will show that Carnap’s physicalism was deeply rooted in the psychophysical tradition that also informed Gestalt psychological research. By failing to acknowledge this, Carnap missed out on the possibility to enter into a serious debate (...)
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  25.  74
    Science and experience/science of experience: Gestalt psychology and the anti-metaphysical project of the Aufbau.Uljana Feest - 2007 - Perspectives on Science 15 (1):1-25.
    : This paper investigates the way in which Rudolf Carnap drew on Gestalt psychological notions when defining the basic elements of his constitutional system. I argue that while Carnap's conceptualization of basic experience was compatible with ideas articulated by members of the Berlin/Frankfurt school of Gestalt psychology, his formal analysis of the relationship between two basic experiences ("recollection of similarity") was not. This is consistent, given that Carnap's aim was to provide a unified reconstruction of scientific knowledge, as opposed to (...)
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  26.  12
    Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice: Introduction.Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle - 2012 - In Uljana Feest & Friedrich Steinle (eds.), Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice. de Gruyter. pp. 1-22.
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  27. (1 other version)Eigenpsychisches und Fremdpsychisches: Rudolf Carnaps Verhältnis zur Psychologie zwischen 1928 und 1932.Uljana Feest - 2021 - In Christian Damböck & Gereon Wolters (eds.), Der Junge Carnap in Historischem Kontext: 1918–1935 / Young Carnap in an Historical Context: 1918–1935. Springer Verlag.
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  28.  54
    Descriptive Psychology and Völkerpsychologie—in the Contexts of Historicism, Relativism, and Naturalism.Christian Damböck, Uljana Feest & Martin Kusch - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):226-233.
  29.  73
    Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer.Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.) - 2017 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This volume is a collection of original essays focusing on a wide range of topics in the History and Philosophy of Science. It is a festschrift for Peter Machamer, which includes contributions from scholars who, at one time or another, were his students. The essays bring together analyses of issues and debates spanning from early modern science and philosophy through the 21st century. Machamer’s influence is reflected in the volume’s broad range of topics. These include: underdetermination, scientific practice, scientific models, (...)
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  30.  20
    (1 other version)Philosophie der Psychologie.Uljana Feest - 2017 - In Simon Lohse & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Grundriss Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Die Philosophien der Einzelwissenschaften. Hamburg: Meiner. pp. 475-509.
    Handbook article about philosophy of psychology. (in German). In S. Lohse & T. Reydon (Eds.): Grundriss Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Die Philosophien der Einzelwissenschaften. Meiner Verlag, pp. 475-509.
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  31.  62
    (1 other version)The Continuing Relevance of 19th-Century Philosophy of Psychology: Brentano and the Autonomy of Psychological Methods.Uljana Feest - forthcoming - In M. C. Galavotti & F. Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective. Springer. pp. 693-709.
    This paper provides an analysis of Franz Brentano’s thesis that psychology employs a distinctive method, which sets it apart from physiology. The aim of the paper is two-fold: First, I situate Brentano’s thesis (and the broader metaphysical system that underwrites it) within the context of specific debates about the nature and status of psychology, arguing that we regard him as engaging in a form of boundary work. Second, I explore the relevance of Brentano’s considerations to more recent debates about autonomy (...)
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  32. Implicit Reasoning.Thomas Sturm & Uljana Feest - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 377-388.
  33. Christian Damböck, Deutscher Empirismus: Studien zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum 1830–1930. [REVIEW]Uljana Feest - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (Fall 2018):480-485.