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Profile: Ulrike Heuer (University of Leeds)
  1. Reasons for Actions and Desires.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.
    It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. (...)
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    Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?Ulrike Heuer - 2006 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide reasons. It is other properties (...)
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  3. Reasons and Impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
    In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to (...)
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  4.  27
    Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3):291-315.
    Many of the things we do in the course of a day we don't do intentionally: blushing, sneezing, breathing, blinking, smiling—to name but a few. But we also do act intentionally, and often when we do we act for reasons. Whether we always act for reasons when we act intentionally is controversial. But at least the converse is generally accepted: when we act for reasons we always act intentionally. Necessarily, it seems. In this paper, I argue that acting intentionally is (...)
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  5. The Paradox of Deontology, Revisited.Ulrike Heuer - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
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  6.  53
    Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams.Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003).
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  7.  88
    Wrongness and Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):137 - 152.
    Is the wrongness of an action a reason not to perform it? Of course it is, you may answer. That an action is wrong both explains and justifies not doing it. Yet, there are doubts. Thinking that wrongness is a reason is confused, so an argument by Jonathan Dancy. There can’t be such a reason if ‘ϕ-ing is wrong’ is verdictive, and an all things considered judgment about what (not) to do in a certain situation. Such judgments are based on (...)
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  8.  43
    Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  9.  15
    Moralischer Zufall und Kontrolle durch Fertigkeiten.Ulrike Heuer - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 70 (1):5-27.
    The problem of moral luck arises from the apparent conflict of two commonly accepted claims: it seems, on the one hand, that we are responsible only for those actions that are under our control; on the other hand, we seem to be responsible for the results of our actions, even if those depend on the cooperation of factors that we do not control directly. The opponents of moral luck side with the socalled control principle. In this paper, I argue, first, (...)
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  10.  69
    Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity.George Pavlakos, Niko Kolodny, Ulrike Heuer & Douglas Lavin - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (2):329-378.
    This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos.
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  11.  22
    Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 219.
  12.  22
    Promising-Part 1.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account and the practice account. (...)
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  13.  26
    Raz on Values and Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philipp Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value. Oxford University Press.
  14.  11
    Sind Wünsche Handlungsgründe?Ulrike Heuer - 1999 - Analyse & Kritik 21 (1):1-24.
    Desires are often taken to be the basis for all practical reasons. I introduce one of the most powerful arguments to sustain this view: the argument from motivation . In section 2, however, I develop an equally powerful objection to desire-based approaches showing that desires are not suited to accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. The objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must presuppose that only desires can explain actions. This move is, (...)
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    Promising - Part 2.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):842-851.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short of explaining the promissory (...)
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    Agency and Luck.Andrei Marmor, Ulrike Heuer, Rebecca Prebble & Nandi Theunissen - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa.
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  17. Gründe Und Motive Über Humesche Theorien Praktischer Vernunft.Ulrike Heuer - 2001
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  18. Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez Blanco (eds.), Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-30.
  19. The Reasons That Can't Be Followed.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 8:1-14.
     
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  20. Unmoralische Moralphilosophen?Ulrike Heuer - 1994 - Ethik Und Sozialwissenschaften 5 (3):383.
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  21. Introduction.Gerald Lang & Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-16.
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