Despite increasing pressure to deal with climate change, firms have been slow to respond with effective action. This article presents a multi-level framework for a better understanding of why many firms are failing to reduce their absolute greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to climate change. The concepts of short-termism and uncertainty avoidance from research in psychology, sociology, and organization theory can explain the phenomenon of organizational inaction on climate change. Antecedents related to short-termism and uncertainty avoidance reinforce one (...) another at three levels—individual, organizational, and institutional—and result in organizational inaction on climate change. The article also discusses the implications of this multi-level framework for research on corporate sustainability. (shrink)

This essay is, primarily, a discussion of four results about the principle of maximizing entropy (MAXENT) and its connections with Bayesian theory. Result 1 provides a restricted equivalence between the two: where the Bayesian model for MAXENT inference uses an "a priori" probability that is uniform, and where all MAXENT constraints are limited to 0-1 expectations for simple indicator-variables. The other three results report on an inability to extend the equivalence beyond these specialized constraints. Result 2 established a sensitivity of (...) MAXENT inference to the choice of the algebra of possibilities even though all empirical constraints imposed on the MAXENT solution are satisfied in each measure space considered. The resulting MAXENT distribution is not invariant over the choice of measure space. Thus, old and familiar problems with the Laplacian principle of Insufficient Reason also plague MAXENT theory. Result 3 builds upon the findings of Friedman and Shimony (1971; 1973) and demonstrates the absence of an exchangeable, Bayesian model for predictive MAXENT distributions when the MAXENT constraints are interpreted according to Jaynes's (1978) prescription for his (1963) Brandeis Dice problem. Lastly, Result 4 generalizes the Friedman and Shimony objection to cross-entropy (Kullback-information) shifts subject to a constraint of a new odds-ratio for two disjoint events. (shrink)

Tschacher and Haken have recently applied a systems-based approach to modeling psychotherapy process in terms of potentially beneficial tendencies toward deterministic as well as chaotic forms of change in the client’s behavioral, cognitive and affective experience during the course of therapy. A chaotic change process refers to a greater exploration of the states that a client can be in, and it may have a potential positive role to play in their development. A distinction is made between on the one hand, (...) specific instances of instability which are due to techniques employed by the therapist, and on the other, a more general instability which is due to the therapeutic relationship, and a key, necessary result of a successful therapeutic alliance. Drawing on Friston’s systems-based model of free energy minimization and predictive coding, it is proposed here that the increase in the instability of a client’s functioning due to therapy can be conceptualized as a reduction in the precisions with which the client’s prior beliefs about themselves and their world, are held. It is shown how a good therapeutic alliance results in the emergence of a new hierarchical level in the client’s generative model of themselves and their relationship with the world. The emergence of this new level of functioning permits the reduction of the precisions of the client’s priors, which allows the client to ‘open up’: to experience thoughts, emotions and experiences they did not have before. It is proposed that this process is a necessary precursor to change due to psychotherapy. A good consilience can be found between this approach to understanding the role of the therapeutic alliance, and the role of epistemic trust in psychotherapy as described by Fonagy and Allison. It is suggested that beneficial forms of instability in clients are an underappreciated influence on psychotherapy process, and thoughts about the implications, as well as situations in which instability may not be beneficial for therapy, are considered. (shrink)

Setting aside some complexities, Koplin and Wilkinson1 argue: 1. Moral status is uncertain if there is a non-zero chance that an entity has, or would develop, full moral status. 2. If its moral status is uncertain, then moral caution is warranted towards that entity. 3. The moral status of both non-chimeric pigs and human-pig chimaeras is uncertain. (Conclusion 1) Therefore, consistency demands that moral caution is warranted towards both non-chimeric pigs and human-pig chimaeras. 4. The commonly held view is that (...) moral caution is warranted towards human-pig chimaeras, but not non-chimeric pigs. (Conclusion 2) Therefore, the commonly held view is inconsistent. This is a valid argument. The authors claim that the inconsistency they expose in conclusion 2 could be resolved in favour of either commonly held view, or by revising both to equivalency. However, it is clear from conclusion 1, and the paper more generally, that the authors are arguing for moral caution to be applied to the treatment of pigs of both types. I will focus on evaluating premises 1 and 2, and the generalisability of the argument in light of this. In doing so, I will attempt to show that the argument has implausible logical implications, and that the moral caution warranted towards human-pig chimaeras of uncertain moral status does not require confidence that they lack full moral status, as the authors claim. According to premise 1, if an entity might currently have moral …. (shrink)

This article examines initial-condition dependence and initial-condition uncertainty for climate projections and predictions. The first contribution is to provide a clear conceptual characterization of predictions and projections. Concerning initial-condition dependence, projections are often described as experiments that do not depend on initial conditions. Although prominent, this claim has not been scrutinized much and can be interpreted differently. If interpreted as the claim that projections are not based on estimates of the actual initial conditions of the world or that what (...) makes projections true are conditions in the world, this claim is true. However, it can also be interpreted as the claim that simulations used to obtain projections are independent of initial-condition ensembles. This article argues that evidence does not support this claim. Concerning initial-condition uncertainty, three kinds of initial-condition uncertainty are identified. The first is the uncertainty associated with the spread of the ensemble simulations. The second arises because the theoretical initial ensemble cannot be used in calculations and has to be approximated by finitely many initial states. The third uncertainty arises because it is unclear how long the model should be run to obtain potential initial conditions at pre-industrial times. Overall, the discussion shows that initial-condition dependence and uncertainty in climate science are more complex and important issues than usually acknowledged. 1Introduction2Projections and Predictions 2.1Predictions2.2Projections3Initial-Condition Dependence 3.1Projections 3.1.1Dynamical conditions justifying independence of initial conditions?3.1.2What projections can and cannot provide3.2Predictions4Initial-Condition Uncertainty 4.1Projections4.2Predictions5ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

Care ethics as initiated by Gilligan, Held, Tronto and others has from its onset been critical towards ethical concepts established in modernity, like ‘autonomy’, alternatively proposing to think from within relationships and to pay attention to power. In this article the question is raised whether renewal in this same critical vein is necessary and possible as late modern circumstances require rethinking the care ethical inquiry. Two late modern realities that invite to rethink care ethics are complexity and precariousness. Late modern (...) organizations, like the general hospital, codetermined by various systems are characterized by complexity and the need for complexity reduction, both permeating care practices. By means of a heuristic use of the concept of precariousness, taken as the installment of uncertainty, it is shown that relations and power in late modern care organizations have changed, precluding the use of a straightforward domination idea of power. In the final section a proposition is made how to rethink the care ethical inquiry in order to take late modern circumstances into account: inquiry should always be related to the concerns of people and practitioners from within care practices. (shrink)

For creatures like us, entertaining possible future scenarios of how our life might play out is often accompanied or “charged” with emotions like hope and anxiety. What will interest me in this article is whether the epistemic profile of hope and anxiety, and in particular the fact that they are directed at uncertain outcomes, might pose a threat to the stability of their valence. Hope and anxiety are not emotions which relate us to evaluative properties of actual events, they relate (...) us to evaluative properties of relevant possibilities (Gordon, 1969; Kurth, 2018; Benton, 2019). I will present and discuss two philosophical accounts according to which hope and anxiety do not have a proprietary and consistent valence. According to the first account, anxiety is an intrinsically ambivalent emotion, as a result of involving an awareness of conflicting possibilities or ways in which the future might unfold (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2015). According to the second, hope is not a strictly positive emotion, as certain specific occurrences of hope are negatively valenced (Stockdale, 2019). Finally, I argue that an evaluative theory of valence helps us clearly conceive of hope and anxiety as two polar opposite experiences of uncertainty. (shrink)

The uncertainty associated with paradigmatic families has been shown to correlate with their phonetic characteristics in speech, suggesting that representations of complex sublexical relations between words are part of speaker knowledge. To better understand this, recent studies have used two-layer neural network models to examine the way paradigmatic uncertainty emerges in learning. However, to date this work has largely ignored the way choices about the representation of inflectional and grammatical functions (IFS) in models strongly influence what they subsequently (...) learn. To explore the consequences of this, we investigate how representations of IFS in the input-output structures of learning models affect the capacity of uncertainty estimates derived from them to account for phonetic variability in speech. Specifically, we examine whether IFS are best represented as outputs to neural networks (as in previous studies) or as inputs by building models that embody both choices and examining their capacity to account for uncertainty effects in the formant trajectories of word final [ɐ], which in German discriminates around sixty different IFS. Overall, we find that formants are enhanced as the uncertainty associated with IFS decreases. This result dovetails with a growing number of studies of morphological and inflectional families that have shown that enhancement is associated with lower uncertainty in context. Importantly, we also find that in models where IFS serve as inputs—as our theoretical analysis suggests they ought to—its uncertainty measures provide better fits to the empirical variance observed in [ɐ] formants than models where IFS serve as outputs. This supports our suggestion that IFS serve as cognitive cues during speech production, and should be treated as such in modeling. It is also consistent with the idea that when IFS serve as inputs to a learning network. This maintains the distinction between those parts of the network that represent message and those that represent signal. We conclude by describing how maintaining a “signal-message-uncertainty distinction” can allow us to reconcile a range of apparently contradictory findings about the relationship between articulation and uncertainty in context. (shrink)

Ex aequo et bono compensations refer to tribunal’s compensations that cannot be determined exactly according to the rule of law, in which case the judge relies on an estimate that seems fair for the case at hand. Such cases are prone to legal uncertainty, given the subjectivity that is inherent to the concept of fairness. We show how basic principles from statistics and machine learning may be used to reduce legal uncertainty in ex aequo et bono judicial decisions. (...) For a given type of ex aequo et bono dispute, we consider two general stages in estimating the compensation. First, the stage where there is significant disagreement among judges as to which compensation is fair. In that case, we let judges rule on such disputes, while a machine tracks a certain measure of the relative differences of the granted compensations. In the second stage that measure, which expresses the degree of legal uncertainty, has dropped below a predefined threshold. From then on legal decisions on the quantity of the ex aequo et bono compensation for the considered type of dispute may be replaced by the average of previous compensations. The main consequence is that this type of dispute is, from this stage on, free of legal uncertainty. (shrink)

From its first significant appearance in physics, the notion of probability has been linked in the minds of physicists with the notion of uncertainty. But the link may prove to be tenuous, if quantum mechanics, construed in terms of the Everett interpretation, is anything to go by.

Ranchers and pastoralists worldwide manage and depend upon resources from rangelands across Earth’s terrestrial surface. In the Great Plains of North America rangeland ecology has increasingly recognized the importance of managing rangeland vegetation heterogeneity to address conservation and production goals. This paradigm, however, has limited application for ranchers as they manage extensive beef production operations under high levels of social-ecological complexity and uncertainty. We draw on the ethics of care theoretical framework to explore how ranchers choose management actions. We (...) used modified grounded theory analysis of repeated interviews with ranchers to compare rancher decision-making under relatively certain and uncertain conditions and describe a typology of practices used to prioritize and choose management actions that maintain effective stewardship of these often multi-generational ranches. We contrast traditional decision-making frameworks with those described by interviewees when high levels of environmental and market uncertainty or ecological complexity led ranchers toward use of care-based, flexible and relational frameworks for decision-making. Ranchers facing complexity and uncertainty often sought “middle-ground” strategies to balance multiple, conflicting responsibilities in rangeland social-ecological systems. For example, ranchers’ care-based decision-making leads to conservative stocking approaches to “manage for the middle,” e.g. to limit risk under uncertain weather and forage availability conditions. Efforts to promote heterogeneity-based rangeland management for biodiversity conservation through the restoration of patch burn grazing and prairie dog conservation will require increased valuation of ranchers’ care work. (shrink)

Economic forecasting is famously unreliable. While this problem has traditionally been blamed on theories such as the efficient market hypothesis or even the butterfly effect, an alternative explanation is the role of money – something which is typically downplayed or excluded altogether from economic models. Instead, models tend to treat the economy as a kind of barter system in which money's only role is as an inert medium of exchange. Prices are assumed to almost perfectly reflect the 'intrinsic value' of (...) an asset. This paper argues, however, that money is better seen as an inherently dualistic phenomenon, which merges precise number with the fuzzy concept of value. Prices are not the optimal result of a mechanical, Newtonian process, but are an emergent property of the money system. And just as quantum physics has its uncertainty principle, so the economy is an uncertain process which can only be approximated by mathematical models. Acknowledging the dynamic and paradoxical qualities of money changes our ontological framework for economic modelling, and for making decisions under uncertainty. Applications to areas of risk analysis, forecasting and modelling are discussed, and it is proposed that a greater appreciation of the fundamental causes of uncertainty will help to make the economy a less uncertain place. (shrink)

The catastrophic risks posed by new technologies such as killer robots and geoengineering have triggered calls for halting new research. Arguments for restricting research typically have a slippery‐slope structure: Researching A will lead to deployment; we have decisive moral reasons against deployment; therefore, we should not research A. However, scientific uncertainty makes it difficult to prove or disprove the conclusion of slippery‐slope arguments. This article accepts this indeterminacy and asks whether and when it would be permissible to restrict research (...) under empirical and normative uncertainty. The argument starts from the ethical framework for the regulation of scientific research with human subjects and offers modifications to adapt it to the purpose of restricting new technologies. Two main questions arise in the process: whether it is permissible to impose restrictions at the research stage to prevent harms that will arise from the use of a technology and whether it is permissible to restrict research preemptively on the grounds of public fear and anxiety, before there is sufficient evidence establishing the risk of harm. I answer both questions in the affirmative and defend this position against objections. (shrink)

The popular notion of bullshit and the term that expresses it has received little philosophical attention despite the fact that it pervades much of human discourse. Frankfurt recovered bullshit analysis in the eighties and opened the way to studies on its nature and function. Our interest in bullshit is philosophically analytical, but also practical, as bullshit particularly affects the field of science policy. In order to understand that double character, we first present Grice’s model of meaning of expressions and then (...) summarize the controversy between the tobacco industry and the US Administration, which allows us to state our basic hypothesis: tobacco companies have developed and implemented a discursive tactic of bullshit in order to delay or avoid governmental regulations and decisions. Before eventually applying the Gricean model to various cases of bullshit, we locate our approach against the background of the comparison between sound and junk science. Keywords: Grice, intention, meaning, tobacco industry, bullshit, junk science, uncertainty. (shrink)

We consider particles prepared by a single slit diffraction experiment. For those particles the standard deviation σ p of the momentum is discussed. We find out that σ p =∞ is not an exception but a rather typical case. A necessary and sufficient condition for σ p <∞ is given. Finally, the inequality σ p Δx≥π ℏ is derived and it is shown that this bound cannot be improved.

When the likelihood ratio approach is employed for evidential reasoning in law, it is often necessary to employ subjective probabilities, which are probabilities derived from the opinions and judgement of a human. At least three concerns arise from the use of subjective probabilities in legal applications. Firstly, human beliefs concerning probabilities can be vague, ambiguous and inaccurate. Secondly, the impact of this vagueness, ambiguity and inaccuracy on the outcome of a probabilistic analysis is not necessarily fully understood. Thirdly, the provenance (...) of subjective probabilities and the associated potential sources of vagueness, ambiguity and inaccuracy tend to be poorly understood, making it difficult for the outcome of probabilistic reasoning to be explained and validated, which is crucial in legal applications. The former two concerns have been addressed by a wide body of research in AI. The latter, however, has received little attention. This paper presents a novel approach to employ argumentation to reason about probability distributions in probabilistic models. It introduces a range of argumentation schemes and corresponding sets of critical questions for the construction and validation of argument models that define sets of probability distributions. By means of an extended example, the paper demonstrates how the approach, argumentation schemes and critical questions can be employed for the development of models and their validation in legal applications of the likelihood ratio approach to evidential reasoning. (shrink)

Given that the benefits of Corporate Political Activity (CPA) are usually granted in the form of favorable industry regulation that benefits all industry participants rather than a single firm, small politically inactive firms are often able to take advantage of the benefits from CPA without investing in them. We argue that the free‐riding problem is context specific. Situations of extreme uncertainty create institutional voids that enable individual firms to more fully appropriate the returns from their CPA. In this paper, (...) we examine the influence that CPA had on the U.S. government’s disbursements of TARP funding in 2008. We find that politically active firms were able to avoid the free‐rider problem by obtaining more instances of TARP funding when compared to firms that were not politically active. In addition to being more likely to receive TARP funds, politically active firms received larger amounts of TARP funding than those firms who were not politically active. (shrink)

In the following, I will discuss the current social reaction to the ecological crisis and the ways in which society reacts to technological risks, which can be understood primarily as a reaction to scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the first section, I will clarify what is meant by scientific and moral or ethical uncertainty. In the second section, I will contrast Max Weber's differentiation of science, law [Recht) and morality in the modern world with the process (...) of de-differentiation of these value spheres, a trend which can be observed in the present-day context of the ecological crisis and technological risks. We shall see that social contradictions emerge in the functional relationships between these value spheres, and that such contradictions go hand in hand with these value spheres or contexts of discourse either losing their original function or becoming transformed. Science forfeits its role as a functional authority and becomes a strategic resource for politics. Law becomes a basic constituent of an amoral form of negotiation, which can no longer be properly grasped in terms of legal categories. Morality is transformed into fear, and economics yields unprofitable practices. In the third section, I will in attempt to open up the moral and ethical dimension of how to deal with uncertainty with the help of discourse theory, as well as outline a possible solution. (shrink)

This is a very short textbook on probabilistic reasoning, expected utility decision-making, cognitive biases, and self-correction, especially in application to medical examples. It also includes a chapter on concepts of health.

When animals share decisions with others, they pool personal information, offset individual errors and, thereby, increase decision accuracy. This is termed ‘swarm intelligence.’ But what if those decisions involve conflicts of interest between individual decision-makers? Should animals share decisions with individuals whose goals are different from, and partially in conflict with, their own? A group decision model developed by Larissa Conradt and colleagues finds that, contrary to intuition, conflicting goals often increase both decision accuracy and the individual gains derived from (...) shared decisions. Thus, conflicts of interest, far from hampering effective decision making, can actually improve decision outcomes for all stakeholders, as long as they also have some goals in common. By contrast, conflict-free decisions shared by animals which all have the same goals are often surprisingly poor. (shrink)

Both papers – to different degrees – underplay the interactive dimensions of music, and both would have benefited from integrating the concept of attachment into their treatments of social bonding. I further suggest that their treatment of music as a discrete domain of human experience and behaviour weakens their arguments concerning its functions in human evolution.

Bohr's 1930 derivation of the uncertainty relation c 2 δm δt≥h bears a close relationship to Einstein's 1913 derivation of the “gravitational redshift” via the “equivalence principle.” A rewording of Bohr's argument is presented here, not taking the last step of acceleration as “equivalent” to a uniform gravity field, thus yielding a derivation of the formula c 2 δm δt≥h, avoiding Treder's 1971 objection.

We give an example from the theory of Markov decision processes which shows that the “optimism in the face of uncertainty” heuristics may fail to make any progress. This is due to the impossibility to falsify a belief that a (transition) probability is larger than 0. Our example shows the utility of Popper’s demand of falsifiability of hypotheses in the area of artificial intelligence.

E=mc 2 is found to be a special case ofE=σ ±1cn, where σ is any one of four susceptibilities, namely electric, magnetic, gravitational, and elastic. Letl be length,t time,Δt time dilation, andΔl a measure of Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction. A particle is stated to be the manifestation of a collection of susceptibilities which arise when(Δl)/1=(Δt)/t. Then(ΔE)/E=5 (Δt)/2t=±(Δσ)/σ. Corresponding to susceptibility, special energy particles are postulated which exhibitSU(3) symmetry, Related to the susceptibilities are five new Heisenberg uncertainty relations. Three new conservation laws (...) for particles are proposed. (shrink)

Research related to indigenous peoples in Sweden and elsewhere has a history marked by discriminatory practice and unequal research processes. Sweden has still not been very visible in terms of openly debating, developing and implementing ethical strategies specifically suited for indigenous research. The present study explores how research ethics is discussed among scholars within the Sami research field in contemporary Sweden. Fifty-six research proposals deriving from eight different research institutions and 160 individual researchers are analyzed, discovering how scholars relate to (...) research ethics when planning for new research projects related to the indigenous Sami. The results demonstrate that ethical guidelines for research are often referred to, but that a common view on what guidelines to use is lacking, leading to a notable variety between different researchers. Ethical discussions are present in the vast majority of the proposals, however there are notable differences between the theories around how to proceed in a culturally safe, ethical manner, and the proposed methods that are to be used to implement theory in practice. In conclusion, there exists a great uncertainty among scholars on where to seek ethical guidance, how to relate to current legislation around research ethics and at the same time act ethically in a culturally appropriate manner. This uncertainty leads to questioning whether discussions of ethics are relevant in the first place, what they are supposed to include, how they are meant to be undertaken and what consequences can be expected from the presence or absence of ethics in indigenous research. (shrink)

Clearance phase at signalized crosswalks is an important parameter of pedestrians’ safety because it helps them to complete the crossing before the green signal for vehicles. However, there is the issue of pedestrian decision as to whether to cross if they arrive at the crosswalk during the clearance phase, which represents a violation in many countries. Due to the proof that pedestrian violations multiply the risk of traffic accidents, in this study, the tendency of pedestrians to commit violations during the (...) clearance time has been researched. With the aim of proposing the design of the pedestrian traffic lights, which could decrease the frequency of pedestrian violations, the comparison of pedestrians behaviour at crosswalks with and without a countdown timer during the clearance time was made, based on the data collected in the video recording. Chi square independency test showed that there is a statistically significant difference in the behaviour of pedestrians during the clearance time, depending on the existence of the timer, as well as the fact that pedestrians behave in a safer manner if there is no clearance time shown on the timer. The total delay rate on the roadway during the red signal, which was the consequence of starting the crossing during the clearance time or subsequent violations, was 1.3 times higher at the crosswalks with the countdown timer. This research was unique because for the first time, two-phase pedestrian crossings on the roadway with the median refuge island in the sense of clearance time were analysed, in spite of the previous proof that pedestrians are more likely to commit violations during the red signal in that kind of roadway. Another novelty in the research was pedestrians following till the end of crossing, due to the possibility of subsequent violations. With the means of binary logistic regression, different factors which affect pedestrians’ behaviour during the clearance time have been determined and they differ depending on the existence of the timer. At the pedestrian crosswalks with the timer, contributing factors have been determined, such as gender, the number of waiting pedestrians, distractions, arrival time, and age. If there is no timer, the contributing factors are the following: the number of crossing pedestrians, distractions, group, position of pedestrians in relation to the vehicle, the number of traffic lanes, and age. Based on the obtained results, a new design of the pedestrian traffic lights was proposed. (shrink)

Emotions influence human decisions under risk and uncertainty, even when they are unrelated to the decisions, i.e. incidental to them. Empirical findings are mixed regarding the directions and sizes of the effects of discrete emotions such as fear, anger, or happiness. According to the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (ATF), appraisals of certainty and control determine why same-valence emotions can differentially alter preferences for risky and uncertain options. Building upon this framework of emotion-specific appraisals, we conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of (...) 28 experimental studies on the effects of discrete incidental emotions on decision-making under risk and uncertainty. We evaluated potential moderators at the task and study levels. We find emotion-specific, moderately heterogeneous effects partially in line with the expectations of the ATF. The framing and financial consequences of choices, the type of choices, and the presence of other participants during the task do not moderate the effect. Our meta-analytic results support the differential influence of discrete, incidental emotions on decision-making under risk and uncertainty depending on appraisals other than valence. We discuss limited sample sizes and heterogeneity as reasons for the absence of significant moderators and encourage experimental investigations of individual differences in the susceptibility to incidental affective influences. (shrink)

The uncertainty relation in quantum mechanics has been explicated sometimes as a statistical relation and at other times as a relation concerning precision of simultaneous measurements. In the present paper, taking the indefiniteness of individual experiments as represented by diameters of Borel sets in projection-valued measure, we mathematically distinguish four expressions, two statistical and two concerning simultaneous measurements, of the uncertainty relation, study their interrelations, and prove that they are nonequivalent to each other and to the eigenvector condition (...) (EV) in infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. (shrink)