Examining a variety of bio-objects in contexts beyond the laboratory, Bio-Objects: Life in the 21st Century explores new ways of thinking about how novel bio-objects enter contemporary life, analysing the manner in which the boundaries between human and animal, organic and non-organic, and being 'alive' and the suspension of living, are questioned, destabilised and in some cases re-established.
This essay complements Roberto Esposito’s analysis of the political category of the person by outlining the role of literature, and especially the genre of the novel, in consolidating this category and allowing it to do its political and affective work. The essay shows how Ben Lerner’s 2014 novel 10:04 dismantles three central features of the traditional novel’s poetics of the person: its investment in the notion of literary character, its use of fictionality, and its structural reliance on the narrative future. (...) Lerner’s novel, like Esposito’s biopolitical work, aims to overcome the hierarchical divisions within human life that are endemic to the category of the person and that have historically fostered biopolitical violence. Both projects intimate a less destructive politics—what Lerner calls “the transpersonal” and Esposito “the impersonal.”. (shrink)
Abstract Forty male and female adults responded to two forms of Kohlberg's test??one in the standard third?person form, and the other imagining themselves as the protagonists in Kohlberg's dilemmas. Females obtained slightly lower moral maturity scores than males across both forms, but there were no sex differences in moral orientation. There were no significant effects for the perspective from which Kohlberg's test was taken, on either moral maturity or moral orientation. Care?oriented moral judgements were more prevalent in dilemmas involving life (...) vs. law conflicts than in dilemmas involving conscience vs. punishment conflicts. Subjects did not consistently make either care? or justice?oriented moral judgements. There was a significant negative correlation between the frequency of care?oriented judgements and moral maturity for males, but not for females. Although these results are partially consistent with the possibility that Kohlberg's test and scoring system are biased against females, they do not support the assumption that females make more care?oriented moral judgements than males on Kohlberg's test, or, indeed, that members of either sex display enough consistency in care?and justice?based moral judgements on Kohlberg's test for such judgements to serve as the basis of moral orientations. (shrink)
Many philosophical disputes, most prominently disputes in ontology, have been suspected of being merely verbal and hence pointless. My goal in this paper is to offer an account of merely verbal disputes and to address the question of what is problematic with such disputes. I begin by arguing that extant accounts that focus on the semantics of the disputed statement S do not capture the full range of cases as they might arise in philosophy. Moreover, these accounts bring in heavy (...) theoretical machinery. I attempt to show that we can capture the full range of cases with an approach that is theoretically lightweight. This approach explains verbal disputes as a pragmatic phenomenon where parties use the same utterance type S with different speaker’s meaning. Moreover, it provides an answer to the crucial question Jackson’s pragmatic account leaves, at best, highly implicit. Based on my account, we can distinguish between different ways in which disputes can be verbal and different extents to which they are defective. Distinguishing between these varieties of verbalness furthermore allows us to specify what kind of substantive issues remain to be discussed once the linguistic confusion is resolved. (shrink)
In this paper we describe a framework for the construction of entities that can serve as interpretations of arbitrary contiguous chunks of text. An important part of the paper is devoted to describing stacking cells, or the proposed meanings for bracket-structures.
Who is Daisaku Ikeda? At one level, he is the leader of a religious movement--Soka Gakkai--which began in Japan, where it still has its headquarters, but which now claims 12 million adherents around the world. At another level, he is a globetrotting figure whose formal conversations with diverse writers, thinkers and diplomats--including Arnold Toynbee, Joseph Rotblat and Mikhail Gorbachev--have garnered him an international profile, as well as academic recognition. Perhaps above all else, Daisaku Ikeda is viewed as a campaigner for (...) peace. And it is Ikeda's specific contribution to peacebuilding, notably through the central emphasis he has placed on the significance of dialogue, that this book explores: the first to do so in a concerted way. Olivier Urbain shows that while Soka Gakkai (the "value society") may stem from the medieval principles of Nichiren Buddhism, under Ikeda's leadership it has taken these classic wisdoms and transformed them. Now essentially classless and secularised, as well as adaptable and sensitive to modern challenges like resource shortages and climate change, this, argues the author, is a pragmatic approach to peace which has proved both popular and eminently transportable. (shrink)
In this paper a semantics for dynamic predicate logic is developed that uses sequence valued assignments. This semantics is compared with the usual relational semantics for dynamic predicate logic: it is shown that the most important intuitions of the usual semantics are preserved. Then it is shown that the refined semantics reflects out intuitions about information growth. Some other issues in dynamic semantics are formulated and discussed in terms of the new sequence semantics.
Contrairement à ce qu’ont affirmé un certain nombre d’historiens et d’historiennes, les femmes ont une place dans l’espace social vénitien aux xve et xvie siècles. Elles appartiennent à l’espace domestique, mais elles sont aussi présentes à l’extérieur, dans les rues et sur les places. Cette étude s’appuie sur des sources picturales pour discuter la présence féminine dans l’espace extérieur et l’espace domestique vénitiens. Peintes par des artistes masculins, elles sont représentées selon des codes bien précis dans l’espace extérieur, souvent à (...) l’image de la Vierge Marie ou d’autres figures saintes. Mais nous verrons également que l’incursion des peintres au sein des case venetiane, qui entraîne une manière plus réaliste de représenter la figure féminine et leur offre une plus grande visibilité, leur permet de gagner une certaine liberté de mouvement, parfois au détriment de leur réputation. (shrink)
In this paper we discuss the treatment of variables in dynamic semantics. Referent systems are introduced as a flexible mechanism for working with variables. In a referent system we carefully distinguish the variables themselves both from the machinery by which we manipulate them - their names - and from the information that we store in them - their values. It is shown that the referent systems provide a natural basis for dynamic semantics. The semantics with referent systems is compared with (...) the familiar formalisms in dynamic semantics, DRT and DPL. (shrink)
We argue that the meaning of smiles is interpreted from physical/contextual cues, and simulation may simply reinforce the information derived from these cues. We suggest that, contrary to the claim of the SIMS model, positive and negative smiles may invoke similar simulation processes. Finally, we provide alternative explanations for the role of eye contact in the processing of smiles.
ZusammenfassungIst Biologie das jüngste Mitglied in der Familie von Big Science? Die vermehrte Zusammenarbeit in der biologischen Forschung wurde in der Folge des Human Genome Project zwar zum Gegenstand hitziger Diskussionen, aber Debatten und Reflexionen blieben meist im Polemischen verhaftet und zeigten eine begrenzte Wertschätzung für die Vielfalt und Erklärungskraft des Konzepts von Big Science. Zur gleichen Zeit haben Wissenschafts- und Technikforscher/innen in ihren Beschreibungen des Wandels der Forschungslandschaft die Verwendung des Begriffs Big Science gemieden. Dieser interdisziplinäre Artikel kombiniert eine (...) begriffliche Analyse des Konzepts von Big Science mit unterschiedlichen Daten und Ideen aus einer Multimethodenuntersuchung mehrerer großer Forschungsprojekte in der Biologie. Ziel ist es, ein empirisch fundiertes, nuanciertes und analytisch nützliches Verständnis von Big Biology zu entwickeln und die normativen Debatten mit ihren einfachen Dichotomien und rhetorischen Positionen hinter sich zu lassen. Zwar kann das Konzept von Big Science als eine Mode in der Wissenschaftspolitik gesehen werden – inzwischen vielleicht sogar als ein altmodisches Konzept –, doch lautet meine innovative Argumentation, dass dessen analytische Verwendung unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die Ausweitung der Zusammenarbeit in den Biowissenschaften lenkt. Die Analyse von Big Biology zeigt Unterschiede zu Big Physics und anderen Formen von Big Science, namentlich in den Mustern der Forschungsorganisation, der verwendeten Technologien und der gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhänge, in denen sie tätig ist. So können Reflexionen über Big Science, Big Biology und ihre Beziehungen zur Wissensproduktion die jüngsten Behauptungen über grundlegende Veränderungen in der Life Science-Forschung in einen historischen Kontext stellen. (shrink)
The notion of exemplification is essential for Goodman’s theory of symbols. But Goodman’s account of exemplification has been criticized as unclear and inadequate. He points out two conditions for an object x exemplifying a label y: (C1) y denotes x and (C2) x refers to y. While (C1) is uncontroversial, (C2) raises the question of how “refers to” should be interpreted. This problem is intertwined with three further questions that consequently should be discussed together with it. Are the two necessary (...) conditions (C1) and (C2) conjointly sufficient? Do they amount to a definition of “exemplification”? Which notions of Goodman’s theory are basic, and hence undefined? In this paper, we address these questions and defend a reconstruction of the notion of exemplification that interprets “refers to” in (C2) as exemplificational reference and hence treats “exemplification” as a basic notion of Goodman’s theory. Firstly, we argue that even though the notion of exemplification is not defined, it is still sufficiently clear. This ensures its contribution to Goodman’s theory of symbols. Secondly, we show that our account is plausible as an interpretation of Goodman’s and Elgin’s writings, although it implies that some of Goodman’s theorems about self-reference have to be weakened. Thirdly, we argue that it is the only materially adequate reconstruction of Goodman’s notion of exemplification, whereas the alternative definitional accounts fail. (shrink)