26 found
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  1.  8
    On Having the Same First Person Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):566-587.
    Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if (...)
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  2.  13
    Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives About the Self.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):487-507.
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  3.  21
    De Se Content and Action Generalisation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):315-344.
    Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our (...)
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  4.  19
    Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will.Victor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (3):355-369.
    There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at (...)
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  5.  25
    Understanding and Disagreement in Belief Ascription.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):183-200.
    It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as (...)
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  6.  47
    Partial Understanding and Concept Possession: A Dilemma.Víctor M. Verdejo & Xavier Donato Rodríguez - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):153-162.
    In the light of partial understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept-individuating possession conditions include cases of partially understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.
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  7.  52
    Levels of Explanation Vindicated.Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.
    Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...)
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  8.  8
    Explaining Public Action.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and (...)
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  9.  8
    Norms for Pure Desire.Victor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.
    According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principlesfor coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several (...)
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  10.  88
    The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2013 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 28 (1):7-25.
    The Fodorian central objections to Inferential Role Semantics can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine these challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which they are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist version of IRS and argue that this version meets head on the Fodorian challenges. If sound, these considerations show that there is (...)
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  11.  3
    The Second Person Perspective.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other (...)
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  12.  13
    A Puzzle About Disagreement.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (37):283-297.
    Verdejo, Víctor_A Puzzle about Disagreement.
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  13.  13
    Meeting the Systematicity Challenge Challenge.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:155-183.
    From Fodor and Pylyshyn’s celebrated 1988 systematicity argument in favour of a language of thought , a challenge to connectionist models arises in the form of a dilemma: either these models do not explain systematicity or they are implementations of LOT. From consideration of this challenge and of systematicity in domains other than language, defenders of connectionism have mounted a parallel systematicity argument against LOT which results in a new self-defeating dilemma, what I call here the systematicity challenge challenge : (...)
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  14.  17
    In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):281-299.
    Consider the Unshareability View, namely, the view that first person thought or self-thought—thought as typically expressed via the first person pronoun—is not shareable from subject to subject. In this article, I show that a significant number of Fregean and non-Fregean commentators of Frege have taken the Unshareability View to be the default Fregean position, rehearse Frege’s chief claims about self-thought and suggest that their combination entails the Unshareability View only on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between way (...)
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  15.  31
    Disbelieving the Normativity of Content.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):441-456.
    Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, which is based on possession conditions for pure thinking or mere entertaining. I argue that the alternative approach has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature and has two important merits. First, it yields a direct analysis of the normativity of mental content, which is, (...)
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  16.  4
    Against Artifactual Epistemic Privilege.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Critica 46 (136):43-67.
    Las profundas raíces intencionales de los artefactos y sus tipos parecen apoyar intuitiva y filosóficamente una forma de privilegio epistémico de los hacedores con respecto a los objetos que crean. En este artículo examino críticamente la tesis del privilegio epistémico para los creadores de artefactos y presento un contraejemplo basado en el antiindividualismo. Se consideran diversas objeciones a las que se da respuesta. Concluyo que si el antiindividualismo es verdadero, entonces el supuesto privilegio epistémico de los creadores de artefactos o (...)
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  17.  19
    Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2009 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 24 (1):29-47.
    Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS can (...)
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  18. Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either).Víctor M. Verdejo - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 24 (1):29-47.
    Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS (...)
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  19.  6
    Correction To: In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-1.
    The article In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought, written by Víctor M. Verdejo, was originally published electronically on the publisher’s internet portal on 02 January 2019 without open access.
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  20.  9
    The Commitment to LOT.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):313-341.
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  21.  7
    Fully Understanding Concept Possession.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):3-27.
    Can subjects genuinely possess concepts they do not understand fully? A simple argument can show that, on the assumption that possession conditions are taken to fully individuate concepts, this question must be answered in the negative. In this paper, I examine this negative answer as possibly articulated within Christopher Peacocke’s seminal theory. I then discuss four central lines of attack to the view that possession of concepts requires full understanding. I conclude that theorists should acknowledge the existence of indefinitely many (...)
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  22.  36
    Concept Possession, Cognitive Value and Anti-Individualism.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):1-25.
  23.  13
    Determinability of Perception as Homogeneity of Representation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (1):33-47.
    Recent philosophical and empirical contributions strongly suggest that perception attributes determinable properties to its objects. But a characterisation of determinability via attributed properties is restricted to the level of content and does not capture the difference between perceptual belief and perception on this score. In this paper, I propose a formal way of cashing out the difference between determinable belief and perception. On the view presented here, determinability in perception distinctively involves homogeneous representation or representation that exhibits special sorts of (...)
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  24.  7
    Meeting the Systematicity Challenge Challenge: A Nonlinguistic Argument for a Language of Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:155-183.
    From Fodor and Pylyshyn’s celebrated 1988 systematicity argument in favour of a language of thought, a challenge to connectionist models arises in the form of a dilemma: either these models do not explain systematicity or they are implementations of LOT. From consideration of this challenge and of systematicity in domains other than language, defenders of connectionism have mounted a parallel systematicity argument against LOT which results in a new self-defeating dilemma, what I call here the systematicity challenge challenge : either (...)
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  25.  7
    The Rationalist Reply to Fodor’s Analyticity and Circularity Challenge.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2013 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 28 (1):7-25.
    The central Fodorian objections to Inferential Role Semantics can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine those two challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which the challenges are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist version of IRS and argue that this version meets the Fodorian challenges head on. If sound, this line of argument (...)
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  26.  10
    Computationalism, Connectionism, Dynamicism and Beyond: Looking for an Integrated Approach to Cognitive Science.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 405--416.