A new wave of thinkers from across different disciplines within the analytical tradition in philosophy has recently focused on critical, societal challenges, such as the silencing and questioning of the credibility of oppressed groups, the political polarization that threatens the good functioning of democratic societies across the globe, or the moral and political significance of gender, race, or sexual orientation. Appealing to both well-established and younger international scholars, this volume delves into some of the most relevant problems and discussions within (...) the area, bringing together for the first time different essays within what we deem to be a “political turn in analytic philosophy.” This political turn consists of putting different conceptual and theoretical tools from epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics at the service of social and political change. The aim is to ensure a better understanding of some of the key features of our social environments in an attempt to achieve a more just and equal society. (shrink)
The expressivist account of knowledge attributions, while claiming that these attributions are nonfactual, also typically holds that they retain a factual component. This factual component involves the attribution of a belief. The aim of this work is to show that considerations analogous to those motivating an expressivist account of knowledge attributions can be applied to belief attributions. As a consequence, we claim that expressivists should not treat the so-called factual component as such. The phenomenon we focus on to claim that (...) belief attributions are non-factual is that of normative doxastic disagreement. We show through several examples that this kind of disagreement is analogous to that of the epistemic kind. The result will be a doxastic expressivism. Finally, we answer some objections that our doxastic expressivism could seem to face. (shrink)
El objetivo fundamental de la arqueología ha sido el de perseguir la vida que ha habido detrás de todos los objetos encontrados del pasado humano 'huesos, cerámica y trozos de piedra' y tratar de descifrar sus contextos histórico y cultural. Este libro ofrece un resumen del discurso escrito de los arqueólogos sobre la instrumentación técnica y los métodos que se han ido proponiendo como la mejor forma de acercarse objetivamente a este pasado.
Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is, in fact, a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this (...) end both Tarski's definition of truth in terms of satisfaction and the T-sentences are taken into account. (shrink)
Here are the 18 guidance points contained in the UNAIDS document on Ethical Considerations in HIV Preventive Vaccine Research, reproduced by kind permission of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.
In "Monkeys, Men, and Moral Responsibility: A Neo-Aristotelian Case for a Qualitative Distinction," Paul Carron (2017) uses the tragic case of Travis the chimpanzee to test Frans de Waal's gradualism. If Travis is not to blame for anything simply because he's a chimp, then gradualism cannot be total: There must be a qualitative difference between chimps and humans that makes humans morally responsible and chimps not. As I understand it, Carron's neo-Aristotelian thesis is that chimps cannot emotionally regulate: The emotional (...) states from which primates act are given to them and "lack rational content," whereas the emotional states from which humans act can be self-consciously developed in the cultivation of character. Carron takes this thesis to be a friendly amendment because it arises "from within the sentimentalist tradition itself broadly construed." In this comment I question just how friendly Carron's amendment turns out to be. (shrink)
Though we cherish freedom and equality, there are human relations we commonly take to be morally permissible despite the fact that they essentially involve an inequality specifically of freedom, i.e., parental and fiduciary relations. In this article, I argue that the morality of these relations is best understood through a very old and dangerous concept, the concept of status. Despite their historic and continuing abuses, status relations are alive and well today, I argue, because some of them are necessary. We (...) must therefore carefully specify the conditions in which such status relations may morally obtain, as well as the duties of virtue and duties of right to which all parties are subject when it does (including a duty of care) to clearly articulate the ways in which these putatively moral status relations that essentially involve an asymmetry of autonomy (status relations) can go well or badly even within the context of the Kantian tradition from which our current legal and social practices arose. To this end, I offer Kant's own concept of status as a promising one because in Kant's theory, status is a nexus of virtue and right that is reducible to neither property nor contract but akin to each in familiar ways. Once status is admitted as an alternative to property and contract, status may be extended beyond Kant's domestic paradigm, most perspicuously to institutional ethics. In this article, I sketch a status-based theory of stakeholding that locates environmental impact, institutional oppression, and other significant features of our moral landscape within a Kantian framework of duties rich enough to more accurately characterize the complexities of stakeholding than current tradition has allowed. (shrink)
In "Disabilities and First-Person Testimony: A Case of Defeat?" Hilary Yancey argues that in at least some cases we have “no significant reason to distrust” the evidential value of first-person testimony concerning the impact of a physical disability on that individual’s well-being. Her argument is premised on a defeasible principle of trust: One should trust the testimony of others regarding p whenever one recognizes that the testifier is in a position to know p. Since the subjective component of wellbeing is (...) fist-person privileged, that is, ordinarily the subject herself is in the best position to know, an audience to such testimony must be aware of a defeater in order to shift the burden of proof and block the testimony from counting as evidence. In the body of the paper Yancey argues that 1) conflicting first-person testimony does not constitute an inescapable content defeater and 2) neither irrational adaptive preferences nor low life expectations inescapably undercuts the reliability of these testifiers regarding matters of their own subjective well-being. The burden of proof is not globally shifted by either kind of defeater, Yancey argues, so at least some first-person testimony about disability must inform our beliefs about the nature of disabilities. In my comment I ask and attempt to answer three questions on Yancy’s behalf, then invite her to set me straight if I have it wrong. I go Kantian along the way. 1. Whence arises the worry, and why focus on these defeaters? 2. How common is PNT, anyway, and why does it matter? 3. On what grounds should we distrust PNT in particular cases? (shrink)
The pessimistic induction and the problem of underdetermination in the philosophy of science have a rich history. In their recent incarnation as the problem of unconceived alternatives, most fully articulated by Kyle Stanford (2010) in Exceeding Our Grasp, the induction is more specific and underdetermination is construed more epistemically than is typical…The problem is not that there are empirically equivalent alternatives, that is, alternative between which no empirical evidence could ever distinguish. The problem is that multiple radically different alternative that (...) are empirically inequivalent might be equally well-confirmed by current evidence, and we might fail to even conceive one or more of those alternatives… In “Of German Tanks and Scientific Theories: Estimating the Number of Unconceived Alternatives,” Burkay Ozturk (2016) challenges Stanford on a distinct front. By applying a method of statistical estimation to scientific alternatives, Ozturk argues that the possibility space within which the alternatives are located allows for probable knowledge. The particular frequentist estimation method Ozturk employs requires that we assume the alternative pool is finite, which seems to be both false and wildly implausible. At first glance. I argue in this comment that Ozturk’s postulate of finitude is actually defensible in circumstances that might actually hold for ordinary scientific contexts. (shrink)
In his paper “Getting Sophisticated: In Favor of Hybrid Views of Skilled Action in Expertise,” Spencer Ivy (2023) argues effectively for what he calls a “sophisticated hybrid” view of expertise, driven by empirical considerations and argument from contemporary phenomenology and cognitive architecture. Here I raise three unfair objections which I think lead to some fair questions that may be productive for discussion and future work.
Misrepresentations can be innocuous or even useful, but Kant’s corollary to the formula of universal law appears to involve a pernicious one: “act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature”. Humans obviously cannot make their maxims into laws of nature, and it seems preposterous to claim that we are morally required to pretend that we can. Given that Kant was careful to eradicate pernicious misrepresentations from theoretical metaphysics, the imperative (...) to act as if I have this supernatural power has typically been treated as an embarrassment meriting apology. The wording of the corollary may be vindicated, however, by recognizing that “as if” (als ob) is a technical term both in the Critique of Pure Reason and here. It signals a modal shift from the assertoric to the problematic mode of cognition, one that is necessitated by the attempt to incorporate the natural effects of a free will into a universal moral imperative that is philosophically practical. In this paper I sketch how the modal shift makes sense of the corollary as a subjectively necessary, philosophically practical idealization of the extension of human freedom into nature, one that accurately represents a necessary parameter of moral conduct: moral ambition. (shrink)
In Kant on Practical Life: From Duty to History, Kristi E. Sweet accepts Allen Wood’s challenge to present in a single book the entire arc of Kant’s practical philosophy, including both its a priori and empirical aspects, literally from duty to history. Others have successfully undertaken a similar task, notably Robert Louden in Kant’s Impure Ethics, but Sweet succeeds in fulfilling three further distinctive aims: settling persistent but outdated contentions that Kant’s ‘deontological’ and ‘teleological’ commitments are inconsistent by tracing duty (...) through to the ends it entails, especially the communal ends “in which reason finds its satisfaction” (10); addressing the problem of human finitude by explicating and resolving the dialectic between reason and nature in its various moments; and leaving virtually no philosophical stone unturned along the way, from the fact of reason to international disarmament. (shrink)
Immanuel Kant’s theory of imagination is a surprisingly fruitful nexus of explanation for the prima facie disparate characteristics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), especially the sub-spectrum best characterized by the Sensory Integration (SI) and Intense World (IW) theories of ASD. According to the psychological theories that underpin these approaches to autism, upstream effects of sensory processing atypicalities explain a cascade of downstream effects that have been characterized in the diagnostic triad, e.g., poor sensory integration contributes to weak central coherence, which (...) in turn contributes to difficulty participating in a back and forth conversation. To see why Kant’s theory of imagination might be useful, consider that ASD is neither a sensory disorder nor an intellectual disorder per se. Cognitive dysfunction is a common comorbidity of ASD, not a characteristic of it. If we exclude sense and intellect, what’s left? According to Kant, imagination is a synthesizing faculty that mediates between sense and understanding. It does so by transforming intuition from the canonic and vital senses. The uses of imagination include our spatially formative, temporally associative, and communicatively affinitive production, where affinitive production includes sympathy and fantasy. Imagination is thus the faculty of sensory integration, embodied subjectivity, empathy, mindreading, and social cooperation. The wide range of how autism presents and how it is experienced can thus be understood in terms of the atypical development of specific functions of imagination. Kant’s theory of imagination provides a new perspective on how to organize our understanding of autism at the psychological level, one that makes sense of how some of the disparate characteristic phenomena of autism are systematically related and which might lead to novel predictions, research targets, or intervention recommendations. (shrink)
In this APA blog, I appeal to two 2020 cases of algorithms gone wrong to motivate philosophical attention to algorithmic oppression. I offer a simple definition, then describe a few of the ways it is engendered. References and extends work by Safiya Noble, Cathy O'Neil, Ruha Benjamin, Virginia Eubanks, Sara Wachter-Boettcher, Michael Kearns & Aaron Roth.
This dissertation concerns the methodology Kant employs in the first two sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork I-II) with particular attention to how the execution of the method of analysis in these sections contributes to the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. My thesis is that Kant had a detailed strategy for the Groundwork, that this strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the Critique of Pure Reason (first Critique) and his (...) lectures on logic, and that understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics. At the most general level of methodology, Kant says there are four steps for the establishment of any science: 1) make distinct the idea of the natural unity of its material 2) determine the special content of the science 3) articulate the systematic unity of the science 4) critique the science to determine its boundaries The first two of these steps are accomplished by the genetically scholastic method of analysis, paradigmatically the method whereby confused and obscure ideas are made clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight that are potentially complete and adequate to philosophical purposes. The analysis of Groundwork I is a paradigmatic analysis that makes distinct what is contained in common understanding, i.e. its Inhalt or intension, making distinct the higher partial concepts that together define the concept of morality. The analysis of Groundwork II is an employment more specifically of the method of logical division, which makes distinct what is contained under the concept, i.e. its Umfang, by which the extension or object of morality is determined. Part I introduces Kant’s conception of moral metaphysical science and why he took it to be in need of establishment, explains the general method for establishing science and the scholastic method of analysis by which its first two steps are to be accomplished, then provides an interpretation of Groundwork I as an execution of this method. Part II details Kant’s determination of the special content of moral science in Groundwork II in relation to the central problem for moral metaphysics – how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible. (shrink)
Mae Smethurst’s work has largely aimed to articulate nō theater in Western terms from their early roots, primarily through Aristotle’s On Tragedy. Her detailed examination of the shared structure of the content of these independent and superficially dissimilar arts reveals their mutual intelligibility and effectiveness through shared underlying universals. In this spirit, I outline how Zeami answers Plato’s first challenge to artistic performance, as expressed in Ion where Plato argues that rhapsody is not an art [techné] because it requires no (...) mastery. (Rhapsodes are instead vehicles of the divine.) This challenge to poetic performing arts, that is, to their claim to be arts at all, determines criteria by which we may judge any putative art, including sarugaku and its elevation to nōgaku. Though Zeami was unaware of Plato’s challenge, he nevertheless answers it in a way that brings Plato’s own assumptions and conceptual framework into relief. In this article I outline the first step of Zeami’s reply to Plato, how nō satisfies the criteria for mastery of a subject, with some help from zen master Dōgen. The focus of this article is twofold: 1) an examination of the ways Plato’s conception of a masterable subject entails metaphysical and epistemic tenets that may be revised or rejected in Buddhist tradition, and 2) a study of the means through which the sense of mindlessness that allegedly precludes rhapsody (and kamigakari) from qualifying as art (techné/michi) contrasts with the mushin and isshin of nō (and zazen). (shrink)
Audi's aim in Means, Ends, and Persons is to introduce an ethics of conduct in which treatment of persons features as a central case. The approach to conduct is inspired by Kant, and there are moments of explicit contact, but this book is not meant to be a work of Kant scholarship. The method of argument consists largely in laying out a system of distinctions that are illustrated and defended by simple, familiar examples. Audi's approach here is a continuation of (...) the common-sense intuitionism he advocates in prior work. (shrink)
If Unamuno had been able to choose how to be remembered, he would have wanted him to be a poet. This book wants to do justice to that happy possibility. But above all because Unamuno was a poet in the highest sense: he was while writing the same essay as a novel, or theater, letter or verse, and he was also a poet when he passionately lived all the facets of his intense existence. His intellectual work was poetic and his (...) personal relationships, as well as his political activity, also responded to that peculiar Unamunian aesthetic in which the vital horizon is inescapably confused with the tasks of thought." --Translated from back cover. (shrink)
Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)
No mais profundo centro: João da Cruz e o Sufismo Sadili cantam a união transformante Carlos Frederico Barboza de Souza O camelô em Belo Horizonte: aspectos da informalidade e da identidade Maria Aparecida Carvalho de Castro Igreja, povo de Deus, sujeito da comunhão e da missão Cleto Caliman A literatura como questionamento do sujeito da modernidade: Memórias do cárcere, de Graciliano Ramos, e A peste, de Albert Camus João Pereira Pinto O ensino religioso na rede pública estadual de Belo (...) Horizonte -MG: história, modelos e percepções de professores sobre formação e docência Douglas Cabral Dantas. (shrink)
This article discusses the establishment of a governance framework for biomedical research in Singapore. It focuses on the work of the Bioethics Advisory Committee , which has been instrumental in institutionalizing a governance framework, through the provision of recommendations to the government, and through the coordination of efforts among government agencies. However, developing capabilities in biomedical sciences presents challenges that are qualitatively different from those of past technologies. The state has a greater role to play in balancing conflicting and potentially (...) irreconcilable economic, social, and political goals. This article analyzes the various ways by which the BAC has facilitated this. (shrink)
This study aimed to understand the expressions of fear in the journeys of health professionals who worked in the confrontation of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19), in the city of Manaus, in the Brazilian Western Amazon. This is an exploratory qualitative study that adopts interpretive description as a method to generate informed knowledge responsive to the needs of the practice. We included 56 participants, comprising 23 health managers and 33 health workers (middle and higher level) of different professional categories. The results (...) revealed three circles of experience: (1) knowledge and professional experience in dealing with the disease (unknown–known–experienced); (2) the growing proximity to death and loss (predicted–witnessed–suffered); and (3) the involvement and proximity to whatever affects the individual, their emotions, and personal transformations in the face of the threat (the collective, the neighbor, and oneself). Our results suggest that health professionals who worked during the COVID‐19 pandemic in Manaus experienced insecurity, dread, and fear, illustrating the complexity of developing their activities in the front line of care and management during the different phases of the pandemic. A contribution of the study is precisely that of capturing this complexity, which suggests the impossibility of analyzing fear only in its simple manifestation, or in each circle of experience. (shrink)
Durante la transición del siglo VI al siglo V a.C. la Magna Grecia experimentó grandes transformaciones sociales y políticas. El ascenso de la tiranía y los primeros avances democráticos produjeron una erosión del poder de la aristocracia y la consagración del Santuario de Delfos como la principal fuente de legitimidad de esta nueva centralidad política. El caso de Metaponto nos ofrece una oportunidad privilegiada para observar este proceso, ya que disponemos de varias fuentes, incluido un relato de Heródoto, que nos (...) permiten acceder a la forma en la que el culto délfico cristalizó entre los metapontinos. La máxima expresión de este culto fue el temenos de Apolo y Aristeas, del que se ofrece una interpretación en este artículo, completada por la posible identificación de una base que habría formado parte del conjunto monumental y estaría representada en el registro numismático. Esta base se encuentra actualmente en las instalaciones del Parco Archeologico dell’area urbana di Metaponto. (shrink)
This w ork ana l yses the response that the Spanish State as a Nation-State, is g i ving to int e g ration of the immi g rant as citizen. Contra r y to those w ho consider that residence has to be the access w a y to citizenship in the f ace of the crisis of the Nation-State and the ge o g raphical mobility that the global econ o m y imposes on people, here the political (...) rel e v ance of nationality is defende d , as an und i vided ind i vidual share of belonging to the constituent p ow er in a harmonious relation with the fl e xi b le concept of residence. This research is d i vided into f i v e sections, in w hich nationality and the constituent p ow e r , the w a ys of access to Spanish nationali t y , the conflict of Nation or State, the characteristics of original nationality and f inal l y , the criteria used b y States to select the potential immi g rant. Th e critical ana l ysis of the Spanish l e gislation on nationality and citizenship t o gether with the theoretical debates, h a v e ena b led us to conclude with a proposal of l e g e fe r enda focussed on a radical refo r m of the concept of nationali t y. (shrink)
Vida y obra de cuatro ilustres pensadores norteños: Hildebrando Castro Pozo, Mariano Iberico Rodríguez, Antenor Orrego Espinoza y Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Con énfasis en el pensamiento filosófico, sociológico y político de cada uno.
Contiene tres trabajos sobre Arturo Ardao: sobre la noción de sujeto (Yamandú Acosta); sobre la interpretación de Andrés Bello (Arturo A. Roig); y sobre su libro Filosofía de lengua española (ver HLAS 36:5047). Mencionamos algunas de las otras contribuciones: el tema de la historia de la filosofía latinoamericana (Horacio Cerutti Guldberg); el batllismo (Manuel A. Claps); el tema de Calibán (Roberto Fernández Retamar); el pensamiento de Pedro Figari (Juan Fló); la universidad latinoamericana en el siglo XVIII (Gregorio Weinberg); el pensamiento (...) socialista en el Uruguay (Carlos Zubillaga). Es de lamentar que no se agregara al volumen una bibliografía de Ardao"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58. (shrink)