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  1.  58
    The Myth of Pain.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2000 - MIT Press.
    or Browse over 3500 reviews in " by Valerie Hardcastle, Ph.D. " _Metapsychology_.
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  2. Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity.David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.
    Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...)
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  3.  27
    When a Pain is Not.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):381.
  4.  28
    Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1999 - MIT Press.
    This book is perhaps the first to open a dialogue between the two disciplines.
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  5. What Do Brain Data Really Show?Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (3):572-582.
    There is a bias in neuroscience toward localizing and modularizing brain functions. Single cell recording, imaging studies, and the study of neurological deficits all feed into the Gallian view that different brain areas do different things and the things being done are confined to particular processing streams. At the same time, there is a growing sentiment that brains probably don’t work like that after all; it is better to conceive of them as fundamentally distributed units, multi‐tasking at every level. This (...)
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  6.  59
    Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness.Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):658-670.
    For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that is objective and scientific. Scientists and clinicians have tended to (...)
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  7.  11
    What Difference Do Brain Images Make in US Criminal Trials?Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Edward Lamb - 2018 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 24 (4):909-915.
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  8. When a Pain is Not.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):381-409.
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  9. On the Normativity of Functions.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2002 - In Andre Ariew (ed.), Functions. Oxford University Press.
  10.  33
    How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1996 - SUNY Press.
    What is required to be an interdisciplinary theory in cognitive science is for it to span more than one traditional domain. Generally speaking, as I discuss ...
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  11.  16
    Why “Moral Enhancement” Isn’T Always Moral Enhancement: The Case of Traumatic Brain Injury in American Vets.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):527-546.
    In this article, I argue that as we learn more about how we might intervene in the brain in ways that impact human behavior, the scope of what counts as “moral behavior” becomes smaller and smaller because things we successfully manipulate using evidence-based science are often things that fall outside the sphere of morality. Consequently, the argument that we are morally obligated to morally enhance our neighbors starts to fall apart, not because humans should be free to make terrible choices, (...)
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  12.  17
    Locating Consciousness.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1995 - John Benjamins.
    Spelling out in detail what we do and do not know about phenomenological experience, this book denies the common view of consciousness as a central decision...
  13. Attention Versus Consciousness: A Distinction with a Difference.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2003 - In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. John Benjamins. pp. 105.
  14.  9
    Intellectual Disability, Brain Damage, and Group-to-Individual Inferences.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2018 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):5-16.
    In this essay, I home in on the difficulties with group-to-individual inferences in neuroscience and how they impact the legal system. I briefly outline how cognitive shortcutting can distort legal decisions, and then turn my attention to G2i inferences, with a special focus on issues of intellectual disability and brain damage. I argue that judges and juries are not situated to appreciate the nuances in brain data and that they are required to make clinical decisions without clinical training. As a (...)
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  15.  67
    Psychology's "Binding Problem" and Possible Neurobiological Solutions.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):66-90.
    Given what we know about the segregated nature of the brain and the relative absence of multi-modal association areas in the cortex, how percepts become unified is not clear. However, if we could work out how and where the brain joins together segregated outputs, we would have a start in localizing the neuronal processes that correlate with conscious perceptual experiences. In this essay, I critically examine data relevant for understanding the neurophysiological underpinnings of perception. In particular, I examine the possibility (...)
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  16. Sisyphus's Boulder: Consciousness and the Limits of the Knowable.Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2004 - John Benjamins.
    In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that..
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  17. The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):7-13.
    In this essay, I hope to make clearer what the points of division between the materialists and the sceptics are. I argue that the rifts are quite deep and turn on basic differences in understanding the scientific enterprise. In section I, I outline the disagreements between David Chalmers and me, arguing that consciousness is not a brute fact about the world. In section II, I point out the fundamental difference between the materialists and the sceptics, suggesting that this difference is (...)
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  18.  48
    Pleasure Gone Awry? A New Conceptualization of Chronic Pain and Addiction.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):71-85.
    I examine what happens in the brain when patients experience chronic pain and when subjects are addicted to alcohol. We can find important parallels between these two cases, and these parallels can perhaps point us toward new ways of treating (or at least understanding) both issues. Interestingly, we can understand both cases as our pleasure system gone awry. In brief, I argue that chronic pain and alcohol addiction both stem from a dysregulation in our brain’s reward structure. This dysregulation in (...)
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  19.  54
    On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):1-25.
    There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores the popular (...)
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  20. The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons From Blindsight.Guven Guzeldere, Owen J. Flanagan & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2000 - In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.
  21.  15
    Predicting the Self: Lessons From Schizophrenia.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):381-400.
    Newly developed Bayesian perspectives on schizophrenia hold out the promise that a common underlying mechanism can account for many, if not all, of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. If this is the case, then understanding how schizophrenic minds go awry could shine light on how healthy minds maintain a sense of self. This article investigates this Bayesian promise by examining whether the approach can indeed account for the difficulties with self-awareness experienced in schizophrenia. While I conclude that it cannot, I (...)
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  22.  14
    It Isn't as Simple as It Seems: Understanding and Treating Psychopathy.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (2):12-13.
  23.  8
    Folk Psychology Wins the DAY! Daubert and the Challenge of False Confessions.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2017 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 24 (3):269-281.
    It has been more than 20 years since the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on the admissibility of scientific expert witness testimony in legal proceedings. It is time, perhaps, to look back at the history of Daubert decisions to determine whether it and its progeny have lived up to their collective promises to keep bad science out of the courtroom, while allowing in good, especially where the mind and brain sciences are concerned.In this (...)
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  24. A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court.Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2002 - Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  25.  10
    On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):1-25.
    There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores the popular (...)
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  26.  7
    To Cure Sometimes, To Relieve Often, and To Comfort Always.Rosalyn Stewart & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (12):66-68.
    Volume 19, Issue 12, December 2019, Page 66-68.
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  27.  93
    Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (3):408-28.
    In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can "illuminate" issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this "illumination" would work (...)
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  28.  22
    Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution. [REVIEW]Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (1):206-207.
    There has been a spate of books recently on the subject of consciousness. Relatively few of these, however, have taken a serious look at the philosophical issues surrounding the study of consciousness. Jeffrey Foss's book Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution is a welcome exception.
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  29. How to Understand the N in NCC.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press.
  30. A Critique of Information Processing Theories of Consciousness.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (1):89-107.
    Information processing theories in psychology give rise to executive theories of consciousness. Roughly speaking, these theories maintain that consciousness is a centralized processor that we use when processing novel or complex stimuli. The computational assumptions driving the executive theories are closely tied to the computer metaphor. However, those who take the metaphor serious — as I believe psychologists who advocate the executive theories do — end up accepting too particular a notion of a computing device. In this essay, I examine (...)
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  31.  73
    Emotions and Narrative Selves.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2003 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):353-356.
  32.  22
    Traumatic Brain Injury, Neuroscience, and the Legal System.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (1):55-64.
    This essay addresses the question: What is the probative value of including neuroscience data in court cases where the defendant might have had a traumatic brain injury? That is, this essay attempts to articulate how well we can connect scientific data and clinical test results to the demands of the Daubert standard in the United States’ court system, and, given the fact that neuroimaging is already being used in our courts, what, if anything, we should do about this fact. Ultimately, (...)
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  33.  39
    The Elusive Illusion of Sensation.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):662-663.
    The sensation of will is not the same thing as the will itself any more than the sensation of hunger is the same thing as being devoid of nutrients. This is not a really surprising claim, but it is the only claim to which Wegner is entitled in his book.
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  34.  63
    The Image of Observables.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):585-597.
    This paper challenges a central tenet of constructive empiricism, namely that empirical adequacy has a privileged epistemic status. I argue that perceptions of observables are theory-wrought, and theory-wrought in the same ways as the observation sentences we use to describe those perceptions, van Fraassen can draw no privileged or fundamental distinction between what we observe and interpreting those observations through theory. Since empirical adequacy depends upon accurately describing what we observe, and we have no theory-independent reason to believe that what (...)
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  35. The Binding Problem.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - manuscript
    It is important to separate the question of binding from the problem of consciousness. Undoubtedly, there are some close connections between the two: my conscious experience is of a bound unity. But my unconscious experiences -- subliminal impressions, masked primings, etc. -- might be bound too for all I know. Hence, some of the recent commentators speak too loosely when they talk of 40 Hz oscillations solving some problem of conscious perception.
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  36.  82
    HOT Theories of Consciousness: More Sad Tales of Philosophical Intuitions Gone Astray.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. pp. 277.
  37.  18
    Supporting Irrational Suicide.Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Rosalyn Walker Stewart - 2002 - Bioethics 16 (5):425-438.
  38.  11
    Medical Decision-Making Capacity: High Stakes, Complex, and Fluid.Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Rosalyn W. Stewart - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (4):21-22.
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  39.  34
    Multiplex Vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders.Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Owen Flanagan - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):645-657.
  40.  64
    Neuroscience and the Art of Single Cell Recordings.Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):195-208.
    This article examines how scientists move from physical measurementsto actual observation of single-cell recordings in the brain. We highlight how easy it is to change the fundamental nature of ourobservations using accepted methodological techniques for manipulatingraw data. Collecting single-cell data is thoroughly pragmatic. Weconclude that there is no deep or interesting difference betweenaccounting for observations by measurements and accounting forobservations by theories.
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  41.  71
    The Puzzle of Attention, the Importance of Metaphors.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):331-351.
    I have two goals in this paper. First, I want to show by example that inferences about theoretical entities are relatively contingent affairs. Previously accepted conceptual metaphors in science set both the general form of new theories and our acceptance of the theories as plausible. In addition, they determine how we define the relevant parameters in investigating phenomena in the first place. These items then determine how we conceptualize things in the world. Second, and maybe more importantly, I want to (...)
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  42.  70
    Computationalism.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):303-17.
    What counts as a computation and how it relates to cognitive function are important questions for scientists interested in understanding how the mind thinks. This paper argues that pragmatic aspects of explanation ultimately determine how we answer those questions by examining what is needed to make rigorous the notion of computation used in the (cognitive) sciences. It (1) outlines the connection between the Church-Turing Thesis and computational theories of physical systems, (2) differentiates merely satisfying a computational function from true computation, (...)
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  43.  21
    The Naturalists Versus the Skeptics: The Debate Over a Scientific Understanding of Consciousness.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1993 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (1):27-50.
    There are three basic skeptical arguments against developing a scientific theory of consciousness: theory cannot capture a first person perspective; consciousness is causally inert with respect to explaining cognition; and the notion "consciousness" is too vague to be a natural kind term. Although I am sympathetic to naturalists' counter-arguments, I also believe that most of the accounts given so far of how explaining consciousness would fit into science are incorrect. In this essay, I indicate errors my colleagues on both sides (...)
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  44.  2
    Changing Perspectives of Motherhood.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1996 - Film and Philosophy 3:167-175.
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  45.  14
    Philosophy of Psychology Meets the Semantic View.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:24 - 34.
    Many philosophers of psychology fail to appreciate the constructivist process of science as well as its pragmatic aspects. A well-developed philosophy of science helps to clear many conceptual confusions. However, ridding ourselves of popular complaints only opens more sophisticated worries regarding how we generalize specific events and how we use those generalizations to build physical systems and abstract models. These questions can still be answered though by realizing that science is largely a social enterprise, and how and what we explain (...)
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  46.  52
    Partitions, Probabilistic Causal Laws, and Simpson's Paradox.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):209 - 228.
  47.  15
    Lone Wolf Terrorists and the Impotence of Moral Enhancement.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83:271-291.
    In their recent book Unfit for the Future, Persson and Savulescu make a heartfelt plea for the increasing necessity of “moral enhancement”, interventions that improve human capacities for moral behaviour.3 They argue that, with all the technological advances of the 20th and 21st centuries, the sheer scope of horror that humans can now potentially wreak on their neighbours or the world is staggering. Hence, we are morally obliged to use interventions at our disposal to prevent such atrocities. However, as we (...)
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  48.  10
    Heavy Objects and Small Children: Developmental Data Extend the Passive Frame Theory.Cheshire Hardcastle, Eliah White, Heidi Kloos & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39.
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  49. Neurobiological Models: An Unnecessary Divide--Neural Models in Psychiatry.Andrew Garnar & Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 2004 - In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  50. How We Get There From Here: Dissolution of the Binding Problem.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1996 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):251-66.
    On the one hand, we think that our conscious perceptions are tied to some stage of whatever processing stream we have. On the other hand, we think that our conscious experiences have to resemble the computational states that instantiate them. However, nothing in our alleged stream resembles our experienced perceptions. Hence, a conflict. The question is: How can we go from what we know about neurons, their connections, and firing patterns, to explaining what conscious perceptual experiences are like? No intuitive (...)
     
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